Avodah Mailing List

Volume 05 : Number 094

Thursday, July 27 2000

• Fwd: D'var Torah U'mada - Mini Summer Series - Avot 2 - Torah Im Derech Eretz
• Re: Fwd: The Holocaust: Divine Retribution?
• Re: Fwd: The Holocaust: Divine Retribution?
• Re: Fwd: The Holocaust: Divine Retribution?
• Re: The Holocaust: Divine Retribution?
• kavanah
• Baruch Hu U'Varuch Shemo
• Re: kavanah
• Re: Baruch Hu U'Varuch Shemo
• Rashi in Chaye Sara
• aliyah/ketuvot
• Nedarim question

here's another installment on the TiDE series.
                             Steve Brizel
                             Zeliglaw@aol.org

==

Avot 2
Torah Im Derech Eretz

We have been led to believe that there are only two possible approaches to
the question of Torah im derech eretz.

The yeshiva world is said to believe that the lekhatchila [ideal] of Torah
life -- the optimum course to be adopted in all cases -- is to devote oneself
to full-time Torah learning for as long as humanly possible. To go out into
the world and earn one's living in a normal way is a course to be adopted
only bedi'avad -- when there is no other alternative. The Hirschian principle
of Torah im derech eretz, which seems to encourage early entry into commerce
or the professions, is seen as horaat sha'ah, a temporary decision intended
to meet special circumstances.

The Hirschians [followers of Rav S.R. Hirsch], on the other hand, see the
situation in precisely opposite terms. According to them, entry into commerce
or the professions is a lekhatchila of Torah life. An intensive education
in both Torah and secular studies would enable young people to succeed in
their chosen occupation and become independent financially, while at the
same time maintain the highest standards of halakhic behavior and a regular
schedule of Torah study. This is seen as the norm. The modern model that
directs young people to devote their lives to Torah to the exclusion of all
economic activity is seen by Hirschians as horaat sha'ah.

A Contradiction by Rambam?

In reality, both modes coexist in Torah. The Hirschian approach can be soundly
based on the famous dictum of Rabban Gamliel in the Mishnah from which the
slogan "Torah im derech eretz" is taken: "The study of Torah goes well with
earning a livelihood, for the effort required to do both together puts sin
out of one's mind" (Avos 2:2).

It is also firmly based in halakhah. Rambam writes that every "sensible
person" should provide himself with a livelihood before marriage (Hilkhot
Dei'ot 5:11), and he gives advice on how to arrange one's business affairs
on a sound economic basis (ibid., 13). He should also eat properly and dress
properly according to his means (ibid., 10) and sleep eight hours every night
(ibid. 4:4). Rambam's severe strictures on one who prefers to learn all day
and live on charity are well known (Hilkhot Talmud Torah 3:10). On the whole,
it would seem a sensible, sound lifestyle is recommended, in which Torah,
mitzvot and derekh eretz are all given due attention. Side by side with this
balanced, "normal" view, we find a completely different ideal. In the same
Hilkhot Talmud Torah, Rambam writes: "The words of the Torah are to be found
only in one who... removes all desire for worldly pleasures from his mind,
doing a little work each day, just sufficient for his needs if he has nothing
to eat, and learning Torah for the rest of the day and night" (ibid., 9).

And a little later he writes: "He who wants to acquire the crown of Torah
must be careful not to lose any one of his nights in sleep or in eating and
drinking and conversation" (ibid., 13).

Gone is the prescription for the normal eight-hour sleep a night. Gone is
the balanced lifestyle. Single-minded pursuit of Torah is now the order of
the day. Absent-mindedness for the normal concerns of life is considered
praiseworthy. On the verse "In her love [of Torah] you shall be ravished
always" (Proverbs 5:19), Rashi comments, "For the love [of Torah] you shall
make yourself absent-minded and foolish, forsaking your own affairs and
running to [hear] a word of halacha" (Eiruvin 54b).

In order to learn Torah, Rabbi Yochanan sold property that could have
supported him in his old age (Shemos Rabba 47:5). Rabbi Eliezer the Great,
at the age of twenty-six, gave up a large inheritance and ran away from home
to study Torah in Jerusalem at the yeshiva of Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai,
where he rose to unprecedented greatness.

