Avodah Mailing List

Volume 06 : Number 134

Friday, February 23 2001

• Re: Judging another
• Re: Judging another
• Voss Iz Der Chilluk? #2: MC vol. 1 p. 102
• RYBS's derech
• Re: RYBS's derech [CORRECTION]
• Re: 72 min. MS- Nothing to Lose, Everything to Gain...
• Re: minimising the sakono
• RE: minimising the sakono
• Re: 72 min. MS- Nothing to Lose, Everything to Gain...
• Re: minor fasts
• Mi-sheyakir (was Erev Pesach sheHal beShabbat0
• Some Possible Aitsohs for Sfaika D'Yoma Shel Shabbos
• Re: Voss Iz Der Chilluk? #2: MC vol. 1 p. 102
• Re: minimising the sakono
• Pi and Melachim Alef 7:23
• Re: Pi and Melachim Alef 7:23
• Re: Pi and Melachim Alef 7:23
• RE: minor fasts
• Re: 72 min. MS- Nothing to Lose, Everything to Gain...
• Re: Voss Iz Der Chilluk? #2: MC vol. 1 p. 102
• Re: Voss Iz Der Chilluk? #2: MC vol. 1 p. 102
• Re: RYBS's derech
• Re: RYBS's derech

In a message dated 2/22/01 2:35:34pm EST, sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu writes:
> You raise an important theological point. The argument can be made, of 
> course that even, say Shabtai Tzvi was essential to Hashem's masterplan. We 
> must reformulate, therefore, azoi:

In the back of the later editions of the Seder Hadoros is printed the
Kuntres "Al Hatzadikim" in that Kuntres the Munkatcher Rebbe (Minchas
Elazar) argues from the Gemara in Sanhedrin that discusses who does
and who does not have a Chelek Lolom Haboh, that one canot say that is
HKB"H's Chesbon. (I am not discussing the particular person at hand).

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

At 02:40 PM 2/22/01 -0500, Yzkd@aol.com Yitzchok Zirkind wrote:
>                                the Munkatcher Rebbe (Minchas Elazar) argues
>from the Gemara in Sanhedrin that discusses who does and who does not have a
>Chelek Lolom Haboh, that one canot say that is HKB"H's Chesbon.

I have the sefer, what page?

I am not sure whether what the Munkatcher is saying is relevant here: *If* 
(Big If!) I understand correctly, he is discussing the issue of a person's 
cheilek in OhB, and is attempting (in my opinion, he is wrong) to prove 
that this is an objective issue, not one subject to hidden cheshbonos of 
HKB"H. But, 'twould seem, that regardless of their cheilek in OhB, 
individuals such as Bil'am and Menahse served as critical components in the 
masterplan of the Beri'oh. I believe that was RAA's premise.

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

The Ketzos Ha'Choshen 25:12 discusses the halacha that states that if two 
dayanim erred in halacha, while the third, overruled, dayan was actually 
the one who was correct, then when the mistake is eventually brought to 
light, the two mistaken dayanim each pay one-third of the loss that was 
incurred by the litigant they had found guilty. The wronged litigant thus 
loses the  one-third of the principle that correspnds to the third dayan.

The Ketzos asks why this halacha differs from the case of an ox ("shor") 
that pushed another ox into a pit ("bor"), and the case of a shor and a man 
("odom") tht damaged in unison. In these cases we see "kee leicah 
l'ishtalumei mei'hai ishtalumei mei'hai" - what one cannot collect from the 
owner ("ba'al") of the shor one collects from the ba'al ha'bor (and vice 
versa), or what one cannot collect from the ba'al ha'shor one collects from 
the odom (and vice versa). So too here, we should say that the last third 
that cannot be collected from the dayan who proved to be correct should be 
collected from the other two dayanim (i.e., one-sixth apiece).

Why not?

Voss Iz Der Chilluk?

What Derech have you used to resolve that Chilluk?


KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

On Tue, Feb 20, 2001 at 02:08:31PM -0600, RYBS wrote:
: >RYBS's derech is, to my mind, a synthesis of Brisk's exploration of
: >chakiros and definitions of categories with Telz's drive to find the
: >essential meaning of the din. By assuming a philosophy of Kirkegaardian
: >dialectic, he can provide philosophical explanation for Brisker chakiros.
: >Tzvei dinim emerge from the tension of the dialectic.

: Be dan l'kaf zechus!! Not Kirkergaard, but Tanya. Brisk + Tanya = RYBS. 
: Tanya was a heavy influence in Telshe as well. But there they accepted it. 
: RYBS fought against it.

I'm thrown by a number of things in these three short lines, I hope you
can help me.

One of the first footnotes to Ish haHalachah raises the subject of
dialectic, and RYBS names Kirkegaard when he places himself in the
"unresolved dialectic" camp. Unless you are saying that doing so is
so far litzad chov that ein adam meisim atzmo rasha applies, I stand
by that bit of characterization.

Second, I would appreciate some examples of Tanya-esque hashkafah playing
a central role in RYBS's thought. I could only think of a couple of
cases where he used an idea from the Ba'al haTanya to explain a point
in tefillah, but nothing central to his machshavah or derech halimud.

Third, it looks like a tarta disasrei -- or is it merely a dialectic? <grin>
-- you say that Tanya is a component in RYBS's thought and that he fought
against it. Please explain further.

(Last, I had to reread the reisha when I got to the seifa. I thought you
were saying it was his wife's hashpa'ah that tempered RYBS's Brisk-keit.)

In short, your comment left me quite confused.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On Thu, Feb 22, 2001 at 03:32:19PM -0500, Micha Berger wrote:
: On Tue, Feb 20, 2001 at 02:08:31PM -0600, RYBS wrote:

I typoed -- it was RYGB who was being quoted. A few of people noted
the wrong attribution, one person quipped about being upset that he
missed techi'as hameisim (there were other variants on that theme).
Since two people seriously asked who I was quoting, I thought I should
clear it up on line.

Two four letter acronyms, both starting RY, and we were discussing RYBS,
my wires got crossed.

-mi

It would seem to me there is a more fundamental question here: when is it
appropriate to pasken, and when do we look at the two sides as a safeik?
If you assume this case it the latter, then RNSR's approach would boil
down to: if you don't know what to do, safeik di'Oraisa lichumrah. (Lo
kol shekein this di'Oraisa!)

Along similar lines, but less extreme is the position of being chosheid
for a rishon lichumrah. Here one is saying that one can pasken mei'ikkar
hadin, but a ba'al nefesh should be treating this as a sefeik.

(Admittedly one could be chosheid for a rishon because he feels that the
rishon's position better fits the ta'am hadin as he understand it. But
that's not the phenomenon as it usually occurs.)

The Asheknazi practice of hanging a mezuzah on the diagonal also enters
this parashah.

So, when do we try to pasken based on birur, and when do we fall back
to treating it like a safeik? (Which nicely ties up with our previous
"vus is der chiluk" question.)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

Moshe Feldman wrote on Areivim:
> We are not supposed to enter into sakanah based on the notion that Hashem
> only kills us when our time comes.  There is also the idea that not everyone
> is zocheh to a miracle.

I'm not sure what you mean by this.  There is a machlokes between Tosafos in 
Kesuvos 30b and the Chovos HaLevavos whether it is possible to commit suicide if
it was not decreed on Rosh HaShanah that one would die that year.  R. Elchanan 
Wasserman discusses this in a short essay in Kovetz Ma'amarim.

Gil Student

Moshe Feldman wrote on Areivim:
>> We are not supposed to enter into sakanah based on the notion that Hashem
>> only kills us when our time comes.  There is also the idea that not everyone
>> is zocheh to a miracle.

From: Gil.Student@citicorp.com [mailto:Gil.Student@citicorp.com]
> I'm not sure what you mean by this.  

