Avodah Mailing List

Volume 05 : Number 095

Friday, July 28 2000

• Re: The Holocaust: Divine Retribution?
• Re: Baruch Hu U'Varuch Shemo
• hashgacha pratis /schar miztva b'hai alma leika (was: The Holoca ust: Divine Retribution?)
• Re: The Holocaust: Divine Retribution?
• Re: hashgacha pratis /schar miztva b'hai alma leika (was: The Holoca ust: Divine Retribution?)
• Trope at 35:4-5
• Re: Rashi in Chaye Sara
• Re: Baruch Hu U'Varuch Shemo
• Re: hashgacha pratis /schar miztva b'hai alma leika (was:
• Re: hashgacha pratis /schar miztva b'hai alma leika (was: The Holoca ust: Divine Retribution?)
• Re: hashgacha pratis /schar miztva b'hai alma leika (was:
• Re: Baruch Hu U'Varuch Shemo
• Re: hashgacha pratis /schar miztva b'hai alma leika (was:
• Re: Baruch Hu U'Varuch Shemo
• Re: Baruch Hu U'Varuch Shemo
• Re: What is Neis? (was Re: The Holocaust: Divine Retribution?)
• Re: What is Neis? (was Re: The Holocaust: Divine Retribution?)
• aliyah
• Re: hashgacha pratis /schar miztva b'hai alma leika (was:
• Re: The Holocaust: Divine Retribution?
• Re: The Holocaust: Divine Retribution?
• Re: The Holocaust: Divine Retribution?

R' Yosef G. Bechhofer <sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu> wrote:
> Once a nes occurs, 'twould seem, it is inherently part of nature, and thus
> must, retroactively, bear some explanation as such.
> I think that the Rambam learns fakehrt, but similarly: All miracles needed
> to have been set in place from sheishes yemei Bereishis.

Ramblings on miracles:

It depends how you define miracles. There are those that define every moment
of existence as a miracle... e.g. the sun rising daily: Is it a miracle
and we are so used to it that we don't consider it such or is it not a miracle?

Also, ignorance can cause one to think that something seemingly inexplicable
to be a miracle... e.g. there was a time that Mankind considered lightning
a miracle but scientific inquiry has more or less explained the physical
nature of lightning and has taken it out of the realm of the inexplicable.
Science has done that a lot over time.

We have all (?) seen the elaborate "magic" of a David Copperfield. I doubt
that any of us knows how he does it. But, does anyone really think that
these are miracles or do we realize that these are just tricks that we are
all being fooled by. For that matter, can you imagine if any of Chzal were
"miraculously" transported to the 21st century and saw all that science and
technology has accomplished? Somthing as mundane as a television transmission
would seem like the greatest miracle.

What about all of those "crying" or "bleeding" Madonna statues? Miracles? Or
is there some physical explanation?

Kriyas Yam Suf was a legitimate miracle. Whether it was B'Derech HaTeva,
as the Rambam explains or whether it broke the "plane" of nature is a matter
of debate by other Rishonim. I prefer to believe that all miracles happened
B'Derech HaTeva because, why ascribe to G-d the need to break the laws of
physics if we don't have to? Not that Chas VeSholom He couldn't. But If
G-d created a physical universe with laws of nature I feel intuitively that
he wouldn't break those laws since he doesn't need to.

Certainly today when everything is Hester Panim. G-d no longer gives us
open miracles. If one thinks he sees a miracle I'd be willing to bet that
it has a rational explanation. Miracles are hidden today. The six day war
which many people say contained miracles and in and of itself was a miracle,
was all done B'Derech HaTeva.

I now return you to the miracle of e-mail.

HM

On 26 Jul 00, at 13:33, Harry Maryles wrote:

> Never the less, it is the universal Minhag (with the
> possible exception of some Yekkes as noted above) to say Baruch Hu U'Varuch
> Shemo in the middle of every Bracha. 

RYBS was noheg not to say Baruch Hu u'Varuch Shmo in Chazoras HaShatz. See
Nefesh HaRav page 127.

