Avodah Mailing List

Volume 06 : Number 083

Thursday, December 28 2000

• Re: zemer lechanuka
• Hair as a das moshe of a das yehudis
• Re: Hair as a das moshe of a das yehudis
• uncovered hair and SA
• haircovering
• men in womens' section(when they're not there :-)
• Re: haircovering
• soap making
• Re: menorah lighting
• RE: menorah lighting
• RE: menorah lighting

In Avodah V6 #81, NWitty wrote:
> I had been following some of the discussion on the zemer ...

Seriously, I'm glad to hear it.

> ...and was astonished to hear some of the things attributed to Ibn
> Ezra.

Speaking strictly for myself, mea culpa for not being extremely clear
in highlighting my own shortcomings in struggling with a sensible
p'shat for this zemer. Whoever the author is, I certainly did not mean
to cavalierly dismiss the zemer as a secular drinking song; instead,
I chose to publicize my stream of consciousness in an attempt to work
with this chevra towards a Torah-true understanding of it. Your words,
whether or not directed towards me, may have a chilling effect upon such
well-meant "streams" in the future -- please keep this in mind the next
time you choose to write hochachah.

> I have not annotated the sources because I think it more important
> that the correct notions of the zemer be publicized.

We're all after the same goal, but let's not presume to have "the correct"
understanding without at least a bit of peer review :-).

> Shabbos chanukah.

More precisely, "b'Shabbos v'Chanukah."

> "Bais kur" is repeated in the next line of the chorus and therefore
> stated here to provide rhyme, or to stress how great is the need to
> ensure that neros Chanukah are available...Tiskor--NOT "tishkor" as was
> erroneously suggested--lease (out) a ... Le-tzorech Chanukah--for the
> needs of Chanukah.

Again, SBAbeles suggested "(even) selling a bes kor to have a feast on
Shabbos Chanukah" and I suggested that the "tzorech" may be nair Chanukah
rather than a s'udah. I don't recall anyone suggesting "tishkor" rather
than "tiskor." WADR, even thinking that "bais kor" is present merely
for the sake of rhyme (and the literati present surely can expound on
the aspect of rhyme in a poem) contradicts your defense of the author
-- I prefer to theorize that various Torah phrases were used for their
connotations and that, re this line, it's the _verbs_, not "bais kor,"
which were conjugated in the infinitive for the sake of the "or" ending.

> even if it means selling or renting real estate in order to have the
> monies necesary to fund the purchase of oil, wicks, candles, etc.

That's an interesting thought -- I was thinking of a "bais kor"'s worth
of produce, but perhaps you're right.

> I suggest that perhaps this is a reference to the halacha that the left
> over oil from neros chanukah must be burned up following Chanukah...

Nice! Perhaps the "echad" is the one nair which represents the basic
mitzva.

> Rack va-tov --the soft, i.e. children, and good, i.e. elders...

I don't think so -- see B'raishis 18:7 and RaShY on 18:10 (re the time
of year).

> An alternate pshat may be that "rach vatov" refers to food, as it does
> in the beginning of Parshas Vayaira.

See above. Looks like you're missing a significant amount of text
between the "v'tov" and the "yechdaloon" -- I'll be happy to send you
the text sent me by AParnes, which lists the RAISH line as "Rach vatov,
shemen u'tzli aish umatzos; onu v'om'ru Omain v'och'lu b'ditzus" and
the HAIH line as "Hakolos yechdaloon...."

> Mi-nisuch haMayim--from pouring water, learning Torah which the gemara
> states in several places is compared to water, in order that ...

That's a possibility. IIRC, the actual event of nisuch hamayim was not
done in as kadosh a spot as the nairos (or the t'midim -- see below...).

> I think another or perhaps more primary meaning may be that this
> reference to the Bais haMikdash refers to hatavas hanairos which took
> place . . . Be-chol yom pa'amayim--twice daily.

