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Volume 06 : Number 027

Wednesday, November 1 2000

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Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2000 07:54:22 -0500
From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
Subject:
Michtav mei'Eliyahu's impact on contemporary thought


On Fri, Oct 27, 2000 at 08:42:49AM -0500, Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer wrote:
: As Micha noted in his own Avodah post today, I am espousing here my own 
: belief (basically the MME)...

I included the Michtav mei'Eliyahu (MME) when I tried setting up a cycle
of study of sifrei machshavah because of a related observation. It seems
that the hashkafah that you breath in the air of the contemporary O
community, such as the ideas you picked up in grade school or mentioned
as a given in a Shabbos derashah, is very heavily MME's.

I would surmize that "the velt believes" some combination of the MME
and the Kuzari.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l


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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2000 08:06:58 EST
From: DFinchPC@aol.com
Subject:
Re: Hakol biydei Shamayim chutz...


In a message dated 10/31/2000 6:46:59am CST micha@aishdas.org writes:
> REED defines the BP to be the point at which I have to make a conscious
> decision. The BP moves with each decision a person makes. For example,
> if a person habitually does a certain aveirah, eventually he doesn't
> think twice, or even once, about it. Or, as the gemara put it "na'aseh
> lo kiheter". OTOH, in any normal circumstance it wouldn't cross my mind
> to walk into a McDonalds and order food for myself.

The notion of a behirah point is very interesting. It seems to say that
one's aveirah -- acquired through the repeated application of free will
-- eventually subsumes the challenges of free will, and more or less
eliminates any "normal circumstance" in which the actor might exercise
free will to depart from the aveirah. Sort of a Holy Habit.

BP might be a blessing for the religious, a mechanism that unclutters
their thought and makes it easier for them to concentrate on Torah without
such distractions as whether to play basketball on Shabbos. But they
still have the free will to do so. The Bostoner Rebbe had the free will
to suit up with Larry Bird and do his stuff at the Garden on a Friday
night. Despite BP, the rebbe's decision to stay at home or walk to shul
instead is a voluntary act. The fact that it would not cross his mind
to do so (or so we think) is immaterial to the mitzvah.

David Finch


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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2000 08:48:15 -0500
From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
Subject:
Re: Hakol biydei Shamayim chutz...


On Tue, Oct 31, 2000 at 08:06:58AM -0500, DFinchPC@aol.com wrote:
: The notion of a behirah point is very interesting. It seems to say that
: one's aveirah -- acquired through the repeated application of free will
: -- eventually subsumes the challenges of free will, and more or less
: eliminates any "normal circumstance" in which the actor might exercise
: free will to depart from the aveirah. Sort of a Holy Habit.

In the example you brought it would be an unholy habit, as you were
discussing the habit to do an aveirah. The Gra actually talks about two
factors: "dirachav" (natural inclination), and "regel" (habit). (See
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol04/v04n243.shtml#10> for a more full
quote.) That is the land behind the "battlefront".

I think that dirachim and those regalim that one didn't choose to
acquire are what motivate the concept of tinok shenishba (TS). A
TS didn't choose to be brought up so that his BP is beyond some
particular aveira. Nor, according to REED, did he choose the aveirah
afterward -- it's beyond his BP, he didn't have bechirah chafshi.

: BP might be a blessing for the religious, a mechanism that unclutters
: their thought and makes it easier for them to concentrate on Torah ...

OTOH, the same reasoning as TS would imply that such Torah study is
of lesser value than one that is the product of bechirah. Lifum
tza'ara agra.

:                                    The Bostoner Rebbe had the free will
: to suit up with Larry Bird and do his stuff at the Garden on a Friday
: night. Despite BP, the rebbe's decision to stay at home or walk to shul
: instead is a voluntary act. The fact that it would not cross his mind
: to do so (or so we think) is immaterial to the mitzvah.

(You're ignoring the lack of opportunity. Security at the Garden wouldn't
make this an option.)

