Avodah Mailing List

Volume 05 : Number 062

Tuesday, June 6 2000

• Re: Avodah V5 #61
• Re: Negative kavanah
• Re: Negative kavanah
• Re: Avodah V5 #61
• Brisker derech
• Re; Interesting Meharsha
• Negative kavanah
• Re: Avodah V5 #61
• Megillas Rus
• Re: Brisker derech
• Re: occupy yourself with Torah
• Re: Quick question in defining "Shomer Shabbos"
• Telzer Derech
• Re: Quick question in defining "Shomer Shabbos"
• Re: Telzer Derech
• Re: Gezeirah Shava
• Re: definition of self
• Re: Fwd (owner-avodah@aishdas.org): BOUNCE avodah@aishdas.org: Approval requi...

Date: Mon, 5 Jun 2000 13:14:27 +0200
From: "Carl M. Sherer" <cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il>
Subject: Re: Kesuvos 62 Father leaving home to learn Torah

<<I'm not sure you can impute our concept of teva to the type of person
who is ready to leave his wife alone for twelve years and spend all of
his time learning Torah day and night.>>

	Or can't wait until sheva brochos are over so he can go to yeshiva with
his chevrusa.  

<<Nishtana haTeva....>>

	Even,  I would say, since Europe 100-150 years ago.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

> 1. To be yotzei through shmiya of someone else necessitates shomea k'oneh
> indpendent of the requirement of mitzvos tzrichos kavanah - e.g. see Mishna
> R"H 3:7 regarding tekiyas shofar. You don't need negative kavanah to avoid
> the issue - lack of positive kavanah suffices to break the shomea k'oneh.

But doesn't the answering of amen have a higher level than shomea koneh
according to the Rambam at least (Source available when I'm at home)

Kol Tuv
Joel Rich

In a message dated 6/5/00 4:23:52 PM Eastern Daylight Time, C1A1Brown@aol.com 
writes:

> 2. By mitzvos of amira b'prat kavanah is necessary acc. to all dayos -
>  see R' Yonah at the end of first perek of Berachos, so you wouldn't need
>  negetive kavanah, just lack of positive.
>  
>  
It is Machlokes see S"A Horav O"C 489:12

Kol Tuv

Yitzchok Zirkind

In Avodah V5#61, MBerger responded:
> I wasn't suggesting that "eisek" in the mishnah referred to business. <

No, you didn't -- AES provided the translation in his post.

> What I meant was that "eisek baTorah" doesn't necessarily mean sitting down
in front of a seifer. One can be "busy in Torah" in other ways. <

Again, I agreed with your point, but my question still is whether your
point can be inferred from R'Meir's words in the mishna. Since you
mentioned "aisek," how do _you_ translate it? Surely you're not reading
it as _including_ activity which is compatible with "Torah" when the Tanna
says we should be m'ma'ait it (and, perhaps, that we should _instead_ be
"osaik baTorah")?!

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

I do not lay claim to great familiarity with either the Brisker derech,
or hilchot nazir, or the Yerushalmi.  Nonetheless, it seems to be that
the question of the nazir who has completed his days of a nezirut vow,
but became tameh prior to bringing his karbonot has a natural
explanation.  The torah requires bringing specific korbonot and a
special ceremony at the end of the nezirut period to complete the
process, and also requires repeating the nezirut vow if the nazir became
tameh during his period.  If the nazir became tameh after his period but
before the ceremony at the mikdash, then he has entered a special
category.  He can not bring the korbonot nazir since there was an
interval of tumah and the bringing of purification (from tumas mes)
korbonot between the conclusion of his nezirut and the mikdash
ceremony.  Yet, he did fulfill his vow of 100 days.  He, therefore, is
given the 30 day generic periond of nezirut to fulfill before he can
complete the process.

Yitzchok Zlochower

See the Sridei Eish Orach Chaim 13 "Mi she'hitkavnu shelo latzeyt ..".
and the Sdei Chemed (that the entire inyan of mitzvot tzrichot kavana
is only mi'drabannan). See also Magen Avraham OC 60 s"k gimmel.

