Avodah Mailing List

Volume 06 : Number 098

Tuesday, January 9 2001

• heicha kedusha
• Re: Women Davening
• Amoraim disagreeing with Tannaim
• Re: Dor Revi'i and TSBP
• Re: Dor Revi'i and TSBP
• Ibn Ezra and Shabbat
• Aruch Hashulchan Choshen Mishpat 388:7
• Rashi's chumash
• Re: Shabbat/shabbatot
• Re: Conversion
• Re: Mincha without Tachanun
• RE: Mincha without Tachanun
• Re: Mincha without Tachanun
• RE: Mincha without Tachanun
• Re: heicha kedusha

Chana Luntz and previous postings for and against heicha kedusha, IIRC,
all ignore the Rambam and his son R' Avraham who recommended abolishing
the chazarat hashatz and had at least partial success. Although later
posekim reversed their decision, to this day many Sephardic shuls on
Shabbat Mussaf have heicha kedusha and no silent shmoneh esrei.

Similarly, the Darda'i Yemenite nusach has heicha kedusha, great followers
of the Rambam, they. Possible correction: I cannot me'id on shacharit
as I never davened shacharit with them, but mincha a number of times.

Too bad the Rambam family lost out on that one. The saved time would
accumulate.

David

> I hope you won't see this as quibbling, I think it 
> is a fascinating list- and rather than quibbling, I 
> think each is worthy of discussion in its own right.

Before we begin, let me just state that my entire premise is said
tentatively. While I have not abandoned it yet, I do realize that it is
against the Magen Avraham (690:22) who quotes the Maharik and Teshuvas
Rama that we are only melamed zechus on a minhag if there is a da'as
yachid. I am *suggesting* that we will also try to justify it with new
sevaras that have no source.

> I think we need to distinguish between those 
> justified by the rishonimand those by the achronim. 

I don't think so. In fact, my list was intentionally inclusive of those
justified by rishonim and acharonim and in three of the four chalakim
of Shulchan Aruch (I would have included Choshen Mishpat also but my
knowledge there is severely lacking and many things there seem to be
dependent on minhag hamakom).

The way I see it, Rishonim have the right to create new interpretations
of gemaras that acharonim can not do. The Gra, with all of his halachic
innovation, was always paskening like an opinion of some rishon.

However, our case is different. We are not talking about interpreting
texts but justifying minhagim that cannot be fit into the text. In other
words, we are trying to get around the texts. I don't see rishonim as
having any more right to do this than acharonim.

> Whereas the Magen Avraham is going against the texts

In what text does it say that women have to daven a full shemoneh esreih?

>>2] Not sleeping in the sukkah.

> Are you referring here to i) the argument that it is
> too cold (mitza'er)or ii) the argument that married 
> men should not sleep in the sukkah because it upsets
> their wives (Taz).

Both. The first does not apply everywhere and in every time. There
are many times when people eat in the sukkah in their winter jackets.
Why not sleep in the sukkah in sleeping bags?

The second IMHO is tzarich iyun gadol. The way I understood the Taz is
that it is a din of teishvu ke'ein taduru. Since men normally sleep in
the same room as their wives, there is a ptur from sleeping without their
wives in the sukkah. Extrapolating from there to a situation I once had
(long story), if the entire family of women is eating a meal in the house
on Sukkos then the man is also patur from sukkah and can eat inside.
When I had this situation I tried to get a ptur but R. Ephraim Kannarfogel
would not go for it.

> Also note that in Israel, lighting outside appears 
> to be fast making a reappearance.

That is because of the trend towards textualism, not that I necessarily
disagree with this trend.

>>5] Chadash bizman hazeh.

[I actually meant in chutz la'aretz, but I think people know what
I meant.]

> Rishonic textual support - and in addition, this one
> is fast making a reappearance.

What rishon ways that it is mutar in chu"l? I've only seen that it
is only assur miderabbanan in chu"l. The Bach says that chadash of
a gentile is mutar, which is very new and very difficult to defend.
The Aruch HaShulchan comes up with a new and plausible sevara that it
is only assur miderabbanan in lands near Eretz Yisrael. I think the AH
is a case in point for my theory.