That isn't what REED is saying. He seems to limit true bechirah chafshi to
things that require conscious decision. Not things that won't cross his
mind. And I think (as I argue above) that it should be as material to
the mitzvah as being a TS is material to aveiros.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l


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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2000 15:20:41 +0200
From: Eli Linas <linaseli@mail.netvision.net.il>
Subject:
Re: Free will


Wolpoe, Richard:
>We have free unlimited free will to WANT something, but not free will to
>succeed at it - except for Yir'as Shamayim.

I believe that there are those who understand the Gemara's statement
literally - that is, even your want for something is programmed in - free
will comes into play about what you will do with that which you want. This
is sort of like the idea of thoughts popping into your head during Shemonah
Esrei: you couldn't keep it from popping in, but it's your choice whether
to dwell on it or not. I have heard (can't quote a source off the top of my
head) that some take this idea to the point that every single action one
does in life that doesn't have free will ramifications (caveat - when you
trace cause and effect, and really scrutinize things, you'll see that in
some way, most things do actually have a ramifications, either directly, or
indirectly), such as which way you decide to drive to work today, or what
you'll wear, is not employing free will - even though you think you are
making the decision. Free will is reserved for the important things in life
- the rights and the wrongs, including bein adam l'atzmo, chaveiro and
l'Makom.


David Finch:
>: I do not have free will
>: to play basketball like Michael Jordan, but I have free will to play
>: basketball, on Shabbos if I want.

Micha Berger:
>Bechirah is limited by the laws of teva, and by the situations we find
>ourselves in. One can't make a choice that never presents itself.

I think what David says can fit in with the Michtav M'Eliyahu. For example,
when a frier who absolutly loves basketball, and his whole week is centered
around his being able to play on Saturday and he starts to become frum,
this is where his free will choice is set at. A few years down the road,
when he's made peace with his decision not to play, this is no longer a
free will choice, just like it's not for an FFB. 

Eli 


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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2000 09:14:16 -0500 (EST)
From: Daniel A HaLevi Yolkut <yolkut@ymail.yu.edu>
Subject:
She'eylas Geshamim


Does anyone know of a very clear source detailing our current practice of
She'eylas Geshamim beginning in December developed?

AT


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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2000 14:46:14 GMT
From: "" <sethm37@hotmail.com>
Subject:
R. Haym Soloveitchik -- Sukka on Shmini Atzeres


On Fri, 27 Oct 2000 15:34:06, Moshe Feldman wrote:
>The transition of the minhag from a minhag of a few families to the minhag
>of a large group seems to have occurred prior to the advent of Chasidism.
>DCS conjectured that it occurred at the time of the move from Germany to
>Poland. Already the Bach in siman 666 (end of s.v. Af al pi) stated
>"v'chol baal nefesh yachmir" to sit in the succah; this implies that many
>were not doing so. In addition, the Magen Avaraham siman 668 refers to
>"ksas anashim...she'ra'oo kach m'avoseihem."

The "minhag of a large group" and "many were not doing so" remains
conjecture. The BaH says "miqtzas anoshim" and the Mogen Avrohom says
"yesh shein yoshvin boh balayloh." Neither says how widespread the custom
was, and both condemn it; my reading is that it was not a widespread
custom. But, to repeat what I posted before, it is entirely unclear
when the idea of not eating in the sukka AT ALL on Shmini Atzeres
originated. There is not a single rishon who quotes such a custom. The
Mogen Avrohom is referring specifically to the custom of eating in
the sukka during the day but not at night; that is the custom that is
attested. AND the Mogen Avrohom, like all of the poskim before him,
condemns it: "ve'eino minhag"... "hadin 'im haTur."