A poster had argued that it makes no difference whether one lives in
Bnei Beraq or a hot-spot in Yesha; after all, Hashem takes away your
neshama only when the proper time has come. I argued in response that
many Jewish philosophers believe that there is an interplay between a
person's zechuyos and nature--even if a person deserves to live, he may
die if he puts himself b'makom sakanah. This depends on the nature of
"nature"--how real is it?--See Michtav Me'eliyahu vs. R Bloch's Shiurei
Daas; see generally R. Shalom Carmy's article in the Torah U'Maddah
Journal which was later printed (with some changes) in the Orthodox
Forum volume on Suffering.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

Micha Berger wrote:
> So, when do we try to pasken based on birur, and when do we fall back 
> to treating it like a safeik? (Which nicely ties up with our previous 
> "vus is der chiluk" question.)

The Ramchal alludes to this in his Messilas Yesharim. He lists two
types of chumras in different places. In the midah of zehirus he says
that one should be machmir if one is not sure what the halachah is.
In the midah of perishus he says that a parush is machmir for opinions
that were never accepted lehalachah. In other words, when you think you
know what the pesak is, it is perishus to be machmir for other shitos.

Perishus is not necessarily bad, but it is not for those who have not
yet reached that madreigah. For myself, I'm still working on zehirus
and zerizus and have definitely not yet reached perishus.

Regarding the ikkar she'eilah of this thread, I will see if I have not
yet packed R. Willig's sefer and, if not, I'll b"n summarize his article.

Gil Student

As there has been a discussion about how long it is appropriate to
wait before declaring Shabbat to be halakhically concluded, with one
factor weighing in favor of prolonging Shabbat, its d'oraita status,
the question arises what is the appropriate time to wait after sunset for
breaking a minor fast. It seems that most people wait at leat 42 minutes
and in many cases as long as they wait after sunset on Shabbat. Why is
there not greater leniency practiced concerning a rabbinic enactment?

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

From: "Carl M. Sherer" <cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il>
> You can daven a LOT earlier than this. Hanetz on Erev Pesach is 
> around 5:20 (assuming we don't go on daylight savings time until 
> after Leil HaSeder this year), which means atifas talis is about 
> 4:30, and you can FINISH davening by 6:30.

This reminds me of something that I've been trying to clarify for some time.
What are the various shitos regarding mi'sheyakir (the earliest time to put
on tallis/tefillin)?  According to Baltimore's Eruv List (a community phone
directory with a lot more than just phone numbers),  R' Henkin held 60 fixed
minutes and R' Moshe Heinemann holds 36 fixed minutes.

KT
Aryeh

The following are based-on a situation, such as in Hawaii, where the
question is whether Shabbos is Friday or Saturday and based on the
assumption that one is following a psak to observe Saturday as the
full Shabbos and to avoid melacha on Friday but nonetheless put on
tefillin and daven the weekday davening.

Kiddush:

First of all, one is yotzei kiddush m'doraisa without wine or challa.
According to some shitos, even by saying 'Gut Shabbos' one has
fulfilled the mitzvah of kiddush min haTorah. Therefore, perhaps one
could say the nusach of kiddush without the sheim Hashem with the
t'nei that if it is Shabbos, then he is saying it to be yotzei the
mitzvah of kiddush but if it is not, then he is merely saying divrei
Torah.  It would seem that one could even do that al HaKos since one
is allowed to drink wine or grape juice during the week.

Would that be enough to avoid the problem of bal tosif? If so,  then
it would seem that one could have three seudos with lechem mishna on
the 'Friday Shabbos' (use same aitsahs for shalosh seudos as when
Shabbos is erev Yom Tov) w/ the t'nei that if it is Shabbos, you are
eating to fulfill the mitzvah of the Shabbos seudos but if it is not,
you are merely eating.

