Avodah Mailing List

Volume 03 : Number 197

Wednesday, September 1 1999

• Violence and Coverups
• Mental Health
• Cheit as Ratzon Hashem
• an avel learning to play a musical during the 12 months of avelus
• Inconsistant Symbology
• Toward a Definition of Psak (was: of Chumra)
• Re: Toward a Definition of Psak (was: of Chumra)
• Re: Women speaking before men
• Re: Toward a Definition of Psak (was: of Chumra)
• Re: Toward a Definition of Psak (was: of Chumra)

Eli Turkel writes:

> I thank RDE for the masterful job he has done in explaining the passage
> of knowledge in some yeshivot. However, my my perspective this is the minor
> problem. Whether every bochur in some yeshiva knows or should know the
> truth about the metziv or Rav Moshe etc is a relatively minor issue.
> 
> The more important issues are what i would call social issues like
> violence, psychologists and related issues. While gedolim are aware of
> the problem it is hidden from the average yeshiva student. Israeli
> papers are full of stories of violence in the family. It rarely appears
> in haredi newspapers except to attack the secularists. While, I
> certainly hope that family violence is lower in religious circles it
> certainly exists. The result is that the problem is usually swept under
> the carpet. Many rabbis are more worried about such news leaking out than
> about the woman. Religious psychologists that I have spoken to told me
> that they are severely restricted in what they can suggest and not just
> by halacha.

While I believe that every word that R. Eli has written in this regard 
is true, at least here in Eretz Yisrael, I just want to point out that 
these coverups are not the exclusive province of the Charedi 
Yeshiva world, as someone opening issue 192 as his first issue of 
Avodah might have thought. About a month ago, there was a story 
in the Jerusalem Post Magazine (yes, I read newspapers, I doubt 
anyone will care after meah v'esrim :-) about an abused woman 
who is being denied a get from her mentally disturbed husband, 
whose "prominent Rabbinic family" denies that he is mentally 
disturbed. The woman was quite clearly dati leumi.

> A few days ago i received a phone call from a haredi relative in Jerusalem
> who is trying to set up a hotline for young cancer patients. It seems
> that some families that suspect that children may have cancer don't do
> anything out of fear that it will affect the marriage prospects of older 
> children. This hotline is meant to guarantee information in complete
> secrecy. Similarly, I have heard from respected rabbis of problems with
> infants with problems being abandonded  because it will affect shidduchim.

This, and R. Micha's comments about it in one of yesterday's 
digests, are also, unfortunately, all true. Hashem yirachem on 
Jews who think they are living in ancient Sparta! 

My wife started a support group for the parents of children (of all 
political and religious stripes) who suffer from the same ailment as 
my son does. She has gotten several anonymous calls. In one 
case, she had a call from a mother whose son was attending 
cheder, without the child, the staff of the cheder or the child's 
grandparents knowing that the child had any ailment at all. How a 
10-year old child can manage not to realize that something is 
wrong when he is subjected to frequent MRI's is beyond me, but 
the woman claimed that they were not telling him.

The shidduch business is also unfortunately true. In a world where 
one knows everything (or one's parents know everything) about a 
potential mate before the couple meet for the first time, it is all too 
easy to reject someone because of a mistaken item or a wrong 
answer on a checklist. When Baruch Yosef first got sick we 
worried about telling people both for his sake and for his siblings' 
sake. In the end, a friend convinced us that people would daven 
more fervently for him if they knew he is our son. But we still 
generally do not publish on the net what ailment Baruch Yosef has. 
And not because it's "yener machla" as people call it 
euphemistically - what he has is not R"L malignant, and in Israel 
what he has is not classified as cancer! 

