Avodah Mailing List

Volume 02 : Number 181

Friday, March 5 1999

• Re: Chazal vs. Secular Sources
• Re: Shittas HaGro
• Chazal vs. Science
• Re: Chazal vs. Secular Sources
• Re: Avodah V2 #180
• Re: Chazal vs. Secular Sources
• Re: Chazal vs. Secular Sources
• [none]
• Re: The Rambam on Aggadita
• Woman in tallis/tefillin at Edah conference
• Albert Einstein
• When Are Chazal Literal? Short Answer
• Chazal Are Constitutive?
• Women counted for recitation of "ha-Riv et rivenu"

In a message dated 3/4/99 6:41:59 PM EST, sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu writes:

>  it is evident that Chazal were mistaken in that they thought the
>  sun went behind a dome at night.

As I once pointed out please see the Gilyoin Hashas's (Psochim 94b) quoting
the Shitoh Mkubetzes.  Also see Rashi D"H Kaan B'ymos Hachamoh Rosh Hashonoh
24a.

Kol Tuv

Yitzchok Zirkind 

In v2n77, Richard Walpoe writes:
: My conclusions:
: 1) The minhog ispo facto ratified the shitos that argued with the Geonim,

Well, one could ask the same question on those Rishonim who overturned the
Geonim.

: 2) We have no right to change our minhoggim wholesale simply based upon
: lomdus.

This eliminates minhagei haGra, much of the minhogim of Chassidus, all of
the Brisker minhogim, etc...

I'd disagree on other grounds though, not just because I feel there are
numerous counterexamples. This touches on a point you make later:

: 4)  What about future implications? If I can show  that the geoninm ate
: kitniyos on Pesach, can we ashkenazim just suspect our minhog based upon
: this?

Good example, as the one mention of kitnios in shas is to provide it as an
example of a minhag sh'tus!

(And about R' Tam's tephillin: The tephillin in Qumron were Rashi, Rabbeinu
Tam, and a third arrangement.)

But, back to the point...

Going back yet again to the subject of halachic pluralism, I'd argue that
minhog can establish a certain p'sak as halachah, but not as "true". IOW,
given that the "gantze velt" chose a valid option within the pluralistic
halachah Hashem gave us, it would ratify the p'sak. However, if it were
based on a ta'us, a minhag ta'os doesn't ratify a mistaken p'sak.

For example, the Gro felt that the common nusach of "moshav yikaro" violated
hilchos Avodah Zarah. It's an anthropomorphication not found in Tanach. He
therefore changed it to the less common version of Aleinu which read "kisei
k'vodo", as Hashem is often pictured on a kisei.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for  4-Mar-99: Chamishi, Sisa
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H O"Ch 301:202-208
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Eruvin 44b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Horeb 705-708

I've been away from the list for a couple of weeks and have just caught 
up with all the posts.  I haven't had a chance but to gloss over most of 
them, as they were quite copious.  Of most interest to me were the posts 
on the value of science vs Chazal, in determining Emes.  I, for one, do 
not think that they are mutually exclusive.  As many have pointed out, 
Chazal were not infallible in matters of science.  But I believe they 
were as intellectually honest as humanly possible in formulating their 
own theories of the universe and came up with the best interpretations 
they could based on the information that was available to them. As a 
matter of fact they probably were way ahead of their day, perhaps 
because of their great genius and their intellectual honesty.  Were they 
ultimately wrong on some of their beliefs about the nature of the 
physical universe?  I believe they were.  However, it should be 
mentioned that there are many brilliant people, R. Aaron Soloveichik, 
among them who believe that Chazal were always right even in matters of 
science and it is we, who are mistaken in our true understanding of the 
nature of the universe.  I am hard pressed to believe, for example that 
the sun disappears behind a dome every night, and I don't know how R. 
Aaron would explain it.  When it comes to matters of science, I am more 
inclined to believe in the scientific method.  I, also, agree with those 
who say one can have intellectual honesty even if he is a Kofer. Albert 
Einstein was such a person.  I don't think you can devise  theories of 
the magnitude or impact The General or Special theory of Relativity 
have, without being brutally loyal to the Scientific Method.  The method 
is simply a logical way of testing a hypothesis (or null hypothesis, if 
you will).  Einstein's theories have become theories precisely because 
they have passed the scrutiny of the Scientific Method.  Science is 
perhaps the one discipline where nothing is sacred.  What are accepted 
doctrines of fact in one era are  rejected refuse of a later era when 
subjected to the test of the Scientific Method in the light of new 
information.  In order for scientific progress and technology to ensue, 
you must make it testable.  That is why I am a true believer (in science 
and it's mentors, that is).  That Einstein was a Kofer is of no 
consequence to me when it comes to his contributions to mankind.  If he 
would start to debate the validity of Yahadus, then he would be out of 
his element and ill equipped to do so as was the great Kofer,  Sigmund 
Freud with his treatise "Moses and Monotheism".  But Freud's 
contributions to mankind's knowledge of the unconscious  mind and 
psychoanalysis are invaluable , even though many of his theories have 
been disproved.