The hatavah took place twice _daily_? Yes, there is such a concept
as two hatavos on Yom HaKippurim (IICR the sugya in BT Yoma), but the
connotation of this phrase is that, like the t'midim (or k'rias Sh'ma),
there was a large timespan between the two activities, while the two
hatavos on YhK were both "babokair" and not separated to a great extent.
I was thinking that "b'chol yom pa'amayim" could be a pair of s'udos, but
(a) that doesn't fit too well; and (b) we have _three_ s'udos on Shabbos.

> Tetzilena oznaichem--may your ears ring (This is an echo of a phrase
> found early on in Shmuel 1).

Great! The line now makes a lot more sense to me. For a further
connection between wine/drinking cups and Chanukah, consider the use of
g'vi'im in the menorah and see how the word is used in Yirmiyahu.

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

Rabbi Bechhofer writes:
> I am not sure the I quite understand the distinction. Why bother codifying a 
> "pure" custom? There have certainly been Arab countries in which Jewish 
> women wore veils. I believe the Maharam Alshakar quoted by the Maharatz 
> Chiyus alludes to this custom, and notes that it cannot be codified as 
> Jewish practice. Similarly, there are certainly cultures in which the heel 
> of a woman's foot has customarily been covered, yet this has not been 
> codified. It seems that the SA very carefully selected the minhagim that 
> *do* represent the universal benchmark of acceptance that *all* Jewish 
> women must strive to maintain - the lack of which may be grounds for 
> divorce. In this sense, I see no clearcut distinction of one being "takanas 
> ha'kohol" (this, BTW, does not seem to be one of the takkanos ha'kohol 
> noted in the first perek of Bava Basra! From whence stems this definition?) 
> and one not. Aderaba.

If I understand Rabbi Bechhofer correctly, he is claiming that both the
conduct called das yehudis in EH 115 and that conduct prohibited in EH 21
is immutable as a rabbinic decree or sometimes a torah prohibition,
independent of whether it actually generates any sexual thoughts or
improprity.  I do not think this is a correct statement of the normative
halacha.  Rama in Even Haezer 21:5 quotes different views on men actually
touching women, and concludes that halacha permits men to touch women when
there is no sexual overtones at all (I will not define either how we
measure that or who is beleived to state this) and normative practice
accepts that (see Rav Moshe's teshuva about bumping on the subway as an
example, and the minhag haolam that women go to men doctors).  This is
well accepted lehalacha.  See also my fianl quote from Rav Moshe below,
which is even more explict.

Rabbi Bechhoffer then wrote:
> >> 2. A limud zechus is a notch lower than b'di'eved...
> >> Does RMJB indeed mean a limud zechus - and, of course, we should always be
> >> melamed zechus on Am Yisroel - or does he mean something else?

and I stated:

> >Not sure myself, to be honest.  In a place where something is the well
> >establish custom, and there was a logical limid zechut that made sense in
> >the context of overall halacha, I do not know how I would respond...

To which he responded:
 
> Umm, could we be a tad more definitive on this point, please?

I do not know what else to say.  Sometimes, one simply says nothing, in
the face of a plusable minhag that goes against the weight of the vast
consensus of the poskim.   

Now we come to the heart of the matter.  Rabbi Bechhoffer wrote:
 
> >> 3. A "Simple SA Jew" ...  would be one that
> >> seeks to fulfill the dictates of the SA, no? As such, he or she should not
> >> be looking towards SA EH 115, which actually is discussing the finer
> >> details, minutiae, and obscurities of divorce and grounds for divorce...
> >> but to the simanim in which the SA lays out the guidelines for proper
> >> living - i.e., SA EH 21:1. There are no ambiguities, no DM nor DY there,
> >> just straightforward, simple  Shulchan Aruch.

and I responded:
> 
> >This paragraph is one that I find hardest to understand.  Even Haezer 21
> >is the general siman for conduct that governs laws of improper sexual or
> >immodest conduct. 21:2 states that "A Jewish woman should not go with her
> >hair uncovered [=parua] in the marketplace whether she be married or
> >single (=penuya)."...                     EH 21 cannot really be the clear
> >source for an immutable non-time bound and objective prohibition which
> >obligates women to cover their hair no matter what the norms of society
> >might be.  It should be subject to the same limitations of the rest of
> >even haezer 21.