>>6] Marrying a woman who already had two husbands who died (i.e. a katlanis).

> Sorry, didn't know we allowed this (not enough 
> experience in the area, I don't know anybody who 
> married more than two husbands who both died). Can 
> you provide details of the s'vara used b'zman hazeh 
> to allow this?

I take this back. I think poskim view this as similar to an agunah in
which they will stretch halachah as far as possible to permit her to
remarry (see, however, Tashbetz (Duran) 3:14 who takes a contrarian
viewpoint and sees this from the angle of pikuach nefesh of the
prospective husband). Also, some of the sevaras fit in well with the
ambiguous text of the gemara.

For sources, see the gemara in Yevamos 64b, the sources quoted in
R. Yosef Engel's Gilyonei HaShas, Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer 9, Otzar
HaPoskim there.

>>7] The takanos zecher lechurban such as leaving a 
>>square amah unfinished in a house and not listening 
>>to music.

> Not sure, would appreciate more information on the 
> s'varah justifying the minhag of not doing the 
> first. 

I'm not sure there is a sevara.  I've just never heard of anyone doing it.

> The second (assuming we are talking about live 
> music, taped music is such a new thing it is hardly 
> a s'vara to justify that it is different) may well 
> be a valid case of c).

What rishon permitted it?

>>8] A father marrying off his ketanah daughter (see 
>>tosafos, kiddushin 41a). 

> Err, this is more a case of tosphos going against 
> the text, but us having reverted to the text. And 
> tosphos's justification could be seenas a form of 
> horaas sha'ah.

Actually, the Rama (37:8) paskens like tosafos. The only posek I've seen
who reverts back to the gemara is the Aruch HaShulchan. However, tosafos
seems to justify the minhag by a non-textual sevara. Exactly our scenario.

R. YH Henkin wrote:
> A mistaken reading of the Rambam cannot be used as 
> grounds for limud zechut for women not davening 
> Shemoneh Esreh. 

That is exactly my point. I am *suggesting* that the Magen Avraham was
justifying the minhag based on a sevara and then tried to find a hint
of it in the Rambam. I don't think that the Rambam was the ikar.

> The answer, given by a number of modern writers

Fascinating answer. Who are these modern writers, other than RYH Henkin?

Gil Student

I apologize in advance about the length. I worked on shortening this.
Eli Turkel

There is s 37 page article on amoraim arguing with tanaaim by
R. Zalman Koren that appeared in a book about R. Kook. I shall attempt
to give a short summary. For more details see the book.
He says he was given the manuscripts of CI which contain more material
of both CI and REW.
CI  = Chazon Ish
REW = R. Elchanan Wasserman
RK  = R. Kook

Rambam (Mamrim 2:1) paskens that except for gezerot each generations bet
din can override that of previous generations. Kesef Mishna asks that
if so why can't amoraim disagree with Tannaim and Rishonim disagree with
the Talmud. He Answers that since the completion of the Talmud they have
accepted not to argue (see also Iggeret R. Sherira Gaon).

REW: A gathering of all the sages is equivalent to a Sanhedrin of 71
sitting in Lishkat haGazit. Only a Sanhedrin can disagree with a previous
Sanhedrin. Thus, the finishing of the Mishna and later the Gemara was
done in a gathering and so has the halacha of a Sanhedrin of 71 and so
later generations can not argue. (see also Mahata Chajes).

An implication is that if today there was a gathering of all sages they
could disagree with the Talmud !

CI: disagrees in a sharp letter to REW.
1. How can the Gemara sometimes pasken like a daat yachid against
   Chachamim in a Mishnah since the Taanaim decided the Halcha is like
   the majority. Similarly sometimes the Gemara paskens like a beraita
   against the Mishna.

2. Why can't an Amora disagree with a Tanna in a Beraita

3. How can Rav disagree with a Mishna if it is like a sanhedrin?

CI disagreed that a meeting of all sages has the din of Sanhedrin.
In particular he disagreed that the sages of Rav Ashi in their meeting
could have disagreed with the Mishna since both are like a Sanhedrin.
CI: His own opinion is that Amoraim decided they were not on the level
of Tannaim and so undertook not to argue. Similarly after completion
of Talmud. However, legally they had the right to argue. (REW quotes
R. Chaim Brisk with a similar opinion).