Ad kan I remembered myself. RHS brings there that the Mechaber holds to say it
(OH 124:5), but the Gra held not to say it (Maaseh Rav 43).

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

Carl and Adina Sherer
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

Micha Berger wrote
> All of which goes back to sechar mitzvos behai alma leika -- because what
> one gets in this world is the situation necessary to maximize his growth
> in temimus and deveikius -- i.e. tov.

This discussion brings up an issue that I've been grappling with recently:
Understanding the Rambam's position (Moreh Nevuchim III:17-18) regarding
hashgacha pratis. Rambam says that Hashem has only hashgacha klalis with
respect to the world other than humankind, and that hashgacha klalis (i.e.,
the rules of nature) will apply to individuals (even Jews) unless they
merit hashgacha pratis (such as is the case with nevi'im and chasidim).
(The Rambam III:17 says that the pasuk "Poseach es yadecha u'masbi'a l'chol
chai ratzon" refers to Hashem's hashgacha klalis, not his hashgacha pratis.)

My understanding of the Rambam's position (though I've never studied it
intensively and would appreciate commentary by those who have) is that
he believes that Hashem created nature to govern the world and makes an
exception only with regard to those who merit it. Therefore, for *most*
people schar mitzvah b'hai alma leika. (Note that the Ramban in bechukosai
says that the promises of "v'nasati gishmaichem b'itam" applies only when
Bnei Yisrael are wholly righteous, and this never occurred and therefore
that promise was never fullfilled; see generally David Berger, "Miracles
and the Natural Order in Nahmanides").

It would seem to me--but I would appreciate it if the chevrah can confirm
this--that the Rambam would not subscribe to the notion that a person who
is not deserving of much hashgacha pratis (i.e., one who is far from being
a chasid) will be entitled to be placed in situations which allow him to
maximize his temimus and deveikus. (Of course, Micha's statement fits well
with many mussar works such as Michtav Me'eliyahu.)

Kol tuv,
Moshe Feldman

In a message dated 7/27/00 4:32:20 AM, hmaryles@yahoo.com writes:
> But If G-d created a physical universe with laws of nature I feel intuitively
> that he wouldn't break those laws since he doesn't need to.

> Certainly today when everything is Hester Panim. G-d no longer gives us
> open miracles. If one thinks he sees a miracle I'd be willing to bet that
> it has a rational explanation. Miracles are hidden today. The six day war
> which many people say contained miracles and in and of itself was a miracle,
> was all done B'Derech HaTeva.

We're too jaded and "educated" to see the openness of HaShem's miracles today.

What if Scripture said that HaShem hurled a particle so small that power of
a million eyes couldn't detect it, into another particle that couldn't be
seen, and then a massive flame arose that destroyed cities and countryside
and nations full of people? What if Scripture said that HaShem focused the
power of his light on an object with such speed that time turned inside out,
and that what was past became the future, and the future became the past?

David Finch

> My understanding of the Rambam's position...is that he believes that Hashem
> created nature to govern the world and makes an exception only with regard
> to those who merit it. Therefore, for *most* people schar mitzvah b'hai alma
> leika.

Were this true, then Rava (Kid. 39) could have learned that the Mishna is
talking about a case of tzaddik gamur where even R' Ya'akov agrees that
there is direct hashgacha. From the fact that the gemara assumes that the
Mishna is against R' Ya'akov and doesn't draw this distinction it seems the
mach. R' Ya'akov and the Mishna is in an absolute sense of whether there is
schar b'hai alma for anyone.

Maybe one can distinguish between the concepts of schar v'onesh and the
general notion of hashgacha as protection (maybe this helps resolve the
apparent contradiction between the Ramban in Bo and the Ramban in his peirush
on Iyov that Dr. Berger refers to.) The other alternative is to say that
although R' ya'akov and the tana argue on absolute terms, the Rambam split
his approach depending on the person. Neither answer is very satisfying...

On another note: Micha wrote that in matters of agadita we suspend the
rules of yachid v'rabim halacha k'rabim. Even if this were true, it begs
the question of why the Rambam felt R' Ya'akov's view was closer to the
'truth' when the majority of his Tannaitic peers did not?

