Avodah Mailing List

Volume 13 : Number 045

Thursday, July 8 2004

• Re: Yizkor
• Re: Singing the Zemer 'Bar Yocha'i in Shul
• Re: Singing the Zemer 'Bar Yocha'i in Shul
• Re: Gestation of wolf,lion,bear,leapord,elephant,and monkey
• Gestation of wolf,lion,bear,leapord,elephant,and monkey
• Re: Gestation of wolf,lion,bear,leapord,elephant,and monkey
• Extinct Animals
• Re: Extinct animals
• Re: Rov dleita kaman
• Re: Yizkor
• Re: Disputing Earlier Generations--Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai
• Re: Psak-shopping
• Re:Rov dleita kaman
• Is yenem "equally right"
• Fw: Gestation of wolf,lion,bear,leapord,elephant,and monkey
• Gestation of wolf,lion,bear,leapord,elephant,and monkey
• Divine knowledge of future righteousness
• RE: 2 Daf Yomi questions
• Rov dleita kaman
• amusement parks

In Avodah V13 #43 dated 7/4/04:
[RRW <RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com>:]
>> ... Yizkor in the first year would bederech klal
>> bring about a form of aveilus befarhesya, something that theoreicallly
>> should go away after the year is over

[R Saul Guberman <saulguberman@juno.com>:]
> I came to the totally opposite conclusion. If Yizkor is for Nedavos
> then I should make sure to say Yizkor during the first year.

I was told to say Yizkor during the first year--but not in shul.
That would obviate the possible aveilus befarhesya problem, and also
satisfy RSG's thinking.

 -Toby Katz
=============

R' Mordechai Phyllostac wrote <<< However, I think they should have
opposed it anyway, and not be so humble when it comes to defending their
holy minhogim (a minhag NOT to say something is also a minhag !). >>>

I don't want to take sides on what the people in that shul should have
done, only to comment on what RMP wrote in the above parentheses.

My recollection is that according to Rav Moshe Feinstein, a minhag not
to say something is *not* a minhag.

I was unable to find it (even with the help of listmember R' Daniel
Eidensohn's _Yad_Moshe_), but I'm pretty sure there's a teshuvah in
the Igros Moshe where he discusses a shul where the leaders of the shul
want to change certain minhagim, and he gives two examples: If they want
to move Hoshanos from Musaf (i.e., immediately after Chazaras HaShatz)
to Shacharis (i.e., immediately after Hallel), they are not allowed to
do that, as it constitutes an improper change to an existing minhag.
However, Rav Moshe writes, if they want to begin saying Shir HaMaalos
MiMaamakim between Yishtabach and Chatzi Kaddish during the Aseres Ymei
Teshuva, they *are* allowed to do this. He explain that "even though
there are good reasons why it should *not* be said" (I'm pretty sure
he used words to that effect), there's still no such thing as a minhag
*not* to say something. The most one can say (says Rav Moshe) is that
they *don't* have a minhag *to* say it, so starting such a *new* minhag
would not constitute an improper change.

Does this sound familiar? Am I remembering it correctly?

Akiva miller

On Wed, Jul 07, 2004 at 12:05:18AM -0400, Kenneth G Miller wrote:
: My recollection is that according to Rav Moshe Feinstein, a minhag not
: to say something is *not* a minhag.

I wondered about this very thing WRT the lack of Berikh Shemeih in
RSRH's siddur.

To me the question seemed as follows:
Did they never adopt or even consider the minhag to say it; or
Did they have a real argument (e.g. Sabbatean concerns) not so say it?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             It isn't what you have, or who you are, or where
micha@aishdas.org        you are,  or what you are doing,  that makes you
http://www.aishdas.org   happy or unhappy. It's what you think about.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Dale Carnegie

RYGoldstein wrote:
> The Gemara Bechoros 8: is apparently in error when it says that these
> animals have a gestation period of 3 years. From the context, it seems
> that the statement was meant literal, as opposed to allegorical.