This does not contradict my Emunas Chachamim.  First of all because I 
believe that their psak Halacha is infallible.  But, more than that, I 
believe that they themselves valued the scientific knowledge of mankind 
and the concept of a "scientific method" and probably utilized a form of 
it in determining their own knowledge of the universe.  The only 
difference between their truth of Halacha and their incomplete and 
sometimes erroneous conceptions of the nature of the universe is the 
element of Ruach HaKodesh involved in the former.

Furthermore, (I may be a Daas Yachid, here) I believe that, in the 
broadest possible sense, science and Torah are one and the same thing. 
The works of G-d in the form of nature are pure Truth as is the Torah. 
To oversimplify the words of "Halakhic. Man", we study Torah so we can 
know how G-d wants us to interact with the physical universe.   And we 
need to know enough about the physical universe so that we can evaluate, 
halachikly,  how to interact with a given parameter (e.g. knowing 
whether to operate in a life threatening situation).   The study of 
Nature, on the other hand was not handed down to us from Har Sinai.   We 
are left to our own devices to ferret out the truth of Nature.  So we 
have to devise systems like the Scientific Method in order to get at the 
truth.  The only problem is that the truth is elusive because new 
discoveries often invalidate former truths.  (E.g. the sun revolving 
around the earth.) 

So, our knowledge of the universe is little and incomplete...  perhaps 
even erroneous.  But we should still embrace the study of science 
because it, too, is the study of Emes and one cannot be a true Oved 
Hashem without knowledge of it.

HM

On Thu, 4 Mar 1999 Yzkd@aol.com wrote:

> As I once pointed out please see the Gilyoin Hashas's (Psochim 94b)
> quoting the Shitoh Mkubetzes.  Also see Rashi D"H Kaan B'ymos Hachamoh
> Rosh Hashonoh 24a. 
>

RYZ, What are we to make of this GH and SM? (I saw them.)

YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

RYGB wrote:
>But, I cannot help but be fascinted, to be honest, by a simple question:
>Why should you - with the mindset you eloquently articulate - choose to
>accept Chazal at all? Seeing how prone they were to error - from your
>perspective - what is to say that there is any validity to Rabbinic
>stricture and decree in Halacha? Except for those rare statements that are
>definitive Halacha l'Moshe Me'Sinai - the rest - say, for example, the
>halachos of muktzeh, according to most opinions, or yom tov sheni when the
>calendar is no longer doubtful - are "sheer" invention by very much error
>prone individuals (you know that I do not hold Chazal infallible - but I
>believe that it is only in the hard sciences that we can ever come to such
>a conclusion - but I understand your perspective is very different)?

I am confused by this post. In matters of halakhah, the rulings of chazal
are constitutive. This is independent of the question of their reliability
in matters scientific. It seems to me an extremely unwise tactic to link
chazal's authority to their scientific competence -- even if in your
estimation this latter is underrated.

-Moish Koppel

Shoshanah M. & Yosef G. Bechhofer wrote:

> I am happy to clarify, but you will note that we have been gently rebuked
> by RDE for discussing "our" opinions, so I am not sure why you still want
> to know what "I" hold :-).
>
> (BTW - RDE - I think this goes back to our disagreement as to sources.
> While I am a great "chosid" of R' Tzadok's, seeing how late he is, it is
> up to me to accept or reject his opinion, especially since he represents a
> specific approach (in most areas), and not one necessarily accepted by
> other streams of Jewish thought - as we recently learned in our discussion
> of Chassidus. Thus, in formulating opinions, we may reference Acharonim,
> but ultimately, the opinions are our own. Indeed, this is part of what
> allows me - of Yekkishe/Litvak/Chabad origin - to opt for other
> approaches. V'yesh l'ha'arich!)