It is unclear what exactly the BaH is referring to when he describes some
people as not eating in the sukka the next day and some eating part of
the meal in the sukka and part in the house, and says "hem 'ovrim 'al
haTalmud." Which is where I came out in my previous post: the custom
of not eating in the sukka AT ALL is first clearly attested to by the
hasidim, and never was given any halakhic justification, outside of
the fact that the BeShT's custom was considered a justification in and
of itself.

The discussion about whether "v'hilchisa yasvei yasvinan" was written by
the Amoraim is relevant only from a textual historical perspective. As
far as the development of the halokho goes, ALL the rishonim accept it
as halokho. Rashi quotes it, the Rif quotes it, the Rambam has it, so
does the Rosh. EVERY ONE of the rishonim and most of the aharonim who
quote the idea of not eating in the sukka for part of Shmini Atzeres
say that this is against the halokho. If something is accepted and
affirmed as halokho by all the rishonim, from all groups, Ashkenazim and
Sefaradim and Teimanim, then it is halokho, regardless of whether certain
small groups did not follow it (and those groups are attested only in
Ashkenaz). R. Haym Soloveitchik may be right about the reasons behind
the spread of not eating in the sukka in Eastern Europe; or his father's
reason may be correct, or one of the several other reasons, but that does
not make such a custom halakhically binding if it is against all poskim.

As far as the last matter, not addressed by RHS, about "minhag not to
sit in the succah derives from an Eretz Yisrael minhag. It seems to me
however that the possibility exists," I say again: there can be no organic
continuation from the custom in Eretz Yisrael in this regard. There was
only one day of Shmini Atzeres in Eretz Yisrael, and no Simhas Torah
at all.

The Talmud Yerushalmi does not refer at all to what the bnei hutz lo'oretz
do on Shmini Atzeres. Yes, many customs from Eretz Yisrael apparently
were continued in Ashkenaz. But to show this is one of them, you will have
to find clear evidence that such a custom was known to the Eretz Yisrael
community who lived in hutz lo'oretz, and I have seen NO such evidence.

Best wishes,
Seth Mandel


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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2000 17:47:59 +0200
From: "Carl M. Sherer" <cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il>
Subject:
Re: She'eylas Geshamim


On 31 Oct 2000, at 9:14, Daniel A HaLevi Yolkut wrote:
> Does anyone know of a very clear source detailing our current practice of
> She'eylas Geshamim beginning in December developed?

I think it's an explicit Gemara in Taanis referring to sixty days after
Tkufas Tishrei. That came out in mid-November, until the calendar
was adjusted by ~11 days in the late 18th or early 19th century.
That adjustment was never accepted by the Gdolim of that time, which
is why in chutz la'aretz you start saying Tal uMatar on December 4 or
5 and not on November 22 or thereabouts. We here in Eretz Yisrael start
this Motzei Shabbos BE"H....

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.


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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2000 12:13:24 -0500
From: "Wolpoe, Richard" <richard_wolpoe@ibi.com>
Subject:
RE: Free will


Eli Linas
: I believe that there are those who understand the Gemara's statement
: literally - that is, even your want for something is programmed in - free
: will comes into play about what you will do with that which you want. This
: is sort of like the idea of thoughts popping into your head during Shemonah
: Esrei: you couldn't keep it from popping in, but it's your choice whether
: to dwell on it or not...

Dear Eli

So would this be a fair re-statement:
Hakol bidey shamayim  is wrt the physical aspects of free choice
BUT
the spiritual aspects are up to us?

Rich Wolpoe


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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2000 12:41:52 -0500
From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
Subject:
Re: Free will


On Tue, Oct 31, 2000 at 03:20:41PM +0200, Eli Linas wrote:
: I believe that there are those who understand the Gemara's statement
: literally - that is, even your want for something is programmed in - free
: will comes into play about what you will do with that which you want...

I don't find either interpretation more literal. It just hinges on what is
"hakol" -- all your thoughts, or all that you accomplish in life?

Hakol biydei Shamayim chutz miyir'as Shamayim can be quite literally
translated: anything you do in life is in the "Hands" of [the One in]
heaven, except for awe of [the One in] heaven.