I don't know what the answer is to this. I don't think free dating is 
the answer. I do plan to let potential mates and machatonim know 
whatever they need to know about Baruch Yosef's medical history; 
I don't plan to hide anything (and I have heard too many stories 
about people who did hide things). There is nothing that Baruch 
Yosef has gone through that would R"L prevent him from having 
normal children (which I think is most people's big fear) and there is 
no reason to believe that R"L what he has "runs in the family." But 
who knows how many potential mates and their parents will never 
come to the table because of (false) rumors they may hear (from 
shadchanim and others) about his medical history. Then again, one 
also hears stories about shidduchim not happening because one 
member of the family has gone out l'tarbus raa, and that's not 
exactly fair to the rest of the siblings either.

This gives me a better understanding of what the Gemara means 
when it says that zivugim are as difficult as kriyas yam suf....

-- Carl


Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

Ksiva vaChasima Tova (or Ktiva vaChatima Tova, depending
on your preference). May you be inscribed and sealed in 
the books of life, health and happiness.

Carl and Adina Sherer
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

There was an article in the New York Times July 3, 1999 dealing with
the new social work program for chareidim in Bnei Brak

*For Cloistered Jews, a Lesson in Social Work*
http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/070399israel-orthodox.html


                   Daniel Eidensohn

On Mon, 30 Aug 1999 21:31:58 EDT, Chaim wrote the following on the subject of
Cheit as ratzon Hashem:

>As to why R' Tzaddok's view presents a conundrum:  I think it is simple to >see why there is no contradiction between saying:

>(a) the Divine Will for Shamai is X
>(b) the Divine Will for Hillel is Y

>Can you explain, however, how to reconcile the following statements:

>(a) murder is a violation of Divine Will for all, at all times, in all places
>(b) Ploni who commits murder has fufilled the Divine Will

>The problem is one of logic, as well as ethics (conclusion b is repulsive).

Leaving aside the ethical issue, and focusing on the logical problem only,
consider whether the following (admittedly un-Tzadokian) approach is at
all helpful.

It seems that the fundamental logical issue here is the application of the principle of non-contradiction to the ratzon Hashem.  The principle of non-
contradiction, as I recall it, says that X cannot be both A and not-A at the same time and in the same respect.

Is the Divine Will (1) only in time, (2) only outside of time or (3) both in time and
outside of time? It does not seem likely that the Divine Will is only in time, but if
it were, then there is a serious logical contradiction in maintaining both that murder
always and everywhere violates the Divine Will and that the murder committed by Ploni does not. 

If, on the other hand, the Divine Will is only outside of time, then it must be exempt from the application of the principle of non-contradiction, which
incorporates and presupposes the concept of time. In other words, the Divine Will must be above logic, and propositions about the Divine Will can't be evaluated for
conformity to logical principles.

If, however, the Divine Will is both in time and outside of time, then, even assuming the applicability of the principal of non-contradiction to something partly outside of time,
the logical problem dissolves because the conflicting propositions about the Divine
Will, to violate the principal of non-contradiction, must be affirmed not only at the same time, but also in the same respect. Insofar as one proposition is affirmed in respect
of the Divine Will as it is outside of time and the other is affirmed in respect of the Divine
Will as it is in of time, they are not being affirmed in the same respect. [This is not so
very different from the distinction between mitzido and mitzidaynu that R. Chaim of Volozhin
makes in sha'ar 3 of Nefesh Hachaim, which enables him to maintain both that (mitzido) ain ode milvado, pshuto k'mashma'o, and (mitzidaynu) things are "truly" distinct from Hashem and have varying degrees of kedusha or its opposite.]

Ksiva vchasima tova David

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------=_NextPart_000_0080_01BEF463.5A841DA0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

 Is it permitted for an avel to learn to play a musical instument while =
he is an avel? He would like to do this to release some stress.
c'siva v chesima tovah
Baruch
bjk1@pipeline.com

------=_NextPart_000_0080_01BEF463.5A841DA0
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-1" =
http-equiv=3DContent-Type>
<META content=3D"MSHTML 5.00.2314.1000" name=3DGENERATOR>
<STYLE></STYLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>&nbsp;Is it permitted for an avel to learn to play a =
musical=20
instument while he is an avel? He would like to do this to release some=20
stress.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>c'siva v chesima tovah</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>Baruch<BR><A=20
href=3D"mailto:bjk1@pipeline.com">bjk1@pipeline.com</A></FONT></DIV></BOD=
Y></HTML>

------=_NextPart_000_0080_01BEF463.5A841DA0--

I noticed two cases of inconsistancy in how we understand a mitzvah.