I found it interesting that the piece I quoted of Rav Tzadok and Josephus -
also contains a criticism of the Abarbanel. There is a dispute in the gemora
Bava Basra 15 regarding who wrote which book of Tanach. The Abarbanel asserts
that since there is a disagreement that means there is no mesora and it is
permissible to voice one's own opinion. Rav Tzadok says that the only options
are those presented by Chazal.

What we are dealing with is the nature of the Mesora. Do we compartmentalize
and say - Halacha is absolute while all other aspects of human knowledge is
totally open to personal discretion. Or do we say that the prime understanding
is through the eyes of Chazal - there are things which are quite
understandable such as halacha and others things which *seem* to be contrary
to our understanding but which are not presumed to be totally wrong. These are
the two extremes.

Rav Hutner has a relevant discussion of this issue regarding history. Letter
86 (page 162) of his collected letters. "It has already been established in
our beis hamedrash that since Yisroel and Torah are an identity it follows
that in the Torah itself there is a problem of giloi panim shelo k'halacha
there is a corresponding problem regarding Jewish history. In fact, anyone who
has learned gemora knows the contrast between a tractate which has Rashi's
commentary and one that doesn't. Without Rashi we stumble like a blindman
moving in the street without guidance - he is certain to stumble and fall.
Reflect for a moment what can be said about Jewish history in which every era
is a complete complex and confusing sugya....What a great danger. What
multitude of  pitfalls await. The snares and pitfalls in proper understanding
of an era of Jewish history is equivalent to giloi ponim baTorah shelo
k'halacha. Yisroel and Torah are an identity.
  The Truth of the matter is because of the above the community of lomdim have
held back from the study of history. Just as we see that they stay away from
the study of the Yerushalmi. Because without the commentaries of the rishonim
we know nothing! This is completely contrary to the perspective of the
intellect that the refraining from studying history is the problem of
batlonus. It is precisely because of the elevated values of Jewish history
that it is neglected. Without appropriate commentaries there is the problem of
error - as we see in fact happening in this area...."

My concern is twofold. Just like the lawyer who bangs and shouts when he has
no evidence - we (myself included) tend to become more strident when we lack
solid evidence. On the other hand a tremendous amount of information exists
that I am not aware of and even what I do know - I would really like to
understand better. [e.g., the comment that Rav Aaron Soleveitchik thinks
Chazal are correct in science]  This is no different than learning a gemora.
Before making pronouncements - it is best to make sure you know what gemora is
being studied - that it be translated properly and that the standard
commentaries be consulted. I find it difficult to hear someone making
judgments on what Rav Moshe and other gedolim said or should have said - when
they haven't taken the trouble to study the issue.

In sum, I am very much interested in the personal opinions expressed here. but
primarily when they are the informed consequence of a serious effort to
wrestle with the material and comprehend the sugya. For those who have studied
the material seriously - it is helpful to show how these opinions relate back
to the sources. I have also observed that simple exchanges of personal
opinions tends to head to heated and/or often pointless discussions. Even
concerning personal opinions there is no reason that we can't  follow in the
footsteps of the Bal HaMeor - arguing with authority within the context
provided by the authorities.

                                    Daniel Eidensohn

Shoshanah M. & Yosef G. Bechhofer wrote:

> I am happy to clarify, but you will note that we have been gently rebuked
> by RDE for discussing "our" opinions, so I am not sure why you still want
> to know what "I" hold :-).
>
> (BTW - RDE - I think this goes back to our disagreement as to sources.
> While I am a great "chosid" of R' Tzadok's, seeing how late he is, it is
> up to me to accept or reject his opinion, especially since he represents a
> specific approach (in most areas), and not one necessarily accepted by
> other streams of Jewish thought - as we recently learned in our discussion
> of Chassidus. Thus, in formulating opinions, we may reference Acharonim,
> but ultimately, the opinions are our own. Indeed, this is part of what
> allows me - of Yekkishe/Litvak/Chabad origin - to opt for other
> approaches. V'yesh l'ha'arich!)

