Avodah Mailing List

Volume 02 : Number 041

Wednesday, November 4 1998

• Re: Chok vs. Mishpat
• Ramban on Avraham and Sarah
• rofeh international
• Re: Nimrod/ Hamurabi
• Re: A simple question
• Re: Chok vs. Mishpat
• Re: Avodah V2 #40 Minhag Hamokom vs. Pluralism
• Re: Avodah V2 #40
• Tekhelet, Ravaad as default
• RE: Avodah V2 #40 - violating halacha
• Re: Chok vs. Mishpat
• Re: Chok vs. Mishpat
• Re: Chok vs. Mishpat
• Re: Avodah V2 #40 Minhag Hamokom vs. Pluralism
• Re: Nimrod/ Hamurabi
• Re: Chok vs. Mishpat

I find this perspective curious. All the questions you asked about Lo
Sirtzach are reasonable ones, and rational ones, and the process by which
they are answered in Halacha is a reasonable and rational one, very
accessible to mortal minds.

I highly doubt that your Moreh Derech, RSR Hirsch, would aree with RYBS on
this point. I think he would, probably, vehemently disagree (I am not
asking you to be consistent as I would never ask of others that which I
would not do myself :-) but am merely pointing out the difficulty I have
with RYBS's position). I think this is part of the attitude attributed to
R' Chaim himself, who is alleged to have said: "I ask what (vos); R'
Shimon Shkop asks why (fahr vos), and that is kefira."

On Tue, 3 Nov 1998, Micha Berger wrote:

> Rav YB Soloveitchik taught (more than once) that every mitzvah has
> elements of chok. 
> 
> Take for example: Lo sirtach. What could be more obvious? But does it
> include euthanasia? What about abortion? Or, can you turn over one
> hostage to be killed to save the rest? When is killing justified? What
> about war? Does it make a difference what the war is for?  What about
> capital punishment? By civil courts? And so on.... 
> 
> The limits of a mitzvah as obvious as the prohibition against murder are
> details that can't be understood by man. To make a line, to say that a
> fetus is or isn't a human being, or a brain-dead person with a pulse is
> or isn't alive, in some objective way, is well into chok territory. 
> 

YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

In parashat Lech Lecha, the Ramban is critical of Avraham's conduct in
going down to Egypt and making misleading (though legally accurate)
statements about the nature of his relationship to Sarah.  He is also
critical of Sarah's treatment of Hagar and Avraham's toleration of her
conduct.  Are the Ramban's criticisms based strictly on his own judgment
or are there any earlier Rabbinic criticisms of Avraham and Sarah in this
regard?

On a similar note, I would observe that in this week's parasha the
Ramban offers no criticism of Avraham's behavior in sending out (at
Sarah's insistence) Ishmael and Hagar from his house.  Now, I concede
that it would be difficult to be too critical of Avraham on this point since
his initial reluctance to accede to Sarah's demand is not overcome before
the RSHO explicitly instructs him to follow Sarah's directive.  However, I
don't believe that that lets Avraham off the hook.  According to the
Scripture (and further emphasized by Chazal), Avraham was an
extremely wealthy individual.  Does it not strike anyone as more than a bit
strange that Avraham could not have sent his concubine and first-born
son out into the desert on foot with nothing more than a sack of bread
and a jug of water?  It is true that the commentaries say that he gave
them enough bread and water to last them until they got to Be'er Sheva. 
Some commentaries try to further mitigate Avraham's conduct by
suggesting that Hagar brought her plight on herself by backsliding into
idolatry after going out into the desert -- an interesting theory, in itself,
concerning a princess who according to the midrash left the court of her
father, Pharoh, to become the maidservant of Sarah because of her
recognition of the greatness of Avraham and Sarah which presumably
had something to do with her own recognition of the RSHO.  But even if
we accept that theory, how is Avraham's culpability mitigated?  To send
a mother and child into the desert would appear to me to be placing them
in some degree of jeopardy.  Why would not Avraham have taken the
reasonable precaution of providing them with an escort? -- forget about
the abject humiliation of the scene in which mother and son are cast 
empty-handed into the wilderness.

The Hagar story is followed almost immediately by the Akeida, but the
Scripture interrupts with the contemporaneous (ba-eit ha-hi) story of
how Avimelech seeks a reconciliation with Avraham and Avraham
rebukes Avimelech for the misdemeanors of his servants who stole his
wells.  The account of the akeida then begins with the words va-yihi
ahar ha-d'varim ha-eleh vha-elokim nisa et Avraham which seems to
suggest a connection tieing together the Hagar story, the Avimelech
reconciliation and the akeida.  Rashi comments on this noting two
opinions -- one that there was heavenly criticism of Avraham who made
a lavish meal for Avimelech but only offered a single sheep as a
sacrifice to the RSHO, the other that Ishmael had boasted that he had
willingly undergone circumcision at the age of 13 whereas Yitzchak's
circumcision was performed on him without consent at the age of 8
days.  Thus, each explanation seeks to find something in the previous
two stories that motivated the test of Avraham, in one it is Avraham's
stinginess in offering sacrifices to G-d compared to his lavishness in
entertaining Avimelech, in the other it is to provide Yitzchak with an
opportunity to outdo Ishmael in his mesirut nefesh.

