Avodah Mailing List

Volume 04 : Number 352

Wednesday, February 9 2000

• SE Letters
• RE: opinion of Rav Henkin z'tz'l' re "onim v'omrim" (was "3 quest ions (Go'al Yisrael out loud)")
• Re: Science and halacha
• RE: opinion of Rav Henkin z'tz'l' re "onim v'omrim" (was "3 quest ions (Go'al Yisrael out loud)")
• Gezel Akum, Seridei Esh and the Suppression of Historical Evidence
• Paskening
• Re: lived together but a breed apart (was "Re[2]: Gezel Akum, Seridei Esh and the Suppression of History")
• Re: Smoking and Halocho
• Re: SE Letters
• Beano
• Re[2]: Smoking and Halocho

Before responding to the points raised by YGB, I would like to raise an additional point.  Eli Clarke mentioned the publication of chiddushim, and the likes of the Ch. haGR"CH taken from R' Chaim's private yoman, or the Ch. HGR"M vhaGRI"D which were private exchanges betweenthe Rav and his father, come to mind.  By we have also seen the publication of many letters by gedolim - letters of the Steipler, the Chazaon Ish, R' Shach.  Many of these letters were written to private individuals, were published posthumously, and are accepted as legitimate representations of the opinions of these gedolim on issues.  And then we have the letters of the SE.  So I ask a simple question: mah li these letters, mah li those letters?  
On to the technical points:

>>>The deficit of mitzva ha'aba'ah b'aveira is
permanent. Thus, while the donation does not constitute a further aveira,
the cheftza (as in lulav shel asheira) remains tainted.<<<

Thsi is totally off track.  Mitzva ha'ba-ah b'aveira is concerned with which objects are usable for mitzva performance.  Reading letters is not a mitzva that demands an untained cheftza shel mitvza (nevermind that intellectual property isn;t a cheftza).

>>> So, the illicitly
published letters remain tainted, and, as such, should be considered
"muktzeh machmas me'us" by any ethically inclined individual (i.e., the
Avodah membership).<<<

Pick up the biography of any well known historical figure and you will discover pages of material culled from personal correspondance, among other things.  Are we to consier the entire field of biographical reporting unethical?  

>>>No, no,no! The letters do not speak for themselves. And here, the choice of
the venue for publication (consciously? subconciously?) pertains very
directly to intepretation! Let me amplify:

>>>But, by printing this essay in the TuM journal, we were (consciously?
subconciously?) being asked to take these letters as absolutley serious,
definitve, accurate and final reflections of the SE's position - and,
triumphantly! - affirm his affiliation with the TuM school of thought.<<<

But a good reader would not draw that conclsion!  An intelligent reader would not draw any conclusion as to a definitive stance of the SE, as to a public stance of the SE, or as to anything else outside the context the letters were presented in - privately held views expressed to selct individuals.  If you wish to refute wrong interpretations, I'm all for it.  

Secondly, there might be multiple conclusions that can be drawn from them that pertain to multiple disciplines.  Just because the facts are placed in a context for consideration does not represent an interpretation.  It does invite the reader to consider the facts, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions within a certain context.  IOW: the reader can interpret as he/she desires - the article provides fodder for thought, not rigid conclusions.  

-----Original Message-----
From: MPoppers@kayescholer.com [mailto:MPoppers@kayescholer.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2000 4:24 PM
Subject: opinion of Rav Henkin z'tz'l' re "onim v'omrim" (was "3
questions (Go'al Yisrael out loud)")

In Avodah 4#343, AEStein wrote:
> On a related note:
R' Henkin also states that the Shatz (and, for that matter, everyone else;
it's just that the problem usually crops up on Shabbos with the Shatz)
should be careful about his pronounciation of words with respect to
phrasing.  For example (in nusach ashkanez), when concluding the paragraph
of "Es shem hakail....", the shatz often groups the last three words
together ("onim v'omrim b'yira"), when, in fact, "onim" belongs to the
previous word "k'echad". <

Michael Poppers wrote:
I haven't seen the source for this example, but I would hazard that Rav
Henkin was not trying to group "onim" with the previous word "k'echad" *to
the exclusion* of grouping "onim" with the subsequent phrase "v'omrim
b'yir'ah" -- could you check and clarify?  Thanks.

