Avodah Mailing List

Volume 06 : Number 026

Tuesday, October 31 2000

• Rosh Chodesh Bentsching
• re:Shmini Atzeres as Regel Bifnei Atzmo
• Hakol biydei Shamayim chutz...
• Re: Hakol biydei Shamayim chutz...
• RE: Rosh Chodesh Bentsching
• Re: Rosh Chodesh Bentsching
• RE: Rosh Chodesh Bentsching
• Siyum (was Re: Rosh Chodesh Bentsching)
• RE: KADDISH
• change in religious calendar?
• [none]
• Re: Shmini Atzeres as Regel Bifnei Atzmo
• Re: Areivim V6 #102
• Re: Hakol biydei Shamayim chutz...

The beginnning of the Rosh Chodesh bentsching is ...shetechadesh alenu
es hachodesh hazeh, etc.

Later, after mentioning when R"Ch will be, we say yechadeshehu HKB"H
alenu ve'al kol amo beis Yisrael...

Is the first part for ourselves only or for all of klal Yisrael? If yes,
why the difference in lashon? If not, why the switch?

Gershon

RYBS (printed in Mesorah, No. 13), noting that in Emor (where the
emphasis is on K'dushas Hayom [hereafter KHY] of Issur M'lacha) and in
Pinchas (where the emphasis is in KHY of Musafim), Shmini is mentioned
separately, while in Re'eh (where the emphasis is on KHY of Chagiga) it
is not mentioned [but only alluded to by the words v'hayisa ach sameach].

His explanation is that for issur m'lacha and musafim it is an independent
regel, while for chagiga it is just a continuation (as tashlumin)
of Succos. His conclusion is that therefore should one mention Chag
Hasukkos in davening, he need not repeat, since it is not a lie -- for
at least one prat, it is a continuation of Succos. However, for Kiddush,
whose m'chayev is issur m'lacha, for which Shmini is a distinct k'dusha,
repetition would be necessary if he said Succos.

It was suggested on Areivim that "hakol biydei Shamayim chutz miyir'as
Shamayim" means that bechirah chafshi is limited to deciding on the issue
of yir'as Shamayim. As the discussion really belongs here, here is my
summary.

David Finch objected:
: I'm not familiar with this concept. Where did you get it? And on what
: level are the non-frum working? Gemorrah sets out a detailed hierarchy
: of criminal punishments and civil penalties that presuppose the actor's
: free will. Gemorrah doesn't ask whether the actor is sufficiently frum
: to have free will. Instead, it calls all Jews into account, as well as
: non-Jews in certain circumstances. The accounting all assumes that the
: actor had a certain degree of hegemony over his own actions.

: Anyhow, Scripture (see Job, especially) makes clear that the obligations
: of free will exist for all men, whether pre-Jewish, Jewish, or
: gentile. Otherwise, most of humanity gets off the hook while only a
: small elite of observant Jews are responsible for their actions.

To which Eli Linas <linaseli@mail.netvision.net.il> replied:
> This is an explicit Gemorah: "And Rebbe Chanina said, "All is in the hands
> of Heaven except for the Fear of Heaven, as it says (Devarim 10:12): 'And
> now, Israel, what does Hashem, your God, request of you, except that you
> fear Hashem, your God, to go in all His ways, and to love Him and to serve
> Hashem, your God, will all your heart and all your soul.'" (Brachos 33b).

If I may interrupt for a moment... What about "Hakol biydei shamayim chutz
mitzinim upachin"?