-CB

[Micha's two cents: Not suspend the rules, the rule doesn't apply. It says
"halachah k'rabim". This isn't halachah.  -mi]

It is my understanding that at Bamidbar 35:4-5 there occurs two consecutive
words (alpayim ba'ama) for which there is unique trope (yerach ben yamo &
karnei fara), i.e., those two tropes appear nowhere else in Torah. It seems
awfully "coincidental" that two different tropes, both of which are unique,
appear on consecutive words. Is there something special about that verse?
I.e., what are we to learn from this?

-- Eric

In a message dated 7/27/00 7:30:48 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
richard_wolpoe@ibi.com writes:
> Philosophically speaking I would prefer to say that an error crept into Rashi
> than ascribe to Rashi as saying one thing while meaning something else...

I just mentioned an alternative answer which is strongly grounded in the 
Gemara. there is another approach to answer the seeming Stira in the 2 
Rashi's based on the understanding that Ben Meioh is the begining of Onshin 
and it is compared to any time less then that (off list I mentioned this, I 
found this brought in the Taz Al Hatorah), Vehabocheir Yivchar.

> My experince with R.Yeruchim Gorelick indicated that if a shver girsa required
> a convulated teirutz , then go with the more straightforward girsa and avoid
> any "kvetching".

As mentioned before, one need to compare with Kisvei Yad and first prints, 
and see what Gdolei Mforshei Rashi say.  (it is well known the saying one 
need to sit Shivah Nkiyeem on Tipas Dyoi of Rashi).

Kol Tuv
Yitzchok Zirkind

On Thu, Jul 27, 2000 at 12:19:20AM +0200, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
: RYBS was noheg not to say Baruch Hu u'Varuch Shmo in Chazoras HaShatz. See
: Nefesh HaRav page 127.

AFAIK, and I did interview a number of eidim on the point, RYBS was noheig NOT
to say it in any context. Yes, I intentionally made this a mesorah not to do
something, as the reasoning given in Nefesh haRav would justify making a point
of not saying it.

-mi

RC Brown wrote:

> Maybe one can distinguish between the concepts of schar v'onesh and the 
> general notion of hashgacha as protection (maybe this helps resolve the 

In other words, if you do a mitzvah you are rewarded and if you do an aveirah 
you are punished.  But not everything good that happens is a reward and not 
everything bad is a punishment.  Hashgachah only goes as far as sechar ve'onesh 
and not the rest of life.  Does anyone explicitly say this?

Gil Student

On Wed, Jul 26, 2000 at 05:30:19PM -0400, Feldman, Mark wrote:
: My understanding of the Rambam's position (though I've never studied it
: intensively and would appreciate commentary by those who have) is that
: he believes that Hashem created nature to govern the world and makes an
: exception only with regard to those who merit it. Therefore, for *most*
: people schar mitzvah b'hai alma leika.

See the discussion titled "Rambam and Hashgachah" in v1n12 and subsequent
volumes, or look for that subject line in the "R" page of the archive's
index.

I disagree, in that I would avoid speaking in absolutes. The Rambam makes
a point of turning the set of humans into a fuzzy set. This totally
changes the concept that all people get hashgachah p'ratis as it means
that some human beings are more "people" in this regard than others.
To the extent that one qualifies one gets more or less hashgachah p'ratis.

The criterion for membership is closeness to HKBH, which in Rambam-ese
is equivalent to yedi'ah. So the only people who would get absolutely
no hashgachah is someone who knows absolutely 0 about Hashem r"l.

I therefore find it hard to argue that this would explain "s'char mitzvos
b'hai alma leika" for *most* people.

:                                    (Of course, Micha's statement fits well
: with many mussar works such as Michtav Me'eliyahu.)

At the time, I commented on the similarity yet difference between the Rambam's
connection between yedi'ah and hashgachah p'ratis and REED's connection
between bitachon and not needing hishtadlus.

BTW, hashgachah p'ratis, having HKBH tweak even the details of one's life,
would include nisyonos, not just siyata diShmaya.

