Avodah Mailing List
Volume 02 : Number 049
Thursday, November 12 1998
Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1998 05:03:32 +0000 (GMT)
From: Michael Frankel <FRANKEL@hq.dswa.mil>
Subject: Re: Right of Chidush by Moderns, Redux
RYGB writes: < I sense that even R' Mechi, who I have always read as
cool,detached and
bemused in his e-writings, is getting somewhat hot under the collar.>
hmm. you're probably right about that one. chotosi -don't know what got into
me. Probably had my supper meat a little too raw that evening. (or possibly I
was overcompensating for being privately twitted by the dor shivie during an
earlier unrelated thread -shiminiless succos-about uncharacteristically
submitting too wimpy a reposte).
Anyway -lo'inyon: RYGB continues:< Sorry, then, to pursue the issue, but, pray
tell, aside from the Kli Yokor, and a Ramban that is questionable (because of
the source in Kabbala, whether the Ramban had the Zohar or not), what is the
basis for a school of thought that runs counter to almost all sources in
Chazal, Rishonim ..> and also < With all due repsect to fellow embers of our
esteemed "High Level" list, I have yet to see a source in Chazal or the
Rishonim for the "School of Thought" that champions finding flaws in the Avos
(an approach I find more disstasteful every time I address it!)>
I'm afraid you are setting up various straw men, the better to discount them,
rather than dealing with the assertions actually made. Thus your citation of
the "School of Thought" which <champions finding flaws in the Avos>. Well, gee.
I wasn't doing that and have never heard of anyone, outside of late medieval
christian polemiscists - who has done that. Championing finding flaws ".
Hardly. No one is "looking" for flaws. Honestly admitting that very
infrequently poh veshom the torah informs us of errors by the ovos or others
hardly qualifies. Or is the Kili Yoqor to be accused of such championing? or
the Ramban for that matter? BTW There is a lot less to this claimed
zoharic/qabbolistic precedent for the ramban's criticism than meets the eye,
aside from the issue of composition date. Thus the ramban cites three
instances of chait (sic) by avrohom. For leaving the land, for dissembling re
soroh's identity (both in Bireishis 12:10), the enui of hogor (16:6), a repeat
emphasis of the same chait of misrepresenting soroh in 20:12. Now it is true
that the zohar tazriah provides "precedent" for the ascription of chait to
dissemblimg about soroh, but the claimed parallel support ascribing chait for
the enui of hogor does not explicitly exist. The most the zohar says here
(second hand through Chavel, I didn't look it up) is that hogor was blameless
the first time she ran away as she had not yet started with avodoh zoroh), it
nowhere explicitly states that therefore soroh or avrohom committed any sin.
And even if you want to grant that such judgement is implicit in the zohar (and
why should we want to do that?), we still have no source for the last chait of
azivas ho'oretz.
I was persusing the shelves at our local bookstore this afternoon and ran
across the Moreshes Moshe, a modern work of parshonus by Dayan Swift, a pillar
of the english chareidi community in this century (a colleague of Dayan
Abramsky, chanich of R. Segal and the Manchester Yeshivoh and also a talmid in
pre war Ponovich) and idly leafing through it when his pishat on "vatichenoh
ainov meri'os" caught my eye. He makes a diyuq on the assumption that the word
"meri'os" is unnecessary and uses it to doreish a flaw in yitzchoq's conduct
(that he should have watched behavior of his kids outside the house but failed
to do so and is being chastised by the torah). Without defending the
persuasiveness of this pishat, is dayan Swift too to be accused of championing
some fault finding school.? I also found reference yesterday to the B'chor
Shor's description of yaacov's buying of the birthright. I looked it up, and
while it doesn't specifically get up and say yaacov sinned, the picture
portrayed is not very complimentary. Did this rishon then champion fault
finding as well?