========> Actually, I am pretty sure that R' Henkin *was* grouping "onim"
with the previous word "k'echad" to the exclusion of grouping "onim" with
the subsequent phrase "v'omrim b'yir'ah".  Similarly, by the phrase "zeh
kaili anu v'amru" in maariv, R' Henkin says that one must group "anu" with
the previous words "zeh kaili" and not with the subsequent word "v'amru".
Again, I think most chazanim are not careful about this, and they group
"anu" together with "v'amru".

Michael Poppers wrote:
As a side point, I think it's noteworthy that there are different nuscha'os
re the words before "kulam k'echad" (e.g. (a) should there be a dagesh in
"b'rurah"? (b) is it "k'dushah" or "k'doshah"?) and after "kulam k'echad"
(e.g. "onim b'aimah v'omrim b'yir'ah" or "onim b'yir'ah v'omrim"), but not
with "kulam k'echad."  That may provide a rationale for a SHaTZ grouping
those two words and then grouping the remaining words (i.e. "onim etc.")
before "Kodosh..." (or it may just be a matter of bad habit/breath
control/ignorance :-).

========>Right...that's why I mentioned that this is really only an issue
with nusach ashkanez.  As for bad habits, ever since I first saw what R'
Henkin said, I have tried to phrase everything the right way, especially
when davening for the amud, and it's amazing how difficult it is change the
way one davens (even though its only a matter of phrasing).

Kol tuv
Aryeh

 remt@juno.com wrote on Wed, 9 Feb 2000 at 11:45:38:

<< (quoting the Rav) If you should start modifying and reassessing the
chazokos upon which a multitude of halochos rest, you will destroy
yahadus! >>

Perhaps a distinction has to be drawn between being okeir the chazaka
completely, and defining a specific situation in which it is no longer
applicable because of whatever halachic principle you will invoke that
overrides any chazaka.  Though I'm not sure how to properly define the
distinction.

 I suppose the first two hypotheticals I gave would be examples that
are unacceptable because they completely destroy the force of the
chazaka.  But the example of the shor (who was diagnosed with congenital
hyper-violence based on current veterinary science) does not deny the
chazaka's veracity, it actually confirms it by asserting that this
particular shor does not fit the pattern.  In this situation I think
relevant medical knowledge can impact the halachic decision making.

 The problem I have with this, though, is that once you can do it for
one shor (just like a person can lose his chezkas sheleimus by virtue of
a medical diagnosis) why can't you do it for many, if not all shvarim? 
By extension, why not for chazakos that apply to people?

  As R. Micha points out regarding the Rav's statement <<What is
interesting to note about this is that it means RYBS is denying a priori
the possibility of scientific inaccuracy in a chazakah. Not that
chazakos wouldn't change if the science were wrong, but that the science
can't be wrong.>>  But if we agree that Chazal themselves recognized
that their science could be inaccurate (Pesachim 94b- unless you
understand "nir'in" as "seem to be but are not actually correct"), and
that scientific confirmation of fact can override a chazaka (a la the
Rambam in Hil Rotzeach that Rav Blau cited), how do we understand the
precise scope of the Rav's forceful words?
 One way I can see is to assert that chazakos were not based on
scientific knowledge, but rather on mesorah, and therefore delineation
of facts does not impact on their force.  However, since ruba v'chazaka
ruba adif, and science can establish a rov by identification of fact,
how does this fit with the Rav's assertion?