A non-frum co worker who read the discussion from the archive asked me the
following: But isn't HKBH CHOOSING to leave one to teva? IOW, isn't the
lack of hashgach p'ratis itself a form of hashgachah p'ratis, in that H' is
allowing nature to take its course?

Which also touches on another issue we raised back then: Aristotle's physics
was deterministic. Current physics allows teva and hashgachah p'ratis to
coexist, as we've seen in recent discussion.

When we had that discussion, R' Sholom Carmy said that he was finishing up
an article on the Rambam and Hashgachah. Anyone (including RSC) know if it
came out?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                    When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org               you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org          You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                           - R' Yekusiel Halbserstam of Sanz zt"l

On Thu, Jul 27, 2000 at 12:00:18PM -0400, Gil.Student@citicorp.com wrote:
: In other words, if you do a mitzvah you are rewarded and if you do an aveirah 
: you are punished.  But not everything good that happens is a reward and not 
: everything bad is a punishment. Hashgachah only goes as far as sechar
: ve'onesh and not the rest of life.

I think we're overlooking one very major point -- Acheir's dilemma. Tzaddik
vira lo. There is no real indication that, all said and done, there is any
correlation between what one does and what one gets in olam hazeh. Sechar
mitzvos behai alma leika is the only quote so far that actually corresponds
to experience. I therefore wouldn't be trying to minimize its purvey, but
trying to explain everything else in light of it.

-mi

On Thu, Jul 27, 2000 at 12:19:20AM +0200, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
: RYBS was noheg not to say Baruch Hu u'Varuch Shmo in Chazoras HaShatz. See
: Nefesh HaRav page 127.

On 27 Jul 2000, at 10:52, Micha Berger wrote:
> AFAIK, and I did interview a number of eidim on the point, RYBS was noheig NOT
> to say it in any context. 

I'm not sure that's correct. I think he didn't say it when it was a Birkas
HaMitzva (obviously) and in Chazoras HaShatz where he held you were being
Yotzei Tfilla b'Tzibur. Other than that, I do not recall being told that he
did not say it.

But then, the times I davened in Maimonides when he was there, I generally
sat too far behind him to hear what he did, so I am relying on what I remember
was taught in class....

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

> In other words, if you do a mitzvah you are rewarded and if you do an
> aveirah you are punished. But not everything good that happens is a reward
> and not everything bad is a punishment. Hashgachah only goes as far as
> sechar ve'onesh and not the rest of life.

Actually I meant the reverse...sorry I didn't make that clear. The whole
machlokes R' Ya'akov and the Mishna in Kid. is with regards to schar v'oneh
b'hai alma as reward and punishment. But, as you wrote, not everything is
reward/punishment, and it is that everything else that falls under the ruberic
of hashgacha. What you gain by the split is that the mach. R' Ya'akov and
the tana in Kid. is independent of the discussion of the nature of hashgacha.

-CB

On Thu, Jul 27, 2000 at 07:25:04PM +0200, Carl M. Sherer wrote:
:> AFAIK, and I did interview a number of eidim on the point, RYBS was noheig
:> NOT to say it in any context. 

: I'm not sure that's correct. I think he didn't say it when it was a Birkas
: HaMitzva (obviously)...

Including Hallel and Sefiras ha'Omer. This would have solved his problem of
how to avoid being yotzei with the Chazan's berachah by saying amein without
obligating having kavanah not to be yotzei. (A kavanah RYBS found distasteful.)
But, he didn't use BHuBS as a hefsek.

All of this is interesting in showing lishitaso. But the same Nefesh haRav
you quote gives a swevarah (which I mentioned earlier) that isn't limited
to those berachos with which you are trying to be yotzei.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halbserstam of Klausenberg zt"l

In a message dated Thu, 27 Jul 2000 12:52:27 PM Eastern Daylight Time, Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> writes:
> Including Hallel and Sefiras ha'Omer. This would have solved his problem of
> how to avoid being yotzei with the Chazan's berachah by saying amein without
> obligating having kavanah not to be yotzei. ... But, he didn't use BHuBS as
> a hefsek.