Finally, RYGBs quotation of the above radak to the effect that we should indeed
look to avrohom and soroh as role models has the same startling impact as the
next dog bites man news break. Unless RYGB is suggesting by this quote that
the other ascola of -lets call them the occasional fault finders - must be
incompatible with this ingrained jewish notion. One only needs to point out
that, ironically enough, it is the same radak who identifies soroh as our role
model who also criticizes soroh for her mistreatment of hogor.
I think a problem one (i.e. me) has with RYGB' shitoh is that he is constantly
coming up with new rules and distinctions she'loa shiarum avoseichem. Thus we
have the rule that rishonim couldn't come up with a chumosh pishat identifying
an error in the ovos that chazal hadn't done first. Then there's the
distinction between faults of ovos and others in tanach ( I note that when a
real chazal took the non criticism tack - R. Shimuel B. Nachmani in Shabbos
55-56- he didn't have distinctions between people - nobody was choteh), then
there's the claim that acharonim couldn't dispute the pishatim of rishonim.
I've probably missed a few but the superstructure is getting a bit unwieldly.
Imho not one of these is supported or supportable.
Finally, not that I'm sensitive about it - unless this is part of some more
subtle Chicago message which us plain pishat reading kind of guys don't get -
that's mechy with a y, not i.
Mechy Frankel frankel@hq.dswa.mil
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Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1998 00:25:42 -0600 (CST)
From: "Shoshanah M. & Yosef G. Bechhofer" <sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>
Subject: Re: Right of Chidush by Moderns, Redux
On Thu, 12 Nov 1998, Michael Frankel wrote:
> Hardly. No one is "looking" for flaws. Honestly admitting that very
> infrequently poh veshom the torah informs us of errors by the ovos or
> others hardly qualifies. Or is the Kili Yoqor to be accused of such
If the Torah informs us of such, great! Where?
I have already noted my rejection of the Kli Yokor. I think I used the
term "out of line."
> championing? or the Ramban for that matter? BTW There is a lot less to
>
The Ramban cannot critique the Avos without source in Chazal either. The
citations of the Zohar merely indicate that the Ramban, as a Rishon, and a
Mekkubal to boot, may have had access to sources that we do not.
> I was persusing the shelves at our local bookstore this afternoon and
> ran across the Moreshes Moshe, a modern work of parshonus by Dayan
> Swift, a pillar of the english chareidi community in this century (a
> colleague of Dayan Abramsky, chanich of R. Segal and the Manchester
> Yeshivoh and also a talmid in pre war Ponovich) and idly leafing through
> it when his pishat on "vatichenoh ainov meri'os" caught my eye. He
> makes a diyuq on the assumption that the word "meri'os" is unnecessary
> and uses it to doreish a flaw in yitzchoq's conduct (that he should have
> watched behavior of his kids outside the house but failed to do so and
> is being chastised by the torah). Without defending the persuasiveness
> of this pishat, is dayan Swift too to be accused of championing some
> fault finding school.? I also found reference yesterday to the B'chor
I guess so. There are. Although for one error I would not commit him to
the "Fault-finding" School. I believer RSR Hirsch and the Malbim commit
the same error in their discussion of Yitzchok's parenting. Slip-ups
happen. No one is infallible.
> Shor's description of yaacov's buying of the birthright. I looked it up,
> and while it doesn't specifically get up and say yaacov sinned, the
> picture portrayed is not very complimentary. Did this rishon then
> champion fault finding as well?
>
Not familiar enough to comment.
> Finally, RYGBs quotation of the above radak to the effect that we should
> indeed look to avrohom and soroh as role models has the same startling
> impact as the next dog bites man news break. Unless RYGB is suggesting
1. That is not a particularly nice comment.
2. You missed my point.
The point is that the Novi says look to Avrohom and Soroh as models of
behavior. If there are countless flaws in their behavior, there is a
problem with the Novi unqualifiedly making such recommendations - next
thing you know, everyone will be "cruel," just like Avorhom and Soroh.