And, unlike assuming we're talking about thoughts, this is usable for
tzinim upachim too. The other quote can't be referring to thoughts --
who plans to catch a cold or sun-stroke?

:            some take this idea to the point that every single action one
: does in life that doesn't have free will ramifications ...
:                      Free will is reserved for the important things in life
: - the rights and the wrongs, including bein adam l'atzmo, chaveiro and
: l'Makom.

Are you then saying that some decisions don't involve yir'as Shamayim
issues whatsoever? When these decisions come up, would you argue that
one need not bother consulting da'as Torah?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l


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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2000 12:46:19 -0500
From: "Ari Z. Zivotofsky - FAM" <azz@lsr.nei.nih.gov>
Subject:
Re: She'eylas Geshamim


On Tue, 31 Oct 2000, Daniel A HaLevi Yolkut wrote:
> Does anyone know of a very clear source detailing our current practice of
> She'eylas Geshamim beginning in December developed?

daniel lasker, currently at ben gurion university, has at least two great
articles on the subject. unfortunately i can't find the reference right
now, so you might want to contact him via bgu email.

ari 


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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2000 14:50:04 -0500
From: "David Glasner" <DGLASNER@ftc.gov>
Subject:
Re: Shemini Atzeres as a Regel Bifnei Atzma


Yitchok Zirkind wrote:
> Why wouldn't saying Chag Hasukos Hazeh be Hepech Hametzius, (especially in 
> E"Y in places that they are Chogeig just one day), that is Bpashtus why in 
> the Mishna and Gemara it is called "Yom Tov Hoachron Shel Chag" "M'atzeres 
> Vad Hachag" (stam not Chag Hasukos).

Very good he'ara. However, in his discussion of sukkah bi-shemini, my
grandfather made the following observation. There are many words in Hebrew
(though it's actually true in other languages too) that have broad and
narrow meanings, and the narrow meanings can be diametrically opposed to
the broad meaning. For example, the noun "yom" can refer broadly to a
complete 24-hour cycle, or it can refer narrowly the shorter period of
daylight in which case it actually excludes the non-daylight period of
"lailah." Thus, "yom" can be understood either to include or to exclude
"lailah." Similarly, the verb "le'ekhol" can be understood in a broad
sense to include "lishtot" or in a narrow sense to exclude "lishtot."

My grandfather argued that term "Sukkot" could be understood either
broadly as a noun designating the entire eight-day holiday cycle and
including Shemini Atzeret or narrowly as a noun designating the first
seven days when one is obligated to dwell in the sukkah, but excluding
Shemini Atzeret, the day when one is obligated to return from the
dirat arai to the dirak k'va. But since the focus of the entire eight
days is the sukkah - the first seven days of dwelling in the sukkah,
and the last day of return from the sukkah - even the eighth day may be
subsumed under the broad heading of hag ha-sukkot. Otherwise the Torah
would not itself have designated the day as Yom ha-Shemini, which tells
us that even though it is a regel bifnei atzmah it is an integral part
of a whole that includes the first seven days, just as the night is an
integral part of a whole that include the sunlight hours as well.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov


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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2000 16:50:12 -0500
From: "Wolpoe, Richard" <richard_wolpoe@ibi.com>
Subject:
Free Will


>> I can of my own free will WANT to play basketball as well as Michael Jordan
>> did, but I cannot manifest that w/o the help of a neis nigleh

DFinchPC@aol.com:
> Certainly. But the concept of free will does not presume *any* level
> of "success," which by definition is an exterior measure dependent on
> circumstances beyond individual control...     I do not have free will
> to play basketball like Michael Jordan, but I have free will to play
> basketball, on Shabbos if I want....

I don't to engage in semantics but the post as written was addressing
specfically "hakol biday shamayim..." etc.

And in the context of THAT QUOTE, what I wrote makes sense.  

