Avodah Mailing List

Volume 27: Number 11

Thu, 07 Jan 2010

• 1. John Locke and Tzedaqa (Michael Makovi)
• 2. Re: electricity on Shabbat (david guttmann)
• 3. Re: Why are beards considered so choshuv? (rabbirichwolpoe@gmail.com)
• 4. Re: Rov Jews in EY? (rabbirichwol...@gmail.com)
• 5. Re: John Locke and Tzedaqa (Rich, Joel)
• 6. Re: Tzedaqah Before T'filah (Rich, Joel)
• 7. Firing a Rabbi (Richard Wolberg)
• 8. Re: Firing a Rabbi (Michael Makovi)
• 9. Re: The Scope of the "7 Mitzvos d'Rabbanan" (Arie Folger)
• 10. Re: What are the Bracha Rishona and Bracha Acharona on a Granola Bar? (Ben Waxman)
• 11. Re: how to reconcile (Micha Berger)
• 12. Re: John Locke and Tzedaqa (Zev Sero)
• 13. Re: John Locke and Tzedaqa (Simon Montagu)
• 14. Re: Tzedaqah Before T'filah (Zev Sero)

The following question has occurred to me, and while I doubt any prior
Jewish authorities ever thought about this issue, it still seems valid
to me. After all, a sevara is d'oraita.

If you carefully read things like John Locke, Cato's Letters, and the
other examples of democratic thought (anything that Thomas Jefferson
would have read), one constantly recurring principle is that the
government has only those powers which the people grant it. Social
contract theory would dictate that the government is only the people's
proxy. Thomas Paine's "Common Sense" opens with a brief overview of
Locke-ian theory, and Ralph Waldo Emerson's "Politics" is excellent as
well.

The issue, however, is that if the government is only the people's
proxy, then it cannot have any powers which the people themselves do
not have. All the people can do is surrender their own powers to
something more capable and powerful, to execute those powers on their
behalf.

Now, I cannot go to my neighbor's house and take his money to feed the
poor. Therefore, I cannot grant the government that power either. The
entire concept of taxation for the sake of social welfare is anathema
to the Framers of the United States Constitution.

Everyone has a right to his own "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness", and everyone has the concomitant obligation to other
others' rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness". So
the liberty and rights are very negative; everyone has the right to
sit under his own vine in content, but no one has a positive right to
anything which he can demand from others. Therefore, the government's
task is only to police society and make sure that everyone's rights
are honored by everyone else.
According to Cato's Letters,

> The two great laws of human society, from whence all the rest derive
> their course and obligation, are those of equity and self-preservation:
> By the first all men are bound alike not to hurt one another; by the
> second all men have a right alike to defend themselves.
>
> ...
>
> Government therefore can have no power, but such as men can
> give...no man can give to another what is none of his own...
>
> ...
>
> Nor has any man in the state of nature power...to take away the
> life of?another, unless to defend his own, or what is as much his
> own, namely,?his property. This power therefore, which no man has,
> no man can transfer to another.
>
> ...
>
> Nor could any man in the state of nature?have a right to violate the
> property of another...as long as he himself?was not injured by that
> industry and those enjoyments. No man therefore?could transfer to
> the magistrate that right which he had not himself.
>
> ...
>
> No man in his senses was ever so wild as to give an unlimited power to
> another to take away his life, or the means of living... But if any man
> restrained himself from any part of his pleasures, or parted with any
> portion of his acquisitions, he did it with the honest purpose of?enjoying
> the rest with greater security, and always in subservience to his own
> happiness, which no man will or can willingly and intentionally give
> away to any other whatsoever.

?As I said, all this is utterly opposed to the concept of welfare,
taxation, etc. A good explanation of this fact is found in "The Rise
of Government and the Decline of Morality" by James A. Dorn,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/catosletters/cl-12.pdf.