> I think a problem one (i.e. me) has with RYGB' shitoh is that he is
> constantly coming up with new rules and distinctions she'loa shiarum
> avoseichem. Thus we have the rule that rishonim couldn't come up with a
Again, this kind of comment is quite pejorative - unnecessarily. I do not
think, however, I need respond, as R' Shalom Carmy has done so eloquently.
> chumosh pishat identifying an error in the ovos that chazal hadn't done
> first. Then there's the distinction between faults of ovos and others
> in tanach ( I note that when a real chazal took the non criticism tack -
Is TDBE a "fake" Chazal? In any event, no where does it say "Chayav Odom
lomar Mosai Yagi'u Ma'asai l'Ma'asei <anyone else i Tanach>."
> R. Shimuel B. Nachmani in Shabbos 55-56- he didn't have distinctions
> between people - nobody was choteh), then there's the claim that
> acharonim couldn't dispute the pishatim of rishonim. I've probably
You just added one. Never claimed that. Bal Tosif!
YGB
Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila
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Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1998 15:39:36 +0200
From: Daniel Eidensohn <yadmoshe@netmedia.net.il>
Subject: Re: Right of Chidush by Moderns, Redux
Michael Frankel wrote:
> ...the Moreshes Moshe, a modern work of parshonus by Dayan Swift, a pillar
> of the english chareidi community in this century (a colleague of Dayan
> Abramsky, chanich of R. Segal and the Manchester Yeshivoh and also a talmid in
> pre war Ponovich) ... He makes a diyuq on the assumption that the word
> "meri'os" is unnecessary and uses it to doreish a flaw in yitzchoq's conduct
> (that he should have watched behavior of his kids outside the house but failed
> to do so and is being chastised by the torah).
The criticism of Yitzchok's parenting is made by Hirsch and others - it seems to be
based on Rashi which is based on the Medrashim (Bereishis 25 27) "And the youths
grew up: As long as they were children they were not distinguishable by their deeds
and *no one* paid attention to their true nature - when they reached the age of 13
one went to yeshiva and the other went to Avodah Zara". I don't think it is a major
stretch to include Yitzchok in those who did not pay attention to who they were -
and thus he is being criticized.
Daniel Eidensohn
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Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1998 17:56:47 +0200 (GMT+0200)
From: Eli Turkel <turkel@math.tau.ac.il>
Subject: [none]
subject: history, avot
Yitzchok writes
>> As to reconciling historical fact "Shaarei Terutzim Lo Ninalu",
>> many seeming Machlokes in Metzios had been answered, would you
>> suggest that if one was going to learn only one of those opinions he
>> shouldn't make a Birchas Hatorah because Sofeik Brochos Lkuloh.
>> The same answer for that answers why the approach to Divrei Chazal
>> even in Aggadah and Medroshos Chalukos has to be that Eilu Veilu DE"C.
In a technical sense one has learned for the birchat haTorah if he
said over the mishnayot in the davening.
More to the point - the Gemara in many places says "machvarta"
that a certain opinion was mistaken. If one spend ones time of
learning in a day going over that opinion I find it hard to believe
that anyone would claim that he didn't fulfill learning that day
because the gemara rejected that opinion. Similarly one fulfills
the mitzva of learning even when the historical fact turns out to be
wrong. As the gemara says just as one gets a reward for darshening each
"et" so one gets reward for retracting the derasha.
R YGB writes
>> I would like to note, that according to the Radak, I can add one source
>> FROM TANACH ITSELF! Yeshaya says (51:2): "Look to Avrohom your forefather
>> and to Soroh who bore you..." The Radak there says we are to emulate the
>> Avos. A nice source for that "obscure Chazal" (double sic) in TDBER.
I don't understand this proof. Everyone on the list believes that the
Avot were great people and should be emulated. Whether they sinned in
some particular action does not change their great status. The fact
that the Gemara does not list them among the people that never sinned
implies that all had some sin in their life.
Does anyone claim that the 4 people who never sinned were the 4 greatest
people in history greater than the Avot and Moshe Rabbenu? Those
these four receive their reward in the world to come there is no
verse that we should emulate these four people. We emulate the Avot
because of their total greatness. Whether Abraham was "right" in
sending away Yishmael does not affect this.