The following ringing declaration comes from Rambam at the end of Hilkhot
Shemitta Veyovel:

"Not only the tribe of Levi, but any person in the world whose spirit prompts
him and whose mind convinces him to separate himself to stand before G-d in
order to serve Him... and who casts off the yoke of the many calculations
pursued by other people is sanctified, considered holy of holies, and G-d
will be his portion for all eternity and will provide for him his sufficient
needs in this world."

This Rambam is quoted by the Chofetz Chaim in Biur Halacha (ch. 156) as an
option for the individual to choose.

(This does not mean that one who opts for "Torah first" lives a monastic
existence, oblivious of the affairs of this world. This would not be Torah
Judaism. When Rambam writes, "to separate himself... to serve G-d," he does
not mean "separate himself from the world," but "separate himself from his
selfish interests." The mitzvos by which he serves his Creator include looking
after the needy and oppressed and taking up the cause of justice wherever
necessary. They also include disseminating Torah and sanctifying G-d's name
in all his human contacts. The "calculations" referred to are, for example,
those which people normally make when they are thinking about their careers,
such as, "If I study for so many years I will get a certain salary.")

A Matter of Conviction

Here we have in the sources, side by side, the Hirschian way and the way of
the yeshivot and kollelim of the present day. "These and those are the words
of the living G-d." But how does one decide which way to adopt? In my opinion,
the decision must be made on a deep level. What did Rambam say? Let us read
it again: "Whoever wants to acquire the crown of Torah...," "Anyone whose
spirit prompts him and whose mind convinces him..." It must be an individual,
personal decision, arrived at after much soul-searching and clarification.

The Gemara relates an episode in the lives of two Amoraim, Ilfa and Rabbi
Yochanan, in their student days in Eretz Yisrael. They were suffering such
deprivation that they made up their minds to leave the yeshiva and go out
to earn a living. After all, they said, earning a living is also a mitzva.
They sat down to eat lunch in a field, in the shade of a rickety wall.
While they ate, Rabbi Yochanan heard two angels conversing. One said, "Look
at these two. They are leaving Eternal Life for the life of the moment. Let
us push the wall over and do away with them." The other replied, "No, leave
them alone. One is destined for greatness."

Rabbi Yochanan said to himself, "Since I heard this and Ilfa didn't, it must be
meant for me." Rabbi Yochanan returned to the yeshiva, suffered and eventually
became Rosh Yeshiva and the spiritual leader of his generation. Ilfa went on
to become a shipping merchant but retained his greatness in Torah. His words
are frequently quoted in both the Talmud Yerushalmi and the Bavli (Taanis 21a).

Here we have the essence of the problem. Rabbi Yochanan listened to the
inner voice of his spirit and chose to suffer in order to realize his full
Torah potential. Ilfa did not blindly follow his colleague, but followed the
mitzvah as he saw it. It is certainly a kiddush Hashem when the world sees
that a successful businessman or professional can still be a fully observant
Jew and a talmid chakham.

On the other hand, along this road, one has reason to believe that one's
livelihood will be more secure. One may even hope to achieve a degree of
affluence, which will of course be used to support Torah and one's needier
brethren. The road of "Torah only" is likely to involve a good deal of
insecurity and financial difficulty. The rewards may be great, but they will
be of a purely spiritual nature. Which road to follow must be the person's
own genuine, inner choice.

It is also possible to guide a son to opt for this lifestyle, but only if
he shows natural propensities for this kind of life. This emerges from a
discussion of a difficulty in the last mishnah of Kiddushin.

First Rabbi Meir states that a father is obligated to teach his son a trade;
otherwise it is as if he taught him banditry. Later in the mishna, Rabbi
Nehorai (who according to Rambam is Rabbi Meir by another name), declares,
"I will leave all trades and teach my son only Torah."