Actually, while it seems that the gemara is factual at first, towards
the end, one gets a feeling that the gemara isn't all that factual. The
whole, rather incredible story about IIRC Rav Oshi'ah going to debate with
the wise men of Athens seems very similar to some of the Rabbah bar bar
'Hannah stories in BB 7x, which the Gaon of Vilna brilliantly explained
in purely spiritual struggle terms. I didn't study these Aggadetot in
Bekhorot in depth yet (I promised my Daf Yomi shiur that we will have
a special shiur about it), but saw that Maharsha wrote extensively on
the topic.

Now a correction, for the 'hevrah's (and hence my) benefit.

I wrote:
<<I didn't get the chance to research the following two questions, of
which I am confident I saw the answer about the first one. Never mind,
I am presenting the questions to you, dear 'hevrah:

* in the 1st chapter of Bekhorot, we learn about the possible tumas okhlin
of donkey, the question being whether it needs ma'hshavah or not (Rabbi
Shim'on vs. Rabbanan). Why does this question exist at all. After all,
donkey has tumah 'hamurah of nivlat beheimah tmeiah?

* in the second chapter, the mishnah (16ab, IIRC) discusses what one
should do if there is doubt as to which animal is a bekhor. What strikes
me is that hamotzi me'havero 'alav harayah rules, even though giving the
sheep to the kohen is a mitzvat 'aseh. Shouldn't we say that indeed, the
kohen can't require the sheep, but it is in the interest of the owner,
in the spirit of safeq deOraitah, to give both sheep?>>

Well, the second gemara is on 17ab, not 16. The first is on 9b-10a.

Could you please CC me privately, as I am soon leaving for vacation and
won't necessarily be able to read every Avodah digest soon enough.

All the best,
Arie Folger
-- 
If an important person, out of humility, does not want to rely on [the Law, as 
applicable to his case], let him behave as an ascetic. However, permission 
was not granted to record this in a book, to rule this way for the future 
generations, and to be stringent of one's own accord, unless he shall bring 
clear proofs from the Talmud [to support his argument].
	paraphrase of Rabbi Asher ben Ye'hiel, as quoted by Rabbi Yoel
	Sirkis, Ba'h, Yoreh De'ah 187:9, s.v. Umah shekatav.

From: Ohrchama@aol.com
> The Gemara Bechoros 8: is apparently in error when it says that these
> animals have a gestation period of 3 years. From the context, it seems
> that the statement was meant literal, as opposed to allegorical. I think
> that this Gemara is an example where it would be very diifficult to say
> that the science of the Gemara is always right, as some in the Yeshiva
> world including the Chazon Ish, seem to hold....

And what about fishing sitting on eggs or that dolphins can mate with
humans?

SBA

On Wed, Jul 07, 2004 at 05:13:58PM +1000, SBA wrote:
: And what about fishing sitting on eggs or that dolphins can mate with
: humans?

FWIW, I think the aramaic word "dolfin" means "mermaid".

See Rashi (d"h "benei yamah) and Tosafos (d"h "hadalfinin") sham who
have a different girsah of the Tosefta. Rashi: "There are fish in the sea
whose form is half-human and half-fish." Rashi explicitly uses the word
"siren" (in his laaz).

The Arukh also dicuses the "sironis" found in Toras Kohanim 3:9. Which
is -- by gezeiras hakasuv -- not metamei ba'ohel.

I'm sure RNL promotes a different peshat, rather than saying the pasuq
provides a gezeirah to cover an at-best hypothetical case.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                    ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (413) 403-9905      

Zev Sero wrote:
"What about the tachash, which the gemara tells us is extinct?"

Sichas Chullin and R Nosson Slifkin suggest the tachash may be the
giraffe.