Challah:

1- We cover the challah, in part to symbolize the frost over the mun. Similarly,
   mishneh lechem.
2- Many chassidim have 12 challos as per the lechem hapanim. Others make sure
   that the braiding will produce 6 bumps on each of the mishneh lechem. FWIW,
   the lechem hapanim are one of the two things called "challah" in the Torah
   and the comparison might even be the origin of the name we use for Shabbos
   bread.
3- We salt it, because the table is a surrogate mizbei'ach, so the challah is
   compared to a korban.

What commonality exists between mun, lechem hapanim and korbanos that we're
trying to embody in the way we eat challah each week?

Shofar:

We speak of the 100 cries of Siserah's mother, and argue whether the biblical
t'ruah is like weeping or sobbing. OTOH, the shofar is used for calling to
arms. We have the "ubashofar gadol yitakah". RSRH speaks of the shofar of
teshuvah in terms of the call to move in the midbar: Teki'ah: break camp,
get out of the rut you're living in; teru'ah: pack up; teki'ah: move.

It's almost an Adam I / Adam II thing. Is the shofar blow a regal fanfare of
dignified upright man or a communal sob of a community longing for redemption?
I say almost because the regality of the shofar isn't man's but HKBH's.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287     MMG"H for  1-Sep-99: Revi'i, Nitzavim-Vayeilech
micha@aishdas.org                                    A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                               Pisachim 31b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.    Melachim-I 15

Akiva Miller writes:

> While Russell Hendel and Carl Sherer are discussing what a Chumra is
> (Avodah 3:187), I've been trying to figure out what a P'sak is.
> 
> Russell Hendel writes <<< a chumrah is a prohibition that some but not
> all poskim hold >>>
> 
> Carl Sherer objects, pointing out that <<< if MY posek is machmir, I
> am "stuck" with that; I can't go psak shopping. >>>
> 
> This comment moves me to raise an issue which I have been working on
> for quite some time. This view, that one is "stuck" with the p'sak of
> one's posek, is very widely held, but I am beginning to suspect that
> it is not true. Can anyone cite a source for it?

R. Aryeh Kaplan z"l in his Hnadbook of Jewish Thought, Volume 1, 
Chapter 12, Section 12:54 (P. 251) writes:

"When a rabbi renders a decision in a question of law, the Torah 
recognizes it as binding. Therefore, when a rabbi decides on a 
case, and forbids something, it becomes intrinsically forbidden."

Among other sources he cites (that I have not had time to look up) 
the Nteziv in Meishiv Davar Yoreh Deah 9, Sdey Chemed, Cheth, 
76 (2:412), Rashba in Chullin 44b, Ran in Avoda Zara (Rif 1b) s"v 
HaNishal (quoting Raavad), and the Meiri and the Ritva in Avoda 
Zara 7a. 

He notes that some authorities hold that it does not become 
intrinsically forbidden, but that the decision cannot be overruled out 
of respect for the first rabbi (see list of sources at note 143 in the 
Handbook).

> The closest I have found to such a source is the Rama YD 242:31. But
> as I read that se'if, it says that if Chacham #1 has already ruled on
> something, then Chacham #2 should not rule on it, except under
> specific circumstances.

R. Kaplan goes on to say in 12:55 (P. 252), "Hence, when one 
rabbi forbids something in a specific case, another rabbi may not 
permit it in the same case. One rabbi can overturn the decision of 
another only if he can prove the initial decision to be erroneous."

He goes on to say in 12:56, "Since the initial decision renders the 
subject of a case intrinsically forbidden, it cannot be permitted even 
by a greater sage or by a majority rule," although he notes that 
according to those who do not hold the "intrinsically forbidden" 
shita, a psak may be overrule by a greater sage or by a majority 
rule.