I found it interesting that the piece I quoted of Rav Tzadok and Josephus -
also contains a criticism of the Abarbanel. There is a dispute in the gemora
Bava Basra 15 regarding who wrote which book of Tanach. The Abarbanel asserts
that since there is a disagreement that means there is no mesora and it is
permissible to voice one's own opinion. Rav Tzadok says that the only options
are those presented by Chazal.

What we are dealing with is the nature of the Mesora. Do we compartmentalize
and say - Halacha is absolute while all other aspects of human knowledge is
totally open to personal discretion. Or do we say that the prime understanding
is through the eyes of Chazal - there are things which are quite
understandable such as halacha and others things which *seem* to be contrary
to our understanding but which are not presumed to be totally wrong. These are
the two extremes.

Rav Hutner has a relevant discussion of this issue regarding history. Letter
86 (page 162) of his collected letters. "It has already been established in
our beis hamedrash that since Yisroel and Torah are an identity it follows
that in the Torah itself there is a problem of giloi panim shelo k'halacha
there is a corresponding problem regarding Jewish history. In fact, anyone who
has learned gemora knows the contrast between a tractate which has Rashi's
commentary and one that doesn't. Without Rashi we stumble like a blindman
moving in the street without guidance - he is certain to stumble and fall.
Reflect for a moment what can be said about Jewish history in which every era
is a complete complex and confusing sugya....What a great danger. What
multitude of  pitfalls await. The snares and pitfalls in proper understanding
of an era of Jewish history is equivalent to giloi ponim baTorah shelo
k'halacha. Yisroel and Torah are an identity.
  The Truth of the matter is because of the above the community of lomdim have
held back from the study of history. Just as we see that they stay away from
the study of the Yerushalmi. Because without the commentaries of the rishonim
we know nothing! This is completely contrary to the perspective of the
intellect that the refraining from studying history is the problem of
batlonus. It is precisely because of the elevated values of Jewish history
that it is neglected. Without appropriate commentaries there is the problem of
error - as we see in fact happening in this area...."

My concern is twofold. Just like the lawyer who bangs and shouts when he has
no evidence - we (myself included) tend to become more strident when we lack
solid evidence. On the other hand a tremendous amount of information exists
that I am not aware of and even what I do know - I would really like to
understand better. [e.g., the comment that Rav Aaron Soleveitchik thinks
Chazal are correct in science]  This is no different than learning a gemora.
Before making pronouncements - it is best to make sure you know what gemora is
being studied - that it be translated properly and that the standard
commentaries be consulted. I find it difficult to hear someone making
judgments on what Rav Moshe and other gedolim said or should have said - when
they haven't taken the trouble to study the issue.

In sum, I am very much interested in the personal opinions expressed here. but
primarily when they are the informed consequence of a serious effort to
wrestle with the material and comprehend the sugya. For those who have studied
the material seriously - it is helpful to show how these opinions relate back
to the sources. I have also observed that simple exchanges of personal
opinions tends to head to heated and/or often pointless discussions. Even
concerning personal opinions there is no reason that we can't  follow in the
footsteps of the Bal HaMeor - arguing with authority within the context
provided by the authorities.

                                    Daniel Eidensohn

While  RYGB poses a number of excellent shailos in his response to the
good Dr. Glasner, but I fear the tone of presentation is marred by the
conveyance of a sense of self evidency to the answers he clearly espouses.
I also perceive that he is setting up a bit of a strawman, the easier
to confound, but which was neither explicit nor implicit in anything
David actually said (not that I don't have a bone or two to pick with
him myself - equating the "dismal science" he practices with whatever,
indeed!).  Thus RYGB sets the stage by the rhetorical device which asked:
<<Seeing how prone they were to error - from your perspective - what
is to say that there is any validity to Rabbinic stricture and decree
in Halacha > .  I reread Dr Glasner's submission and nowhere find the
inaccurate characterization you impute to him of "proneness" to error on
the part of chazal.  Also the unwarranted conflation which would equate
questioning the historicity of some statements (plenty of precedent for
that amongst recognized gidolim - and while RYGB, in a methodological
reprise of his rejection of "out of the mainstream" poroshonim during
the late exegetical wars will probably simply reject these as well,
demonization of those who disagree hardly seems appropriate - no telling
what godol might get swept up in such a net.) with a questioning of the
exercise of halochic authority simply seems to me a logical disconnect.
But no doubt David can rally to his own defense.
Sender: owner-avodah@aishdas.org
Precedence: bulk
Reply-To: avodah@aishdas.org