Back to REL:
> The only free will man has is in whether he chooses to fulfill the mitzvos
> or not. Therfore, the more one is engaged in mitzvah observance, the more
> role free will has has in his life. Therefore, the people who deal with the
> mitzvos the most have the greatest relationship to free will. The lesser
> the one is connected to mitzvah observance, the lesser his free will. Yes,
> the Gemorah setting out this detailed hierarchy presumes free will - to the
> extent that one abuses his free will, by, for example, flaunting the
> commandment not to steal, he will be punished. Yes, bnei Noach are also in
> this equation - the Rambam, I believe, notes that how could the Egyptians
> be punished for making life tough for the Jews, if they were the designated
> tool? The answer is, because they carried out their job above and beyond
> the call of duty. Alternatively, who said they had to be the nation? They
> could have refused to have been the Almighty's tool. Because of these last
> two reasons, most of humanity is, in fact, not left off the hook. Finally,
> what happens to us or not is independant of what an enemy want - even if a
> bullet has already been shot, He can deflect it. What happens to us is only
> what the Almighty wants to happen to us. So, even if the Arabs, in this
> case, have free will (and sometimes, when a person is a big enough rasha,
> the Almighty suspends it), that has no bearing on us: our job is to do a
> cheshbone and do teshuvah. Finally, we see that the Rambam actually agrees
> with my point, not disagrees. In the very beginning of hilchos Ta'anis, he
> says that when any troubles come upon Israel, such as wars, etc., they are
> responsible to pray, fast and do teshuvah. So we see that when bad things
> happen, we have to make a cheshbone. 

Akiva Atwood <atwood@netvision.net.il> quotes REL on the point that bechirah
is limited to choosing to do the mitzvos and compares it to his answer that
the Mitzriyim went beyond the call of duty. He notes:

: There seems to be a contradiction between these two statements. If the only
: free will man has is to do Miztvot, then how could the Egyptians *choose* to
: "carry out their job above and beyond the call of duty"?

REL replied:
> It's a huge, huge topic, and of course there are questions to be
> asked. While I don't want to open up a discussion on this thread more
> than has already been mentioned, because it was really in passing as a
> comment on a different topic, two possible answers spring immediately
> to mind: The Almighty can control free will. Therefore, He placed in
> the Egyptian's minds and hearts to afflict the Jews. Therefore, at that
> level, they wouldn't have been punished. However, maybe the Almighty
> only put it in their hearts to afflict them up to a certain point, but
> if they decided to go beyond that, that was their own free will choice,
> and they were punished for it. 2) Maybe that's why the second peshat is
> offered, because of the difficulty you raised with it.

RDF adds:
:> The only free will man has is in whether he chooses to fulfill the mitzvos
:> or not.

: Since all of life can be encapsulated in the mitvos, this statement is 
: literally true but somewhat misleading. It is consistent with the Rambam's 
: view that man can choose to exercise free will over virtually all of his 
: actual conduct. So what are we arguing about?

To which REL replied:
> A person can lose their free will. Second of all, while this may be true
> for the Torah observant Jew, it is not true for everyone else.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

David Finch:
: Since all of life can be encapsulated in the mitvos, this statement is 
: literally true but somewhat misleading. It is consistent with the Rambam's 
: view that man can choose to exercise free will over virtually all of his 
: actual conduct. So what are we arguing about?

To which REL replied:
> A person can lose their free will. Second of all, while this may be true
> for the Torah observant Jew, it is not true for everyone else.

I think you've put the cart before the horse. The observance of mitzvot is 
the most refined manifestation of the exercise of free will, particularly 
those mitzvot that challenge the heart or the intellect. So you need free 
will in order to *become* observant. And to exercise free will, you need to 
think -- think hard. (Too many "observant" Jews today believe that frumness 
involves blind, automatic adherence to some rebbe's mechanical instructions. 
Only when the learn to follow the instructions do they acquire free will, or 
so the think. In our mesorah this is fundamentally non-Jewish, and 
fundamentally sad.)

The Rambam put it somewhat differently. Chazal said, Let your actions be for 
the sake of Heaven. The Rambam said, all bodily actions prescribed by law are 
for the sake of *knowing* heaven. Thus by using one's free will to honor the 
law, one can hew closer to HaShem. Will, observance, and the act and 
experience of learning and combined in one process. 

None of this makes sense if free will were the prerogative only of "frum" 
Jews. Were that the case, the process identified by the Rambam would be 
turned on its head.

David Finch

Gershon Dubin:
: The beginnning of the Rosh Chodesh bentsching is ...shetechadesh alenu
: es hachodesh hazeh, etc.