[snip]

> If a person has asked a shaalah, and then asks someone else, then
> PERHAPS he is violating Kavod Harav. 

Not necessarily, since the first Rav can also be overruled if it's a 
case of toeh bidvar mishna (see R. Kaplan and sources cited at 
12:57). That's not the issue. The issue is that if one goes to ask a 
second rav, one is supposed to tell the second rav of the first rav's 
psak (Kaplan 12:63 P. 255 and sources cited there). And the 
second rav is not supposed to overrule the first rav unless the first 
rav was toeh bidvar mishna or, according to some opinions, if he is 
a greater sage than the first rav or somehow constitutes a majority 
rule.

But I propose that he is NOT
> violating some kind of "stuck"ness which was established when he got
> the first p'sak.

No, it doesn't prevent me from going to ask, and I can always say 
Torah hee ulelomdo ani tzarich. But for the second rav to be 
allowed to overrule the first one would require a pretty serious set of 
circumstances.

> Let's go further. Suppose the asker never asked a second posek.
> Rather, in the course of time his learning increased, and other ideas
> and shitos appealed to him, and he came to disagree with the p'sak he
> was given. 

First of all, he himself is a nogea badavar, which says to me at 
least that his disagreement may not be honest. Kaplan writes in 
12:74 (P. 259), "The essence of the halakhic process is that as 
long as it is not clouded by ulterior motives, the desire for 
assimilation or profit, the collective Jewish will parallels the will of 
Hashem." (Citing Gemara Bava Metzia 59b and Mishna Avos 2:4). 
It seems to me that if you are paskening halacha for yourself, you 
may have an ulterior motive, and therefore your view of halacha is 
unlikely to be a correct one.

Kaplan says at 12:41 (Page 248), "When a community accepts a 
rabbi as their religious leader, his decisions are binding in all 
cases." (Citing, amongst others, Tshuvos HaRashba 253, Tshuvos 
HaRan 48, Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 25:2 and the Gra 
there at S"K 22). 

Or maybe he attended a shiur at which a respected chacham
> voices a view which differs from the p'sak which he was given. Is
> there really anything wrong with choosing to follow the new opinion?

If the "thing" is rendered assur in accordance with the first view 
cited above, there clearly is something wrong with following the 
"new" opinion - the cheftza is assur. If we follow the second view 
cited above, then you could only follow the "new" opinion if it is the 
opinion of someone who is either a greater sage or who somehow 
constitutes a majority. In either event, I don't think that you, as the 
person who now wants to change the psak, are qualified to make 
that determination, because you are a nogea badavar.

> Most people seem to believe that when a person asks a shaalah, and
> recieves a psak halacha, some kind of real change occurs. If he
> follows the halacha as the posek told him, Hashem will reward him, but
> if he goes against the words of the posek, he is clearly violating the
> halacha and will be punished.

Well, at least according to the first opinion I cited above, there is a 
real change. If the rav paskens assur, the cheftza becomes assur. 
BTW, Kaplan also says that if the rav paskens muttar, the cheftza 
doesn't become muttar until you act upon the psak (Kaplan 12:59 
P. 253).

> That is what CS meant by being "stuck" with a p'sak, in contrast to a
> person who does *not* ask a shaalah, but relies on the the Torah which
> he learned to come up with a personal decision on how to act. We all
> do this many times in a typical day, in situations ranging the gamut
> from what b'racha to say on a new food, to whether a certain
> discussion constitutes lashon hara, and many other areas. In such
> situations, one has the illusion of being free to choose which course
> of action to take. In actuality, it is only an illusion, because there
> is only one correct decision in Hashem's eyes, and the individual is
> gambling that his decision will be the correct one.