Neither suggestion strikes me as persuasive.  I would suggest a different
explanation.  The contrast is between Avraham's lavish embrace of
Avimelech (coupled with complaints to Avimelech about misappropriation
of his property by Avimelech's servants) and his miserly and insensitive
way in which he casts Hagar and Ishmael out of his home.  Even if it
was the will of the Almighty that they no longer reside in Avraham's
house, the Scripture does not say that it was the will of the Almighty that
they be cast out alone and empty-handed into the wilderness.  Perhaps
Avraham was relying on G-d's promise that Ishmael would also become
a great nation, but how could that promise absolve Avraham of his own
responsibility as a father?  So it seems to me that the akeida is not just a
test, but a kind of retribution exacted by the RSHO from Avraham for his
mistreatment of Ishmael when he expelled Ishmael from his house.  I
haven't yet looked carefully at the p'sukim in the Hagar story and the
akeida story, but from memory there appear to be a number of parallels
and contrasts.  Both include vayashkem Avraham ba-boker.  Both
Yitzchak and Ishmael are at the point of death when a heavenly voice
intercedes to prevent their demise. Avraham relies on G-d's promise that
Ishmael will become a great nation, Avraham is told to sacrifice Yitzchak
notwithstanding G-d's promise that Yitzchak will be his sole offspring.  

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

 Can any of you help? someone asked me for the number of Rofeh International
to ask their advice.  Please email me their number.   thanx

     A few years ago I heard from Rav Yakov Weinberg that Kidolomer in
ancient syrian (I may have the language wrong) spells out Hamurabi.  I have
no idea how he knew this, but chazal say Kidolomer was Nimrod....

-Moshe

     In one other note, I'd like to know if anyone has  heard the theory
(or
has proof or disproof) that Hamurabbi was NImrod

ELiE GiNSPARG

In a message dated 98-11-03 06:00:26 EST, you write:

<< 
 >	I think you're making things unnecessarily complicated for Mr. 
 >Nelson. Most people that I know just celebrate their Bar Mitzvah on a 
 >Saturday soon after their 13th birthday, rather than on their actual
 birthday. 
 	This does not change the day he is required to perform all mitzvos.  I
 think the importance of a bar mitzvah transcends the party part, as I
 would hope you would agree.
 
 Gershon
 
 _ >>
I think also that bo bayom automatically makes it a seudat mitzvah.

Kol Tuv
Joel Rich

In a message dated 11/3/98 9:38:52 AM EST, micha@aishdas.org writes:

> Similarly, the ma'akeh. If we were to treat it as pure mishpat, it would be
a
>  chovas cheftzah, not gavrah. 

Plz elaborate, since the Cheftza is a passive one, it doesn't go anywhere, it
is out of the way of everyone how can one be Mchayeiv it.  The Chiuv WRT a
Boyr is only if it is owned by a Gavroh, should the Gavroh be Mafkir his
previously owned pit he is pottur, would you consider Boyr a Chok?

Kol Tuv
Yitzchok

     re: R YGB's reply:
     >>
     >      4) If so does moving to Holland allow one to wait only 1 hour 
     after 
     >      meat to eat dairy?
     
     Yes.<<
     
     Ok, then.  Please set up the criteria where pluralisim begins and 
     conforming to the minhog haMakom ends.
     
     (I hate to force you to use a Brisker Derech, but it seems to me the 
     best way out of a stiro here)
     
     Regards,
     Rich Wolpoe

     re: R. Pechman's distinction:
     >>that there's a difference between an individual who deviates and an
     organization which deviates. No reference was made to any particular
     organization or any deviation, real or imagined.<<
     
     Let me be Modeh to his point.  Nevetheless, I would also advance the 
     distcintion between violating halocho (even in a group instituional 
     setting) and out and out rejection of Halocho.  One rebbe of mine, (R. 
     Yosef Weiss) gave us Mussar to as inclusive as possible to people who 
     were only partially observant...
     
     Rich Wolpoe 
      
        

Someone had asked a while back, Why the Ptil Tekhelet Association chose
the Ravaad
for its default option?  I have gotten a response from Eliyahu Tevgar on
this matter. He is the Rav associated with "P'til Tekhelet" and makes
their final decisions.
Saul Guberman

"To all who are interested:

Why has the "Ptil Tekhelet" Association chosen the position of the
Ravaad for its default option?