What about the obligation to teach one's son a trade? Some commentaries
answer that Rabbi Meir's statement refers to ordinary people, while the
son referred to in the second statement is one who shows unusual alertness,
intelligence and desire for Torah learning, so he would certainly merit having
his physical needs looked after by others (Pnei Yehoshua). Alternatively, at
an early age such a child shows the exceptional faith and trust in G-d needed
to carry him through this type of life successfully (Sefer Hamakneh). Here
we have a clear statement of the nature of the two options.

However, to adopt the "Torah only" lifestyle just to "follow the crowd,"
without strong inner motivation, will not be a success. We must remember that
Abayei begged his students "not to inherit two Gehinnoms" (Yoma 72b). If they
were not sincere they would have one Gehinnom in this world, since learning
Torah involves much effort and deprivation, and still face another Geninnom
in the other world, because they failed to reach the spiritual goal that
beckoned them here.

There are other pitfalls for the unwary. The Mishna on Torah im derech eretz
quoted above continues, "All Torah study without work will not last and will
lead to sin" (Avos 2:2). Rabbeinu Yona Girondi, in his commentary on this
Mishna, is not slow to point out the sins that are likely to result. Poverty,
he says, will lead one to accept gifts from all and sundry (itself fatal),
and this will lead to attempts to manipulate the donors. When gifts dry up,
the person, in his destitution, will be compelled to resort to dishonesty,
and this opens the floodgates to all the crimes against the Torah.

According to the view presented here, all this applies to the person who
chooses the path of Torah only due to peer pressure or some other external
motivation. But happy is the one who possesses all the love of Torah,
abundant faith and inner toughness needed to triumph over the trials and
difficulties this path involves.

Rabbi Aryeh Carmell, Editor of Mikhtav MeEliyahu and Strive for Truth,
author of Masterplan and Vice-Principal of Yeshiva Dvar Yerushalaim

*************************************************************
Senior Editor:  Prof. Leo Levi,
Rector Emeritus, Jerusalem College of Technology -- Machon Lev
Junior Editor:  Avi Polak
--
D'var Torah U'Mada
Department of Public Relations
Jerusalem College of Technology - Machon Lev
21 Havaad Haleumi St., POB16031
Jerusalem, 91160 ISRAEL
Tel:  972-2-675-1193  Fax:  972-2-675-1190

On Mon, Jul 24, 2000 at 09:29:06AM -0400, Gil.Student@citicorp.com wrote:
: So says the Sefer HaIkkarim (4:29).  He further (4:42) brings proof from R. 
: Ya'akov that one would not be an apikores for denying sechar mitzvah in olam 
: hazeh.  I think this explains R. Yosef's lament (Kiddushin 39b) that if only 
: Acher had learned like R. Ya'akov he would not have become an apikores.
: Better a minority view than an apikores. [Interestingly, the Sefer Yuchasin
: says that R. Ya'akov was Acher's grandson.]

I think it's simpler than that. R' Yaakov showed that "lima'an ya'arichun
yamecha" must refer to olam haba, whereas his grandfather took the pasuk
literally -- chayei olam hazeh. One need not explore R' Yaaokov's or Acheir's
positions WRT sechar in general, as the two disagree about the nature of
this particular sechar and on how to understand the pasuk. The "ya'arichun"
of this particular sechar is the basis of R" Yaakov's statement.

It is possible that R' Yaakov believes that other forms of sechar come in olam
hazeh, and that he's not asserting sechar mitzvos behai alma leikah (SMBAL) in
general.


We need to distinguish between two issues: correctness and permissability. IOW,
it's one thing to assert or deny DMBAL. It's another to say that anyone who is
choleik with you is an apikireis. The Seifer haIkkarim is bringing a major
chiddush here. The Rabam (hakdamah to Cheilek, the ikkarei emunah) is not
mechayev emunah in a specific kind of sechar va'onesh (SvA), just in SvA and
tzidduk hadin in general.

Also, in terms of halachah, we can talk about azlinan basar rubba and which
view is that of the mi'ut. WRT to truth, though, there is nothing guaranteeing
that the majority is correct. Aggadita has no parallel to the halachic process.
So, while the Ikkarim holds that the discussion is halachic and about the
definition of apikoreis, and therefore he feels that the fact that it's a
da'as yachid is relevent -- I'm not sure that needs to be universal.