: Later, after mentioning when R"Ch will be, we say yechadeshehu HKB"H
: alenu ve'al kol amo beis Yisrael...

: Is the first part for ourselves only or for all of klal Yisrael? If yes,
: why the difference in lashon? If not, why the switch?

The Yehi Ratzon is an adaptation of Rav's siyyum of the Amida as brought
down in Brachos 16:B

Bepashtus the line shetechadesh Aleinu was to adapt this otherwise daily
tefillah to Rosh Chodesh Benching. (Baer's Avodas Yisrael says simliar)

The question remains: how medayyek was the "adaptor" being in order
consistent with the rest of the formula of chodesh Benching?  My opinon is
that he was simply not so medayeik, because this formula was a simple "add
on" (again see Baer)  

FWIW I attended a Chabad Minyan this last Shabbos that omits this entire
paragraph al pi Nusach ha'Ari.

Shalom and Regards,
Rich Wolpoe
Richard_Wolpoe@ibi.com  

On Mon, Oct 30, 2000 at 09:09:03AM -0500, Wolpoe, Richard wrote:
: The Yehi Ratzon is an adaptation of Rav's siyyum of the Amida as brought
: down in Brachos 16:B

Nit: Rav said it "basar tzilosana", after, not as the conclusion of
it. IOW, like "E-lokai Netzor", it was intended to be tachanunim,
not tefillah.

-mi

Micha Berger
>: The Yehi Ratzon is an adaptation of Rav's siyyum of the Amida as brought
>: down in Brachos 16:B

> Nit: Rav said it "basar tzilosana", after, not as the conclusion of
> it. IOW, like "E-lokai Netzor", it was intended to be tachanunim,
> not tefillah.

Yep that was how I meant it that it was his version of Elokai Netzor etc.

Nit: the "siyyum"  {ie. Hadran alach} we do at after a Seder Mishayno is not
in the Mishnayos either! <smile>

-RW

On Mon, Oct 30, 2000 at 09:30:12AM -0500, Wolpoe, Richard wrote:
: Nit: the "siyyum"  {ie. Hadran alach} we do at after a Seder Mishayno is not
: in the Mishnayos either! <smile>

I believe the word "siyum" refers to concluding the seifer, not the Hadran.

-mi

SBA:
>> Also does anyone know of the sources for the parenthesis in kaddish derabanan
>> (vara,tovim,brachamv)

> And I'd like to know why Kaddish D'rabonon has these additional words
> (tovim, brachmov)?

> Talking about Kaddish...

> What I haven't seen yet, is anyone telling us - if someone - not davening
> with the minyan, and holds b'emtza tefilla (Psuke d'zimra, after Borchu
> etc) and he wishes to say kaddish yosom or rabonon with the tzibbur -
> may he do so? In what places is it considered a hefsek and where not?

FWIW Baer's Avodas Yisrael p. 153  & 130-131 are good starter points
-Rich Wolpoe

>In ha-Rav Prof. H. Soloveitchik's review...
>"I would suggest that sukkah-sitting on Shemini Azeret was established on
>an original fault line, and its observance ultimately cracked under the
>joint pressure of colder climate and the change in religious calendar that
>occurred in eastern Europe...

Can you explain what is meant by 'change in religious calendar'?  Hasn't it
been unchanged for 1500 years?

-- Eric

Eli Linas <linaseli@mail.netvision.net.il>:
> Free will is not as free ranging as you seem to indicate - it is only in
> the realm of Yiras Shemayim. 

Here is a simple way of looking at it.

We have free unlimited free will to WANT something, but not free will to
succeed at it - except for Yir'as Shamayim.

I can of my own free will WANT to play basketball as well as Michael Jordan
did, but I cannot manifest that w/o the help of  a neis nigleh! <smile> 

But if I want to have Yir'as Shamayim as a great as Moshe Rabbeinu (at least
relative to my my naitve abilities) that I *can*accomplish.  (At least that
is how I understood the Rambam).

We also pretty much have to play with the deck of genetic cards that life
has dealt us.