Josh

From: C1A1Brown@aol.com
> 1. To be yotzei through shmiya of someone else necessitates shomea k'oneh
> indpendent of the requirement of mitzvos tzrichos kavanah - e.g. see Mishna
> R"H 3:7 regarding tekiyas shofar. You don't need negative kavanah to avoid
> the issue - lack of positive kavanah suffices to break the shomea 
> k'oneh.

> 2. By mitzvos of amira b'prat kavanah is necessary acc. to all dayos -
> see R' Yonah at the end of first perek of Berachos, so you wouldn't need
> negetive kavanah, just lack of positive.

Please see discussion in SA horav 489:12-15 which seems to contradict
this lahalocho.

Chaim G. Steinmetz
cgsteinmetz@juno.com

Sholem Berger:
> A short question. When we say "Retsey vehakhalitseynu ... bemitsvoytsekho, 
> uvemitsvas yom hashvii hashabos hagadol...", what mitsve [loshn-yokhid] are 
> we talking about when we say "mitsvas yom hashvii"? Zakhor? Shamor? Oneg? Or 
> is there some mitsve that most emphasizes shabes as zeykher lemayse breyshis 
> (hence "yom hashvii") that we are meant to focus on?
 
 A gutn khoydesh

See Nesivos Shalom , Chelek Beis . The Slonimer Rebbe, Yivadlenu lchaim, 
points out there is a mitzvas yom hashivi in the following sense.leil SHabbos 
is the bechina of maaseh breishis, yom haShabbos is the bechina of matan 
Torah and Seudah Shlishis is yimos HaMoshiach. 
                                                Steven Brizel
                                                Zeliglaw@aol.com

The Gemara in Yevamos 47b says on the pasuk "ki el asher tailchi 
ailaich u'ba'asher talini alin" that Rus was referring to the mitzva of 
tchum Shabbos and the issur of yichud. The Chasam Sofer in the 
Drashos 2:298a asks why Rus davka referred to these two mitzvos 
at this time, i.e. at the time when Orpa has just left Rus and 
Naomi, and Naomi is trying to convince Rus to return to Moav as 
well.

Furthermore, Naomi tells Rus that Orpa has left and has returned 
to her (Moabite) God. How could Naomi have possibly known that? 
Maybe Orpa returned to Moav, but continued to believe in Hashem.

The Chasam Sofer brings from the Medrash that because of the 
mitzva of Yishuv Eretz Yisrael, Naomi allowed herself to embark on 
her trip on the first day of Pesach. Therefore, if Orpa turned around 
to return to Moav on Yom Tov she had to be oiver one of two 
issurim. Either she went chutz la'tchum on Yom Tov (for if she were 
not heading to Eretz Yisrael, she would not be permitted to go 
chutz la'tchum, and she would have to stay in her place until after 
Yom Tov), or she would remain in her place and inevitably come to 
be meyached with a goy. Either way, it was clear that Orpa was 
leaving Yahadus. 

Rus therefore answers correctly - ba'asher tailchi ailaich - I will go 
where you will go, and not in violation of the issur of going chutz 
la'tchum. U'ba'asher talini alin - I will stay with you, and therefore I 
will not be oiver the issur of yichud. 

The Chasam Sofer then brings in the name of his son-in-law R. 
Dovid Tzvi that because Rus reacted in this manner, she was 
zocheh that David (who was goizer on yichud pnuya) and Shlomo 
(who was mesaken eruvin) both came out from her.

This Drashos Chasam Sofer was originally brought in the Daf Shiur 
on Yevamos 47 (IIRC by R. Fishel Shachter).

A gutten Yom Tov.