Rabbi Bechhoffer then wrote:
 
> Nope....> SA EH 21 is the final word on modesty. [I (MJB) delete here
> the reference to the bigdei shesh so that the reader is encouraged to
> buy this worthwhile sefer (I own a copy) himself, and not be allowed to
> reads thoughts second hand] the SA and Remo 
> represent the final word on psak din. It is clear that for us the 
> definition extends to "SA plus Nosei Keilim". Thus, EH 21 is a set piece, 
> and that is what, together with the BS and CM etc., most of which are 
> located conveniently (by Hashgocho Protis, no doubt), on the page of the 
> SA, constitutes final halacha for Tefutzos Yisroel...

I agree with this, and I note that SA and Tur adopt a view inconsistent
with BS and CM, and thus the halacha on this matter is still open and not
established.  The Ritva is quoted by the yam shel shomolo and by the
pitchai teshuva, thus putting it well within the ambiance of this test of
the validity of this view.  

> I am somewhat surprised by my colleague's reference, in this context, to 
> the Ritva. Leaving She'eilas Shalom aside, and I suspect that I am not as 
> meikel in this as RMJB might surmise, we are not talking now about the 
> aspects of interaction, which are individual specific (according to that 
> Ritva), but of objective standards of tzeni'us. Surely RMJB would not use 
> the Ritva to allow miniskirts and halter tops where those are the norms? 
> Yet, essentially, he is deploying, in the preceding paragraph, the Ritva in 
> precisly such an argument.

Take a deep breadth now.  I accept that the standards of modesty imposed
through das yehudis and which religious women must adhere to in terms of
the physical area a woman has to cover is governed by the normal standards
of modesty adopted by religious jewsish women who are personally sexually
and religiously modest.  Thus, I could imagine a society where religious
women go to an ob/gyn who touches parts of their body, and engages in
other direct physical touching, that is generally deemed "mechuar"
(disgusting and prohibited)  but in this context is not,
and such conduct -- if the norm amoung other religious women (and of
course not actually generating any sexual thoughts in anyway), would not
be a violation of halacha.  That is exactly what the pitchai teshuva and
Ritva means. Indeed, I feel that this is exactly what the Rama himself
means in EH 21 when talking about physical touching.  Presumably if it
permissible for a man to touch, it is permissible for a woman to be
touched.  This is explictly stated to be the rule by Igrot Moshe quoted
below.

I proceeded to observe:
> >         1.      Why should married women's hair be different than
> >divorced/widowed women's hair (as it clearly is noted to be by Rav Moshe,
> >and many others).

and Rabbi Bechhoffer answers:
> I believe R' Moshe deals with that question in his teshuva, no?

Rabbi Feinstein indeed does respond by noting that hair is a das moshe and
not a das yehudis for a married women and thus not subject to these rules
-- I completely agree with Rav Moshe's analysis, in that IF hair is a das
moshe for married women, then it is objectively prohibited and societal
norms play no role.  I simply want to note that Rav Moshe accepts quite
clearly that when hair is a das yehudis (partial uncovering, widows,
divorcees, in his veiw) uncovering is frequently permited.  This is my
exact point!!
When something is not governed by the das moshe, the das yehudis is much
more societal, and changes since notions of modesty change (I mean
consider that Rav Moshe permits a widow to uncover hair to earn a
living, but presumably he would not permitt her to uncover some thigh or
belly, as hair was not erotic and thigh is).