If that would not be workable, then one could still do the following:

Make kiddush after plag hamincha on Friday, but before davening maariv
and before shkia. This way, if Shabbos was really Friday, you have
fulfilled the mitzvah of kiddush b/c it is still Friday but if Shabbos
is Saturday, you are also fine b/c one can make kiddush anytime after
plag Hamincha on Erev Shabbos. [1]


Tefilos:
If I recall correctly, the halacha is that one is yotzei shmoneh esrai
on Shabbos even if he would daven the entire weekday shmoneh esrai ,
_as long as some mention of Shabbos is made  somewhere in it_.
Therefore,  for Thursday night's maariv and the shacharis and mincha
of Friday, could one make mention of Shabbos somewhere in shmoneh
esrai w/ the t'nei that if it is not Shabbos, it is only saying divrei
Torah? ( which although assur b'soch shmoneh esrai, is nonetheless not
m'akeiv )

Hadlokos Neiros:

What about lighting candles before shkia on Thursday (w/out a brocho,
of course) with a t'nei that if Thursday night is Shabbos, they should
be for the mitzvah of neiros Shabbos but if not you are  just merely
lighting candles shel chol (so it shouldn't be bal tosif) .

I thought of the idea of lighting candles that would burn through
Friday night but the problem is that the mitzvah of hadlokos neiros
can only be fulfilled _after_ plag hamincha on erev Shabbos.


Notes:

[1] Obviously you are left with the problem that if Friday really was
Shabbos, everything that you ate until you made kiddush was eaten
b'issur since one can't before kiddush. Since it is only a s'faik
Shabbos and since the issur of eating before kiddush is d'rabonon,
this would not seem to be much of a problem, however the baal hanefesh
who wishes to be machmir could possibly fast from shkia (or sometime
afterwards)  on Thursday until making kiddush just after plag hamincha
on Friday. Of course, then there is the problem of fasting on Shabbos,
for which I thought of the following two possible aitsahs:

1. Eat something before davening on Friday morning.

 Many poskim hold that if one eats before davening, one does not make
kiddush first and there are Chassidim who eat a little before davening
on Shabbos morning (after saying birkas HaTorah and krias shema)  in
order to give them koach to daven and because of the reasoning that it
is "better to eat to daven than to daven to eat".

One could toivel in the ocean [*1]and learn and/or say Tehillim before
davening and then daven very slowly with extra kavanah, thereby
justifying eating beforehand.

2. (Humor alert) The halacha is that one may fast because of a
disturbing dream on Shabbos, so one could watch a scary movie or read
a scary story on Thursday in order to have a nightmare on Thursday
night and then fast hatovos cholom on Friday!

Notes on Notes:
[*1]

a. Even Waikiki, the world's most famous beach is empty at the crack
of dawn at least until after sunrise and probably until close to 8
a.m.

b. I was once in a summer camp that didn't have a mikvah and the
Chasidishe bochurim would toivel in the lake. I wondered about the
halachic question of doing so on Shabbos morning (in a lake; the
question of toiveling in a mikvah is an old machlokes)  but there were
some who did so, including at least one of the rebbeim. (an
interesting aside: There are many who go to the mikvah on Erev Shabbos
but not on Shabbos, however, I recall hearing that the Arizal said
that the teviolh of Shabbos morning is actually more important. Any
elaboration on this?) (Another aside: The Gra toiveled every morning
except for Shabbos and he would toivel on motsai Shabbos to make-up
for it.  There are chassidim who toivel on motsai Yom Kippur and
motsai Tisha B'Av because of the lost day)

- Noach

> So too here, we should say that the last third that cannot be collected
> from the dayan who proved to be correct should be collected from the
> other two

Can you explain the kashe better? - ki leika lishtalumei transfers
hischayvus from one bar chiyuva to another; the dayan who did nothing
wrong was never a bar chiyuva.

On Thu, Feb 22, 2001 at 05:14:49PM -0500, Feldman, Mark wrote:
:                                    after all, Hashem takes away your
: neshama only when the proper time has come. I argued in response that
: many Jewish philosophers believe that there is an interplay between a
: person's zechuyos and nature...

Well, nature isn't necessarily deterministic.