I should also like to comment RYGB's assertion (paraphrased) that he
himself is no obstructionist and is willing to entertain deviations from
chazalic historical statements if presented with solid proof, but absent
such, he will simply continue to place more credibility in Chazal than
Herodotus.  Set aside for the moment that the problem is much bigger than
Herodotus, the problem I see here is that we will never, in practice,
achieve the level of "proof" that RYGB demands.  It is an ever higher
moving bar, and thus, e.g. RDPETs sketchy but nevertheless impressive
list of "proofs" can still be blown off as subjectively unconvincing,
without ever really explaining why.   Prior to reading the last issue I
had dashed off, but had not posted, a suggestion that we consider a new
thread which might, calmly one hoped, explore some additional parameters
of chazalic authority.  RYGB's questions have kindof jumpstarted that
suggestion but I think it may be still be worthy of posting at this
point to help frame the discussion, at least for me, in a somewhat less
charged formulation than employed so far.  So:

I should like to explore a new thread, or perhaps sub-thread would be a
better characterization. We have been witness in recent and not so recent
exchanges of lichoroh, a basic divide on the part of list participants in
their appreciation of the binding authority of non-halachic statements
by chazal or gidolim.  I would like to explore this a bit further with
a focus on chazal.

The non-halachic arena which generally receives the most scrutiny when
such matters come up is undoubtedly the midrosh aggodoh.  There is an
ancient history of divergent views on this subject which no doubt is
capable of inflaming even more passions from current listmembers than
does mention of albert einstein, with combatants delineated, to my mind,
by degree of personal identification with the rambam's third ascoloh.
But it is not my intention here to discuss aggodoh if only because
everybody could cite so much precedent for their views, no matter what
they might happen to be.  Instead I'd like to consider an application
suggested by the recent 165 year dust up, which is - what credence
should we, must we, place in chazalic utterances which seem to be
simple -often maisiach lifie sumo - factual assertions re historical
matters, with the seder olam rabboh serving as paradigmatic issue.
BTW avi's reference to the different girso'os of seder olom itself,
while interesting for its relationship to the persian period problem,
doesn't mitigate the fact that other chazal have made statements that
are reliant on the common 52 persian years version.

To expand a bit - does the fact that some non-halachic declarative
assertions by chazal are considered incorrect and rejected these days by
everybody (If I've inadvertently included listmembers who would rather not
be there in this presumptive consensus, doubtless they will correct me )
- and I'm specifically thinking of statements related to the physical
world, e.g. spontaneous generation or the cause of night and day but
specifically not talking about cases where it is possible to avoid a
conflict, and some, though not all, posiqim have done so, by calling
on hishtanus ha'tevoh - thus I leave out things like RPD Eli Turkel's
citation of the vilod born in the 8th month and many other matters as well
(see R. Gutel's strikingly informative, even for its footnotes alone,
sefer for that). I also leave out nonsense like mazal and astrology
(just call  me a strong rambam fan here) and other superstitious stuff
(I noticed the evil eye is making a comeback on mail jewish which is
also starting to reappear with more regularity. yasher koiach to avi
f and, kein ayin horo, may it flourish) since, shamefully sad to say,
I recognize the complete lack of any presumptive consensus here.  But,
given the fact that some assertions are rejectable without apparant
injury to either yiras shomayim or yiras hacovode due chazal, are
simple historical assertions which similarly seem to conflict with the
best available external evidence, similarly dispensable with?  Or are
these historical references in some different category, and if so, why?
E.g. I could see positing a hava aminoh that they should be treated with
even more caution, since surely iqar emunoh must ultimately rest on our
conviction of the historicity of our tradition and starting to tamper
with traditional understandings leads to an uncomfortable - im kain
nosatoh divorechoh li'shiurin - position to defend.