Daniel Eidensohn writes
>> Rav Hutner is discussing the arguments of Chazal concerning halacha
>> which are based on metzius. . He states that Emes is that which is
>> G-d's will. The opposing *halachic* positions - even though only one
>> is accurate in describing Metzius - are all considered Emes.
Rav Hutner reiterates this idea in his volume on Chanukah.
He states that all though only mishkan existed neverthless the
various halakhic opinions based on opposing pictures of the mishkan
are all valid.
However, I see have trouble understanding this. It almost sounds like
the concept of alternative universes that some physicists expound -
that I also have difficulty following
Reiteating what others have said I don't see how arguments about
history can fall under Elu v'Elu. Either Ketura and Hagar were the
same person or not, similarly Ezra and Malachi and/or Mordecai.
We have many disagreements in the Gemara about how the Holy Temple
looked, the order of sacrifices etc. These may have halakhic
implications but there stilll was only historical truth.
In many cases Rambam "decides" the halakhah - does that inply he
decides the history?
One simple example is the machloket whether the script we use today
is the original script of Moshe. As previously stated there are
arguments about the Temple. We obviously would not use Josephus as an
opinion to decide Halakha but I don't think we can go the other route
either and decide history based on psak halakhah.
Similarly we have numerous debates among amoraim as to what Rav
Yochanan said. It fact the gemara implies that some traditions were
more reliable than others. We don't assume that all were true.
The Vilna Gaon at times gives interesting examples how to reconcile
some arguments, specifically the last 8 pesukim in the Torah and the
also the story of the concubine of Givah and the era of Job.
This shows that many arguements can be reconciled but hardly shows
that all of them can.
"Shaarei Terutzim Lo Ninalu" is not sufficient for me.
Eli Turkel
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Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1998 12:12:30 -0500
From: Joel Margolies <margol@ms.com>
Subject: Shir Hama'alos and Tehilas
Hi All,
Does anyone know the mekor for appending the pesukim starting Tehilas
Hashem at the end of Shir Hama'alos that many people do today?
Take care,
Joel
--
Joel
Margolies
margol@ms.com
W-212-762-2386
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Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1998 12:43:33 EST
From: Yzkd@aol.com
Subject: Re:
In a message dated 11/12/98 10:58:22 AM EST, turkel@math.tau.ac.il writes:
> Yitzchok writes
>
> >> As to reconciling historical fact "Shaarei Terutzim Lo Ninalu",
> >> many seeming Machlokes in Metzios had been answered, would you
> >> suggest that if one was going to learn only one of those opinions he
> >> shouldn't make a Birchas Hatorah because Sofeik Brochos Lkuloh.
> >> The same answer for that answers why the approach to Divrei Chazal
> >> even in Aggadah and Medroshos Chalukos has to be that Eilu Veilu DE"C.
>
> More to the point - the Gemara in many places says "machvarta"
> that a certain opinion was mistaken. If one spend ones time of
> learning in a day going over that opinion I find it hard to believe
> that anyone would claim that he didn't fulfill learning that day
> because the gemara rejected that opinion. Similarly one fulfills
> the mitzva of learning even when the historical fact turns out to be
> wrong. As the gemara says just as one gets a reward for darshening each
> "et" so one gets reward for retracting the derasha.
The two are not synonymous when one learns a Sevoroh even if it is rejected he
gained knowledge in Torah either in the positive or the negative, when stating
a wrong fact what exactly did he learn, i.e. Avrohom AO"H was 40 yeras when he
recognized G-d (Ramabam Hil. Avodoh Zoroh 1:3), 3, 4, 48, 49 should all be
useless to reject, a total waste of time.
I Dafkoh picked that example as that one is mentioned in a Sefer of Halacha
(Rambam and Raavad), and Dafkoh there the Kesef Mishnoh (written by the
Mechabeir of the Shulchan Oruch) brings an answer how both can be true.