REW responds: agrees that Amoraim were not on level of Tannaim and Geonim
not on level of Amoraim. Nevertheless there are exceptions to this rule
like we see that the greatest Gaon was Hai Gaon though he was close to the
end and also Gra was like a Rishon. So maybe some singular Amora was like
a Tanna? It seems from the Gemara that there can't be any exceptions! (he
agrres that today there could not be a gathering of sages that would
overrule the Gemara or Mishna). CI doesn't fit into words of Kesef Mishna.

Terefah:
What decides the status of Terefah animals when Chazal disagrees with
modern medicine? This is especially true since the Mishna states that
they consulted the doctor Todos about some of these matters. Rambam
says that we can;t change terefot because "al pi haTorah asher Yorucha".
However, it is not clear what this pasuk has to do with the question.

CI: Chazal established terefot based on ruach hakodesh. What
they established is final because they were the end of 2000 years
of Torah. This is all hashgacha from G-d. Whatever was the status of
medicine then is what determines it forever. CI then uses the same idea
in terms of disagreeing with the Talmud. Rebbe and Rav Natan were the
end of Mishna, Ravina and Rav Ashi were the end of "Horaah" and this
is part of G-ds plan for the world. Whatever, needed to be revealed was
done at the appropriate time. Therefore, even a supergreat Amora could
not disagree with a Tanna except for the first generation of Amoraim
because of sof Mishna and 2000 years of Torah..

authors objections: agrees that CI doesn't fit into words of Kesef
Mishna and it doesn't seem he is disagreeing. Kesef Mishna not the same
as REW either. REW uses the hakdama of Rambam as a proof. CI explains
Rambam differently but it is forced. In conclusion neither seems to fit
into either Rambam or Kesef Mishna and CI doesn't give a halachic answer.

Rama (CM 28:1) (based on Rosh- against Raavad) later generations can
disagree with earlier ones (even Geonim) on anything not mentioned in
the Gemara. One should not be mekel in an accepted minhag unless he
received from his rebbi differently.

Gra: We learn this from a Sanhedrin arguing with a previous Sanhedrin
only if it was not accepted by everyone.


RK: Gra is not clear. The Gemara is talking about gezerot and we are
talking about halachic arguements. To answer he quotes Maharik: rules of
the Gemara how we pasken are like takanot and gezerot. Further the rules
of the Gemara are not based on individual logic of each case. The later
Amoraim did not want to decide between Tannaim or earlier Amoraim.
Therefore thet decided on general grounds to pasken like R. Yochanan
against resh Lakish, R. Yose against R. Shimin and R. Yehuda, etc.
Therefore, on halachot like Negaim that did not apply in the days of
the Gemara there was no psak and so rashi can disagree with some rule.
Aguday Ezov asks on Maharik: If there are general rules of psak they
should apply even to matters that were not applicable in the days of
the Amoraim.

RK: Being smarter doesn't mean that a rabbi is always right. So Chazal
made rules just so that there would not be two Torahs, not because they
claimed that their decision was always right!! Therefore, it doesn;t
apply to things that were not needed in their days, like negaim.

Difficulty: what gives Chazal this power? What if they say an animal
is kosher that would be terefah according to modern medicine? We are
overiding the Torah in a positive way. Furthermore, one can rely on the
psak of a Sanhedrin against ones opinion only if he argued against the
court and they overruled him. However, if they don't know of his opinion
he cannot rely on the Sanhedrin (Ramban to sefer haMitzvot)
One has to answer that nevertheless Chazal had a right to make a
takanah to rule in accordance with certain people for the benefit of
all generations. Even following the majority is based on logic and not
the verse of following the majority that only applies to a bet din.

Hence, RK agrees with REW that Amoraim could not disagree with Tanaim
according to halacha and not just because they accepted it upon
themselves. However, the reason is not because there was a meeting of
all the sages but rather that the finishing of the Mishna or Gemara had
the status of a Takanah and so the Gra is correct in his analogy. Chazal
made this takanah for the reasons given by CI of the end of 2000 years
of Torah and that it was a plan of G-d.