Sincerely, 
David Eisenman

AEStein replied:
> Actually, I am pretty sure that R' Henkin *was* grouping "onim" with the
previous word "k'echad" to the exclusion of grouping "onim" with the
subsequent phrase "v'omrim b'yir'ah".  Similarly, by the phrase "zeh kaili
anu v'amru" in maariv, R' Henkin says that one must group "anu" with the
previous words "zeh kaili" and not with the subsequent word "v'amru".
Again, I think most chazanim are not careful about this, and they group
"anu" together with "v'amru"....As for bad habits, ever since I first saw
what R' Henkin said, I have tried to phrase everything the right way,
especially when davening for the amud, and it's amazing how difficult it is
change the way one davens (even though its only a matter of phrasing). <
Then, b'm'chilas kovod shel Godol baTorah, I have to note that this opinion
is not the "right way" merely because you agree with Rav Henkin.  As I
mentioned, there are various nuscha'os -- some, such as "onim b'yir'ah
v'omrim" (which, IIRC [sorry, quoting from memory], Baer [see Siddur Avodas
Yisroel] found in Machzor Roma), clearly imply otherwise (in the example's
case, because it makes no sense for the next phrase to begin "b'yir'ah...")
and are quite long in the tooth.  Since you brought "zeh kaili" as further
evidence for Rav Henkin's apparent "separate aniyah from amirah" point of
view, I have to ask whether it's sensible to group "onu," which is not in
the Torah, with "zeh kaili" (Sh'mos 15:2), as opposed to grouping two verbs
(esp. when the second verb is prefixed with a conjunctive "vov"); if you
understand my logic on this point, it may be extended without undue effort
to "kulam k'echad...."

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

RYGB writes:

>Hmm. I was moved to do some cursory research. Look at the Sdei Chemed
>Ma'areches ha'Mem 77:13. The deficit of mitzva ha'aba'ah b'aveira is
>permanent. Thus, while the donation does not constitute a further aveira,
>the cheftza (as in lulav shel asheira) remains tainted. So, the illicitly
>published letters remain tainted, and, as such, should be considered
>"muktzeh machmas me'us" by any ethically inclined individual (i.e., the
>Avodah membership).

I am not convinced.  In the case of a lulav shel asherah, the hefetz is
intrinsically assur and remains so until the hefetz undergoes bittul by
an oved avodah zarah.  Indeed, in the case of a lulav shel asherah,
there is the additional problem of mihtat shiureih.

The question here is whether words of a dead person that were published
in violation of some supposed issur regarding privacy retain their
taint.  The issur is difficult for me to analyze because I am not clear
on its source.  But assuming that it relates to privacy, I think the
taint disappears as soon as the information ceases being private.  (An
analogy to lashon ha-ra leaps to mind.)  After all, the problem is
publicizing a private letter.  If  the letter is no longer private, then
one is now publicizing a public letter and therefore not violating the
issur.

Regarding RYGB's broader claims that (a) the TuM journal is trying to
score ideological points and (b) that the letters may be interpreted as
not true expressions of R. Weinberg's thoughts:

First, it saddens me that RYGB apparently views so much of life in terms
of the ideological conflict between MO and RW.  I have found this
worldview typical of the Jewish Observer, but not ecountered it
elsewhere.

Second, the thrust of the article was that R. Weinberg maintained a
friendship with Prof. Atlas, not that R. Weinberg subscribed to a
particular worldview.  RYGB is free to reject this friendship thesis as
well, although much evidence exists outside the article, including R.
Weinberg's haskamah  -- and hearot -- to Atlas's Hiddushei ha-Raavad to
Bava Kama (at least it appears in the copy on my shelf, a photo offset
published by your basic frum seforim press).

Third, R. Weinberg's moral qualms regarding certain halakhot were
expressed in other forums as well, as I recall, including published
articles.  I believe this was documented in the following issue of the
TuM Journal.

Fourth, it is common knowledge that R. Weinberg had a Ph.D.  That alone
seems to classify his weltanschauung somewhat, at least with respect to
university education, and strikes me as far more significant than the
letters discussed in the article in the TuM Journal.  Also, as charter
members of Bnei Akiva know, he gave a qualified heter to mixed youth
groups.  And he wrote a famous teshuvah on kol ishah.  So I think most
people might already suspect that R. Weiberg's hashkafah was not
identical to that of, say, the Hazon Ish or R. Dessler.

Fifth, words cannot describe how dubious I find RYGB's proposed attempts
to "re-interpret" the letters.  As both of us know, there are many
things a public figure will say in private that he cannot say in public.
 This is certainly true in the Torah community.  Therefore, private
correspondence is more likely to be an accurate reflection and
expression of a person's thoughts.  Indeed, in one of his letters to
Atlas, R. Weinberg states that he cannot reveal his innermost thoughts
to anyone but Atlas.  (Of course, this could also be hyperbole or an
attempt at kiruv; also I could be a secret opponent of TuM who is being
paid to provoke charter members of the yeshiva world to reveal their
otherwise secret devotion to TuM.) Moreover, I think that if the letters
could be easily reinterpeted, R. Weingort would not have expressed his
strong opposition to their publication.