And that is why-
> The Vilna Gaon at times gives interesting examples how to reconcile
> some arguments,
> This shows that many arguements can be reconciled but hardly shows
> that all of them can.
> "Shaarei Terutzim Lo Ninalu" is not sufficient for me.
The main thing it shows was the Tzugang - not to accept a seeming
contradiction as such, since we are dealing with Torahs Emes, on the contrary
we apply the rule of Yogatoh Umtzosoh Taamin.
Kol Tuv
Yitzchok Zirkind
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Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1998 19:43:52 +0200 (GMT+0200)
From: Eli Turkel <turkel@math.tau.ac.il>
Subject: [none]
subject: chok
In a recent article on liablilty for motor vehicle damage in the Journal
of Halcha and Contemporary Society the author (Rabbi Tzvi Sendler)
takes it for granted that the law of damages is a chok and a not a
mishpat (at least completely). He presents several examples
(he doesn't quote Rav Soloveitchik)
1. First the well known requirement of 2 kosher witnesses to the car accident
preponderance of evidence doesn't help.
In all cases of doubt the muchzak wins not the one with the "stronger" case
2. koach sheni and koach kocho might not be liable
while secular law considers secondary but direct damage as equivalent to
primary damage (see Ritva Makkot 8a)
3. Damages caused by property in reshut harabbim are not liable
4. Driving fast for the purposes of a mitzva may not be considered negligent
(CM 378:8)
5. If a car stops suddenly it is considered a "bor" and not liable to
damage on property (i.e. the car in back).
6. In general in Halakha the mazik is either liable or not (in rare cases
1/2 payment). There is no concept of partial payment for partial cause.
7. grama is not liable
8. The most amazing is an opinion of Maharshal, Machane Ephraim and Ketzot
that one is not liable if the item can be repaired. Repayment is
necessary only for complete unrepairable damage !!
In most of these cases these laws are learned from pesukim. i.e. the
Torah logic outweighs human logic i.e. a chok!
Eli Turkel
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Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1998 12:47:59 EST
From: Yzkd@aol.com
Subject: Re: Shir Hama'alos and Tehilas
In a message dated 11/12/98 12:12:59 PM EST, margol@ms.com writes:
> Does anyone know the mekor for appending the pesukim starting Tehilas
> Hashem at the end of Shir Hama'alos that many people do today?
>
See Tur O"C 51 (brought in S"O Horav 51:9)
Kol Tuv
Yitzchok Zirkind
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Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1998 12:56:11 EST
From: Yzkd@aol.com
Subject: Re:
In a message dated 11/12/98 12:44:44 PM EST, turkel@math.tau.ac.il writes:
> In a recent article on liablilty for motor vehicle damage in the Journal
> of Halcha and Contemporary Society the author (Rabbi Tzvi Sendler)
> takes it for granted that the law of damages is a chok and a not a
> mishpat (at least completely).
As you finish off the main point is not completely (or IOW not only) mishpot.
The laws of damages are brought in the Torah in parshas "MISHPOTIM".
Kol Tuv
Yitzchok Zirkind
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Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1998 12:58:45 -0500
From: Joel Margolies <margol@ms.com>
Subject: Re: chok
Eli Turkel wrote:
>
> subject: chok
> In a recent article on liablilty for motor vehicle damage in the Journal
> of Halcha and Contemporary Society the author (Rabbi Tzvi Sendler)
> takes it for granted that the law of damages is a chok and a not a
> mishpat (at least completely). He presents several examples
> (he doesn't quote Rav Soloveitchik)
<deleted>
> In most of these cases these laws are learned from pesukim. i.e. the
> Torah logic outweighs human logic i.e. a chok!
After all the posts on this issue, it seems to me to really be a matter
of defining chukim and mishpatim. If I look at the above post I wouls
say that a chok is a law based on Torah logic that normative human logic
would decide differently. Whereas a mishpat is a law where Torah and
human logic are in agreement.