Moshe
=====
Mark Schlusselberg

Zev Sero asked:
<<What about the tachash, which the gemara tells us is extinct? (It it
the gemara, or later commentaries? I don't really remember, but *someone*
says it's extinct.) It's supposed to have been a large animal with a
multicoloured hide. Fossils wouldn't tell us the colours, but do the
'literary and artistic records' give us an animal, backed up by fossil
records, that would fit the tachash? And if it could exist and go extinct,
and not appear in the records, then why not other animals?>>

First, I am not saying that it is impossible for an animal to be extinct
and unknown, just very very unlikely.

Second, it is only one opinion that describes the tachash as the colorful
animal with one horn. The Yerushalmi brings other opinions that tachash
is a type of dye, or a badger.

Third, the usual understanding of this opinion is that the tachash was
created just at that time and just for that purpose, so we wouldn't
expect to find literary or fossil records.

Fourth, even according to this opinion, Sichas Chullin suggests that
it just means that the tachash was only in Sinai at that time, but it
exists elsewhere at other times. He suggests that it is the giraffe.

Kol tuv,
Nosson Slifkin
www.zootorah.com

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
> Was anyone able to find the Ran the Pischei Teshuvah refer to? The
> inyan is found in 4 places in shas, which gives 8 locations to
> look in. So, I could have missed it. But it's driving me nuts.

The Ran reffered to is merely the beggining of the paragraph in the
tshuva (Knesses Yechezkiel) that he brings - not that the Ran writes on
this issue. [The ran reffered to is in Chulin 63:b, connected with the
Tos. "Vedilma" there].

Chaim G Steinmetz
cgsteinmetz@juno.com

RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com wrote:
> The main piont AISI is strictly about making nedavos in memory of beloved
> family etc. Of course this is done in their zchus, but it theorically
> should NOT induce mournful feelings. this also helps to explain no Yizkor
> for the first year etc. Yizkor in the first year would bederech klal
> bring about a form of aveilus befarhesya, something that theoreicallly
> should go away after the year is over

From: "Saul Guberman" <saulguberman@juno.com>
> I came to the totally opposite conclusion. If Yizkor is for Nedavos
> then I should make sure to say Yizkor during the first year.

IIRC the Munkatcher Rav z'l indeed says that Yizkor should be said the
first year.

SBA

On 5 Jul 2004, Zvi Lampel asked (re: the R'Micha Berger's posting,
"The Malbim explicitly says that kol haTorah kulah can be reconstructed
from TSBK and these 613 rules"), "where does he actually say this?"

Never mind, I see it's right at the beginning of his introduction.

ZL

Jon Baker wrote:
>Where does this issur on psak shopping come from?

See Avodah Zarah 7a and Tosafos sv. ha-nishal.

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

I)
R.Joel Rich wrote
>IS nb"Y saying this is Halacha moshe misinai or a takanna that is
>unchangeable, or is it a rough and ready estimator? (Nafka mina-what if
>you could prove there's a better estimator-e.g. karov)

See The Aruch haShuchan YD 110:12-13, who quotes the Plati sk 7 as to
why we don't use karov in kavua (that is, kavua makes it 50-50, so karov
should be the "tie-breaker").
The AhS's answer AIUI is like the first possibility RJR raised above;
the halacha leMoshe misinai of kavua is that we consider the case mechtza
al mechtza, and ignore karov entirely. Please see the AhS inside, sk 13.

II)
R.Micha Berger asked:
>Was anyone able to find the Ran the Pischei Teshuvah refers to?

The PT quotes the Knesset Yechezkel *dibbur hamatchil* raiti b'Ran.
The reference to the Ran is just what the paragraph starts with, not
necessarily a statement that the Ran directly addresses the question
at hand. Without seeing the Knesset Yechezkel inside, there is no
possibility of knowing what Ran he's referring to, and in any event
the Ran referred to is very likely is not relevant to our subject.
I think that RMB can stop looking for a Ran which discusses this subject
(although, of course, all the Torat HaRan he has learned while looking
so far is of tremendous value).