There are two reasons for this, practical and halachic.

The practical reason being that the position of the Ravaad enables the
production of more tzitzit sets within a shorter amount of time,
therefore enabling more Jews to do the mitzva.  The cost of the set
according to the position of the Raavad is also cheaper than those sets
according to other positions, which also causes a spreading of the
mitzva.

The halachic reason is that the position of the Ravaad seems to be the
most suitable according to the Sources.  In reality, it is important to
note that we honor any opinion, as we are interested only in the
distribution of the tekhelet itself; but when our opinion is asked, we
can only answer from our heart.

There are two ways of deciding in P'sak - a way of formality and a way
of clarification.

In the way of formality, different rules are used - majority of opinion,
latest Posek, "Mara D'athra" (Regional authority), not to base on
commentators etc.  In this way, there can be discussions how to to
decide on our subject. Some can say that Ashkenazis have to go according
to "Chachmei Ashkenaz" - Rashi, Tosaphot, Rosh. Others can say that they
are only commentators and we must go according to the Rambam, the Posek.
We can add
and say that halacha is like the Ravaad, according to the rule -
"halacha k'divrei hamachria" (halacha like the Deciding). Rashi and
Rambam disagree on two points: 1) Is "ptil tekhelet" one string only or
not? 2) Does "ptil tekhelet" have a special function - to be the string
wound or not?  The Ravaad, on one hand, accepts the opinion of the
Rambam on the first question. On the other hand, he accepts the opinion
of Rashi on the second question. If so, he is the Deciding. (By the way
in Yad Mal'achi, in Klalei
haRambam vehaRavaad, #41, it is brought down that when there is a
disagreement between them, it should go according to the  Ravaad.) 

In the way of clarification, we check to which opinion the sources of
Chazal are more suitable.  In this framework, I cannot elaborate, and I
therefore refer anyone interested to my book, "Klil Tekhelet", where I
have examined the subject.  But, I will say here in short that the most
central source relating to our  question is from a passage in the Sifri,
who brings a disagreement between Beth Shamai and Beth Hillel on this
subject.  The passage appears twice - in Parshath Shlach and in Parshath
Ki-Thetze.
According to the version in Parshath Shlach, Beth Shamai (that for this
question the halacha is according to them) is of the opinion - three
white strings and one blue string. According to the version in Parshath
Ki-Thetze - four white strings and four blue strings. The version in
Parshath Shlach matches the position of the Ravaad. The version in
Parshath Ki-Thetze matches the position of Rashi. It can proven that the
version of Parshath Shlach is more correct (The G'ra also corrected the
version in Parshath Ki-Thetze). Both versions do not at all match the
position of the Rambam.

The position of the G'ra on the subject is complicated. In three
different places he has three different opinions - Rashi, Rambam,
Ravaad.  I refer all those interested to my article, which is soon to be
published in Yeshurun magazine, where I have tried to explain this
difficulty.

Eliyahu Tavger

> -----Original Message-----
> From: richard_wolpoe@ibi.com [mailto:richard_wolpoe@ibi.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, November 03, 1998 1:19 PM
> To: avodah@aishdas.org
> Subject: Re: Avodah V2 #40 
> 
> 
>      distcintion between violating halocho (even in a group 
> instituional 
>      setting) and out and out rejection of Halocho.  One 

What is the mitigating nature of a "mere" violation as opposed to an out and
out rejection?

> rebbe of mine, (R. 
>      Yosef Weiss) gave us Mussar to as inclusive as possible 
> to people who 
>      were only partially observant...

I understand that the inclusion should be with the ultimate goal of making
the partially observant more fully observant. Are we really meant to accept
the partially observant as they are, without any underlining goal of kiruv?

>      
>      Rich Wolpoe 
>       
>         
Avi Pechman 

What I understood RYBS to mean by elements of "chok" is the ability to accept
a mitzvah a priori, without needing to understand the mishpat. (R' YGB
apparantly took the Rav's statement to be ontological as opposed to his more
usual experiential or existential approach.)

Therefore, one can't just accept lo sirtzach because of its mishpat-ness.
Because there are elements that, while consistant, may run against your
inherent feeling of justice. (For example, letting someone who is conscious
die so as not to take organs from someone who is brain dead. Assuming we
pasken that way, of course.)

: I highly doubt that your Moreh Derech, RSR Hirsch, would aree with RYBS on
: this point. I think he would, probably, vehemently disagree (I am not
: asking you to be consistent as I would never ask of others that which I
: would not do myself :-) but am merely pointing out the difficulty I have
: with RYBS's position). I think this is part of the attitude attributed to
: R' Chaim himself, who is alleged to have said: "I ask what (vos); R'
: Shimon Shkop asks why (fahr vos), and that is kefira."