And as I said, I'm sure that everything I've said so far is utterly
foreign to the Tanakh, Gemara, Rambam, etc. If I started speaking
about social contract theory to them, and my right to revolt against
the government when I am not pleased with it, they'd think I'm crazy.
Nevertheless, the Tanakh tells us that the PEOPLE choose a king. I
feel quite confident that the basic roots of democracy are in the
Tanakh, and indeed, it is from the Tanakh that John Locke derived his
ideas.?And as I said, a sevara is d'oraita. Everything I've said so
far, sounds perfectly logical on paper.

So my question is: given that we know that historically, the Jewish
communities would assess tzedaqa like a tax, how could they do this?
Granted that everyone has an obligation to give tzedaqa, but who gave
the kehilla the right to assess tzedaqa? Who made the kehilla boss?

Now, then, one might argue that the people made the kehilla the boss.
But even according to this, any one individual could still withdraw
his democratic consent to be governed under the social contract, and
thus deny the kehilla the right to assess taxes from him personally.

So here's what I'm thinking: in a small, self-contained community,
where everything is intertwined and mutually-related, living in the
community and eating kosher food and using the miqvah are all parts of
living there, and so is paying taxes to finance tzedaqa. If one
doesn't want to pay tzedaqa, then fine, leave the community and live
with the Christians or Muslims. At the very least, stop eating the
community's kosher food, using its miqvah, etc.

But my justification for religious coercion falls apart in a larger
nation, with a capitalistic economy. In that case, one is more likely
to belong to a synagogue, pay dues to the mikvah, buy kosher food at a
purely capitalistic market with no communal backing, etc. Everything
is delocalized. Thus, it becomes far more difficult to assess tzedaqa
as a tax. For how Judaism and democracy interact in a modern society
and nation, we'd have to study both the halakhah and John Locke much
more deeply, and study the words of Rabbis Haim Hirschensohn, Benzion
Uziel, Yitzhak Herzog, and anyone else who's written on the subject.
Tzarikh `iyun gadol me'od.

In other words: in a small self-contained community, a greater amount
of coercion is justifiable, because the community has more reality
than a larger community, especially a nation. As the community grows
larger, especially as it becomes an entire nation, it grows more and
more abstract and disconnected from the people. At the same time, it
becomes harder and harder to escape. To enforce religious practice in
a small Jewish community is tolerable, because one could conceivably
move away from the community to somewhere else. Additionally, he is an
intimate part of the community and its services. The community is both
concrete and immanent. But a nation is abstract and transcendant; it
is neither immanent in his personal life, nor can he easily escape it
if he is displeased with it.

Of course, nowadays, Israeli politics is even further from democracy
than it is from the Torah. Israelis care about John Locke even less
than they care about kashrut and Shabbat. In Israel, we're still
struggling to ensure that the government is democratically-elected, as
most of the power is in the hands of the judiciary, which is not
elected and has no constitution to limit its powers. So the question
of how to reconcile mandatory tzedaqa with John Locke is the least of
our problems.

Interestingly, however, I just saw that Moshe Feiglin advocates the
revitalization of localized communities in Israel, precisely because
he believes it will lead to a resurgence of Jewishness and Judaism in
Israel. In his article "Judaism and Democracy for Israel"
(http://www.jewishisrael.org/eng_contents/articles/article7020.html),
he writes:
> Israel's Jewish constitution must institute district elections, as is
> common practice in the vast majority of democracies in the world.
> In that way, Israel's communities will be revived. (They were all
> united into one large socialist collective when the state was born).
> Every community will decide on its Jewish public character. There
> is no doubt that the absolute majority of communities will choose to
> preserve their Jewish identity. Even the residents of predominantly
> secular Ramat Aviv preferred closing their local mall on Shabbat ?
> once they were finally asked.

So perhaps indeed, localizing and de-nationalizing matters is the
correct thing to do, both from a pragmatic standpoint (i.e. it will
encourage people to themselves choose to be more Jewish) and from a
philosophic standpoint (i.e. John Locke).

But today's community's are something else, to study later. Right now,
I just want to reconcile Medieval Jewish practice with John Locke.
Anachronistic, yes, but it's a still a concern to me.