And for many assertions there will be neither contradictory nor
confirmatory external evidence.  Should these simply be accepted under
the authority that a chazal uttered them? How about an inyon where there
is a single da'as chazal disputing a majority on some non-halachic
historical matter - would those, as I believe there to be, who would
accept an undisputed da'as chazal be willing to hold like a minority
view in a non-halochic matter as they would not in a halochic inyon?
How about the discussion concerning ezra's changing of the script?

Would people have trouble rejecting the gemoroh's explanation that he
merely changed it back to the original?  Etc etc and stuff like that.
I am not advocating that these types of considerations be aired in every
9th grade hashkofoh class, but this is supposed to be a high level group.
Any comments?

Mechy Frankel		michael.frankel@dtra.mil

Mechy Frankel just posted (mere moments ago...):
:                                       combatants delineated, to my mind,
: by degree of personal identification with the rambam's third ascoloh.

This to my mind is /the/ key to the discussion. The Rambam clearly ridicules
people who read every aggadita as literal truth. The same opinion is reiterated
in the Maharshah, Gur Aryeh, and the Gra's Peirush al Kama Agados.

They are mashalim, Chazal only cared about the truth of the nimshal, not the
mashal. Never mind the answer to the question of whether or not RCBD's wife
lit vinegar one Shabbos, just asking the question is already askew from
Chazal's derech. They didn't care.

To my mind, the more important question is knowing when this rule applies. Eg:
making galus Bavel 70 years is not necessarily for the purpose of a mashal,
it would be more literal to say that Chazal were giving p'shat in a nivu'ah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for  5-Mar-99: Shishi, Sisa
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H O"Ch 301:209-215
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Eruvin 45a
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Haftorah

Sorry I'm a bit behind on this; I wanted to plow through my accumulated
digests to see if someone else had responded.

Several posters raised questions about the newspaper picture of the woman
wearing tallis and tefillin at the Edah conference.  (Of course newspapers
focus on the unusual, not on the average, events at things like this --
they're always looking for an "angle".)

One astute poster asked:


> Or perhaps she felt comfortable that she was with people who would 
> not publicly embarrass someone who did something misguided but would
> seek to give that individual tochacha privately in a manner that 
> draws the individual in rather than alienates them.  I can't speak 
> for her or Edah but I'd like to be dan both lkaf zchut. 

Has it occurred to anyone that perhaps the woman asked a shaila of her LOR
and was told that it was permitted for her?  Why would tochacha be
required in such a case?  (I know of several cases where women have
inquired about tallis and been told, yes, and WITH the brocha; and at
least one where the answer about tefillin was yes.  I also know of one
"Modern" Orthodox shul where several women used to wear taleisim (the
women have moved out of the neighborhood and there have been several
changes of rabbi since then, so I can't report on current events).

Freda Birnbaum, fbb6@columbia.edu

I finally gave up looking for my copy of "Ideas and Opinions" a collection
of essays and transcriptions of speeches by AE (primarily NOT physics).

IIRC, the man thought of himself as an atheist. When asked about "G-d does not
play dice with the universe" Einstein explained that he meant it poetically --
that he didn't mean a real G-d any more than he meant real dice. To Einstein,
the order underlying the laws of nature was because they all came from a
single underlying law of physics. He spent his latter years searching for
this Grand Unification Theory.

As to AE's potential as a gaon...

Einstein's greatly was not only the quantity of his intelligence, but in his
ability to not let common sense and day-to-day evidence get in the way. He
took Lorenz's contraction equations and asked what kind of universe they
describe. And if it means that velocities don't add linearly -- fine.

There was another famous physicist who had that ability, Heisenberg y"sh (one
of the founders of Quantum Mechanics, and a Nazi) also revolutionized physics
by being able to follow the science to the exclusion of common sense. Think
what would have happened in that as-if universe had AE been learning Torah
all those years, and relativity waited for Heisenberg to discover it. Germany
would have had the bomb before the United States CHAS VICHALILA!

Point of this excercize? Just to show that you can't really play "what-if".
"Hanistaros Lashem E-lokeinu..."

Also, I'm not sure how this kisharon, which appears to be more of what
Hirsch and the Ba'al HaTanya would call binah (deductive reasoning) to
the exclusion of da'as (knowledge about methodology; see v1n1, R' Winston
disliked these definitions, considering my two sources to be yechidim in the
face of overwhelmig consensus to define them otherwise) would have carried
over well into a domain where the ideal is *Da'as* Torah. Chidushim are
supposed to be done by becoming one with the system, not by overturning it!