III)
R.M. Levin, after positing that the machloket is whether we look at the
source or the product, and explaining the "source" part of his chakira,
wrote:

>Nodeh B'Yehuda thinks that we look at the product
>and consider the rov of which store it came from. What makes up the
>rov according to him is the chance that the product came from the
>kosher store.

I regret that I do not understand this statement. Why do we disregard
the chance that this *product* came from the non-kosher meat sold (which
too is a rov)?

Furthermore, I would think that a principle which states "kol d'porush
miruba porush" surely puts the main emphasis on the *source*.

Achar mchilat kvodo, I have an objection in principle to R.M. Levin's
hesber. This objection is based on the premise that he did not see either
tshuva inside. If this premise is wrong, I abjectly apologize.

Surely having a hesber in the machloket is very desirable. But I
would also respectfully submit that giving a hesber without seeing the
achronim inside, and analyzing their presumably complex arguments as they
themselves state them, is skating on very thin ice indeed. We do this all
the time, (I certainly do) but it's a very bad practise, IMHO. Very often,
when we subsequently see the tshuva inside, we that see our hesber does
not explain what the tshuva says at all. I do not know that this is the
case here, since I myself did not see either tshuva, but I have my doubts.

IV)
Although I copied the subject "Rov dleita kaman" from the previous
postings, I am puzzled as to how it describes our subject. Surely tesha
chanuyot is the classic ruba *d'ita* kaman.

Saul Mashbaum

From: Chana Luntz <chana@KolSassoon.net> [on Areivim]
<<Similarly, the yeshiva velt of the charedi world is a wonderful
environment of pure torah. And the desire to dwell in the midbar and
learn only torah is fully understandable. However, it is wrong, because
our tafkid is to interact with the modern world>>

Analogy fails here: it was said about the dor hamidbar, until they were
told to go into Eretz Yisrael, that "lo nitna Torah elah le'ochlei haman"

Their denial of their tafkid is only wrong because Hashem told them to
go into E"Y. And the ma'apilim, who were told NOT to, were wrong to try
to go in. It eludes me how you can make the statement that "our tafkid
is to interact with the modern world" Who says so?

In fact, as Rashi explains on "kach tzintenes achas", there can be and
should be ochlei haman in every generation.

Elah, who should be ochlei haman and who not-there has to be a nesias
halev, a' la the Rambam in Shemita Veyovel. Perhaps some decision making
mechanism to help the process along.

But to make a blanket statement that "our tafkid is to interact with
the modern world" is no less wrong than to say "our tafkid is to avoid
the modern world and only sit and learn.

In the Gemara you alluded to (that I snipped), "harbeh asu keRShBY velo
alsa beyadam. But some did succeed.

[Email #2. -mi]

On Wed, 7 Jul 2004 14:47:21 +0100 Chana Luntz <Chana@kolsassoon.net>
writes:
<<So Moshe rabbanu was wrong to beg and plead and daven to Hashem to
let him go in? If you are right, why did he get so upset? He should
have been perfectly happy to stay in the midbar and eat mon.>>

By himself? Note he didn't ask to go in until the dor yotz'ei mitzrayim
were all gone and the dor ba'ei ha'aretz were about to go in.

<<However, I think the more conventional response is that while it is
unquestionably better to go in, it is also a privilege to be allowed to
go in>>

Agreed, but not necessarily because of the change from ochlei haman,
more so because of the advantages of Eretz Yisrael, only part of which
is ish tachas gafno.

<<The thinkers and philosophers of Modern Orthodoxy believe so>>

You are confusing "interacting with the modern world" with acting
like Rabbi Yishmael recommends. In order to "paskin" like RShB"Y,
one would need do nothing but learn. The vast majority of non-MO, with
the exception of the last 50 years (or less) in E"Y, does not do that.
(I consider the proportions of kollel people in E"Y to be an anomaly in
the greater scheme of Jewish history.); they act like Rabbi Yishmael.