Which brings us to:
: HOWEVER, the Rambam (Hilchos Teshuvah 8:1, chap. 9) seems to follow R.
: Ya'akov.  ...
: So how does the Rambam learn like R. Ya'akov, a da'as yachid? ...

While your teiretz works, it requires making the Rambam hold like Rashi's
understanding of Abayei. One can give a more general answer: the Rambam
assumes the discussion is one of aggadita (what is true), not halachah (what
belief is muttar). Therefore he need worry about yachid virabbim *halachah*
kirabbim.

: According to the Rambam, even the tochachos are not sechar ve'onesh but more
: of a mitzvah goreres mitzvah, aveirah goreres aveirah.

Thank you, this ties up my one loose end. Do you have a mar'eh makom? Is it
in the same peirush on Pei'ah you mention later?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 26-Jul-00: Revi'i, Matos-Masei
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 42b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Yeshaiah 15

RM Berger wrote:
> I think it's simpler than that. R' Yaakov showed that "lima'an ya'arichun 
> yamecha" must refer to olam haba, whereas his grandfather took the pasuk 
> literally -- chayei olam hazeh. One need not explore R' Yaaokov's or Acheir's 
> positions WRT sechar in general, as the two disagree about the nature of
> this particular sechar and on how to understand the pasuk.

Then what is the teirutz in the gemara to the stirah between the Mishnah and the
Baraisa?
     
> While your teiretz works, it requires making the Rambam hold like Rashi's 
> understanding of Abayei. One can give a more general answer: the Rambam 
> assumes the discussion is one of aggadita (what is true), not halachah (what 
> belief is muttar). Therefore he need worry about yachid virabbim *halachah* 
> kirabbim.

Probably true.
     
>: According to the Rambam, even the tochachos are not sechar ve'onesh but 
>: more of a mitzvah goreres mitzvah, aveirah goreres aveirah.
     
> Thank you, this ties up my one loose end. Do you have a mar'eh makom? Is it in
> the same peirush on Pei'ah you mention later?

Hilchos Teshuvah ch. 9.  The Einayim LaMishpat HaShalem also quoted a Moreh 
Nevuchim (I think 3:27) but I didn't see its relevance.
     
Gil Student

On Wed, Jul 26, 2000 at 11:46:01AM -0400, Gil.Student@citicorp.com wrote:
: Then what is the teirutz in the gemara to the stirah between the Mishnah and
: the Baraisa?

I'm not denying that R' Yaakov says "sechar mitzvos behai alma leikah" (SMBAL).
The gemara says he does. I'm just saying that it's not that nekudah which
would have avoided Acheir's error.

R' Yaakov could be understood in three steps:
1- "Lima'an ya'arichun yamecha" / "viha'arachta yamim" imply that one can earn
   Olam haBa (and that Olam haBa exists, for that matter) through these two
   mitzvos;
2- "Ulma'an yiytav lach" implies that the tov one gets for these two mitzvos is
   part of "ya'arichun yamecha", IOW in Olam haBa;
3- This is a binyan av for all mitzvos, being the only two mitzvos where the
   sechar is mentioned. IOW, SMBAL.

I was so into my "what if" I lost sight of reality. So please let me rephrase
that paragraph:
    It would have been possible for R' Yaakov to believe that other forms of
    sechar come in olam hazeh, and not assert SMBAL in general. And had
    Acheir only agreed to that much, he wouldn't have been a kofeir.

Second, it's the gemara here that says R' Yaakov was Acheir's grandson.
    Amar R' Yosef: Ilmalei darsheha Acheir lihai k'ra kiR' Yaakov bar biraseih
    lo chata.

Thanks to this discussion, I found two ways to read R' Yosef:

1- Lishitas haIkkarim: The cheit in question is kefirah about sechar va'onesh
   in particular, Acheir's initial crisis of faith. In which case, R' Yosef is
   saying that R' Yaakov's position avoids this kefirah. Implied is that
   R' Yosef didn't and wouldn't go so far as to say R' Yaakov's shitah is
   emes. It's wrong, but not apikursus.