-- Carl


Carl M. Sherer, Adv.
Silber, Schottenfels, Gerber & Sherer
Telephone 972-2-625-7751
Fax 972-2-625-0461
mailto:cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

From: Isaac A Zlochower <zlochoia@bellatlantic.net>
> ...                       If the nazir became tameh after his period but
> before the ceremony at the mikdash, then he has entered a special
> category.  He can not bring the korbonot nazir since there was an
> interval of tumah and the bringing of purification (from tumas mes)
> korbonot between the conclusion of his nezirut and the mikdash
> ceremony.  Yet, he did fulfill his vow of 100 days.  He, therefore, is
> given the 30 day generic periond of nezirut to fulfill before he can
> complete the process.

The issue is why not, as R' Eliezer says in that mishna, only seven days?

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila    ygb@aishdas.org

On Mon, Jun 05, 2000 at 05:24:25PM -0400, MPoppers@kayescholer.com wrote:
: Again, I agreed with your point, but my question still is whether your
: point can be inferred from R'Meir's words in the mishna. Since you
: mentioned "aisek," how do _you_ translate it?

(Before I respond, I feel a need to write a disclaimer. Earlier this morning,
I composed a much clearer post making the same point. I lost my network
connection. As I was cut-and-pasting it to another window, so that I kill
that connection [and therefore that window] and reconnect to aishdas.org to
continue the email, my block had a power failure. It seems HKBH had something
against that email. Deciding whether His objection would apply also to this
one and it reached the list because it's biderech adam rotzeh leileich,
or whether it's because there is some difference between the emails that
removes Hashem's objection, is left as an excercise for the reader.)

I define "aisek" as being preoccupied with your occupation. Much like the point
I posited earlier about the gemara we were discussing, about the difference
between keva and arai. You can spend most of your waking hours of a given
day working, and yet still view your job as an "arai". In your spare time
you aren't oseik in your eisek, you're oseik in turning over ideas in Torah.

More relevently, based on the braisa in Avos 6:2 I want to distinguish between
"oseik baTorah" and "oseik biTalmud Torah". The mishnah describes three people:
a- someone who is not oseik baTorah is called a nazuf;
b- there is no ben chorin other than someone who is oseik biTalmud Torah;
c- greater than that is someone who is oseik biTorah tadir.

The "greater than that" is my translation of "nis'aleh". There is no object to
the sentence, so I'm reading it as "greater than an oseik biTalmud Torah is
someone is is constantly oseik biTorah".

I'm being medayeik from the switch in lishonos that an "oseik baTorah" is NOT
only someone who is sitting in front of a text, as that would be identical to
an oseik biTalmud Torah.

I realize I'm trying to be medayeik on my own a bit much of a chidush from
the lashon of a braisa. I think the mishnah in 3:2 also shows that "oseik
baTorah has this more inclusive meaning. There, R' Chananiah ben Tradion
compares an individual who is oseik baTorah two people who "yeish beineihem
divrei Torah".

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for  6-Jun-00: Shelishi
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 17b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

RC Brown wrote:

> Ruach haChaim on Avos 1:3 writes that the ideal is al menas l'kabel schar - to
> draw Hashem's shefa to the world and reap its benefits, but most of us aren't 
> on the madreiga to do avodah that way so we settle for shelo al menas l'kabel 
> pras.  An interesting twist.  
     
RM Berger wrote:

> The distinction between sechar and peras seems to vaguely relate to our  
> earlier discussion of sechar seguli vs sechar gemuli. But nothing specific 
> comes to mind.
     
> Anyone want to compare/contrast?
     
I'm not familiar with the previous discussion but I just saw that R. Chaim 
Friedlander talks about this Ruach Chaim in his recently published Sifsei Chaim 
- Emunah U'Vechirah (vol. 2 1:4).

The gemara says that an important person can be mekadesh a woman by having HER 
give HIM a gift and the hana'ah that HE gives to HER by accepting the gift is 
the kiddushin.  Similarly, we want Hashem to give us sechar so that He will have
the hana'ah of giving, kivyachol.