They work. They are carpenters, plumbers and college professors.
Insurance salesmen, physicians, retail merchants and lawyers. Etc.
"Paskining" like Rabbi Yishmael requires one to earn a living and not
to depend on "melachtan na'asis al yedei acherim". Clearly this does
not depend on what one does as much as on the fact of doing something,
and the fellow who works as a clerk in the post office is as much an
adherent of Rabbi Yishmael as the PhD research scientist. And the
microscope is no more holy in this regard than the pencil behind the
ear or the amas habinyan.

(NB: In fact, according the to the Nefesh Hachayim, it is better to
follow a non- intellectual pursuit in quest of parnasa, as that would
permit "hanheg bahem minhag derech eretz as the Nefesh Hachayim interprets
it; ayen sham.)

It is a TIDE philosophy to ascribe particular significance to the pursuit
of chochmah bagoyim, but it is simply wrong to say that anyone who does
not subscribe to this philosophy is an adherent of the derech of RShB"Y.
This is simply not the case, as above.

<<Agreed - which is why poskening like Rashbi (which is what you are
doing) >>

No it is not, as above. Simply paskening like a non-MO variant of
Rabbi Yishmael.

<<However it is perfectly understandable for somebody to hold, given
the language of the gemora, that while some did succeed under Rashbi's
position, the correct way to posken for the klal is as per the Rabbanan,
and that poskening like Rashbi is wrong, even though it is perfectly
true that some may succeed.>>

There is a position more consistent with the language of the Gemara.
While I know that I heard it (pachos o yoser) from Rav Bulman z"l, I seem
to recall that he said it as his understanding of the Nefesh Hachayim,
but I may be wrong on that score.

That is, that aderaba, the pesak for the kelal is exactly the way the
Gemara formulates it: some of the kelal should follow RShB"Y; despite
the fact that it is not to be a general rule for all/most people, it is a
derech that needs to be followed by the mi'ut. Read here the last Rambam
in Shemita veyovel that I previously quoted; even MO's need benei Levi.

For any one member of the kelal (as opposed to the kelal as a whole)
the preferred derech is Rabbi Yishmael. But if everyone followed that,
the Gemara's kashya of "Toraso masai na'asis" would be a serious problem.

Perhaps Rn Toby was paying attention during Nefesh Hachayim class?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

> From: Ohrchama@aol.com
> The Gemara Bechoros 8: is apparently in error when it says that these
> animals have a gestation period of 3 years.> <<<

From: "SBA" <sba@iprimus.com.au>
> And what about fishing sitting on eggs or that dolphins can mate with
> humans?

Correction: That should be 'fish' - and it is Rashi that mentions it

BTW the Gemoro there also talks about the mating methods of camels upon
which the the Ben Yehoyodo writes that 'there are many camels in Baghdad
and the gemoro's depiction is 'incorrect'.

He suggests 'nishtaneh hateveh' - which is probably what we must say
about the other matters desribed there as well.

SBA

[R Yaakov Goldstein:]
> "The Gemara Bechoros 8: is apparently in error when it says that these
> animals have a gestation period of 3 years. From the context, it seems
> that the statement was meant literal, as opposed to allegorical. I think
> that this Gemara is an example where it would be very diifficult to say
> that the science of the Gemara is always right, .............

The (London) "Times" newspaper had an interesting response from a
herpetoligist not long ago. This was in response to a reader's query
about a pet snake. It may well have relevance to the above Gemara's
discussion of the gestation period of a snake.

The expert pointed out that snake have been known to lay eggs several
years after coitus. The female can, he said, store semen for years before
it is activated!

As readers will now the maximum life of human semen according to the
Talmud is 72 hours.

I would be interested in Rabbi Slifkin's comments on this point. Is there,
I wonder, some connection to the Pesukim in Breshis on the curses of
Chavah and the snake ?