2- Lishitas haRambam: The cheit is the subsequent general kefirah and
   abandonment of shemiras hamitzvos that Acheir fell into. Therefore the
   "lo chata" isn't faint praise for R' Yaakov's position, but a causal
   statement: Had Acheir known that the pasuk doesn't promise long life
   in Olam haZeh, he never would have fallen into a life of sin.


BTW, note that anyone can have Acheir's kushya -- after all is said and done,
we don't experience any correlation between tzidkus and what a person's
cheilek in life is. After all the philosophizing here, we need an answer
that fits the empirical data.

: Hilchos Teshuvah ch. 9.  The Einayim LaMishpat HaShalem also quoted a Moreh 
: Nevuchim (I think 3:27) but I didn't see its relevance.

Thanks again.

-mi

I do wish the poster would rejoin us (on Avodah, if not Arevim) personally, 
but I am happy to act, for now, as his shaliach.

KT,
YGB

At 01:06 PM 7/26/00 -0400, you wrote:
>I've been reading the Web version of Avodah, and would like to comment on a
>recent discussion. Please feel free to pass along any or all of this to the
>group.
>
>Thanks
>Akiva Miller
>
>=====
>
>Gil Student asked <<< Are you saying that all miracles are WITHIN the laws
>of nature?  Was kerias yam suf really just a low tide?  Makas dam just
>bacteria in the water? >>>
>
>RYGB responded <<< Once a nes occurs, 'twould seem, it is inherently part of
>nature, and thus must, retroactively, bear some explanation as such. I think
>that the Rambam learns fakehrt, but similarly: All miracles needed to have
>been set in place from sheishes yemei Bereishis. >>>
>
>It might help this conversation to address R. Student's examples directly.
>
>My feeling is that modern quantum physics has done incredible things to show
>how, indeed, Biblical miracles can occur within the laws of nature. On a
>subatomic level, all motion is random to a certain degree. A given electron
>can go this way, or it can go that way. There is no way to predict which way
>it will go.
>
>One might give a *probability* that it will go one way or the other, and one
>can reasonably predict that given a large number of electrons, a number will
>go this way and a different number will go that way, but these are still
>probabilities. Not certainties. That is the critical point. A ridiculously
>overwhelming probability is NOT the same thing as a certainty.
>
>A body of water tends to have a reasonably flat surface on top. The water
>molecules are all bouncing off each other in random directions. But if we
>accept the idea of "random" as *truly* unpredictable, then we have to admit
>that once or twice in every few dozen googolplex years, all *these*
>molecules will start moving one way, and all *those* molecules will move the
>other way, and we'll have a path of dry land in the middle, which (as
>randomness will have it) might even remain in that condition for several
>hours.
>
>Absurdly improbable? Yes. Totally impossible according to the laws of nature
>as we understand them today? No. "Low tide" theories contradict the "dry
>land" of the pasuk. But quantum physics allows everything. Even
>transmutation of water into blood -- a few electrons here, a few neutrons
>over there, presto change-o, and there you are! No problem!
>
>This is MY understanding of how <<< All miracles needed to have been set in
>place from sheishes yemei Bereishis. >>> Previous generations understood
>these miracles as conforming to the laws of nature as THEY understood them,
>those laws allowing perfectly natural things such as magic and witchcraft.
>And we can understand them as conforming to our own modern and enlightened
>-- but no less whacko -- theories.

> Halacha recognizes kavanah al tnai...
>Does anyone know the earliest source for this concept?

Brachos, right at the bottom of 27a and top of 27b (perek 4). There's an
interesting discussion of making up a tfilla (with Rashi talking about what
kind of kavanna one should have).

The question there is this: A baraisa says that if you miss Mincha on shabbos,
you should you make it up with two Ma'arivs on motzi shabbos, saying mavdil
(ata chonantanu) in the first and not the second, but if you say it in the
second and not the first the first doesn't count.

Ur'minhu - another baraisa says that if you miss mavdil in motzei shabbos
ma'ariv, you don't have to repeat it, because you'll make havdallah at home.