Gil Student
gil.student@citicorp.com

From my essay on Telshe, available at www.aishdas.org :

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila    ygb@aishdas.org


The Telzer Derech

We mentioned that Telshe was renowned for a unique derech halimud of Havona and
Higoyon. This derech is manifest in both the Talmudic lomdus and derech avoda
in Machashava and Mussar practiced in the Lithuanian Telshe. An illustrious
Telzer, Rabbi Elimelech Bar Shaul zt"l, in his foreword to the Shiurei Da'as,
points out that a synopsis of the derech may be found in the shiur da'as:
"Chomer viTzura."

The Ba'alei Machashava state that all objects in Creation consist of chomer,
the physical substance of the object; and tzura, its spiritual essence.
Intellectual ideas also consist of chomer and tzura. The chomer of an idea is
its expression in thought and words. The tzura of the idea is the manner in
which the idea expands and expresses itself in one's heart. The chomer of an
idea varies little from person to person. It is in the tzura of the idea that
we may distinguish between individuals. If an individual maintains lifelong
intellectual growth, the tzura of the ideas that he or she has assimilated
will change and grow more profound over time.

The greatness of Gedolei Yisroel is not manifest in the chomer of their
knowledge. Many bright people might master vast tracts of Torah. It is in the
tzura of their chochma that their greatness is manifest. That is why when
Chazal describe the greatness of previous generations they talk in terms
of "the Rishonim's heart" (Eruvin 53a). In Mo'ed Kattan 9a Rabbi Shimon
bar Yochai tells his son that he should pursue berachos from "people of
tzura." In Shabbos 63a we are told about the "tzura dishemata", the tzura of
a sugya. When Chazal describe later generations, they define their insight as
"a finger upon wax." The earlier generations excelled in their penetrating
understanding - their heart. The later generations are superficial - like a
finger that manipulates wax. They might have the same chomer, but they lack
the tzura. (It is significant that Chazal, despite their lower level vis a vis
the earlier generations, still felt qualified to define their greatness. We
can transcend our normal capacities and perceive, at least from afar, what
made the earlier generations greater; what tzura they possessed.)

In Yuma 72b we are told that a fool attempts to acquire wisdom without heart -
without its tzura. One who strives for wisdom will attempt to uplift him or
herself toward an idea and its most profound tzura. Most people, however, will
attempt to bring a lofty intellectual idea down to their own level. In Torah,
at the core of any idea is the yiras shomayim it should provide us. When
a great person delivers a shiur, he not only gives over the chomer of the
ideas being considered, but also the tzura of his wisdom. This is evident
in his facial expression: "The wisdom of an individual illuminates his face"
(Koheles 8). This manifest tzura comprised the radiance of Moshe Rabbeinu -
"for his face shone" (Shemos 34).

The quest for tzura is the hallmark of the Telzer derech. It is in this quest
that Telshe departed from Brisk. In Brisk, the primary method of analysis
is categorization. The classic "tzvei dinim" is a brilliant tool for the
definition of "what". For example: What is this idea? Is it one that pertains
to the gavra (the person) or to the cheftza (the object)? In Telshe, however,
the primary method of analysis is abstraction, e.g., what is the essence of
this idea, how does it work and why does it work the way it does.

(In his introduction to his definitive work on the Rogatchover zt"l's derech,
"Mefa'anei'ach Tzefunos", Rabbi Menachem Mendel Kasher zt"l relates the
following anecdote: The Greek philosopher Plato was once strolling with
one of his disciples. They saw a horse in the street. Plato turned to his
companion and asked him: "What do you see?" The student responded: "I see
a horse." Plato then said to him: "I see the `horseness', the abstract of a
horse. You lack perception, and you, therefore, do not possess the talent of
profound intellectual insight. You only possess the vision of the physical
senses, which cannot grasp essences." Rabbi Kasher notes a similar comment
by the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim 2:6.)