----------------------------------
For anyone still with me I have some objections to all these opinions.

1. It is clear that the Gemara was not finished in one seating. The
Gemara itself has extensive discussions with Mar Bar Rav Ashi and later
generations. The Saboraim added other parts of the Gemara.

2. How does the Yerushalmi fit into the picture? How about Mesechot
Soferim and other late pieces.

3. what bothers me most is that in fact Amoraim do argue with
Tannaim. Instead of doing it directly they reinterpret a Mishna or
Beraita in ways that seem far from pshat. In many cases it is clear they
are not doing it based on tradition but based on logic.

Similarly, they frequently change the text of the Mishna. Again it many
cases it is clear that this is not based on other versions of the Mishna
but simply logic.

Eli Turkel

Micha Berger wrote:
>:> I- Di'Oraisa
>:>     1- Those that come from the pasuk
>:>     2- Halachah liMosheh miSinai
>:>     3- Conclusions reached from 1, 2, and earlier halachos of this category
>:>        via derashah and sevarah.
>:> II- Di'Rabbanan
>:>     4- Siyag
>:>     5- Dinim Dirabanan

On Wed, Jan 03, 2001 at 10:12:57AM -0500, David Glasner wrote:
>:                                                     A further quibble
>: is that the dividing line between I.3 and II is not so clear because
>: I.3 seems to refer to divrei sofrim which can have either d'oraita or
>: d'rabbanan status.

> The Rambam just doesn't mention divrei soferim in his discussion. Perhaps
> because the concept is orthoganal to the concept he was using to make
> this particular taxonomy.

> He wasn't speaking about whether something is treated like midi'Oraisa
> or midiRabbanan, but whether or not something can be subject to debate,
> later legislation, etc...

I was just observing that Mamrim 2:1 may also apply to dinei d'rabbanan
insofar as those dinei d'rabbanan are properly subsumed under the 
category of divrei soferim rather than takanot, g'zeirot or s'yagim.

>:> To explain the Rambam, he holds that halachos that come from pisukim
>:> (1) or are hlMmS (2) are immune from machlokes. There is no Rabbinic
>:> input. So, when he addresses the authority of a beis din, as in Hil
>:> Mamrim perek 2, he can only be talking about 3 - 6.

>: I agree that he is only talking about 3 - 6, which to me seems to include
>: most of our everyday halakhic practice.  But, the boundary between 1-2 and 3
>: is far from clear.

> 1 and 2 are dinim gotten from mesorah; 3 are things known to be from
> derashah or sevarah. When in doubt whether a derashah or a sevara
> is the origin of a din or a post-facto explanation/mnemonic, safeik
> di'Oraisa. How is there a problem?

I have trouble with the notion that the Sanhedrin whose function is
to resolve s'feikot would use safeik as a basis for deciding what the
halakhah is. Furthermore, we are talking about safeik concerning different
kinds of d'oraita, so what is the halakhic inference that you are trying
draw from this alleged safeik?

>:> Li nir'eh that 2:1 can only refer to derashos, possibly the entire
>:> category 3, sevara as well. The words "shedarshu bi'achas min hamidos"
>:> is pretty clear...

>: Actually, come to think of it, s'vara is on the same level as category 1.
>: "kra mai ba'i? s'vara hu."

> This is a great question on the Rambam. Mai ba'i? Simple -- so that no
> later Sanhedrin can come up with another sevra and change the halachah.
> IOW, to move it from (3) to (1).

Good he'ara. However, in the Rambam's defense, I would argue that a s'vara
on the level of pasuk must be so powerful that there can be no effective
counterargument. Now, philosophically, that is a difficult argument to
make, because we can never be sure that we have thought things through
well enough to absolutely know that there is no counter-s'vara. However,
the Rambam would say (in other words what I would say if I were him)
is that halakhah l'ma'asseh does not require that level of certainty.

> But by saying "is on the same level" and not "why isn't it", you are
> changing the subject. You're now looking at the inyan given your own
> sevarah, and no longer exploring the Rambam's shitah.