The gemoro ends with "Kashya".  (Good question/no resolution).

A major Gaon (ouch, I forgot who) notes that Kashya doesn't mean that it's
unresolvable, just that the Gemoro doesn't settle it. Rashi's own answer is
that "intent" is what matters. When you make up a tfilla, the first one is
the correct one, and the second is the make-up one. I think the resolution of
the 'kashya' is this: since the first one is the make-up, if you did mavdil
in the second, then clearly the first one was with the intent of using it to
make up for the missed mincha, and that's the wrong intent since the first
one is supposed to be the 'real' maariv. OTOH, in ordinary circumstances,
when one says the motzi shabbos maariv and accidentally skips mavdil, it's OK,
because the _intent_ was still to say a motzi shabbos maariv. (I'm unclear
as to which/how much of that reasoning is the Gaon and how much is Rashi's).

(Carl, you should be pleased to know (reference to an earlier debate): I'm
studying three tractates simultaneously: two from the English Artscroll
(Shavuos and Rosh HaShana), but one from a Vilna Shas. And wouldn't you
know it, I have exactly 1-1/2 amud under my belt: the bottom of Brachos 27a
and all of 27b!)

-- Eric

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> After Shabbatai Zvi, Yekkes make a point of not quoting the Zohar in tefillah,
> and some other kehillos dropped "baruch hu ubaruch sh'mo" because the S"Z-niks
> found it was gematria for S"Z.

A few weeks ago I happen to notice that R. Matisyahu Blum brings down in
his Sefer "Torah LaDaas" that that Rabbi Kramer did not say Baruch Hu
U'Varuch Shemo. This got me to wondering about how the Minhag got started
in the first place and what the point of saying it is. But obviously, it is
a strong Minhag Israel. Now-a-days it's so ingrained in Orthodox practice
to say it in the middle of a Bracha that it is almost impossible to hold
yourself back. It is reflex like.

But if you think about it, there is no real purpose to it. Furhtermore,
when one wants to be Yotze a with someone else's Bracha, saying Baruch Hu
U'Varuch Shemo is considerd a Hefsek. Additionally, Chazal were Mesaken
Chazaras HaShatz, so that those who couldn't read would have a way of being
Yotze Teffila through the Halachic mechanism of HaShomyah KeOneh, confirming
each Bracha with Amen. Baruch Hu U'Varuch Shemo would invalidate and be
considered a Hefsek. Never the less, it is the universal Minhag (with the
possible exception of some Yekkes as noted above) to say Baruch Hu U'Varuch
Shemo in the middle of every Bracha. I realize that today we all know how
to Daven. But wouldn't it be wise to not answer Baruch Hu U'Varuch Shemo so
that we can have a second chance at being Yotze Teffilah in case we somehow
messed up without realizing it? It seems to me that it is a win/win situation
if we don't say Baruch Hu U'Varuch Shemo but if we do say it, we exclude
ourselves of a second chance at Shmone Esreh.

So... who invented Baruch Hu U'Varuch Shemo and why?

HM

P.S. Rabbi Kramer is also know by his nickname "the Gra".



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On Tue, Jul 25, 2000 at 08:35:51AM -0400, Joelirich@aol.com wrote:
: Halacha recognizes kavanah al tnai ...                                I'm
: not sure one can actually maintain this bifurcated kavana during the actual
: maaseh (ie if you are able to maintain a separate level of consciousness while
: counting the omer, what is your intent at any one point in time - in my mind
: it's a boolean variable(0 or 1 and nothing else). Do others see it
: differently?

I think that lima'aseh I don't end up having a t'nai on my kavanah, but rather
my kavanah includes a t'nai. IOW, I don't try to simulatanously harbor two
thoughts about bein hashmashos when I'm counting omer: it's still day and
it's night. Rather one thought "It MIGHT be night, and if so, I'm counting."
Having in mind that it might means realizing it's a maybe. I'm not sure if
that's sufficient, or if the t'nai requires both positive and negative forms,
as per hilchos nedarim. I haven't bothered doing so in the past. In which case
it becomes two thoughts (adding "then again, in might not") that don't
contradict.