Is it the case that you are not yotze even bdieved if you answer BHBS to a
bracha with which you wish to be yotze?

Kol Tuv,
Joel Rich

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> those things that we can predict (teva), and those we can't (neis). Which
> is the usage we find, for example, in the Rambam's Hil Yesodei haTorah
> and elsewhere.

Predictability, while useful in trying to identify Neis, is not definitive.

It has, for example, been determined that the placement of an electron as it
orbits within it's shell of any atom is not predictible. That is, science
has determined that it is not possible to predict where an electron will be
in it's orbit at any given point in time. Does this make the existence of
an eletron a neis? I don't think so.

I think that perhaps a better definition might be that any phenomenon which
either breaks the plane of nature (violates the laws of nature) would be by
definition a Neis.

To minimalists, like myself, who do not like the idea of tampering with the
laws of nature, A neis would be defined as being "in the right place at the
right time". The laws of nature would mandate that this phenomenon would
occur for me at perecisely the time I would need it, seeming to me that it
actually violated the laws of nature while not actually doing so.

So, for example, the sun being stopped in it's movement across the sky by
Joshua when he fit the battle of Jehrico, was a natural occurrence of the
nature of the cosmos merely timed for Joshua's use at that moment in time
by G-d.

HM

On Thu, Jul 27, 2000 at 11:09am -7, Harry Maryles wrote:
: Predictability, while useful in trying to identify Neis, is not definitive.

I wasn't clear. I'm saying that "neis" means "that which, like a flag (*),
calls attention". I'm altogather denying the existance of the line between
natural and non-natural events, al pi REED (R' Dessler, a new addition to
the standard acronymn dictionary). All is from HKBH, so there is no real
distinction -- except in our expectations. Which is why, as I said, R'
Chanina ben Dosa who truly saw yad Hashem in oil's ability to burn was such
a ba'al mofeis.

(* There is a chaveir ba'Avodah who is bothered by the hamon am's inability
to simply translate the words of tephillah, just knowing what they're saying.
One of his tests: What does "visa neis likabeitz goluyoseinu" mean?)

: It has, for example, been determined that the placement of an electron as it
: orbits within it's shell of any atom is not predictible. That is, science
: has determined that it is not possible to predict where an electron will be
: in it's orbit at any given point in time.

It is possible to predict probabilities. If electrons were to suddenly behave
very differently than their random variables' expected values, violating
the law of large numbers, yes it would be a neis. You yourself have cited
k'rias yam suf as a case in point.

: To minimalists, like myself, who do not like the idea of tampering with the
: laws of nature...

I, OTOH, am a maximalist (again, lishitas REED). I don't believe in "laws of 
nature" as a different thing than non-nature -- it's an illusion that gives
value to behirach chafshi by:

1- allowing man to plan; choosing actions based on desired consequences means
   the need to be able to predict the effects of an act.
2- providing man with the opportunity to suppress his knowledge of Hashem's
   presence.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halbserstam of Klausenberg zt"l

> Eli is puzzled by Rav Yehuda's statement at the end of T.B. Ketubot (111a)
> that it is forbidden to go from Bavel to Eretz Yisrael when his rebbeim...
>                                                Rav Yehuda felt that Bavel
> was now the major torah center, and, therefore, concluded that there was
> no longer a basis for leaving Bavel. His talmid, R' Zeira, who did leave
> Bavel to study in Israel obviously believed differently.

The problem with this answer is that R. Yehudah seems to have 2 problems.
One moving from Bavel to israel and another one moving from Bavel to
anywhere else.

The "usual" explanation is that the prohibition of moving to anywhere else
is based on Bavel being the center of learning. However, the prohibition of
moving to Israel is independent of this and flows from the decree of exile.

BTW I thought that R. Zeira did learn under R. Yochanan. In any case
R. Yochana's talmidim like R. Elazar, R. Ami, R. Asi, R. Abahu, R. Yirmiya
etc. were also major figures.

Eli Turkel

In a message dated 7/27/00 10:22:47 AM US Central Standard Time, 
micha@aishdas.org writes:
> I think we're overlooking one very major point -- Acheir's dilemma. Tzaddik
> vira lo. There is no real indication that, all said and done, there is any
> correlation between what one does and what one gets in olam hazeh.