I am not an authority enogh to say what the correct definition is -
however I have always understood the poshut definition of a chok to be a
law based on reasons UNCOMPREHEDABLE to human logic. A chok lies down a
course that humans would never follow. Whereas a mishpat is based on
logic that is understandable (even if not preferable) within human
thought. All laws quoted above fall into my mishpat category - but into
R' Turkel's chok category. I'm not sure it really matters as long as we
all agree to be doing mitzvahs not because we understand or desire to
follow their logic but rather because Hashem commanded us to do them.
Take care,
Joel
--
Joel
Margolies
margol@ms.com
W-212-762-2386
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Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1998 13:05:15 -0600 (CST)
From: "Shoshanah M. & Yosef G. Bechhofer" <sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>
Subject: truth vs. ambiguity (fwd)
R' DR asked me to forward this, as below.
YGB
Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1998 10:18:22 -0500
From: David Riceman <dr@insight.att.com>
To: driceman@worldnet.att.net
Cc: sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu
Subject: truth vs. ambiguity
Rabbi B.
I have misplace the address of the list. Could you forward this to
them?
DR
We have to distinguish between the lives of the Avos and the lives of
the Avos as canonized in scripture. Two examples: (1) chazal say "if
Reuven had realized that the pasuk would say ..." (2) as far as I recall
the Ramban never uses the principle "maaseh avos siman l'banim" with
respect to something that appears only in midrash but not in Tanach (I'm
sure someone will correct my memory if it is mistaken).
Even though RYGB hasn't gotten there yet all of us know the Yerushalmi
in Sanhedrin which asserts that the halachic parts of the Torah are
purposely ambiguous. I suggest that the same applies to non-halachic
aspects. Rishonim are entitled to argue about Yitzhaq's age at the
Aqedah because the Chumash is written to support several possible
readings.
Admittedly there are illegitimate readings ("kol haomer david hemelech
chata ..."). Nonetheless I think R. Elie is mistaken when he asserts
"we're arguing about emes" (does "ki sifsei cohen yishmru daas" apply to
typed as well as spoken remarks?).
Incidentally there is an intriguing midrash which I have not taken the
time to track down but which may be relevant. In it one Tanna (?)
rejects another's drush by saying "ain dorshin Shir HaShirim (?) lignus
yisrael" or words to that effect. (?) indicates that I may have the
title/sefer wrong. The point being that, rather than specific
traditions about chataim, there may have been general (and conflicting)
traditions about how to evaluate maaseh avos. Part of the confusion
those of us who grew up with Rashi have (as the Ramban often points out)
is that he conflates differing midrashim in his peirush on chumash. Has
anyone on the list systematically gone through the midrashim to try to
isolates shittos in Tannaim about how to evaluate (and when or whether
to criticise) maaseh avos?
David Riceman
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Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1998 13:18:10 -0600 (CST)
From: "Shoshanah M. & Yosef G. Bechhofer" <sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>
Subject: Response to R' Eli Turkel's Critique of the Lesson from Yeshaya
On Thu, 12 Nov 1998, Eli Turkel wrote:
> R YGB writes
>
> >> I would like to note, that according to the Radak, I can add one source
> >> FROM TANACH ITSELF! Yeshaya says (51:2): "Look to Avrohom your forefather
> >> and to Soroh who bore you..." The Radak there says we are to emulate the
> >> Avos. A nice source for that "obscure Chazal" (double sic) in TDBER.
>
> I don't understand this proof. Everyone on the list believes that the
> Avot were great people and should be emulated. Whether they sinned in
> some particular action does not change their great status. The fact
> that the Gemara does not list them among the people that never sinned
> implies that all had some sin in their life.
>
Let me explain. How are we to ever know what deeds of the Avos to emulate?
I would have thought, sans R' Davide Glasner's pshat, that it is proper to
emulate Avrohom's casting Yishmael out: "Misan'echa Hashem esnah." But
now, I know not if I should emulate that.