Perhaps RYGB himself was getting carried away, but I do not believe that
anyone -- let alone a trained historian like the author of the TuM
article  -- would claim that a private letter contains the "definitive,
accurate and final reflections" of the letter writer.  But I think most
people would assume that they contain an accurate picture of what he
felt at the time that he wrote it.  That is certainly my assumption.

On the other hand, what a person writes to an e-mail list with 100's of
subcribers may not be what he or she really thinks.  And I am definitely
not going to tell anyone here what I really think!

Kol tuv,

Eli Clark

Kol tuv,


> Moreover, the "ill-gotten gain" that RYGB refers to is unclear to me.
> Who gained from the publication of R. Weinberg's letters?  (The TuM
> Journal is generally distributed free of charge; neither the editor nor
> the contributors receive monetary compensation.)  And even if you say
> that the author of the article or the editor of the journal gained in
> some illicit way, why should a third party, like R. Dratch, not be
> allowed to make use of the information?
>

REC, REC! Please! Surely in our rarified stratosphere of high intellect
and
sophisticated inquiry financial gain is but to be disdained! Money?!

Nay, the gains we seek our ideological and philosophical!

Indeed, we must understand "journal-ism" in its proper historical
context,
as a prelude to the next component of our discussion.

It is a hallmark of academia to establish journals to promote schools of
thought and analysis. For example, the book I am currently listening
explains how the French historian Marc Bloch and his associates
established
a journal to promote their type of materialistic analysis, a goal in
which
they were wildly successful.

The TuM journal clearly serves to promote the view that there exists a
TuM
weltanschaunng, that despite the relative recent coinage of the phrase
it
has antecedents, and that its perspectives may be traced and identified
in
the works of great Jewish minds through the ages. Even anti-TuM essays
would
serve to further this goal, as were TuM not a school of thought, it
would
not be worth fighting over, no?

Thus, the gain here is actually quite great: Another Gadol has been
co-opted
by and firmly palced within the TuM camp (at least vis-a-vis the
essential
humanistic component thereof).

> RYGB then goes on to question the agenda of the historians involved and
> to make some sweeping pronouncements in the name of Yahdaut:
>
> >In this regard, the choice of venue for publishing these letters is
> >fascinating, as the TuM journal is not an objective historical journal,
but
> >one whose very name belies an overt agenda. The publication (and,
> >occasionally, the citation) of these letters, was not bias-free "history"
> >(if there is such a thing) but very much agenda driven (prohibition
aside).
> >Yahadus, as formalized by Cherem d'Rabbeinu Gershom, dictates a specific
> >level of privacy in defining the contours of a person's theological or
> >philosophical persona: Unpublished material not authorized for
distribution
> >is seen as rumination and speculation, which may admittedly be frivolous,
> >half-baked or even inane - certainly private and priveleged - and
precisely
> >for that reason its admission as testimony in the historical record is
more
> >harmful - either to the person, the persona, or theology and philosophy
in
> >general - than good.
>
> Well now.  Let us grant, again for the sake of argument, that the TuM
> journal and all of its varied contributors (of whom I am one) all
> somehow share a single agenda, whatever that may be.  Let us also
> assume, again for the sake of argument, that we therefore cannot trust
> the interpretation of the letters by the historian in question.  Does
> that mean we cannot trust our own eyes?  Do the letters not speak for
> themselves?  I submit that the "agenda" issue is a red herring.
>

No, no,no! The letters do not speak for themselves. And here, the choice
of
the venue for publication (consciously? subconciously?) pertains very
directly to intepretation! Let me amplify:

Were there to exist a "Journal for Kiruv Methods and Techniques", the
same
letter could have been published there by the Rosh Yeshiva of some Kiruv
Yeshiva as an example of how one can approach a secular friend and
parlay
with him on his own terms in order to lasso him into frumkeit.

Were there to exist the "Journal of German Jewish Hyperbole and
Bombastic
Language" (the journal that, doubtless, will someday analyze my writings
:-) ), a scholar of historic forms of expression might have pointed out
how
transplanted Lithuanians adopted the German mode of exaggeration in
one's
writings.