[material by both of us deleted]

I then asked:
 >(Rabbi Bechhoffer:  Do you agree that das yehudis obligations can change?)

and Rabbi Bechhoffer answers:
> 
> Perhaps - but only in the context of grounds for divorce, the topic of SA 
> EH 115, not in the area of the proper behavior for a Bas Yisroel, the topic 
> of SA EH 21. 

This is a central issue.  Rabbi Bechhoffer does not think that standards
of modesty can change al pe din.  I think they can.  Furthermore I think
that wealth of sources can be put forward to disagree with Rabbi
Bechhoffer here.  Consider the case of partial uncovering of hair, first
addressed in the maharam alshakar 35 when he discusses this, as welll as
many other places in many different achronim concering whether any given
activity is mutar in one location, and assur in another as it relates to
tzinuyut.  Let me quote one simple example:

"There is yet another prohibition governing the conduct of women, based on
the rules of das yehudis as found in ketubot 72a, not to behave
immodestyly, but this only applies when she herself engages in this
conduct, but when it is the standard of all women in her city to do this,
THIS CANNOT BE CONSIDER IMMODEST [PERETZUT] and one cannot even argue
that this conduct of [religious] women is caused by immodesty, since
nevertheless it is the manner of their dress and conduct, one cannot
consider this immodest and one cannot consider it assur, or prohibit it 
to them, but only as a [derech chasidut] extra pious conduct for
[tziniyut yetera] heightend modesty [not required by halacha"

Who is the author of this quote, which explictly notes that that which is
not prohibited by das yehudis is mutar al pe din to women [and not merely
not grounds for divorce BUT ACTUALLY PERMITTED!], Rav Moshe Feinstein in
Iggros Moshe EH 1:69 (last paragraph).  I could produce many other such
sources. I challege Rabbi Bechhoffer to produce a souce that accepts as
correct his chidish that conduct which is not prohibited by either das
yehudis or das moshe can still be prohibited all Pe din to women.  I think
that chiddish -- which if true -- certainly would well explain why
uncovered hair is only called a das yehudis and yet perminently assur, is
simply wrong al pe din.

I thus repeat my initial halachic point.  SA and Tur both classify even
full hair covering for a married woman as only a das yehudis and not a das
moshe, and nothign in EH 21 indicates that married women's hair and
unmarried women's hair should be treated differently -- both are das
yehudis.  Rambam and Bais Shmeul argue quite clearly and classify hair as
objectively assur for married women.  If the veiw of SA and TUR is
correct, [note, I did not say that this view is correct], then there is
considerable basis for married women not to cover their hair in our modern
society, where hair covering is not a das yehudis.  This is no small
point, and has yet to be addressed.

Michael Broyde

At 09:19 PM 12/27/00 -0500, Michael J Broyde wrote:
>If I understand Rabbi Bechhofer correctly, he is claiming that both the
>conduct called das yehudis in EH 115 and that conduct prohibited in EH 21
>is immutable as a rabbinic decree or sometimes a torah prohibition,
>independent of whether it actually generates any sexual thoughts or
>improprity.  I do not think this is a correct statement of the normative

No, you misunderstand me.

There are two elements in EH 21:

1. The element of modest attire - that is immutable, subject only to 
variation of opinion on what is shok, how much hair may escape the 
covering, etc. - issues not expressly clarified in the SA and NK (Nosei 
Keilim).

2. The element of interaction. The Ritva you quoted earlier, and the Remo 
(which, BTW, as you allude to in your parentheses, is good proof to assur 
mixed dancing, even bein ish l'ishto, in public) pertain to that element, 
not the one of personal modesty.

>halacha.  Rama in Even Haezer 21:5 quotes different views on men actually
>touching women, and concludes that halacha permits men to touch women when
>there is no sexual overtones at all (I will not define either how we
>measure that or who is beleived to state this) and normative practice
>accepts that (see Rav Moshe's teshuva about bumping on the subway as an
>example, and the minhag haolam that women go to men doctors).  This is
>well accepted lehalacha.  See also my fianl quote from Rav Moshe below,
>which is even more explict.