The pursuit of tzura underlies the Telzer approach to all areas of Jewish
thought and endeavor. Tzura is related to the term "da'as" in the system
of chochma, bina, da'as. As Reb Yosef Leib explains (in the shiur da'as:
"Chochma, Bina, Da'as") chochma is knowledge: the warehouse of accumulated
facts one amasses. Bina is understanding: a Navon categorizes facts in his
or her heart, depicts them in his or her mind, experiences their full breadth
and depth, and can extrapolate from them to new intellectual areas. Da'as is
achieved when chochma, characterized and developed by bina, becomes one with
a person's essence and being, so much so that a person can conclude that
this da'as is absolute truth. The Jewish soul has been designed by Hashem
specifically to allow an individual to achieve this da'as. We are connected
to the highest spiritual realms [olamos elyonim] and we are "hard-wired"
to allow us to grasp their essences. Hashem designed characteristic human
traits to reflect the attributes that He employs in directing Creation.

(In many shiurei da'as, such as "Ki Chol BaShomayim UboAretz" and "BiTzalmeinu
KiDimuseinu", Reb Yosef expands on this idea of "shiur koma." This Kabbalistic
principle explains that the entire array of olamos are contained in miniature
in man's body and soul, and the related principle of "miniatures", that the
physical world is a scale model that reflects the spiritual one. These ideas
are not so novel to us. Over the past fifty years many of the Yeshiva world's
great thinkers have introduced their students to Kabbalistic and Chassidic
ideas. At the time, however, this system must have been an exciting chiddush
to the Telzer bochurim. The prime mover of the Lithuanian yeshiva movement,
Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin zt"l, wrote a sefer that described Yahadus in clear
Kabbalistic terms. It seems, however, that by the early twentieth century
this form of study was not popular. Shiurei Da'as is written in a style
that captures the flavor of Reb Yosef Leib's original delivery. Readers can
sense the aura of novelty and revelation that surrounded even the most basic
mystical discussions at the time.)

A focal theme in Telzer thought is the supremacy of intellect and intellectual
endeavor. The more we expand our intellect, the greater positive spiritual
impact we have on the universe - and on ourselves. We then feel uplifted and
our souls are unified with and enlivened by the spiritual worlds (shiur da'as:
"VaYikra Bishem Hashem"). Reb Avrohom Yitzchok wrote: "This derech unifies
logic and poetry. The logic is a logic of poetry and the poetry is a poetry
of logic." He explained: "The firmest emuna is Emuna Peshuta, with the utmost
simplicity. Hashem, however, has granted man a unique intellect, with the
capacity to think with profundity. Man is therefore obliged to channel these
divine gifts in the service of Hashem, i.e., to deepen and strengthen his
emuna and Avodas Hashem by analyzing them deeply." There are limits to our
understanding. At some point we must halt our inquiries with the conclusion:
"This is the will of Hashem, whether I understand it or not" - but the road
is very long until we reach that point, and, often, upon subsequent further
analysis we can understand more than we previously thought (shiur da'as:
"Al Yechsar HaMozeg").

Rabbi Bar Shaul writes that in Telshe there were no mussar shmuessen, rather
shiurei da'as. A shmuess is emotional, inspirational, and often informal. It
is an experience of the heart. A shiur da'as is intellectual, educational,
and covers a topic in a formal and systematic manner. It, too, reaches the
heart, but via the mind. In a shiur da'as on Mussar ("Limud HaMussar VeOfen
HaLimud"), Reb Yosef Leib applies this approach to the study of mussar
texts. He departs from Reb Yisroel's mussar bihispa'alus - the study of
mussar with fervor and emotion, and advocates a more intellectual approach.