Were there to exist a "Journal for the Research of Inaccurate Reflection
and
Expression in Private Correspondence", then the letters would have been
held
up there as an example of how a Gadol b'Torah, instead of doodling,
playing
solitaire, or e-mailing questionable humor across the Internet, wrote
lettrs
of the cuff as a form of diversion and recreation.

Yahadus (sheesh, there he goes again with sweeping statements!), via
CDRG
(Cherem d'Rabbeinu Gershom) approximates, as I have noted, the position
of
our third journal (the JRIR-EPIC).

But, by printing this essay in the TuM journal, we were (consciously?
subconciously?) being asked to take t

I wrote <<< A Posek, a.k.a. Rabbi, a.k.a. Talmid Chacham, can give a binding
p'sak regarding whether a *cheftza* is assur/mutar. He can also give a
non-binding *opinion* regarding whether an *act* is assur/mutar/chiyuv, and
an intelligent person will act accordingly, but that does not make the act
inherently assur or mutar. >>>

R' Rich Wolpoe asked <<< Are you categorically syaing that an LOR cannot
say, for you smoking is oveir v'nishmartem? >>>

I think our difference is in the way we understand the concept of "binding
psak".

I am saying that an LOR can say "It is my opinion that if you do ABC, then
you will be oveir on XYZ." If you are smart and you repect him and trust
him, you will follow what he says. But if you don't, and you do ABC despite
what he said, you will not be oveir on 'lo sasur yemin o smol', and only
HaShem knows for sure whether or not you are really oveir on XYZ.

Akiva Miller

In Avodah 4#351, RWolpoe responded:
> ok how about Washington/Adams/Jefferson? <smile> <
Almost as bad as Hamilton/Burr/Jefferson :-).

All the best (including the hope that I haven't added to a political
"slippery slope") from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

In message , Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer
<sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu> writes
>I believe you misunderstood me. I said there are things beyond *Halacha* not
>beyond *Torah*. I.e., the sum of Torah is greater than the part of Halacha.

But listen to the language that you use.  To quote from your previous
post:

>I have been thinking a little about what I find objectionable in the
>discussion here. After all, I think smoking is bad and stupid, so what
>is my problem (I am sure many of you have been wondering the same thing
>:-) )?

How do you translate the concept "bad and stupid" into the language of
the Torah (by which I do not just mean Hebrew, I mean language that
means something within Torah).  I, certainly, do not find it very easy.
But let me try:

bad is usually translated as "ra" - which makes one think of "r'eih
nasati lfanecha hayom es hachaim v'es hatov v'es hamaves v'es hara".
But how could any person, gadol or otherwise stand back without
protesting if the people were following a derech ra?

Perhaps we should go with your other language, stupid.  Perhaps k'sil is
the right concept.  After all, there are understandings of holy fools
within our literature (and, after all, hak'sil bchoshech holech).  I am
not sure if that captures your meaning though (is it on a par with
somebody who keeps the chumras of two shitas?)

So how, within a Torah framework, does one understand "bad and stupid"
behaviour? How is one supposed to relate to it?  Sure the English
secular world tells us how to relate.  If it interferes with you in a
material way, you report it to the police, if it does not, you shrug
your shoulders and say "it's a free country".

What is the Torah way (lets broaden it from halacha) in relation to such
behaviour?

It was firstly because of this language, which fits completely within
the English secular weltershung, but is difficult to translate across,
that it seemed to me that you were seeing two separate worlds.  The
secular world in which the knowledge was generated, but where the
appropriate responses would be "yes it is bad and stupid but it is not
my problem" and the Torah world of halacha.

And secondly because of the next piece of language in your original
post:

>
>There are two different thrusts here:
>
>1. Smoking is assur al pi halocho. A rabbinic pronouncement would merely
>confirm that prohibition (psak).
>2. Smoking may be muttar, but it should be banned. A pronouncement would
>promulgate that ban (takkana).