Does anything I've said make sense?

Michael Makovi

RMB wrote:

It's not fire? Metal is disappearing off the contact, there is glowing
air... It's a momentary flame, really.

The issur is Lo Teva'aru Esh, there are therefore two components Biur and
Esh. Making fire alone is not an issur, it is fire that has Bi'ur, some kind
of longer term result (similar to veshilach et Be'iro Ubi'er besadeh acher).
See Rambam Hilchot Shabbat 12:1 the issur is only if one makes fire on
something - hamadlik et haner o et ha'etzim.... 



David Guttmann
 
If you agree that Believing is Knowing, join me in the search for Knowledge
at http://yediah.blogspot.com/ 
 
Ve'izen vechiker (Kohelet 12:9) subscribe to Hakirah at www.hakirah.org 

RTK
> Obviously in Litvishe circles where all the bachurim go beardless,
> they are not concerned that being beardless is "effeminate." But even
> in those circles, men are strongly encouraged to grow their beards after
> marriage, when they need to appear more adult and less juvenile.

A few minor quibbles
And some "factoids"

Litvisher bachurim traditionally had long sideburns [think of some civil
war pictures].

AIUI, the hakpadah of "lo silbash" may be avoided by having ANY masculine
facial hair
EG mustache, long sideburns, goatees, etc.

Thus many litvisher and yekkisher rabbonim had limited facial hair,
but were NOT quite clean shaven either -- the way eino-yehudim are.

For a litivisher bachur to grow a full beard was conisdered "yuhara".
And RHS only grew his beard in the wake of the passing of his rebbe RYDS.
[I am admittedly presuming cause and effect here]

And AIUI the Arizal was machhmir not to cut ANY facial hair at
all. [Except perhaps to trim the mustache as needed]

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

RAF:
> 'Hatam Sofer takes to mean that there was a special Sanhedrin
> conference to take away teh Kuttim's Jewishness.

See Igros Moshe Orach Hayyim vol. 2 #100 on his use of nimnu v'gamru WRT
overturingg the g'zeira in the mishnah in Beitza prohibiting clapping
slapping and "stomping" on YT and Shabbos

If someone is kind enough they can send the original text of a CD to
Micha and if he wishes he can upload it to the web.

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

So my question is: given that we know that historically, the Jewish communities would assess tzedaqa like a tax, how could they do this?
Granted that everyone has an obligation to give tzedaqa, but who gave the kehilla the right to assess tzedaqa? Who made the kehilla boss?
====================
Your premise is not necessarily accepted by all-the tzibbur (a la R'YBS) is much more than the sum of its parts.
KT
Joel Rich

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333 West 34th St.
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> Question: how come most qehilos routinely collect tzedaqah during
> hazaras hasha"tz?

Because more people are there, and they aren't busy davening.

--
Zev Sero
==============================
Or listening to chazarat hashatz???
IIRC the S"A says to give before davening, the Ari at Vayivarech (actually iirc "to set aside"), and no one that I could find says during chazarat hashatz.
Oh well- bnai neviim heim.
KT
Joel Rich

In late February 2010,  our NY Office is moving to :
333 West 34th St.
New York, NY 10001-2402
All telephone and fax numbers (and e-mail addresses) will remain the same.
THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE 
ADDRESSEE.  IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE.  Dissemination, 
distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is 
strictly prohibited.  If you received this message in error, please notify us 
immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message.  
Thank you.

> Halacha says that you cannot fire a rabbi.
> Can you please be more specific?
I was quoting R' Micha who emailed me and stated that specifically it is a halacha.
I was not aware of any such halacha, so perhaps R' Micha could be more specific.
Frankly, if it is a halacha, I would consider it a chok.