A true Telzer toils mightily to uncover and reveal the roots, essences and
abstracts - the core truths - of all areas of Torah. The deeper one delves,
the more the differences between Halacha and Agada blur. As one's understanding
becomes more profound, as one achieves more tzura, one is penetrating more
deeply into the very neshama of Torah. The more profound the principle one
uncovers, the more it explains (shiur da'as: "Nishmas HaTorah". Reb Yosef Leib
emphasizes that the true pleasure of Torah study only comes with ascendance
into its neshama. See Rashi Shabbos 88b d.h. LaMiyamnin Ba. ) This is manifest
in the remarkable similarity between Reb Yosef Leib's Shiurei Halacha and
Shiurei Da'as. If a Torah idea truly possesses a certain tzura, then that
tzura must be an essential truth. If it is an essential truth, it should be
consistently true across the entire vast tract of our Toras Emes. (A brief,
but comprehensive, discussion of the Telzer derech is to be found in Reb
Elya Meir's introductory essay in Shiurei Da'as: "Darcha shel Torah".)


Some Examples of the Unique Telzer Derech HaLimud

1. Toch kedei dibbur kidibbur dami: An act done or verbalization uttered
within the span of time that it takes to say the words "Shalom alecha rabbi"
of a preceding act or verbalization is considered linked to that prior
act or verbalization. Reb Yosef Leib explains this principle: In truth it
is impossible to determine how finely time can be divided, for although we
measure time by seconds, in fact each second may be divided yet further. The
possibilities to divide time into still smaller segments are endless. It
would thus seem impossible to determine an inherent quantitative maximum
interval that Halacha would regard as linking two events.

Time, therefore, is measured and divided based on man's senses. Chazal
understood that any movement, verbalization, thought or deed that person
performs engages him for a certain time span following its performance. A
person is not at rest until toch kidei dibbur after the deed is done. You
may readily perceive this when you do or speak some matter that requires
concentration and immediately after that must respond to another person. For
example, when you complete a beracha and immediately afterwards must attend to
some mundane matter, you feel as if your kavana has been interrupted. This is
because for some time after you complete a task your heart is still focused
on it.

That is why Halacha measures all man's activities by the unit of toch
kidei dibbur.


2. Tenai: If a lender marries a woman with objects given to him as collateral
on a loan, the marriage is valid - even if the borrower redeemed that
collateral during the loan's term. This is difficult to understand. After
all, a lender only holds the collateral as security. His ownership thereof
should be conditional on the borrower's defaulting on payment, which, here,
did not occur.

Reb Yosef Leib explains that ownership on an object can be limited and divided.
One individual may have certain rights of ownership in the object and a
second individual other rights of ownership in the same object. Similarly, two
individuals can limit and divide their ownership in a way that is conditional
on some future condition. This is not the conventional notion of a condition,
which postulates that the outcome of the condition will validate the ownership
of one party and void that of the other. In Reb Yosef Leib's perspective,
as long as the condition does not come into play each party has partial
ownership. Only then will the ownership of the person on the "losing" side
of the condition end.

In our case, therefore, until the condition of payment (or default) is met,
the collateral is owned jointly by both the lender and the borrower. The
lender's marriage via the object is, therefore, valid.


3. Eidei kiyum: A valid Halachic marriage ceremony requires the chosson to
both give an object to the kalla and to expressly say that he is giving her
this object to marry her. This is true even if this was obviously the chosson's
intent: if he didn't make an explicit statement, the marriage is invalid. Why?
Reb Yosef Leib explains: We obviously know that the chosson's intent in
presenting the object to the kalla was to effect marriage. A person, however,
can function at different levels of intent. When we analyze man's potential
levels of intent, we readily discern that the intent and decisiveness of an
individual is greater when he performs a transaction in front of witnesses
than when he performs the same transaction in private. Halacha requires
different levels of intent and decisiveness for different transactions. The
more powerful the bond that must be created through the transaction, the
greater the decisiveness required. To effect Kiddushin, Halacha requires an
unequivocal statement by the chosson in front of witnesses whose presence
is known to him.