No, I was citing a principle enunciated and accepted by the Gemara and
by the Rambam. See hilkhot Deiot perek 5 where he accepts that we know
that one is obligated not to take the life of another in order to save
his own life based on a s'vara, and that the obligation not to engage
in a forbidden intimate relationship to save one's own life is derived
from the former obligation based on an explicit comparison between the
two in the Torah.

>: Sanhedrin were to conclude that spontaneous generation does not occur, 
>: that it could not change the halakhah p'sukah (whether l'heter or l'issur is
>: irrelevant) concerning killing a louse on Shabbat.

> I am not sure the Rambam would agree, unless he considers this to be a
> din diRabbanan, not a sevarah in a di'Oraisa.

Now I'm confused again.  Weren't you telling me before that a Sanhedrin, 
under Mamrim 2:2-3, has less discretion over dinei d'rabbanan than over
dinei d'oraita that are derived through the 13 midot?  If you look at the sugya
in Shabbat you will see that the makhloket between R. Eliezer and the 
Hakhamim concerns whether the prohibition of taking a life (n'tilate nefesh)
on Shabbat applies to any nefesh including one spontaneously generated 
or only to those that come into existence through procreation.  There is then
a mahloket between Rav Yoseiph and Abaye (I'm writing from memory now,
so I may not have the names of the Amoraim correct) about whether lice
procreate or not.  Under what theory of the power of Sanhedrin, would it
be prohibited for a new Sanhedrin to change the halakhah and pasken either 
like R. Eliezer against the Hakhamim or like Abaye against R. Yoseiph (the
latter being a mahloket in m'tziut)?  Let me also observe that I'm not now
touching the question of halakhah l'ma'asseh now in the absence of a
Sanhedrin.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

Gil Student wrote:

<<<
FWIW, the Sefer HaIkkarim 3:23 says on his own (although he tends to be
eclectic without citing sources) exactly what Micha and I believe the
Rambam said in Hilchos Mamrim 2:1.
>>>

Thanks for the reference.  As long as we are in FWIW mode, I would 
observe that in his introduction to Z'raim, the Rambam bases his 
assertion that there were not only specific Halakhot l'Moshe mi-Sinai
with no Scriptural basis transmitted from Sinai, but also authoritative
and binding mi-pi ha-Shemua interpretations of Scriptural passages, 
on the famous saying of Hazal that the entire Torah was given at Sinai 
with "klaloteha, p'rateha, v'dikdukeha."  Now Rashi cites this saying of 
Hazal in his answer to his famous question at the beginning of parashat
ba-har, "mah inyan shemitah eitzel har sinai?" However, if you look 
carefully at that Rashi, you will see that he is troubled by it and goes into 
a fairly lengthy explanation of what Hazal meant, which elicits a fairly 
lengthy comment by the Siftei Hakhamim.  To me, the upshot of the 
Rashi and the Siftei Hakhamim is clearly that Rashi is saying that the 
issue addressed by the Midrash was simply whether there was any 
transmission of halakhot in arvot mo'av that had not already been given 
in full at sinai.  And the answer is no.  Nothing was held back at sinai for 
later transmission at arvot mo'av, even though many halakhot are 
mentioned only in a general way in the first four books are discussed in 
detail in D'varim.  So, it seems perfectly clear to me that, according to 
Rashi at least, the Rambam has absolutely no support for his position 
about mi-pi ha-sh'muah interpretation from the source that he is relying on.  
Now I admit that I could be wrong in this interpretation of Rashi, but if you 
look at the Beis Yehudoh chumish which contains a yiddish translation of 
Rashi the Beis Yehudoh gives a lengthy argument in Yiddish about why 
one should not interpret Rashi as I do.  My Yiddish is not that good, so I 
may not have followed him, but I don't think that his argument against my 
interpretation was very persuasive.  But I invite you to read what he says 
and convince me otherwise.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