E.R. Manchester

I just noticed an interesting issue in Rashi's explanation of Sotah (2a).

Rashi (Sotah 2a): The gemora asks: How could it be that a person’s
spiritual level determines whom he will marry? We know that a person’s
spouse is determined before he is born when it is not known what his
spiritual level will be when he grow up? If you want to say that obviously
everything is revealed to G-d. But we also know that everything is in
the hands of Heaven except for fear of Heaven. We see this in Nidah
(16b): The angel who is in charge of pregnancy takes the embryo before
G-d and says whether it will be strong or weak, wise or foolish, rich
or poor but not whether it will be righteous or wicked since this in not
in the control of Heaven. The gemora answers that the first marriage is
determined on the basis of mazel but concerning the second marriage it
is based on merit. It is only the second marriage which is difficult to
make as the splitting of the Sea since they are not inherently matched.

If I am reading this correctly, Rashi is asserting that not only is it
not predetermined whether a person will grow to be righteous or wicked -
but even G-d doesn't know this aspect of the person?

While there is such a viewpoint in kabbalah - is this the correct reading
of Rashi?

Ohr HaChaim (Bereishis 6:5): The Rambam is correct when he states that
the nature of G-d's knowing is incomprehensible to us... For example
G-d is able to make Himself not know something that He already knows. In
contrast it is impossible for a man to deliberately not know something
that he already knows.... This unique ability is indicated when Bileam
states (Bamidbar 23:21): G-d does not see iniquity in Yaakov... Thus
G-d is able to not know something when He wishes. He is able to do this
since His knowledge is not external to Himself as it is with man but
G-d and His knowledge are identical... It would seem that at the time
G-d created man He excluded from His awareness all the transgressions
man would ever commit. There are two reasons why G-d nullifies His
knowledge of sinning. 1) G-d is inherently good and doesn't want to
see transgression. But this reason by itself is not sufficient since
knowledge is important in order to know what to do. 2) His blockage of
knowledge of man's future sins is necessary in order to refute the claim
of the wicked that since G-d knows they will sin they have no free will
not to sin. If G-d's knowledge requires it to happen then there could be
no punishment for the wicked since they lack free will. Therefore G-d
blocks His knowledge of the future concerning sin but not concerning
the good deeds of the righteous. In fact He rejoices at the knowledge
of the good deeds of the righteous and that is the reason for creation.

Malbim(Bereishis 22:1): A different explanation is expressed by
Kabbalists. They say that foreknowledge only exists in the Ein Sof
aspect of G-d. The Ein Sof is not describable by strict justice nor
mercy or any other identifiable attributes. In contrast at the level of
Atzilus -- where the attributes of justice start as well as reward and
punishment -- there is no absolutely no foreknowledge and it is relevant
for G-d to say "Now I know". This foreknowledge which the Ein Sof has
is totally beyond all our intellectual comprehension and there is no
reference to it in the Bible. In contrast the Bible describes G-d's
attributes and activities from the perspective of Atzilus -- which is
according to the type of knowledge which is also relevant to us. So the
expression "Now I know" should be understood to be "Now I make known" --
according to the knowledge of man and not the knowledge of the Ein Sof.
Thus the test of Avraham was both for the sake of the Tester as well as
those who saw the test.

Pri Tzadik (Pesachim 17):... But in truth for G-d there is no such thing
as contradiction since He can have two contradictory facts and they are
both true. This is similar to the well known problem of G-d's knowledge
and man's free will. The Rambam (Hilchos Teshuva 5:5) explains that
the conflict is resolved because G-d's thoughts are not like those of
man. The Raavad criticizes the Rambam and says the issue should simply
be accepted on faith even though it is not understood. I explained in
Vayeishev (11) that the Rambam's view that there is not a paradox --
because G-d's mind is different -- is found in the Zohar Chadash and
the writings of the Arizal. In these sources it says: Where there is
G-d's knowledge there is no free will... The explanation is that at the
highest level nothing is concealed from G-d... However on the lower
level there is free will... Even though these two are contradictory,
but for G-d they can both be true...