Shalom and Regards,
Rich Wolpoe
Richard_Wolpoe@ibi.com  

In a message dated 10/30/00 7:30:16am EST, remt@juno.com writes:
>            His conclusion is that therefore should one mention Chag
> Hasukkos in davening, he need not repeat, since it is not a lie -- for
> at least one prat, it is a continuation of Succos. However, for Kiddush,
> whose m'chayev is issur m'lacha, for which Shmini is a distinct k'dusha,
> repetition would be necessary if he said Succos.

Why wouldn't saying Chag Hasukos Hazeh be Hepech Hametzius, (especially in 
E"Y in places that they are Chogeig just one day), that is Bpashtus why in 
the Mishna and Gemara it is called "Yom Tov Hoachron Shel Chag" "M'atzeres 
Vad Hachag" (stam not Chag Hasukos).

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

> We have free unlimited free will to WANT something, but not free will to
> succeed at it - except for Yir'as Shamayim.
 
> I can of my own free will WANT to play basketball as well as Michael Jordan
> did, but I cannot manifest that w/o the help of a neis nigleh

Certainly. But the concept of free will does not presume *any* level
of "success," which by definition is an exterior measure dependent on
circumstances beyond individual control. Free will addresses only that
which an individual can accomplish on his own. I do not have free will
to play basketball like Michael Jordan, but I have free will to play
basketball, on Shabbos if I want. That's the decision point.

David Finch

On Tue, Oct 31, 2000 at 12:41:50AM -0500, DFinchPC@aol.com wrote:
:> We have free unlimited free will to WANT something, but not free will to
:> succeed at it - except for Yir'as Shamayim.

: Certainly. But the concept of free will does not presume *any* level
: of "success"...

I believe that was RRW's point. That the statement "hakol biydei Shamayim
chutz miyir'as Shamayim" isn't about bechirah chafshi, the *ability* to
choose. Rather it's about success in what you choose to do. G-d refuses to
meddle in whether or not we feel awe toward him. But any other decision,
might succeed, might not.

Similarly, in a world of hester Panim, there is a limit to the extent
Hashem chooses to violate teva. Therefore we have a similar statement,
"hakol biydei Shamayim chutz mitzinin upachin". If you don't take
care of your own health, no neis is going to intervene to keep you
healthy.

:> I can of my own free will WANT to play basketball as well as Michael Jordan
:> did, but I cannot manifest that w/o the help of a neis nigleh

:                                                I do not have free will
: to play basketball like Michael Jordan, but I have free will to play
: basketball, on Shabbos if I want.

This raises an issue I haven't seen discussed in any of the primary
sources.

Bechirah is limited by the laws of teva, and by the situations we find
ourselves in. One can't make a choice that never presents itself.

I mentioned this idea when we were discussing the line in birchas
haChodesh, "chayim sheyeish bahem yir'as Shamayim viyir'as cheit". The
choices and opportunities one faces in life can affect whether one
develops yir'as Shamayim or ch"v not. Even though one has full free will
about how to react to those experiences, and how to make the choices
that life does present us with.

:                                   That's the decision point.

If this is a reference to REED's opionion in Michtav mei'Eliyahu (the
only source I know that discusses the notion of a bechirah point;
hereafter BP), that's not what it's about.

REED defines the BP to be the point at which I have to make a conscious
decision. The BP moves with each decision a person makes. For example,
if a person habitually does a certain aveirah, eventually he doesn't
think twice, or even once, about it. Or, as the gemara put it "na'aseh
lo kiheter". OTOH, in any normal circumstance it wouldn't cross my mind
to walk into a McDonalds and order food for myself.

REED likens the BP, the point at which decisions will be conscious, to a
battlefront between the yeitzer hatov and the yeitzer hara. As the battle
progresses, the front moves; sometimes this way, sometimes r"l the other.

According to REED, decisions outside the BP, that do not require conscious
thought, do not involve bechirah. Yet another limitation to bechirah
chafshi: natural inclination and habit robs us of opportunities where we
would bother to choose. (Even before we choose not to choose.)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

********************


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