Amihai alluded to Avraham Ibn Ezra's polemic against those who allegedly
defamed the shabbat by insisting that the biblical day started in the
morning and ended the next morning.  He further gave a reference to a
Rashbam in the beginning of Bereishit.  It is my understanding that the
view of the Rashbam was censored out of the usual Mikraot Gedolot
texts.  In fact, there appears to be no Rashbam commentary in the first
few parshiot.  The Hama'or edition of Mikraot Gedolot has some Rashbam
on parsha bereishit including a brief reference in verse 5 to his view
that "va'yehi erev va'yehi boker, yom echad" means after the day's
activity it became dark (night) then light again, with the reappearance
of light signaling the start of a new day.  It is possible that the
Merkaz Harav chumash has more of the peyrush.  I remember seeing the
Shulsinger 6 volume "chumash" many years ago which contained,
apparently, the full text of the Rashbam (the Rosh, Baalei Tosfot and
other mefarshim omitted from the Mikraot Gedolot formed the 6th
volume).  In it, Rashbam amplifies his view by citing various verses
about the moadim whose evident meaning implies that day does not start
with the previous night.  I believe that he cites "ba'rishon, be'arba'ah
asar yom la'chodesh ba'erev tochlu matzot ad yom ha'echad va'esrim
la'chodesh ba'erev" (Ex. 12:18). The chag starts in the night following
the 14th day [i.e. the latter (night) half of the 14th day]and ends in
the night following the 21st day.  More strikingly, the verse in Emor
about Yom Kippur states, " ...ve'initem et nafshoteychem be'tish'ah
la'chodesh ba'erev, meyerev ad erev tishbetu shabbatchem" (Lev. 23:32).
The fast starts the night following the daylight period in the 9th day
of the seventh month (I know the drashat chazal, but we are here
strictly focused on peshat).  It is also a well-accepted fact that in
the zemanim of the mishkan/mikdash, the night follows the day, e.g.,
the time alloted for eating the various korbonot.  What about shabbat?
Surely the Rashbam must agree that work on the shabbat is prohibited
from what the Rashbam would call the evening of the 6th day.  Indeed,
that is the case (despite what might be mistakenly inferred from the Ibn
Ezra's critique), but the Rashbam bases that biblical prohibition on the
verse in Emor just cited, "...meyerev ad boker tishbetu shabbatchem".
The verse here refers no longer specifically to Yom Kippur, but to every
shabbat which is to start on the night of the 6th day and end on the
night of the 7th day.

Does anyone have more detailed knowledge of what particularly bothered
Ibn Ezra (if, indeed, the dream about shabbat hamalka issuing a
complaint against the Rashbam was actually cited by Ibn Ezra), and when
did the Rashbam's peyrush on the beginning of bereishit fall into
disfavor (and by whom)?  My own supposition is that some printer got a
notion into his head as to what belongs on the page and what doesn't.
For reasons that are not obvious, the minor commentary of the sifsey
chachamim got in, but major commentators were omitted and the Rashbam
makes it in a very small font (when he isn't censored).

The Aruch Hashulchan, in his discussion of the rules related to informing
(mesirah) writes:

	Note: It is known to all who study history that in times of old,
	in places far away, a person had not assurances in his life or his
	money because of the robbers and bandits, even if they functioned
	within the framework of government, as in knonw nowadays in far
	away governments in Africa, where robbery and theft are widespread
	by the government.  For good we recall the governments of Europe,
	and particularly the Czars of Russia and the kings of England, who
	spread their influence over faw away places in order that people
	should feel assured that is life and money are protected and the
	wealthy need not hide themselves so that theur moeny not be looted
	and they themselves killed; on this principle hinges all rules of
	and they themselves killed; on this principle hinges all rules of
	informing and talebearing in shas and poskim....

This understanding (that mesira is not prohibited in an honest government)
is accepted by a number of poskim (see Tzitz Eliezer 19:52).  However,
other have claimed that the aruch hashulchan did not mean that which he
wrote, and he wrote for the censors.  This raises a couple of questions
that I seek help with.  To wit:

1.	Is the Aruch Hashulchan on lina anywhere, so we can search for
linguistic indicia of censorship?

2.	Does the Aruch Hashulchan ever use the phrase "he'ara" [note] in
any other context?

3.	Is this the only case where the notes [if intended for the censor]
are not italics?

I would welcome any thoughts.