See above what I said about the collective Jewish will parallelling 
the will of Hashem. Yes, we can all make mistakes. That's why 
Yom Kippur is coming. No, I do not have to run to my Rav every 
time I make a bracha to make sure I am making the correct 
bracha. That's because there's a Shulchan Aruch, and there are 
glosses on the Shulchan Aruch, and it's my duty to learn those 
sources and to follow them. It's the cases that aren't so clear cut 
because the facts don't necessarily match, or the cases that are 
disputed in the Shulchan Aruch or in the Achronim (I say 
Achronim, because the Shulchan Aruch and the Rama are 
generally looked upon as the last of the Rishonim) that I have to 
take to a Rav to ask. And I can't pasken those cases for myself, 
because I am a nogea badavar; I will generally have a clear interest 
in how the halacha should come out. That is NOT to say that I will 
necessarily act in accordance with my clear interest. For example, 
one of the things I have heard from several people who pasken 
ksomim is that people who do not ask shailas tend to be too 
machmir because they are afraid of making a mistake.

> It is for this reason that Pirkei Avos says to "get yourself a rabbi,
> and remove yourself from doubt," because when one asks the shaalah and
> gets a p'sak, there is no gamble any more, because the halacha which
> had been unclear is now very clear. He must do what the posek
> paskened. Perhaps the halacha is even *too* clear, because he is
> "stuck" with that p'sak even if he does not like it for some reason.

That's why you get yourself a Rav with whom you feel comfortable 
asking questions, whose psakim you will be able to accept, and 
who you feel understands your position on the ladder of fruhmkeit 
and your station in life.

> I am reasonably certain that the above accurately describes how many
> people understand the action of asking for a p'sak halacha. Support
> for it can be found in the practice of some people of INDIRECTLY
> asking for a p'sak. People who are hoping for answer A, and fear that
> they'll be unable to follow answer B, will sometimes deliberately
> avoid asking the rav "What should I do?" Rather, they ask "How do you
> hold?" or "My friend has this problem; what should *he* do?" In this
> manner, if the answer is A, they follow that action with a clear
> conscience. But if the rabbi answers with B, they can rationalize, "I
> know that there are other shitos and I am relying on them."

I don't think a person who is nogea badavar has the halachic right 
to rely on "other shitos." Of course, he can if they are more 
machmir (and yes, that might qualify as a chumra under my 
definition if he is doing so for the right reasons), but usually the 
person who is doing the type of what my Rebbe would call 
"blufferay" that you describe above is not looking to rely on the 
more machmir shita.

> But I have strayed from my point, which is to suggest that the above
> description is WRONG.
> 
> It seems to me that without a Sanhedrin or other duly-authorized Beis
> Din to resolve questions of halacha, the concept of psak halacha does
> not exist. 

Actually what you're saying is that halacha does not exist. Kaplan 
would disagree. 12:1 (P. 231): It is G-d's will that there exist a 
certain degree of uniformity in Jewish practices, as well as in the 
interpretation of the Law. It is thus written, "There shall be one 
Torah and one law for you." (Bamidbar 15:16 and numerous other 
sources in the footnotes). 12:2: "Therefore, even when no central 
authority, such as the Sanhedrin, exists, G-d has provided 
guidelines to insure the continuance of Judaism as a unified way of 
life. These guidelines provide the basis for the system of Torah law 
known as halakhah." 12:3: "Moreover, it was impossible to include 
every possible case in the Oral Torah. It would be impossible for 
the Sanhedrin to decide in every possible case. Therefore, G-d 
gave each qualified Torah scholar the right to decide questions of 
Torah law. Then, even if laws were forgotten, they could be restored 
through the halkhic process." (Citing the Yerushalmi in Sanhedrin 
4:2 (29a-b) and the Karban HaEdah and Yeffe Mareh there, 
amongst others).

(I am not discussing the ability of a community to choose a
> scholar to lead them in the ways of Hashem; that can be considered a
> political position.) I am talking about the ability of a person to say
> "Hashem does not want you to do that." He can say it, and he might be
> right, but the act of saying so does not *make* it so.

It does according to both shitos I cited above unless he is totally 
wrong (toeh bidvar mishna), or, according to the second shita, if a 
greater sage or a majority of sages says otherwise.