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for  5-Mar-99: Shishi, Sisa
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H O"Ch 301:209-215
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Eruvin 45a
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Haftorah

RYGB:>>There is a significant difference, of course, between your proposal and 
that of R' David Glasner. RDG is proposing that Chazal were very much
fallible and error prone - there accuracy rate he left somewhat vague, but 
it seems that he postulates a very high rate of error in any area other 
than halacha. You propose not to see it as error, but as non-literalness. 
But I am not sure if the net result is not similar.<<

Using a Maimodidian-like model.  In the Yad the Rambam used conventional 
halachic methodolgy (save for perhaps sefer Mada); while in the Moreh, he 
suspended a literal understanding of certain events in Tanach and saw them 
as "visions" <I guess that's a pun somehow>.

This is a form of "Palginon dibburo". Halachically if chazal catoegrozie 
Pishtim as a tree, it's a tree!  But that does not mean I tell that to my 
high-school biology teacher <smile>!  

I believe:
A) Emunas Chachocim, ie. Chazal are always right (at least on some level).
B) Halachically, we are bound by what they say. (Otherwise ein l'dovor sof).
C) In the realm of the physical, the "reality" might be quite different from 
what Chazal are syaing; and yes, that can be genuine paradox!

Examples of Halachic Ipmlications that we don't neccesarily see as literal:

1) Treating Dam nido as Dan Zovo.  Rov/chazoko/Vestos etc. all imply 
niddo, yet we behave as if she were a zovo.  A Halachic reality but not a 
phsysical one.
..

2) Saying v'sein Tal umotor on Dec. 4/5 and not Nov. 21/22, even though 
"science" tells us that the Gregorian has superceed the Julian.

3)  Vayehi Erev, etc.  We date the Brias hoolaum from 25 Ellul based on a 
24 hour day model. YET the sheemsh and Yoreiach wer not there until day 4? 
Halchically, we can say the 6 days are understood literally, but that does 
not mean we must take it literally from a physical POV.

4) Rav Schwab's original article would have had to deal with the halachic 
discrepancies of 420 vs. 585.  Halachically speaking 420 IS literal.  But 
not necessarily physically speaking.

5) Rabbeinu Tam's shito on zmanim is not as close to the physical reality 
as the Gro's yet it served as a model for centuries!

Kol Tuv,
Rich Wolpoe

On Fri, 5 Mar 1999, Moshe Koppel wrote:

> I am confused by this post. In matters of halakhah, the rulings of
> chazal are constitutive. This is independent of the question of their
> reliability in matters scientific. It seems to me an extremely unwise
> tactic to link chazal's authority to their scientific competence -- even
> if in your estimation this latter is underrated. 
> 

How do you define "Constitutive"? The Founding Fathers were constitutive
of the US Constitution, yet we know that their handiwork is not holy, its
observance does not impart holiness to an individual, and there is
certainly no reason to assume they were correct about anything - it is a
convention that was ratified by acceptance, and has more or less worked -
but it can and has been amended and changed, and there are components -
such as the right to bear arms - that many of us would regard as seriously
flawed and misguided.

Are Chazal Constitutive in that sense?

YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

Rich Wolpoe asks:

>According to poskim:
>1) One can read the Megillo without a Minyan
>2) The brocho Ahcarona does require a Minyan

>Question:  Given an audience of 5 men and 5 women, would they be mitztaref
for a
>Minyan legabei the last brocho?

This question is addressed in an article by listmember R. Aryeh Frimer,
"Women and Minyan," Tradition 23:4 (Summer 1988).  He cites a number of
Rishonim (e.g., Ran, Re'ah, Meiri)  who count women toward the asarah
for megillah, and a number of Aharonim who extend this to the berakhah
of ha-Rav et rivenu, based on the theory that ten are needed for pirsum,
for which women qualify.  Of course, other Aharonim disagree.  But the
question of being mitztaref raises tzeniut issues.  Thus, the Sefer
ha-Ittur opposes being metzaref women and men for megillah purposes by
analogy to zimmun.

Kol tuv and Sahbbat shalom,

Eli Clark

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