(deleted)

>I do not know what else to say.  Sometimes, one simply says nothing, in
>the face of a plusable minhag that goes against the weight of the vast
>consensus of the poskim.

Come, come. How, now would you pasken for those who are sar l'mishma'atecha?

>I agree with this, and I note that SA and Tur adopt a view inconsistent
>with BS and CM, and thus the halacha on this matter is still open and not
>established.  The Ritva is quoted by the yam shel shomolo and by the
>pitchai teshuva, thus putting it well within the ambiance of this test of
>the validity of this view.

True, but only as pertains to interactions (remember, that is the topic of 
that Ritva, end of Kiddushin, and that, IIRC, alone) not personal modesty.

>Take a deep breadth now.  I accept that the standards of modesty imposed

Breadth or breath? Yesh l'kayem sheneihem :-) .

>through das yehudis and which religious women must adhere to in terms of
>the physical area a woman has to cover is governed by the normal standards
>of modesty adopted by religious jewsish women who are personally sexually
>and religiously modest.  Thus, I could imagine a society where religious
>women go to an ob/gyn who touches parts of their body, and engages in
>other direct physical touching, that is generally deemed "mechuar"
>(disgusting and prohibited)  but in this context is not,
>and such conduct -- if the norm amoung other religious women (and of
>course not actually generating any sexual thoughts in anyway), would not
>be a violation of halacha.  That is exactly what the pitchai teshuva and
>Ritva means. Indeed, I feel that this is exactly what the Rama himself
>means in EH 21 when talking about physical touching.  Presumably if it
>permissible for a man to touch, it is permissible for a woman to be
>touched.  This is explictly stated to be the rule by Igrot Moshe quoted
>below.

All this is true and we agree on it! *Because* this deals with 
*interaction* not *attire*. You have not addressed the miniskirts and 
halter tops! And if you brand these different because of vulgarity, what 
about bare-shouldered evening gowns?

Again, as of now you have no precedent (and I think you are incorrect) to 
apply the Ritva to attire.

>Rabbi Feinstein indeed does respond by noting that hair is a das moshe and
>not a das yehudis for a married women and thus not subject to these rules
>-- I completely agree with Rav Moshe's analysis, in that IF hair is a das
>moshe for married women, then it is objectively prohibited and societal
>norms play no role.  I simply want to note that Rav Moshe accepts quite
>clearly that when hair is a das yehudis (partial uncovering, widows,
>divorcees, in his veiw) uncovering is frequently permited.  This is my
>exact point!!
>When something is not governed by the das moshe, the das yehudis is much
>more societal, and changes since notions of modesty change (I mean
>consider that Rav Moshe permits a widow to uncover hair to earn a
>living, but presumably he would not permitt her to uncover some thigh or
>belly, as hair was not erotic and thigh is).

Actually, this is entirely inaccurate.

R' Moshe (IM EH 1:57) holds that it is mandatory that all women who are 
married or have been married cover their hair. Period. His distinction, 
based on the difference in the obligation, leads to his chiddush that for a 
woman *currently unmarried*, since the obligation is "only" a Mitzvas Aseh, 
like all other Mitzvos Aseh, one is not required to spend more than 
one-fifth of one's wealth to fulfill that Aseh. But the requirement is 
immutable and non-relative. Thus, in situations where the loss would be 
less than one-fifth, the obligation immediately returns in full force.

Let us draw an analogy. R' Moshe holds that the nature of the obligation 
vis a vis a currently married woman is that of a Lav. It is, therefore, 
like,  say, Achilas Treifos, that, short of Piku'ach Nefesh is assur. Vis a 
vis a once married, but currently unmarried woman the obligation is similar 
to a man's obligation to wear tefillin. There are extenuating circumstances 
in which one may forgo Tefillin, but the daily obligation is constant and 
non-changing.