> There is a very important distinction which needs to be made.
> Firing a rabbi implies terminating a contract prior to its conclusion.
> Agreed.  What if the rabbi is incompetent or is in some other way affecting
the way the shul/community is run negatively.
I'm not the one to ask that question, as I did not know it was a halacha to begin with.
Common sense tells me one thing, but since the halacha does not make
sense to me in the context of the culture and times in which we live, I cannot 
give you an answer. I can tell you though, that I am the Chairman of the Ethics
Committee of the Cantors Assembly and there have been some cases of incompetence
and worse, where the hazzan was either fired or did not have his contract renewed.
> 
Who says that we can make a contract with a Rabbi? Doesn't that defeat the
purpose of the Rabbi if he is constantly worried about how different
congregants(sp?) are going to view his positions?  Where is the original
source of the modern professional rabbinate?  ie- Why
It appears that you are not facing the reality of the 21st century. There is no halacha
that says we cannot make a contract with a rabbi, cantor, educational director, etc.
In today's world most religious leaders have contracts, at least in the beginning. And
the very purpose of the contract is to protect both parties. If a rabbi or other leader is competent
then it is less likely he has to worry about renewal. However, if the rabbi is "incompetent", which
is the very word you used above for your argument regarding halacha, then the contract becomes
very useful, so that the baal habatim are not cornered in to have to keep the rabbi for the rest of his
life. 
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In historical Jewish communities, it was very common for the rabbis to
be not hired. The whole purpose of the contract having a time-limit
was so one could "fire" him when his term expired. If it were
forbidden to not rehire the rabbi / renew his contract, then why put a
time-limit on the contract in the first place? The very institution of
a time-limit implies the right to not renew the contract.

But also, if the rabbi violates his contract, I believe (AFAIK) he can
be fired right then. The whole purpose of a contract is to ensure
accountability. Of course, the contract is also very specific. If the
contract says the rabbi must know Gemara and rule on halakhah, then
the community cannot fire him just because his rulings are too strict.
But if, say, he makes a transparently and demonstrably wrong ruling,
then he has violated his contract (assuming such terms in that
contract), and the community may fire him.

Rabbi Hirsch's entire essay "Jewish Communal Life" is in fact devoted
to the concept that the laity must learn Torah in order that they
oversee their rabbi and make sure he neither makes wrong rulings nor
usurps his power. The rabbi must be accountable to the people and to
the Torah, he says, and therefore, he says, the laity has an
obligation to learn Torah themselves and to carefully watch whether
the rabbi keeps true to his contract.

Now, I'm sure that all the laws of contracts and such make this much
more complex. I'm sure firing the rabbi involves a trial before a beit
din to ensure he really did violate the contract, etc. But what I've
said above is all correct AFAIK in terms of basic gist.

Michael Makovi

R'nTK wrote, about the origins of birkat ner Shabbat:
> But that would imply that a woman somewhere composed the bracha on her own
> initiative and told other women to say it.  Highly unlikely.

Interestingly, that is exactly what the IIRC KolBo and Avudraham say
about the origin of Seh'assani Kirtzono. If it is highly unlikely, one
should add, "but it has been done."
-- 
Arie Folger,
Latest blog posts on http://ariefolger.wordpress.com/
* Was die j?dische Frommigkeit animieren soll
* Equal Justice for All - even in Israel?
* The Warmongering Laboring Amazons
* But is it Still Pork?
* Glaubensweitergabe ? Ein Videovortrag

And what is the bracha for the person who does eat 2 or more bars in less than 2 minutes?

Ben
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Yitzchok Levine 
  The OU's conclusion is that if a person consumed 2 granola bars in less
  than 2 minutes, he has no choice but to recite a Borei Nefashos. 
  Ideally, however, one should either plan to eat less than 1? Nature
  Valley granola bars every 2-5 minutes and recite a Borei Nefashos
  (avoiding the possibility of reciting an "Al Ha'Adama VeAl Pri Ha'Adama,"
  as an insufficient shiur of toasted whole grains has been eaten within
  the required Bracha Achrona timespan), or to only eat the granola bars
  after having washed on a meal containing bread.