I might have thought to emulate Avrohom's tefillos for Sdom, but perhaps
some "modern" will come along and say that Avrohom was being "mai'tiach
devarim klapei ma'alah," and should not be mimiced.
I might have thought to emulate Avrohom's running to greet the three Arab
wanderers, but someone else might come along and say that Avrohom was
transgressing, on the third day ater a Milla, "v'nishmartem me'od
l'nafshoseichem."
So, how can I ever learn from the Avos? The Navi's advice, perforce, is
predicated on the assumption that all of Avrohom's behavior is suitable
for emulation.
YGB
Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila
Go to top.
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1998 13:45:24 -0600
From: "Steve. Katz" <katzco@sprintmail.com>
Subject: Re: Shir Hama'alos and Tehilas
Joel Margolies wrote:
>
> Hi All,
>
> Does anyone know the mekor for appending the pesukim starting Tehilas
> Hashem at the end of Shir Hama'alos that many people do today?
>
> Take care,
>
> Joel
> --
>
> Joel
> Margolies
> margol@ms.com
> W-212-762-2386I do not recall where I heard this. Singing "houdu lashem ... is
already like benching d'oreisoh and the the entire birchas hamozoun is
then a brocho lvatoloh.
Take care,
steve
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Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1998 14:49:47 -0500
From: David Glasner <DGLASNER@FTC.GOV>
Subject: makom hinihu li avotai l'hitgader bo
I am doubtful that further discussion of the issues that have arisen since
my posting on the akeida will lead to any closing of the gap that seems to
divide many of us. This posting is therefore essentially an act of faith in
the enduring value of rational discourse and a mahloket l'shem shamayim.
I submitted my earlier posting because I thought that I might (underscore
"might") have arrived at an insight that might (again underscore "might")
help solve what seemed to me to be a difficult problem in parashat
veyeira, namely the abrupt manner in which Abraham sends Hagar and
Ishmael into the desert. It appears from the text that Abraham was
putting the lives of Hagar and Ishmael into jeopardy by sending them out
unescorted with a minimally adequate supply of food and water. (The
mere fact that Abraham provided enough bread and water to last them
until they reached Be'er Sheva if they did not get lost on the way proves
only that Abraham did not deliberately try to kill them, it does not prove
that he a properly discharged his personal responsibility to ensure their
safety.) I did not make up this story. This is the Torah's account, as best
as I can determine, l'phi p'shuto shel mikra. I further suggested that it
might be that, in recounting the episode in this fashion, the Torah did not
mean to give a blanket endorsement of Abraham's conduct.
For making this suggestion b'derech efshar (and if I was insufficiently
clear in emphasizing "b'derech efshar" as Prof. Carmy would have us do
in such situations I beg everyone's forgiveness) I was sternly rebuked
by several members of the list for daring to speak ill of the Avot without a
Chazalic or Rishonic basis. Again, I make no claims to mastery of the
relevant sources, but what troubles me about the critical responses to
my suggestion is that while they cite the attempts by various
commentaries to excuse or justify Abraham's behavior, none of the
responses addressed in a substantive way the actual conduct of
Abraham explicitly recorded in the Torah. The closest anyone came to
doing so was a citation of Rashi (I believe) that Abraham gave Hagar and
Ishmael enough bread and water to reach Be'er Sheva, but Hagar went
off the path (so to speak) and as a result ran out of provisions while still
in the desert. But how does this justify Abraham's not providing Hagar
and Ishmael with an escort or guide to lead them safely to their
destination? Can you imagine Hagar's trauma in being suddenly expelled
with her son from the house of Abraham? Is it totally surprising that in
her confusion and anger she might have wandered off course either
physically or spiritually under such circumstances? It would be easier
for me to retrace the footsteps of Chazal and the Rishonim on this
question if I saw any mention of these questions in their discussion of
the episode. But instead I am told (in a, for the most part, polite way) to
be quiet [I originally used another less polite synonym for "be quiet" but,
in the interests of darkei no'am have substituted a more tepid
expression]. Well, if you want me to be quiet, please answer my
question, which is how do you justify the conduct of Abraham explicitly
described by the Torah? If there is a problem of lashon horah, it is the
problem of Moshe and the RShO, because they wrote the story for the
whole world to see. At most there is an inyan here of "dan l'chaf
z'chut." I am waiting for someone to do exactly that, which means more
than just saying that whatever Avraham Avinu alav ha-shalom did was
kosher v'yoshor. It means explaining precisely why his conduct was
kosher v'yoshor. If the Rishonim (and again, if you can point me to a
Rishon who does discuss the question, I will be most appreciative) don't
even address my question, how can I be satisfied with their answer?