The nature of what is required never changes. There are circumstances in 
which any Aseh may be temporarily abrogated, but the nature of the Aseh 
does not change. Period.

>This is a central issue.  Rabbi Bechhoffer does not think that standards
>of modesty can change al pe din.  I think they can.  Furthermore I think
>that wealth of sources can be put forward to disagree with Rabbi
>Bechhoffer here.  Consider the case of partial uncovering of hair, first
>addressed in the maharam alshakar 35 when he discusses this, as welll as
>many other places in many different achronim concering whether any given
>activity is mutar in one location, and assur in another as it relates to
>tzinuyut.  Let me quote one simple example:

I am still waiting for the source. As RDE noted today, the MA was 
discussing hair that escapes a covering - he never entertained the thought 
that no covering was required!

>"There is yet another prohibition governing the conduct of women, based on
>the rules of das yehudis as found in ketubot 72a, not to behave
>immodestyly, but this only applies when she herself engages in this
>conduct, but when it is the standard of all women in her city to do this,
>THIS CANNOT BE CONSIDER IMMODEST [PERETZUT] and one cannot even argue
>that this conduct of [religious] women is caused by immodesty, since
>nevertheless it is the manner of their dress and conduct, one cannot
>consider this immodest and one cannot consider it assur, or prohibit it
>to them, but only as a [derech chasidut] extra pious conduct for
>[tziniyut yetera] heightend modesty [not required by halacha"

Oy vey! The IM there is discussing what *women* may or may not observe in 
*other women* lest they come to hirhur! This is totally irrelevant to the 
discussion at hand! He saying that modest women need not be afraid that by 
viewing immodest women they will come to lustful thoughts, since that is 
the standard of the city, and to prohibit that would be only derech 
chassidus ( I assume he is discussing a scenario of modestly attired women 
bathing in a swimming pool with immodestly attired women, etc.).

>Who is the author of this quote, which explictly notes that that which is
>not prohibited by das yehudis is mutar al pe din to women [and not merely
>not grounds for divorce BUT ACTUALLY PERMITTED!], Rav Moshe Feinstein in
>Iggros Moshe EH 1:69 (last paragraph).  I could produce many other such
>sources. I challege Rabbi Bechhoffer to produce a souce that accepts as
>correct his chidish that conduct which is not prohibited by either das
>yehudis or das moshe can still be prohibited all Pe din to women.  I think
>that chiddish -- which if true -- certainly would well explain why
>uncovered hair is only called a das yehudis and yet perminently assur, is
>simply wrong al pe din.

I still await even the first of these many sources. To coin a phrase, a 
simple SA Jew still has only SA EH 21 to turn to, a standard that brooks no 
exceptions.

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

Reb Michael J Broyde wrote a fascinating limud zchus for women who don't
cover their hair.  I think his motivation fits all of the criteria set down
by HaRav H. Henkin in his brilliant definition of limud zchus in halacha.

However, I think the task is very difficult.

1. SA: He wrote: her head uncovered, and she has a large hat [ridid]
even though her head is covered with a scarf. Does this mean she is
wearing 2 hats? If so, hardly a source for uncovered hair.

2. Really it says there w/o the rdid. Only one hat(mitpachas). Still not
a source for no head covering.

3. In the Tur, he wrote: What is dat yehudis: She goes out with her
head uncovered, even if it is not completely uncovered, but she is
wearing a kalata (=small hat) since she is not covered with a scarf,
she looses her ketubah.... Where is her hair completely uncovered?
Perhaps a diyuk from the word "even"? The Tur's phrasing of a woman
wearing a hat implies the same could be true *even* without a hat.
See the Bais Yosef there, author of SA, who argues that the phrasing
is parallel to the rhetorical style of the Gemara. But, BY notes,
really the Tur agrees with the Rambam's ruling concerning das Moshe.
Note that SA eliminates this difficult phrasing of "even".

4. See Otzar HaPoskim, the now-classic compendium of Acharonim on
Even HaEzer, that there is no real opinion that uncovered hair is just
das yehudis.