WRT the kavanah for the mitzvah, though it's only the "then" clause(s), the
"I'm counting" part that is kavanah in the sense of "mitzvos einum tzerichos
kavanah". Therefore the part of my personal intent that's kavanah for the
mitzvah is al t'nai.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 26-Jul-00: Revi'i, Matos-Masei
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 42b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Yeshaiah 15

On Wed, Jul 26, 2000 at 01:33:52PM -0700, Harry Maryles wrote:
: A few weeks ago I happen to notice that R. Matisyahu Blum brings down in
: his Sefer "Torah LaDaas" that that Rabbi Kramer did not say Baruch Hu
: U'Varuch Shemo....

In Nefesh haRav, R' Schecher, in the name of RYBS, gives a reason for the
Gra's position. The Ein Sof itself can't be the subject of a brachah, when
we say "b'rich hu" in Kaddish we mean that man's perception of Hashem should
be blessed. IOW, "b'rich hu" implicitely means "baruch sh'mo".

By adding "baruch sh'mo" after it, you are implying that by "baruch hu" you
mean the Ein Sof itself. The lashon therefore borders on apikursus. The
minhag is therefore a minhag ta'us, and no valid minhag to say even "baruch
sh'mo" alone during berachos even where one isn't trying to be yotzei.

: P.S. Rabbi Kramer is also know by his nickname "the Gra".

Kind of like referring to the famous Rabbi Solomon Issacson? (*)

-mi

(* Spoiler: translate to Hebrew and take the acronym.)

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 26-Jul-00: Revi'i, Matos-Masei
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 42b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Yeshaiah 15

Yitzchok Zirkind:
> no source in Medrosh that the cut off point was Matan Torah) that in the days
> of Peleg was when peoples life expectancy was cut (Peleg meaning halved),
> he further explains that "Matan Torah" rfers to the time of Hanefesh Asher
> Osu Vichoron (based on the Gemara that Shnei Alofim Torah begins in the year
> 2000). this answers both questions.

Philosophically speaking I would prefer to say that an error crept into Rashi
than ascribe to Rashi as saying one thing while meaning something else,
especialy when we have texts to support a different girsa. There is no
doubt that Rashi often stated things at 2 or more levels of understanding;
however to state that Rashi openly said X but - due to some hidden agenda -
meant Y not X (as opposed to meaing Y as well as X) is imho a much bigger
udnermining of Rashi than changing a girsa. Now we have to read Rashi as
being something esoteric w/o a simple meaning. And since Rashi was supposed
to simplify our understanding of Mikra not make it more esoteric, it is in
effect a a boomerang.

My experince with R.Yeruchim Gorelick indicated that if a shver girsa required
a convulated teirutz , then go with the more straightforward girsa and avoid
any "kvetching".

Rich Wolpoe

Eli is puzzled by Rav Yehuda's statement at the end of T.B. Ketubot (111a)
that it is forbidden to go from Bavel to Eretz Yisrael when his rebbeim,
Rav and Shmuel, went as did the tanaim, R' Chiya, R' Natan, and Hillel.
How does a drash from a pasuk override the actual practice of his illustrious
predecessors? These are solid questions that can only be answered with
difficulty. One would have to say in Rav Yehuda's defence, it seems to me,
that the mitzvah of talmud or harbotzas (in the case of R' Chiya) torah
overrides the presumed "aseh" of not leaving Bavel. In earlier generations,
the major torah center was in Eretz Yisrael and that justified making aliyah.
In Rav Yehuda's generation that was no longer the case. The leader of his
generation, R' Yochanan, had died in Israel and the increasing repression
of Jews there caused the academies to dwindle. Rav Yehuda felt that Bavel
was now the major torah center, and, therefore, concluded that there was
no longer a basis for leaving Bavel. His talmid, R' Zeira, who did leave
Bavel to study in Israel obviously believed differently.

One could ask a more basic question on the alleged scriptural basis of
Rav Yehuda's viewpoint. He states, "Whoever leaves Bavel for Eretz Yisrael
transgresses a positive commandment, as it says 'They will be brought to Bavel
and remain there until the day that I appoint for them'.." (Jer. 27:22).