Daniel Eidensohn

I'm back on-line, and it's my pleasure to restart with a posting to
Avoda, and in response to a question posed by my esteemed "cousin"
Rabbiner Arie Folger, who asked;

 in the second chapter, the mishnah (16ab, IIRC) discusses what one
should do if there is doubt as to which animal is a bekhor. What strikes
me is that hamotzi me'havero 'alav harayah rules, even though giving the
sheep to the kohen is a mitzvat 'aseh. Shouldn't we say that indeed, the
kohen can't require the sheep, but it is in the interest of the owner,
in the spirit of safeq deOraitah, to give both sheep?

I spent a few minutes researching this. It starts on daf 9a. Many
meforshim (from the Bartenura, via the Tur/Sh"a to the small print
at the back of the Gemora) touch on this. Right before the Tosefta I
found the RambaN (standing in for the Rif). He is surrounded by the
Ry"t Algazi. On pg 8 in the LH column (starting Gem' VeKivan) the Ry"t
Algazi analyses this issue in detail -- comparing it to various other
safeq deOraitah cases.

In a nutshell: Pidyan Peter Chamor has 2 distinct parts.

1. As soon as you dedicate a sheep to do the pidyon, you have done the
mitzva -- and that is when you say the brocho. As a deOraitah you have
to do this even in a case of doubt.

2. You now own a sheep that belongs to a kohen. To avoid the issur of
theft, you should give it to its rightful owner, i.e. your favourite
kohen. In the case of a safeq we don't know if you have a sheep that
belongs to a kohen, so "hamotzi me'havero 'alav harayah rules".

The Ry"t Algazi seems to say that while we usually oblige you to redo
safeq mitzvos (e.g. safeq if Shema was said), we don't do so when there's
monetary loss involved.

Hope this helps
 - Danny
   dannyschoemann@hotmail.com

> Achar mchilat kvodo, I have an objection in principle to R.M. Levin's
> hesber. This objection is based on the premise that he did not see either
> tshuva inside. If this premise is wrong, I abjectly apologize.

> Surely having a hesber in the machloket is very desirable. But I
> would also respectfully submit that giving a hesber without seeing the
> achronim inside, and analyzing their presumably complex arguments as they
> themselves state them, is skating on very thin ice indeed...

I did see it in the Pitchei Tshuva but you are right, I did not examine
the actual tshuvos that he cites at the end. You perceptively picked
that up and I agree and accept your criticism. Until I find and look
these tshuvos up, I withdraw my suggested hesber. I would add that the
hesber was not along the lines that these poskim usually pursue but more
along brisker lines.

M. Levin

This past weekend, I saw at least two frum groups at a popular amusement
park (hershey park), one of which from the looks of them were "yeshivish."

I've also been told that many of the more yeshivish camps will go on
trips to amusement parks. Since the dress of the general population at
amusement parks is, it seemed to me, no different from the dress of the
general population at the beach (particularly since the park had a water
park area, and many people just walked around the park in essentially
their bathing suits and not much else), and since such camps and groups
would obviously not go to a mixed beach at least in part because of the
way the general population would be dressed, I'm wondering why amusement
parks are deemed "kosher."

More specifically, does anyone know of contemporary poskim who either
1. specifically say that amusement parks are mutar to go to,
2. specifically say that amusement parks are assur to go to, or
3. distinguish between amusement parks with water areas and amusement
parks without ones in deciding whether they are muttar or assur.

Also, if there are poskim who do say that amusement parks are assur,
what other forms of recreation do they say are assur because of
the pritzus around (ie. cruises, paddle-boating, miniature golf, and
jogging in central park all would almost certainly involve being around
scantily-clad people).

~Sammy P. Groner

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