5. In conclusion, it is difficult to big mountains from only one diyuk
in the Tur. SA never says fully uncovered hair is only das yehudis.
Probably the Bais Yosef and the Bais Shmuel are correct that uncovered
hair is das Moshe.

Shlomo Goldstein

From: "Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>
>  SA EH 21 is the final word on modesty.

iow, single women have been remiss in covering their hair for centuries.

janet

I've heard there is some hakpada on men davening in the womens' section 
(seemingly not an uncommon practice)  Anyone know of any sources?

KT & FC
Joel

On Thu, Dec 28, 2000 at 09:27:25AM +0200, janet rosenbaum wrote:
:>  SA EH 21 is the final word on modesty.

: iow, single women have been remiss in covering their hair for centuries.

So paskens R' Ovadia Yosef. Although his kehillah was /not/ remiss, they
merely thought they were doing so because the Arab gov't required it.

-mi

> Does anyone have any information about the history of the
> manufacturing of soap?

the colonial american way of making soap was by heating lard and lye 
together, so it wasn't edible either.  i don't know about older soap. 

janet

> 2) There is real evidence that there were two hadlakot that are
> commemorated on Chanukah. The first, the miracle of the oil, occurred
> several weeks earlier, sometime in Cheshvan.... They then spent a month
> and a half making new keilim for avodah in the BHM"K,... I think the
> 8 days of rededication was linked to having missed out on Sukkot that year.

What is the evidence? Is this from the Book of Maccabees (ch. 13) -
that doesn't seem to fit the gemara in Shabbos 21?

Can you elaborate?

C1A1Brown@aol.com:
>>                           The first, the miracle of the oil, occurred
>> several weeks earlier, sometime in Cheshvan.... They then spent a month
>> and a half making new keilim for avodah in the BHM"K,... I think the
>> 8 days of rededication was linked to having missed out on Sukkot that year.

> What is the evidence? Is this from the Book of Maccabees (ch. 13) -
> that doesn't seem to fit the gemara in Shabbos 21?

First of all, the al hanissim makes no mention of the neis of the oil. As
per my earlier hypothesis, what is normative is in the liturgy. If the
Gmoro in Shabbas 21 were required belief then lich'ora it should have been
in the al hanissim too. So as I see it, the al hanissim is THE definitive
text of the story - i.e. from a halachically normative point of view.

We also dealt with this discrepancy at Bernard Revel Grad School.

Q: If the neis Hanukkah was the miracle of the oil, then why no mention
until the Gmoro in Shabbas?
A: What the Gmoro was doing was making it normative in the post churban
galus.

Q: Now does that mean that the Gmoro "made-up" this story?
A: Lav davka, the story could have been quite true historically, but it
was not considered RELEVANT until later on

Q: Why was it not considered relevant until later on?
A: The answer is, that while there was an independent Jewish state
and a Beis Hamikdash, Hanukkah commemorated those events. However,
the question of Mai Hanukkah in the Gmoro is -what is Hanukkah to us
NOW in galus with NO BhM? Until the restoration of the Mikdash and the
subsequent independence FAR overshadowed the "little" neis.

Q: So what changed?
A: The loss of the BhM and the galus left us with no reason to celebrate
Hanukkah any more.

Q: so what's the point of the Gmoro
A: To give us, the post-churban galus a reason to STILL celebrate

Q: Why sukkos?
A: there are lots of reasons. It was the last holiday missed. But here is
my Chiddush. Sukkos is a celebration of the Hanukkah of Shlomo Hamelech
as indicated by the haftoros of day 2 and Shmini Atzeres (in the golah).
This was a MODEL for the Hashmonaim.