Shalom and Regards,
Rich Wolpoe
Richard_Wolpoe@ibi.com  


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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2000 16:42:43 EST
From: Yzkd@aol.com
Subject:
Re: Shemini Atzeres as a Regel Bifnei Atzma


In a message dated 10/31/00 3:05:54 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
DGLASNER@ftc.gov writes:
 
>  My grandfather argued that term "Sukkot" could be understood either
>  broadly as a noun designating the entire eight-day holiday cycle and
>  including Shemini Atzeret or narrowly as a noun designating the first
>  seven days when one is obligated to dwell in the sukkah, but excluding
>  Shemini Atzeret,

See T"Z begining of O"C 668, (however the Pilpul there is WRT saying the word 
"Chag" on S"A, (not Chag Hassukos) and see Bach on the Tur 668).

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind


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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2000 17:19:01 -0500
From: "Wolpoe, Richard" <richard_wolpoe@ibi.com>
Subject:
RE: Dr. Chaim Soloveitchik--Succah on Shmini Atzeres


Feldman, Mark:
> The minhag of not eating in the Succah at night goes back to the family of
> Rav Yitzchak HaLevy of Worms,...
> The transition of the minhag from a minhag of a few families to the minhag
> of a large group seems to have occurred ...
> DCS did not conjecture as to whether the ancient minhag not to sit in the
> succah derives from an Eretz Yisrael minhag....
>                Moreover, many quote the Yerushalmi as the makor of the
> minhag, though, as Raavya demonstrates, the Yerushalmi is opaque.  Also,
> there is one source which quotes this as the minhag of a person in Italy
> (and Italy was the conduit of Minhag Eretz Yisrael from Israel to
> Ashkenaz)....

Tangentially this is WHY imho Rishonim are so much more authoritative in
many respects than acharonim because they were sensitive to these traditions
and their implications.  It seems to me that Acharonim often overlook the
historical threads that tie certain minhaggim to their roots and therefore
tend to dismiss many minhaggim as baseless in light of what they do know.

While some of those who are into wissenshaft have resuscitated this
background information - which seems to have become dormant following the
eras of the Maharil and Rema -  I don't think it HAD to be done that way.

Perhaps R. Hamburger and others will bring some of these concepts into the
mainstream yeshivishe velt and people will no longer be so puzzled that
there are indeed traditions outside the boundaries of the Bavli.

Shalom and Regards,
Rich Wolpoe
Richard_Wolpoe@ibi.com 


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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2000 18:38:33 -0500
From: "Wolpoe, Richard" <richard_wolpoe@ibi.com>
Subject:
RE: Fwd: Insight 5761 - 5


-mi:
>         IOW, someone who gives tzedakah out of concern for the ani does
> more to develop his own midas chessed than someone who gives the exact
> same donation in the exact same way, but does so in order to develop
> his middos. The latter is selfishness, not chessed.

How about 3 levels?

1) Totally altruistic
2) In order to better one's Middos
3) In order to gain compensation.

AISI Antigonos Ish Socho was taking a jab mostly at reason #3. Reason #2 is
indeed self-interest but it is what I would term enlightened self-interest

Reason #1 is perhaps the highest level.  But according to those who say
"schar mitzva mitzva" that a mitzva contains its own intrinsic reward then
#2 might be suggested as a valid alternative to #1.  After all isn't one
entitled to feel good about a mitzva?  Unless you say "lechach notzarta"!?

We can agree that being meshamesh HKBH with the idea of getting rewards is
the lowest level.  But I would not be too quick to put down those who do
Chessed out of a sense of "self-improvement" or of a sense of tikkun olam.
This plays out like the fellow who plants a tree because his father planted
one before him.  Everyone feels his duty to make the world a slightly better
place and can take solace in the thought that ultimately kindness may be
contagious.

Shalom and Regards,
Rich Wolpoe
Richard_Wolpoe@ibi.com  


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