[See below -MB]

In R' Zeira's defence, the gemara answers that this verse speaks of the
vessels of Shlomo's bet hamikdash that had been taken to Bavel together with
the young king Yechaniah and the leading citizens some 11 years before the
destruction of Yerushalayim and the temple. A quck reference to the preceding
verse and the context of the passage shows that this is obviously the peshat.
Somehow, Rav Yehuda expanded that specific reference to include the people,
as well (that is probably how the expression "klei kodesh" came to refer to
religious functionaries). Why did Rav Yehuda take such liberties with the
verse and make it seem that there is a divine command not to leave Bavel?
Moreover, the appointed time had long since come centuries prior to Rav Yehuda
with the return to Judea by many of the Babylonian exiles, together with
the temple vessels, at the instigation of the founder of the Persian empire,
Cyrus, the great. Nor was the proclamation of Cyrus a mere political event.
It was clearly foretold by Isaiah, "Who calls Koresh (Cyrus) My shepherd
who will fulfill My wishes, and who will say that Jerusalem be rebuilt
and the temple be founded" (Isa. 44:28). This proclamation is prominently
featured at the beginning of Ezra and at the end of Chronicles where it is
stated that Cyrus was inspired by G-D to make his proclamation. Thousands of
Babylonian Jews had made aliyah as a result of that proclamation and similar
proclamations or authorizations from the subsequent Persian emperors, Darius
the great and Artxerxes - including such luminaries as Yehoshua, the high
priest, Zerubavel, the great grandson of Yechaniah, Ezra, and Nechemiah.
The temple was rebuilt with the encouragement of the prophets Haggai and
Zechariah, and the community flourished under the leadership of Ezra,
Nechemiah, and the people of the Great Assembly. Does anyone believe that
all of this was counter to the alleged ban on leaving Bavel? How, then,
can we understand the position of Rav Yehudah?

It would seem that Rav Yehudah is using the verse in Jeremiah as a token
support (asmachta be'alma). The real basis of his prohibition against
leaving Bavel in this view is based on the attitude that one must not leave
the place which is the center of torah study, as was remarked earlier.
Rashi in T.B. Ketubot (111a) uses the torah center argument to account for
the prohibition against leaving Bavel for other countries. His position
allows for change in the subject of that halacha as circumstances change.
Bavel has not been a torah center for a millenium, and various other places
have taken over that role in the interim. The Rambam, however, (M.T.,
Kings 5:12) cites the prohibition against leaving Bavel for other countries
and bases it on the verse in Jeremiah. I had the impression that the Rambam
always seeks solid support from the biblical text for a torah-based halacha.
Yet, here he uses a verse that was refuted in the above gemara when applied
to Israel and now uses it for other countries where there is even less of
a connection to the verse. The Lechem Mishneh has noted this difficulty
and concludes that Rashi's approach is correct. Does anyone have a way of
understanding the Rambam?


--

[This came in  a second email, but it ammends the previous one. -MB]

I see that I made an error in explaining Jeremiah 27:22. The verse is not
about the temple vessels that were taken to Bavel together with the young
king and prominent citizens some 11 years prior to the destruction of the
temple and the city. Rather, it is about the temple vessels that remained.
It is foretold that these would join the other vessels already held in Bavel
where they would remain until the time appointed for their return to their
former place and function.

Yitzchok Zlochower

In Vol. 5 No. 93 Gershon Dubin asks:
> "Has anyone noticed that the leshon haGemara in Nedarim is more Aramaic
> than in other masechtos? I don't mean the specific nedarim which the Gemara
> describes, which follow the rule of leshon benei adam; I mean the shakla
> vetaria of the Gemara itself. "

Note the commentary of Rosh (Rabbenu Asher) to Nedarim 2b (the first wide
line) "in other masechtot this would have been phrased "where was [the
concept of] yadot mentioned?" but the language of Nedarim is atypical"
("lashon nedarim meshuneh")

Saul Stokar

********************


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