Of course, as a Rabbi that I know often says (quoting the Hafetz Hayim)
"those who believe have no questions; those who do not believe have
no answers." [Would anyone care to vouch for the authenticity of the
quotation?] That is certainly an attitude well designed to bring any
religious discussion to a screeching halt. In the beis medrash, I hope it is
still the case that someone may ask a question on a shverer Rambam or
a shvere Tosafos even if he cannot cite a Rishon who has already
asked his question. If someone doesn't understand a p'sak of the
Rambam is he told, "well, if you were frumer you wouldn't ask such a
question"? Why should our intellectual standards regarding parshanut
be less rigorous than our intellectual standards for gemara and poskim?
And I admit to being utterly appalled by Elie Grinsparg's rebbi. Do you
mean to say that a rebbi who cannot think of a way to refute a
suggestion made by his student can simply dismiss his suggestion by
engaging in a personal attack? "Mi-kol m'lamdai hiskalti, u-mi-talmidai
yoteir mi-kulam." "Ei-zehu hacham? ha-lomed mi-kol adam." And by the
way I have no doubt that "adam" in that context includes gentiles as well
as Jews. Imagine how differently the student might have responded if
the rebbi had encouraged him to think that he might, just might, have been
able to answer a question that stumped the great R. Akiva Eiger. Would
it have been so terrible for such a thought to cross the student's mind?
Do you think that maybe, just maybe, such a thought might have inspired
him to study more diligently and with greater enthusiasm? And if he
studied more diligently and with greater enthusiasm do you think it is
possible, just possible, that he might, just might, eventually have been
inspired to come to minyan a little bit earlier every morning? "Gadol
ha-limud she-ha-limud meivi li-dai ma'aseh." Did it ever occur to you that
nitkatnu ha-dorot can be a self-fulfilling prophecy? If R. Chaim Brisker
had been brainwashed into thinking that he could never ever know or
figure out something that the Rishonim did not already know, do you
really think that he would have become what he became and achieved
what he achieved?
I referred in my previous post to the sugya in Hullin 6b-7a of makom
hinihu li avotai l'hitgader bo. The sugya concludes. "Mi-kan l'talmid
hacham she-amar d'var halakha, she-ein mazihin oto, v'amri lah ein
maznihin oto, v'amri lah ein mazhihin oto." Rashi says "mi-kan. that we
saw that Rebi accepted this testimony [about whether trumot and
ma'asrot had to be given from crops grown in Beit Sh'an] even though it
was a surprising thing, because they had always held that it was asur,
so we learn that we don't force a scholar who offers hidush in halachah
to retract his opinion by saying you aren't allowed to say this because
you never heard it.. . maznihin. we don't abominate his words.
mazhihin. we don't say your pride caused you to say this because you
didn't listen carefully to how your teacher taught the halachah."
The Gemara says clearly that one may not reject a hidush offered by a
scholar (I gladly assign to Rabbi Riskin that role for purposes of this
discussion) by saying, in essence, you are not frum enough to be
listened to or if this hidush were true someone would have already said
it. Now the question is whether if the Gemara applies this principle to a
hidush in d'var halachah, is it more or less applicable to a hidush in
parshanut. I think the answer is obviously more applicable, but I would
be interested to hear any opinions to the contrary.
David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov
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