4. Migo dezachei linafshei zachei nami lichavrei: Normally, a person cannot,
on his own initiative, act on behalf of another person where such activity will
prove detrimental to others [tofes liba'al chov bimakom dichav liacharinei]. To
acquire a random lost object for one person is to deprive it from all others.
Such an acquisition, therefore, should not be valid. Where, however, the
person picking up the random lost object could have acquired it for himself,
he may acquire it on behalf of another. The conventional understanding of
this procedure is that since [mego] the individual picking up the object is
entitled to act on his own behalf, he may, therefore, transfer that license
to the person for whom he intends to pick up the object.

There are several difficulties with this understanding. For example, if such
a case occurred on Yom Tov, Halacha imposes a techum, i.e. a prohibition
on carrying the object over the boundaries of the two thousand square amah
area in which the owner may travel. One opinion states that this object is
subject to the limitations of the person who picked it up. According to the
conventional understanding, however, the person that picked up the object
is never its owner. Why should the object be restricted to his techum?

Reb Yosef Leib, therefore, explains this procedure differently: In fact,
the person who picks up the object acquires it and owns it. Ownership is
not always narrowly defined as the possession of an object. Even an object
that never actually came into one's hands may be considered, in a broader,
more abstract sense, owned by that individual - if that person derived use
and benefitted from the object. Since such use has tangible value, it places
the object within one's realm of ownership. It is in that broader sense
that the person who picks up the object and give it to another exercises
ownership. One of the rights and uses of ownership is the right to give an
object one owns to someone else. He thus becomes, initially, the first owner
of this object, and, therefore, it is his techum that restricts the object's
movement on that Yom Tov.

>>>The gemara says that an important person can be mekadesh a woman by having
HER give HIM a gift and the hana'ah that HE gives to HER by accepting the
gift is the kiddushin. Similarly, we want Hashem to give us sechar so that
He will have the hana'ah of giving, kivyachol.<<<

The Shev Shmaytza in his hakdama in discussing why giving terumah has to be
lishma (Rashi P' terumah) has a similar vort where Hashem's acceptance of
the terumah serves as the kiddushei hana'ah. I don't recall all the details
of his mehaleich offhand.

-Chaim B.

In a message dated 6/6/00 9:13:56 AM US Central Standard Time, 
sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu writes:

<< A true Telzer toils mightily to uncover and reveal the roots, essences and
 abstracts - the core truths - of all areas of Torah. The deeper one delves,
 the more the differences between Halacha and Agada blur. >>

Wouldn't that be apparent whether da'as is approached through rationalism 
(e.g., either the Telzer or the Hirschian variety), through the "heart" 
(Mussar or Chabad), or otherwise?

Franz Rosenzweig wrote in "The Star of Redemption" that the only real da'as 
is the emanation of existence from or by HaShem. Da'as is chimerical and 
takes many false forms when refracted through the human mind: the supposed 
extremes of chaos and absoluteness, for example, are really no more than 
false idealistic categories that actually *merge* when one overcomes the need 
to categorize. Isn't this merger very much like the blurring of halacha and 
aggada to which RYGB refers?

David Finch

On Sun, Jun 04, 2000 at 01:14:56PM -0400, Yzkd@aol.com wrote:
: AIUI "moavi vilo moavis" is not a Gezeira Shava, and see Yevomos 76b-77a.

"Moavi vilo mo'avis" is a hekesh from Amoni, which itself comes from "al
davar asher lo kidmu lachem" which was only a ta'anah on the men. See the
parallel Y'lmi, which quotes R' Meir and R' Le'azar (?) bei R' Shim'on on
our derashah calling it a "gezeirah shava bimakom shekasuv".

The word "hekesh" is not in the braisa that has R' Yishma'el categorization
of the middos shehatorah nidreshes bahem. I thought this was because hekesh
is a subcategory of gezeira shava. This appears to be born out by the Y'lmi.