No, I don't agree these were the thrusts of most of the participants.
Because I do not think that most of the participants are in fact
Briskers.  Rather, they use the language of tzivui, of command, as that
is the language of the Torah, it gives value to rebuke. And they expect
gedolim, as leaders of the people to issue such rebuke, as they do on
many other issues (eg television, the internet etc) using precisely
these kinds of language (V'nishmartem etc).  Admittedly the boundaries
between this and strict psak or takkana are porous, but because of the
tendency to unify, rather than divide, that fluidity is acceptable
(rather, it is thought to be appropriate).  I suspect that what most
people are envisioning is, if anything, a cry from the heart of the
gedolim over people who are destroying their lives, just the way we have
heard the cry from the heart of Rav Pam over people who are destroying
their marriages and their children.  Where do cries from the heart stop
and psak/takana begin?  The boundary is not clear, and people do not
seek to probe, rather it might be seen as something of a continuum.

So rather it seems to me that it is you, on this list who were seeking
to define and then divide between strict halacha (which you then argued
should not be applied) and this which fits within secular, not Torah
(and yet still valid) categories.  It therefore appeared to limit the
scope of what appeared straightforward Torah responses while allowing
for areas outside of Torah, using a form of argument that I had not seen
in a while.

>In this respect, the banner of TIDE (vs. "Torah Only") is a misnomer. RSRH
>did not see DE as "beyond Torah" - but rather as part and parcel of the
>Torah.
>

I deliberately used derech eretz with a small de, and then clarified it
by saying "by which I mean basic human decency", to make it clear that I
was not, in any way, refering to RSRH and his philosophy.  The
philosophy I was describing was emphatically *not* a form of RSRH
philosophy.

>"Torah Only" is also a misnomer, and only relevant to a contrast with DE.

No, I think it is relevant as a contrast to the street philosophy I was
describing (I use the term street philosophy to refer to philosophy that
may not be fully articulated by a master, it can often be based on
several, but is widely held by the "am".  Meaning of course that there
may be many inherent contradictions, but the "am" happily lives with
them.  In this regard, the kind of Habbakuk philosophy I am describing
is also a street philosophy).

>There is "Torah u'Mussar" "Torah v'Chesed" "Torah v'Chassidus" "Torah,
>Avodah u'Gemilus Chasodim", etc.

You are referring to specific worked out philosophical positions.
However most people have not studied enough philosophy in order to fall
within one position or another.  But in order to make sense of the world
around them, people have to develop an underlying philosophical
perspective, often poorly articulated, but which can be understood by
piecing together their articulated views.  I confess a fascination for
these genuine philosophical positions, despite their messiness and
contradictory nature, perhaps even more so than the grand schemes of the
masters.

>> Because this isn't a viewpoint I have heard in a while.  Once upon a
>> time it was very widely held, particularly, I would say, among the Torah
>> u'Mada crowd, ie there is Torah, and there are things outside Torah
>> which have their own value and therefore should be studied and valued
>> independently.  This was traditionally contrasted with the view in
>> favour of "only Torah", which said that nothing outside of Torah had any
>> value and since Mada was outside, it should not be valued.  And I think,
>> to a large extent, the "only Torah" people won the debate.  Look, they
>> argued, if Torah is emes, and emes is Torah, everything that is not
>> Torah must be tiflus or sheker (if not the sitra achra).
>>
>
>TuM is indeed different. Classic Lithuanian TuM could fit very neatly with a
>Brisker world view, with the one caveat that besides Halocho there is also
>Madda.

Sure, but note that I was not referring to classic TuM - I was referring
to the street version (hence the use of my terminology the Torah u'Mada
crowd).  That is, somebody operating out of this kind of a philosophical
basis will come out with statements very close to yours, whereas I would
not expect a response like that from somebody with a Habbakuk
perspective.

>
>> And in the face of this argument, it seems to me that viewpoint you
>> articulate has virtually disappeared (sure it seems to reflect a
>> position within the traditional sources, but I don't mean that, I mean
>> in the living breathing Torah world of today).   However, that does not
>> mean that those who supported Mada abandoned its study and involvement.
>> Rather, it seems to me, there was a shift in philosophical position, in
>> many ways a paradigmatic shift to a perspective that agrees that Torah
>> "covers the field".  That does not mean that the full "only Torah"
>> viewpoint has taken over and areas of knowledge that were once accepted
>> were rejected.  Rather the shift has been to see various parts of Torah
>> as "picking up" the other things that are valued, rather than seeing
>> them as other but still emes.
>>
>
>Not at all. Once refraining from smoking is seen as al pi mussar and
>curtailing ta'avo, it is fully part of Torah (=Yahadus).
>

Is bad and stupid accurately translated as al pi mussar and curtailing
ta'avo?  Is smoking indeed on the same level as gluttony and a few
notches less of a concern than conspicuous consumption?  Remember we are
talking about something that is killing thousands if not tens of
thousands of yidden a year (that's a conservative estimate).  Is that
how high Yahadus rates the self induced destruction of a human life?