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On Thu, Dec 31, 2009 at 11:33:23PM +0000, rabbirichwol...@gmail.com wrote:
:> Mah beinaihu? 
:> Isn't the point of every Divine punishment to teach a lesson?? 

: 1 Blame 
: 2 Guilt 

AIUI, you are drawing a distinction I would describe as that between
regular yisurin and yisurin shel ahavah. One is a lesson because a person
proved that they need one; IOW yisurin are punishment in the same sense
that the US "Rehabilitation Center" is really a prison.

Yisurin shel ahavah, OTOH, are what someone is told to assume their
problem is after yepashpeish bemaasav and exploring their bitul Torah
ruled out sins of commission and ommission. IOW, Hashem meting out a hard
lesson in order to someone who is capable of thereby becoming closer to
Him (thus: ahavah).

: 3 does it apply to others 
....
: So it matters if Yosef's ordeal is for g'dolei baalei emunah or for stam
: vanilla menschen. I say Yosef was on the madreiga that Huzqaq to wait

There, I'm not as sure. Something could be an error and require
an onesh, but only because the person was capable of doing better.
Different demands are made of different people. Punishment doesn't
correlate to it necessarily applying to others.

Skipping back to a different point in the material just ellided:
: As I explain it Yosef is blameless, but he inadvertantly set himself
: up. G'zeira shema he might take out the wrong lesson

This really relied on the diyuq halashon you consequently posted.
"Huzqaq" /zqq/ is a language of sechar va'onesh (see Rashi on Bereishis
12:2 "ve'esekha legoy gadol" where the term is used to introduce 3
berakhos provided midah keneged midah) but as you point out, one could
require a response from HQBH for reasons other than SvO. So there is no
reason to insist that's the meaning here.

R Avraham b haRambam writes on our pasuq: Ve'efshar shelo yihyeh alav
genus bazeh... underscoring that hishtadlus doesn't imply a lack of
bitachon.


On Sat, Jan 02, 2010 at 06:33:15PM +0200, Ben Waxman wrote:
: When I read that QL I had a bit of a problem with it. When is trying the 
: same as relying? How far does the QL go when he says "he should desist from 
: any physical reaction and rather he should simply trust and have faith in 
: Hashem, and surely it will be transformed into something good and 
: positive."? ...

RRW might save the medrash quoted by Rashi from the same question, but
usually that's the context in which this is asked. Other than real-life
situations.

This is why REED sets up his formula that one should only put in
hishtadlus in proportion to his lack of bitachon. Presumably putting in
less won't lead to success, and putting in more will reduce the bitachon.
(If so, it's leshitaso with his whole concept of moving the bechitah
point. You can't move the battlefront 20 miles in an hour; there are some
choices for which bechirah doesn't come into play; there are situations
where the bitachon simply can't suffice.)

Notice this relied on a Chassidishe or Novhardoker notion of bitachon,
that is both PREscriptive and defines the good outcome as one that you
want. Meaning: If you believe enough, you get what you want. The CI's
Emunah uBitachon is all about rejecting that definition in favor of
a DEscriptive bitachon -- the belief that nothing is miqreh and thus
everything has His Purpose. Not necessarily will it be what I want,
even in the long run. Nor is it that my believe is related to the outcome.

The CI's bitachon too is hard to reconcile with those rishonim (eg the
Rambam) who hold that hashgachah peratis is earned, and thus there are
events that even touch a person's life that are subject to teva and
aren't the product of hashgachah.

Something else we should note about all this... At the end of everying,
Yosef's yeshu'ah *is* through the sar hamashkim's intervention after
all.

This might reinforce my off-the-cuff suggestion that the problem wasn't as
much the hishtadlus in general, but in it taking the form of relying on
another person. As the medrash puts it "talah bo Yosed bitachono". Once
yi'ush set in, the hishtadlus worked. Still pretty "creative" rather
than well-founded, though.

And although this answer works for the medrash in Rashi and the Yalqut
Shim'oni, it doesn't work for the QL who lauds Yosef's passivity the
subsequent 2 years, rather than addressing the impassivity of the
discussion with the sar hamashqim.