"The world of man is but a fiction / All within in it is contradiction."
William Blake (or close to it; I recited from memory). Compare this to the
absolute, unknowable perfection of the world of HaShem, include the World to
Come. Olam hazeh exist within our sensual experience and HaShem's absolute
imagination. Olam hazeh seems contradictory because it is *man's*; i.e.,
our minds are too feeble to understand the completeness of it.

Blake was a tzaddik, no?
David Finch

DFinchPC@aol.com wrote:
> We're too jaded and "educated" to see the openness of HaShem's miracles today.

> What if Scripture said that HaShem hurled a particle so small that power of
> a million eyes couldn't detect it, into another particle that couldn't be
> seen, and then a massive flame arose that destroyed cities and countryside
> and nations full of people? What if Scripture said that HaShem focused the
> power of his light on an object with such speed that time turned inside out,
> and that what was past became the future, and the future became the past?

Perhaps we are too jaded. The above examples in fact tend corroborate it
my belief that miracles lie within the laws of nature. (I believe you are
reffering to a nuclear reaction and a facet of Einstien's General Theory
of Relativity)


Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> I'm altogather denying the existance of the line between natural and
> non-natural events, al pi REED... All is from HKBH, so there is no real
> distinction -- except in our expectations.

While I agree with REED's view that all is from HKBH, I do not subscribe
to the necessity of eliminating the line of distinction between natural and
non-natural events. To ascribe any of that which man does not understand to
the realm of the supernatural is to negate the ability of Man to determine
what reality itself is.

HM

On Thu, Jul 27, 2000 at 03:57:25PM -0700, Harry Maryles wrote:
:> I'm altogather denying the existance of the line between natural and
:> non-natural events, al pi REED... All is from HKBH, so there is no real
:> distinction -- except in our expectations.

: While I agree with REED's view that all is from HKBH, I do not subscribe
: to the necessity of eliminating the line of distinction between natural and
: non-natural events. To ascribe any of that which man does not understand to
: the realm of the supernatural is to negate the ability of Man to determine
: what reality itself is.

I guess I wasn't sufficiently clear. The motivation for eliminating
the concept of "teva" as a "beryah bifnei atzmah" has nothing to do with
denying the explicability of most events. Teva is still about being able to
predict events based entirely on rules that don't have the word "HKBH" in
them. The difference is that REED is saying this predictability is the
ENTIRE definition of teva. An event that is biderech hateva happens for the
same reasons and through the same mechanism as neis.

Hashem wants us to have such rules because otherwise we'd have as little
bechirah as mal'achim (as per the Ohr Samei'ach) -- all choices would
be obvious. Just as He wants us to walk bayabashah bisoch hayam.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halbserstam of Klausenberg zt"l

I agree that an event that is biderech hateva happens for the same reasons
and through the same mechanism as neis, if you mean by that, G-d's creative
capacity. G-d cretaes teva... He creates Neis. Same mechanism. I believe what
you are in effect saying is that in the practical terms applicable to Mankind,
REED defines Teva as predictability. This may be true. I am trying to give
a scientific, rather than a practical definition of Neis vs Teva. Teva is
that which can be perceived by the five senses, directly or indirectly, or
can be proven imperically, through the use of the scientific method, or can
be deduced logically. Neis is not necessarily subject to any of the above.
It is more likely subjectively experienced.

OTOH, as I have said, I beleive that Neis is actually a part of Teva (which
seems to contradict my whole thesis). But that is not the same as defining
it is a predictability vs an unpredictability. It is only our subjective
perception of the Neis and our inability to understand the natural basis of
a Neis that makes it seem to violate the laws of nature. But definitionally
it is a "beryah bifnei atzmah"

> Hashem wants us to have such rules because otherwise we'd have as little
> bechirah as mal'achim (as per the Ohr Samei'ach) -- all choices would
> be obvious. Just as He wants us to walk bayabashah bisoch hayam.

I agree but this does not contradict what I said.

HM

********************


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