> I think that a person who asks for a "p'sak" is NOT "stuck" and
> obligated to follow it. I propose that a "p'sak" from a source other
> than a Sanhedrin or similar Beis Din is not The Word Of G-d, but is
> sage advice, which must be seriously considered by the individual in
> question. 

I hope you see why the material I cited above (and there is much 
more - I didn't even scratch the surface of all the mekoros Kaplan 
brings - if you don't own the book it's a must buy, even if it is 
expensive) totally refutes your proposal (at least IMHO).

In all likelihood, the p'sak is correct, inasmuch as the
> posek is more learned than the person who is asking, and so the person
> is taking quite a risk if he disobeys the posek. But it is only a
> risk, not a certainty.

No, it's more than just that the posek is more learned. The posek 
also brings an unbiased view to the problem, so that even if the 
person asking is more learned, and even if he knows all the 
sources, he should not pasken halacha for himself except in a 
case that is clearly paskened in the Shulchan Aruch. 

> Above, I quoted Pirkei Avos as saying to "get yourself a rabbi, and
> remove yourself from doubt." I propose that this is not because the
> rabbi is *kovea* halacha for a person, but because he can *teach* the
> halacha to a person. 

Actually I think it's for both reasons. There is certainly nothing 
wrong with asking a Rav to justify his psak. Aderaba, Kaplan says 
(12:51, P. 250) that if a rabbi renders an unusual or anomalous 
decision, he must carefully explain the reasons for it (citing, among 
others, the Shach in Yoreh Deah 242:17). But asking him for the 
reasons does not mean that you can disregard the psak if you 
disagree with it.

Even the greatest of gedolim is not perfect, and
> he does not have the authority to say "This is what Hashem wants you
> to do." The most he can say is "This is what I believe Hashem wants
> you to do."

Yes, but his belief of what Hashem wants you to do carries great 
weight. See above.

> I look forward to posters who can either confirm or disprove these
> ideas. Thank you for taking the time to read this lengthy post.

If anyone other than Akiva has read this response to the end, I will 
be quite surprised.....

-- Carl


Carl M. Sherer, Adv.
Silber, Schottenfels, Gerber & Sherer
Telephone 972-2-625-7751
Fax 972-2-625-0461
mailto:csherer@netvision.net.il
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

In a message dated 9/1/99 1:48:48 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
csherer@netvision.net.il writes:

<< 
 If anyone other than Akiva has read this response to the end, I will 
 be quite surprised.....
 
 -- Carl
 
  >>
I did:-)

I'm struck by the different approaches as seeming parallel to me to the 2 
functions of bet din and/or edut articulated by R'YBS - kiyum and birur(I 
think). In one role they establish reality(Carl's view of psak) and in the 
other they help reveal an already existing reality(Akiva's view)

Carl - Does R' Kaplan deal at all with the question of a posek being nogea 
when one of the litigants or the shoel is a community leader or a big donor 
etc?

KVCT
Joel Rich

Russell Hendel (with his neice's approval - but do we know whether she
offered that approval willingly or was she intimidated by that scary CD-rom 
that sits atop your, I assume, broad shoulders?) supports his contention 
that Rashi (actually the Sifri) is obviously referring to court prodeedings 
when commenting in Ki Teitzei

"mi-kan she'ein r'shut l'isha l'daber bifnei ha-ish"

by citing three Biblical episodes of women speaking:  Deborah and Barak,
Miriam and Aaron, and the daughters of Tzelephhad and Moses.

I had questioned whether the limitation to court proceedings is quite as 
obvious as Russell (and his niece) apparently take for granted.  I am not
persuaded that these three episodes provide the proof that Russell 
(and his neice) evidently think that they provide.  Certainly if the Torah
Temimah (whatever Artscroll and the Yeshivishe insiders might think 
about his bona fides, sorry, Micha, I couldn't help myself) thought that 
the Rashi/Sifri had a more general application, I would be reluctant, with 
all due respect to you (and your neice), to take it as totally obvious that 
Rashi/Sifri extend only to court proceedings.