Between R' SR Hirsch and R' Shim'on Shkop, you've pretty much covered my
religious roots. <grin>

I'm not comfortable with RSRH's definition of "chok". According to Horeb, a
chok is a mitzvah that addresses man's relationship to the inanimate and/or
animal. This bucks pretty much everyone else, who assumes chukim are those
mitzvos that are inherently transrational.

Of course, Hirsch measures the value of ritual mitzvos by the lessons one
takes from them. How does one learn from something he's not intended to be
able to understand? (Other than the idea of trust in the Legislator.) So this
definition of "chok" is unsurprising -- just very much a da'as yachid.

OTOH, Hirsch assumes that ta'amei hamitzvos are theories designed to fit
experimental data. He nowhere insists that the capture the essence of G-d's
Reason for the mitzvah. Quite the contrary. He insists that one may not pasken
on the basis of ta'am, which would imply that such capture isn't even possible
in principle.

So, while RSRH denies that any mitzvah is purely transrational, I don't think
he'd insist that any mitzvah is purely rational, either.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287    Help free Yehuda Katz, held by Syria 5968 days!
micha@aishdas.org                         (11-Jun-82 - 3-Nov-98)
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.
http://www.aishdas.org -- Orthodox Judaism: Torah, Avodah, Chessed

Is this example straight from Rav YBS's mouth?  I think that I have the
same reservations that Rav YGB has.  Unless you are expanding the
meaning of chok - shaylos of euthanasia, etc don't seem to come into the
category - they are undestood within the framework of halachik
analysis.  The answers may not be apparent when reading the chumash -
but does that make it a chok?  A specific example given by Rav YBS might
elucidate this concept for us.  (Assuming that the Lo sirtzach is not
one...) 

Take care,

Joel

Micha Berger wrote:
> 
> Rav YB Soloveitchik taught (more than once) that every mitzvah has elements of
> chok.
> 
> Take for example: Lo sirtach. What could be more obvious? But does it include
> euthanasia? etc...
-- 

Joel
Margolies                                                                           
margol@ms.com	
W-212-762-2386

Yes, between my father and myself, we can testify that R' YB Soloveitchik
zt"l, gave the "lo sirtzach" example I tried to capture more than once.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287    Help free Yehuda Katz, held by Syria 5968 days!
micha@aishdas.org                         (11-Jun-82 - 3-Nov-98)
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.
http://www.aishdas.org -- Orthodox Judaism: Torah, Avodah, Chessed

On Tue, 3 Nov 1998 richard_wolpoe@ibi.com wrote: 

>      > 4) If so does moving to Holland allow one to wait only 1 hour
>      after meat to eat dairy? 
>      
>      Yes.<<
>      
>      Ok, then.  Please set up the criteria where pluralism begins and
>      conforming to the minhog haMakom ends. 
>      
>      (I hate to force you to use a Brisker Derech, but it seems to me the 
>      best way out of a stiro here)

I would like to note, speaking of Briskers, that the Brisker Rav continued
to keep Yom Tov Sheni privatelly even while living in EY. While one has
the right to change a minhag - l'kulla - upon moving to a new locale -
even immediately, certainly after 30 days - one does not have to.

But, I don't understand what the Brisker Derech has to do with this.


YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

Rashi brings a medrash which says amraphel is nimrod, is there a medrash
which i'm forgetting which says Kidolomer is nimrod
Elie Ginsparg
On Tue, 3 Nov 1998 mluchins@Zweig-Dimenna.com wrote:

>      A few years ago I heard from Rav Yakov Weinberg that Kidolomer in
> ancient syrian (I may have the language wrong) spells out Hamurabi.  I have
> no idea how he knew this, but chazal say Kidolomer was Nimrod....
> 
> -Moshe
> 
>      In one other note, I'd like to know if anyone has  heard the theory
> (or
> has proof or disproof) that Hamurabbi was NImrod
> 
> ELiE GiNSPARG
> 
> 
> 

Joel Margolies wrote:
> 
> Is this example straight from Rav YBS's mouth?  I think that I have the
> same reservations that Rav YGB has.  Unless you are expanding the
> meaning of chok - shaylos of euthanasia, etc don't seem to come into the
> category - they are undestood within the framework of halachik
> analysis.  The answers may not be apparent when reading the chumash -
> but does that make it a chok?  A specific example given by Rav YBS might
> elucidate this concept for us.  (Assuming that the Lo sirtzach is not
> one...)
> 
> Take care,
> 
> JoelOn page 95 in 'Mand of Faith in the Modern World" R. Besdin writes: 

"Clearly, mishpatim too must be accepted as hukim, lest they be 
rationalized away.

If we only look at mitzvot beyn odom l'chaverh as rational mishpatim 
without an element of chok, how are we diferent from any ethical 
non-believer?
steve katz

********************


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