If that is indeed your position, then, I agree, it is not have I have
said - rather what it indicates is that your understanding of some of
the fundamental values underlying Yahadus are radically different to, I
suspect, most of the others on the list.  Most others I would suspect,
intuitively feel that Yahadus places a very high premium on the
preservation of human life.  Not to the exclusion of all else, there
are, as you know, situations in which life must be given up for higher
values.  But very close to the top of the list.  Most of our
understanding of what Yahadus values comes from halacha, everything from
fencing roofs to being mechallel shabbas for the preservation of human
life.  But out of all this comes a sense of underlying principle which
is violated when jeopardising a human life (albeit it slowly and over
long periods of time) is placed on the same level as walking around with
a smile on one's face.  It just does not have the feel of emes to most
people.  People expect something stronger, something closer to the core
values of Torah, which are preserved by halachic fiat.  It is not that
there is only halacha.  Rather halacha (psak/takana) is the ultimate
expression of the underlying Torah values and the closer the expression
is to psak (and a cry of the heart from a Gadol is very close) the
stronger it is within Yahadus.


Regards

Chana

-- 
Chana/Heather Luntz

IIRC R. S. Schwab once suggested that since history w/o accuracy is useless, but
any accurate history is at least likely - if not definitely - going to include 
loshon horo, therefore it is best not to learn history.

It's likely he would have said the same about biography, too.

Richard_Wolpoe@ibi.com


______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________
<snip>
Pick up the biography of any well known historical figure and you will discover 
pages of material culled from personal correspondance, among other things.  Are 
we to consier the entire field of biographical reporting unethical?  

<snip>

There is a very important point which no one has yet mentioned about Beano.

IT'S NOT MEDICINE !!!

I don't remember where I heard this, but Beano and Lactaid are not medicines
in any sense of the term. In no way do they have any kind of therapeutic
effect on the person. Their effect is directly on the food, to make the food
more digestible. It therefore has none of the halachos of medicines, and all
the halachos of food additives, like colorings, flavorings, vitamins, etc.

The candies you at last Shabbos -- I'm sure the candies had a hechsher you
approve of. Now how would you feel if the manufacturer used artificial
colorings that had no hechsher? I suppose bitul might work for certain
ingredients even l'chatchila, but most of us don't like to rely on that. ---
But Beano is a whole nother thing entirely, in that *you* are the one adding
it to your food. Do you want to do that with something that has no hechsher?
(And kal vachomer for Lactaid, which is eaten on its own, not even mixed
in!)

I searched the archives of both Avodah and Mail-Jewish, hoping to find
something more authoritative, but I came back empty-handed. I know we have a
few MD's on the list -- what do you think?

Akiva Miller

How about this analogy?

When I learned in Ner Yisreol I was told:

It is not ossur to argue on Rishonim, just foolish.

Perhaps it was in this sense that RYGB applied it to smoking?

Richard_Wolpoe@ibi.com




______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________

But listen to the language that you use.  To quote from your previous 
post:

>I have been thinking a little about what I find objectionable in the 
>discussion here. After all, I think smoking is bad and stupid, so what 
>is my problem (I am sure many of you have been wondering the same thing 
>:-) )?

How do you translate the concept "bad and stupid" into the language of 
the Torah (by which I do not just mean Hebrew, I mean language that 
means something within Torah).  I, certainly, do not find it very easy. 
But let me try:

bad is usually translated as "ra" - which makes one think of "r'eih 
nasati lfanecha hayom es hachaim v'es hatov v'es hamaves v'es hara". 
But how could any person, gadol or otherwise stand back without 
protesting if the people were following a derech ra?
<snip>


Regards

Chana

*********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]