: What does the QL mean for us to do?

Assuming something like REED's formula, I think it means for us to get
to the point where we don't need hishtadlus. Thus, we aren't to act like
Yosef AND there is a lesson to be learned from his story.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Good decisions come from experience;
mi...@aishdas.org        Experience comes from bad decisions.
http://www.aishdas.org          - Djoha, from a Sepharadi fable
Fax: (270) 514-1507

Mazel tov.  You've just discovered libertarianism.

As for your question: how, if this theory is true, the gemara can say
"me'asin al hatzedakah", that one can be forced to give tzedakah, and
if someone is assessed for tzedakah and doesn't give it his property
can be confiscated and sold at auction to pay it, the answer is simple:
the beis din can make a Jew give tzedakah under exactly the same power
with which it can make him wear tefillin.

Locke's logic makes perfect sense when dealing with obligations bein
adam lachavero.  In a state of nature a person is owed nothing by others
but that they keep their hands off him and his property.  Thus, the only
time he is entitled to use force against them is if they have initiated
force or fraud against him.  If he sees someone initiating force or fraud
against a helpless third person, he may act as the victim's agent and
come to his defense, since it's reasonable to assume the victim would
consent.  But so long as the other person's behaviour does not create a
right of self-defense in any person, there is nobody who has the right
to use force to stop him, and thus nobody who can delegate such a right
to others or to the government.  The person himself has surely not given
anyone such a right!

But our obligations to HKBH aren't like that.  We don't come to Him in
a "state of nature".  He made us, not as parents make their children,
and not even as a silversmith makes a cup, but out of nothing; and He
has the right to give us orders and make us obey them.  And He has made
each of us responsible for our fellow Jews, and authorised us to use
force if necessary to make each other keep halacha.  That authority
rests with the beis din.  When they lawfully order him to give a get,
and he refuses, he is violating "lo tasur", and they may beat him to
make him comply.  Under the exact same power they may also make him do
any other mitzvah, such as wearing tefillin, and even mitzvot derabanan;
hence "makat mardus".  And under the same power they can make him give
the tzedakah that they have estimated a person of his financial standing
ought to give.

-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher

On Thu, Jan 7, 2010 at 5:26 AM, Rich, Joel <JR...@sibson.com> wrote:

>
>
> So my question is: given that we know that historically, the Jewish
> communities would assess tzedaqa like a tax, how could they do this?
> Granted that everyone has an obligation to give tzedaqa, but who gave the
> kehilla the right to assess tzedaqa? Who made the kehilla boss?
> ====================
> Your premise is not necessarily accepted by all-the tzibbur (a la R'YBS) is
> much more than the sum of its parts.
>
>
This is true even of a minimal tzibbur of 10, who have the right to compel
one another not to leave town on Yamim Nora'im, or to pay for a replacement.
(end of OH 55).

The Rema's lashon "kofin ze et ze" is interesting: I think it implies
exactly the opposite of your premise -- none of the tzibbur has this right
as individuals, and even nine do not have the right to compel the tenth; but
ten have the right to compel one another.
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Rich, Joel wrote:

>>> Question: how come most qehilos routinely collect tzedaqah during
>>> hazaras hasha"tz?
 
>> Because more people are there, and they aren't busy davening.
>> Or listening to chazarat hashatz???

> IIRC the S"A says to give before davening, the Ari at Vayivarech
> (actually iirc "to set aside"), and no one that I could find says
> during chazarat hashatz.

This is all true.  From the giver's POV, the best time to give is before
davening, which psukei dezimra is.  That's when you get the best mitzvah.
But from the collector's POV, the best time to *collect* is when the late-
comers have already arrived, and people are not too busy to deal with you.
Since the time of collection is determined by the collectors and not by
the givers, it's not surprising that they collect at the time that gives
them the best results.  If their purpose was to be mezakeh you with a
mitzvah, rather than to collect for tzedakah, then they would go around
earlier.

-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher


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