First since Deborah was herself a judge, and thus presided over a court, 
I fail to see how her conduct provides any evidence about the permissible 
conduct of a woman of lesser status.  Again, I don't say that Deborah's conduct
is irrelevant, but I can at least think of a good reason why it might not be 
relevant, so you (and your neice) have some more work to do on that one.  
Second, without easy access to a CD rom or the book of Judges, I can't tell for 
sure precisely what interaction between Deborah and Barak you (and your 
neice) are referring to.  But if it was a private conversation between them, why 
would a purely private conversation necessarily lend support to your interpretation 
of Rashi/Sifri?  Perhaps Rashi/Sifri mean to include conversations in which 
there are more than two male participants, so that it would make sense to say
"l'daber bifnei ha-ish."  In other words, in a venue in which there are at least
two men present, a women may not initiate a conversation, for to do so would
be "l'daber bifnei ha-ish."  This would, of course, include court proceedings, but
also many other types of social interaction.  But then one might say that a women, 
as a matter of social etiquette, could initiate a private conversation with a man 
when no one else was present.  This would also dispose of the Miriam/Aaron 
incident, so I won't even bother with Miriam's status as a prophet.  Finally, I don't 
see how any conclusion can be brought from the daughters of Tzelaphhad, 
because the Torah may simply have recorded the substance of their 
conversation with Moses without telling us all the details of how they approached 
him or the procedure they followed for obtaining recognition before speaking.

By the way, just to avoid any misunderstanding, I like your interpretation better
than I do the Torah Temimah's (not that my opinion of him suffers as a result.  Nor
mighty I add would it suffer even if I found out that he didn't say Hallel with a 
brachah on Yom Ha-Atmaut, in fact,come to think of it I am sure that he never in 
his whole life said Hallel, with or without a brachah on Yom Ha-Atzmaut - you 
would think that might count for something with the Artscrollers).  I just think that 
you (and your neice) have a ways to go before you can convince me that yours 
(and your neice's) is the more plausible interpretation.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

P.S.  Russell also wrote:

<<<
My neice was STRONGLY 
interested in this Rashi that women should not talk before
men and urged her Uncle Russell to respond (Interestingly
by not responding herself she was following Rashi's directions).
>>>

What was that?  Did you and your niece conduct your little discussion in
front of a court?  Or are you saying that posting to the Avodah list is the 
equivalent of speaking in front of a court?  Better check your hard drive.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               !
!
!
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               !
!
!
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               !
!
!
                                                                                                

"Carl M. Sherer" wrote:

> Actually what you're saying is that halacha does not exist. Kaplan
> would disagree. 12:1 (P. 231): It is G-d's will that there exist a
> certain degree of uniformity in Jewish practices, as well as in the
> interpretation of the Law. It is thus written, "There shall be one
> Torah and one law for you." (Bamidbar 15:16 and numerous other
> sources in the footnotes). 12:2: "Therefore, even when no central
> authority, such as the Sanhedrin, exists, G-d has provided
> guidelines to insure the continuance of Judaism as a unified way of
> life.

Citing Rabbi Kaplan indicates one of three things. Either you hold 1) that
he is Daas Torah - and therefore even if his sources don't say what he is
saying he is still  authoritative or 2) That he is merely summarizing what
his sources say or 3) these are all statements that exists on the subject -
but the sources do not in fact  satisfactorily justify the assertions.

I think we would all disregard the first. While being a  very positive
influence in the world Rabbi Kaplan  never achieved the status of gadol.
Thus we are left with position 2 and 3. The problem with 2 is that his
summaries are not always supported by his footnotes. That leaves us with
position 3 that the major component of his summary might be a das yachid or
obscure source because that is the only reference that even mentions the
issue. The problem being that the source does not convincingly prove what is
asserted or might be just a conjecture on the part of the source.