Michael Broyde

R' RichW's mention of Rashi's chumash girsa on chanikhav reminded me
that I know of only three instances of where Rashi's nusach haTorah was
different from ours and he used them for a d'rash. All have been noted
in Avodah,

mezuzot
pilagshim
chanikhav

I'd be interested to hear if someone on the list knows of any other
examples of this. Perhaps someone who learns Rashi more often than I do.

David

R' Micha wrote re: the gender of Shabbat:
> "Shabbasos limnuchah". OTOH, "Shabbos kodesh". The word itself is
> zachar, it just takes a "-os" in lashon rabbim.

Since when does kodesh follow the gender of the word it is describing?

[R' Seth Mandel already pointed out that I was mistanslating kodesh;
it's not an adjective. -mi]

Admat kodesh.  Therefore adama is zakhar??
and mish-chat kodesh, and yovel hi tihyeh lakhem, and riv-vot kodesh.
All zakhar by Micha? All nekeiva by me. And all the above examples
are from the mikra, the mikra kodesh. Mikra, plural mikraot, and, yes,
mikra is zakhar.

I admit that b'rit kodesh has some connection with zakhar, but the word
b'rit is still nekeiva. Ouch. I still remember.

But, the Rambam (Hil. Shab. 30, Hal 2), in reference to Shabbat Ha-malka
calls her Shabbat Ha-melekh.

So, R' Micha, your "Ivrit Kodesh may be a bit off, but, with the Rambam
at your side on Shabbos, you have on whom to lean.

K"T,
David

Michael Feldstein wrote (on Areivim):
> I heard from a third party that a certain prominent Orthodox rabbi made the 
> claim that if a person who was converted (post-bar mitzvah) in an acceptable 
> halachic way, and later rejected observing mitzvot, that his conversion can 
> then be declared null and void....

If you are discussing someone who never really accepted Torah and mitzvos, then 
that is a tumult in the poskim.  However, if a convert accepted Torah and 
mitzvos and then later rejected them, the gemara (Yevamos 47b) is explicit that 
this convert remains a Jew.  The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 268:12) paskens like
that gemara.

Gil Student

Does anyone know the source for the minhag of davening mincha without
tachanun, every day? (My father keeps this minhag, but I do not.)

Daniel Schiffman

> Does anyone know the source for the minhag of davening mincha without
> tachanun, every day? (My father keeps this minhag, but I do not.)

There's a custom not to say tachanun on a tzaddik's yartzeit. Since there's
at least one tzaddik who was niftar each day...

You can buy calendars here with the yartzeits on them.

Akiva

Daniel Schiffman wrote:
> Does anyone know the source for the minhag of davening mincha without 
> tachanun, every day? (My father keeps this minhag, but I do not.)

I've heard R. Hershel Schachter quote the Dvar Yehoshua (?) as explaining
that based on kabbalah we do not say tachanunim at night before midnight.
Since many chasidim daven minchah after sheki'ah, they do not say tachanun
because of that "prohibition".

Gil Student

From:  Daniel Schiffman
> Does anyone know the source for the minhag of davening mincha without
> tachanun, every day? (My father keeps this minhag, but I do not.)

Hypothesis #1
Since Hassidim davened mincha very late in the day after darkm therefore
it was too late fro nefilas apayim. This would mean that those who do
daven earlier might say Tachanun anyway.

Hypothesis #2
I vaguely recall that this might have to do with rebbes' yahrtzeits.
Im kein saying tachanun would be problematicla in the morning, too,
unless we add a svara that they only were mkeabeil to omit tachanun
davka at mincha.

Shalom
Rich Wolpoe

In a message dated Tue, 9 Jan 2001  2:44:36pm EST, "D. and E-H. Bannett"
<dbnet@barak-online.net> writes:
> Chana Luntz and previous postings for and against heicha kedusha, IIRC,
> all ignore the Rambam and his son R' Avraham who recommended abolishing
> the chazarat hashatz and had at least partial success...

R' Avraham suggested eliminating it  (where did you see that his father did 
as well?) because people were talking and spitting etc. instead of paying 
attention as they should.  Our goal should be to have people understand the 
meaning of tfilat hatzibur(per R'YBS) rather than eliminating it.

KT
Joel

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