As to whether this kind of g"sh is included in the braisa in Cheilek that
requires out belief that all gezeiros shava are miSinai is another question.
Perhaps it only refers to comparison by terminology.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for  6-Jun-00: Shelishi
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 17b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

On Fri, Jun 02, 2000 at 02:49:29PM -0400, Josh Hoexter wrote:
: I'm not an expert but... Acc to Tanya, Nefesh/Ruach/Neshama (NaRaN) are
: not three separate souls but instead refer to the three levels of any
: "soul".

I didn't intend otherwise. As I implied earlier when I said about chibas
hakever that perhaps the soul's attachment to the guf isn't caused by or
felt by the nefesh, but is the nefesh.

:         Nefesh is associated with physical life; ruach is associated with
: emotions (middos); neshama is associated with intellect (seichel).

This model is unlike the Gra's which places the seichel with the ruach. So
I back off from my earlier post that tried to be meyasheiv the two shitos.

: Essentially non-tzadikim identify with the physical body and the soul that
: gives it life, intellect, emotions, etc while tzadikim identify only and
: purely with G-d....

This implies three entities: the nefesh beheimis, the nefesh elokis, and that
which does the identifying with one or the other -- the "self" asked about in
the email which launched this discussion.

If this third entity does exist in the Ba'al haTanya's model of man, then
this triad is actually closer to the Gra's Naran than the Ba'al haTanya's
Naran is. Although one implies three aspects while the other implies three
entities.



Avrohom Weidberg <eweidberg@tor.stikeman.com> writes:
: IIUC, the BhT generally places the nefesh hachiyunis habehamis of a
: person separately below the nefesh Elokis of naranchai...

I just want to point out an observation I made. Chabad tends to view
Naranchai as a whole far more often than the sources I turned to (Maharal,
the Vilna Gaon, R' Chaim Vilozhiner, RSRH (!)) do. They tend to talk
more about Naran, occasionally tying in the fact that there are two
others.

Notably, when the Maharal explains why the eirachin is always a multiple
of 5, and why the number of years B' Hillel and B' Shammai argues was
2-1/2 years -- half of 5, he does not invoke Naranchai. Rather, he counts
Naran, the "vehicle" for the neshamah, and the "vehicle" for the nefesh,
to yield 5.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for  6-Jun-00: Shelishi
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 17b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

Apropos the topic of the time of life best suited to the intense study of
Torah: See chapter 75 of RSRH's Horeb, particularly section 493. RSRH seems 
quite sensitive to the issue of the role of personal experience and maturity 
in how and when one approaches particular aspects of Torah learning. He sees 
the study of Gemorrah, in particular, to be reflective experience, as opposed 
to learning Mishneh Torah, SA, or the other codes. I doubt he would've 
characterized his approach as sociological or pragmatic. Instead, he was 
sensitive to the different intellectual requirements of different aspects of 
Torah learning, and to the life experiences necessary to meet these 
requirements. As RSRH believed that Torah *is* what conscientious Jews 
preserve it to be dor l'dor, the life dynamics involved in the truly 
appreciative learning of Torah can be said to be part of Torah itself.

I am reminded of some of the ideas of Leo Strauss, that echt-old-world 
classicist who didn't hide his Jewishness nearly as much as he is sometimes 
accused of having done. In his "Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy," he 
includes a fascinating piece entitled, "Notes on Maimonides' Letter on 
Astrology." Strauss alludes to the frightening complexity of the Rambam's 
efforts to decide for himself where methodology of Torah leaves off and that 
of "philosophy," as he understood that term from the Greeks, begins. (The 
Rambam seemed to be able to handle such abstractions equably, as opposed, 
perhaps, to RYBS, who never seemed to have recovered emotionally from the 
Kantian abyss he learned in Germany.) Anyhow, Strauss stresses the high level 
of sophistication necessary to understand the Rambam's theoretical works, as 
opposed to Mishneh Torah. His views are nearly identical to those of RSRH, 
who, in his religiosity, went further and implied that such sophistication is 
therefore a component of understanding Torah itself.

So . . . the age at which Torah can best be taught so that it can be truly 
understood and appreciated goes to divrei Torah itself. 

David Finch

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