Therefore in order to legitimately  make any of the assertions made by Rav
Kaplan it would be necessary to go through all his notes and show that  in
fact the positions cited are clearly accepted and supported positions of
Yiddishkeit. When it comes to the issues of authority - aside from the fact
that everybody agrees it must exist  - there is not much clarity or
agreement of what in fact is the source or parameters of that authority. Of
course that doesn't mean that it doesn't exist.
Ultimately we are faced with two choices - either contemporary authority can
clearly be traced to sources - such as existed for Sanhedrin and Nevi'im or
that authority exists because we accept the authority of our mesora and the
baalei mesora - even though we can't absolutely identify the exact mechanism
to justify that authority.

If it it is the latter position - then the nature of authority and psak is a
function of your mesora and thus will legitimately vary between chasid and
litvak - Ashkenazi and Sephardi. This is in fact seems to be the position
described by Rav Ben Tzion Abba Shaul as well as the Baal HaTanya and can
readily be ascribed to Rav Elchonon Wasserman understanding of the Ramban.

In summary I think R' Akiva Miller - has raised solid issues which can not
be brushed aside simply by citing R' Aryeh Kaplan's handbook. On the other
hand  - Rav Kaplan's assertions might be the best we can do aside from
simply accepting our mesora(s) which I think is the real answer.


                                   Daniel Eidensohn

Daniel Eidensohn writes:
: Citing Rabbi Kaplan indicates one of three things. Either you hold 1) that
: he is Daas Torah - and therefore even if his sources don't say what he is
: saying he is still  authoritative
....
: I think we would all disregard the first. While being a  very positive
: influence in the world Rabbi Kaplan  never achieved the status of gadol.

What do you mean by "he is da'as Torah"? I had assumed, reading the first
paragraph, that you meant the standard shorthand of "his opinions on this
subject are those shaped by da'as Torah". In which case, he needn't be a
gadol in p'sak halachah or in Torah in general, "just" an authority on the
subject at hand and immersed in the Torah weltenschaung.

There's also a black-and-white-ness about your descriptions of gadlus and
of da'as Torah that I don't think are "justifiable" (see below).

(And, speaking quite probably as the only person on Avodah who knew R'
Aryeh Kaplan, I have no hesitation in saying that in inyanei machshavah he
certainly is one of this century's greats. Although I don't expect many here
to agree, I found his grasp of aggadic issues as personally impressive as R'
Moshe's piskei halachah. So "we wouldn't *all* disregard" giving him the label
"gadol".)

[Jumping back]
:                                      2) That he is merely summarizing what
: his sources say
....
:                                         The problem with 2 is that his
: summaries are not always supported by his footnotes.

Again, I disagree. I can't say more without specific examples. Here you
speak of summaries, whereas in #3 you speak of satisfactorily justifying
an idea. You'd have to show me multiple clear examples to convince me that
RAK published an idea that wasn't "satisfactorily justified". He was very
willing to extrapolate, but his arguments were always very tightly supported
by numerous different sources.

:                    3) these are all statements that exists on the subject -
: but the sources do not in fact  satisfactorily justify the assertions.
....
:                                                      That leaves us with
: position 3 that the major component of his summary might be a das yachid or
: obscure source because that is the only reference that even mentions the
: issue. The problem being that the source does not convincingly prove what is
: asserted or might be just a conjecture on the part of the source.

You appear to insist that if an opinion isn't taken by "a gadol" or is
taken up by numerous people, it can be dismissed. I don't know where such
a principle comes from. I think you're expecting a unanimity in hashkafah
that just doesn't exist, but I could be wrong.

Inasmuch as:
: In summary I think R' Akiva Miller - has raised solid issues...

At least the same could be said of RAK's "Handbook". The fact that it's
in the book is a strong argument that this model of halachic authority is
consistant with at least one paneh of Torah. It doesn't show how, though --
for which I wait for Carl's reply as much as you do.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287     MMG"H for  1-Sep-99: Revi'i, Nitzavim-Vayeilech
micha@aishdas.org                                    A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                               Pisachim 31b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.    Melachim-I 15

*********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]