Q: If independence was won why not use Peasch as a model?
A: Because real independence did NOT come until about 142 BCE. During 25
Isle BCE ONLY the mikdash was restored not independence

Q: But the Beis Yoseif implies the OIL is what dictated 8 days???
A: Despite the Beis Yoseph et. al. it is unlikely from the historical
sources that the 8 day celebration was ORIGINALLY due to the miracle of
the oil. Aderabbah, the silence of the source is deafening. However you
can easily see the reason we STILL do 8 days and did not shorten Hanukkah
to just one day. In a sense.

Q: I still don't get it. The early sources say one thing, the Gmoro
and poskim another thing entirely.
A: Historically there are TWO Hanukkah eras. One from 165 BCE until
70 CE. That first era had a life of its own that ended with the Churban.
The 2nd era is after 70 CE. And the Gmoro and the Halachah are really
focused on THIS era. In a sense the original Hanukah is not relevant
any more to US.

Q: So what is all the confusion about?
A: Sometimes we are tempted to assume a Chazakah. That since we do
things NOW for reason X it was ALWAYS that way. Historians see that
certain events altered reasons. A parallel is YT sheini shel galuyos.
It is no longer a necessity because of our "fixed" calendar, but it is
still observed. The observance continues, the rationale has changed
following a change in the underlying rationale.

The assumption is that WE do Hanukkah for the same reason they did it
in 165 BCE. Well that is lav davka. And that is a bi-directional.
IOW just because the Hashmonaim DID Sukkos does not imply WE are. And
vice versa, just because WE do the oil miracle does not mean THEY did.
If they were indeed doing the oil miracle, then all of the contemporary
sources missed the boat.

And if we were doing Sukkos, then all of our Halachic literature misses
the boat, too.

I accept neither alternative as legit.

We must accept the Halachic imperative on its own terms. It is normative
and binding.

Yet we cannot re-write history based upon some 1984-like illusion of how
things WERE based upon OUR paradigm. It's not intellectually honest in
the absence of evidence to support this.

Shalom and Regards,
Rich Wolpoe
Richard_Wolpoe@ibi.com

On 26 Dec 2000, at 11:19, Stein, Aryeh E. wrote:
> In Halichos Shlomo (IIRC, p. 352)...
> 1)  Women are chayiv in hallel...but they are yotzei with the menorah. (I
> believe that RSZA explains why they don't actually say hallel like men do.)

"Carl M. Sherer" <cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il>:
> Lichora this would  be an argument for RYBS's shita that women should also 
> bentch licht individually.

Perhaps, although the same way a women is yotzei with her husband's kiddush,
she should be able to be yotzei with her husband's lighting.  On the other
hand, however, RSZA is mashma that a woman should say "Haneros hallolu..."
herself.

(RSZA goes so far as to say that if a person lights his menorah without
thinking at all about the hallel aspect, while he is technically yotzei the
mitzva, he has missed out on the "ikar" part of the chanuka licht.)



C1A1Brown@aol.com:
>> RSZA explains that, when we light our menorahs, we are not doing so
>> because of the neis that the oil lasted for eight days, but rather
>> as a form of hallel for the miraculous victory over the yavanim.
>> This approach solves several questions:

> Don't understand why you can't solve the questions without that chiddush:

I don't think RSZA meant to imply that his chiddush is the only way to deal
with the questions that he answers. 

> Acc. to the Rishonim who hold that they had to cause the nes, the
> neither caused the victory in battle or the finding of the oil. Acc. to
> the Rishonim who hold that they just have to be part of the nes, then
> weren't they beneficieries of the military victory as well?

Exactly: since the women were also beneficiaries of the military victory,
why don't they say hallel?  Thus, RSZA explains that they really do say
hallel.  (And ayin sham for reasons why women don't say the same hallel that
we do in shacharis.  IIRC, one possibility that RSZA brings from someone is:
we know that women are chayiv to daven, but, according the Magen Avraham,
they are yotzei with short tefilah, so too on Chanuka: they are chayiv to
say hallel, but they are yotzei with something less....such as "Haneiros
hallolu...."

KT
Aryeh

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