I would have thought the more relevent discussion is the rejection of
fatalism and predetermination.

To define my terms: Fatalism is the statement that since everything has
a purpose, my fate is sealed by that purpose. Determinism is the belief
that since everything has a cause, we can apply the rules of physics to
the current moment to figure out the future.

Contemporary physics isn't deterministic (*), so one can believe that
nature is an independent entity (i.e. hold like the Rambam, not REED) but
still believe that one's zechuyos determin how nature plays out for you.

* For the non-physicist: quantum mechanics, as usually understood, is
based on the idea that physics determines probabilities only. In the
normal scale that we live on, the law of averages usually reduces this
to deterministic levels. When you toss the coin once per subatomic
particle, you're bound to get VERY close to 50% heads.

However, there is a second new idea -- chaos theory. This theory is about
a class of complex systems that due to feedback effects can have grossly
different final states because of microscopic changes in initial state.
The famous example is the butterfly in Africa which can cause a tornado
in the southern US or not, just by flapping its winds or not. In such
systems, the effects don't average. Which is why the weatherman or
economist can never reach 100% accuracy.

It also means that quantum effects won't average out. All but the most
textbook of human-scale situations are non-deterministic in QM. For
example, the workings of the human brain, the shape of a mountain or
coastline, the development of a human during gestation, etc...

In Aristotle's physics, nature was considered deterministic -- except that
minds start chains of causality by imparting impetus to objects, and minds
are non-deterministic. In addition, impetus, unlike Newtonian momentum,
tapers off with time. In Yesodei haTorah the Rambam uses this physics to
show that the celestial spheres have siechel. Otherwise, how could they
continue to move? Their impetus would have expired well before Adam did.

Which means that the Rambam had no problem fitting siyata diShmaya into
this kind of nature.

If I may introduce one more idea... The Rambam in the Moreh proves that
mal'achim exist by defining a mal'ach as the seichel that imparts the
impetus that performs some task for HKBH. An example he gives is the
mal'ach that tells each blade of grass to grow. The Rambam explains that
this is why each mal'ach has only one tafkid. Imparting two impetuses
(impeti?) would be definitionally two mal'achim.

This implies something about the difference between siy'ata diShamaya
and those who are abandoned to teva. It would directly link it to
the Rambam's angelogy.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

My recollection is that the problem of determining Pi in the description of
the Yam in Melachim Alef 7:23 (where the radius of the Yam is 5 and the
circumference is 30) is soleved by the Gra based on the relationship between
the Keri and the Ketiv in the Pasuk.

Is anyone familiar with that Gra, where it can be found, and what the
equation was?

Hodesh Tov,
Shalom Berger
Alon Shvut

R. Shalom Berger (my ninth grade rebbe, BTW) wrote:

> My recollection is that the problem of determining Pi in the description of 
> the Yam in Melachim Alef 7:23 (where the radius of the Yam is 5 and the 
> circumference is 30) is soleved by the Gra based on the relationship 
> between the Keri and the Ketiv in the Pasuk.
     
Am I misreading this passuk or does the circumference of 30 amos refer to the 
diameter of 10 amos?  That would be an approximation of pi at 3, rounded down 
from 3.14159...

Gil Student

On Fri, Feb 23, 2001 at 01:20:27AM +0200, shalom wrote:
: My recollection is that the problem of determining Pi in the description of
: the Yam in Melachim Alef 7:23 (where the radius of the Yam is 5 and the
: circumference is 30) is soleved by the Gra based on the relationship between
: the Keri and the Ketiv in the Pasuk.

I'm not the one to ask for mar'eh mekomos, but I approved this post
before recalling our discussion of this very topic from v2n189 - n195.
Usually, although there are many exceptions that I don't catch, I ask
people to review previous posts on a subject before re-opening the topic.

Since I did, let me quote R' Moshe Koppel
(<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol02/v02n195.shtml#06>):
> A brief, but very thorough, historical overview of rabbinic discussions of
> pi can be found in a paper by Shimon Bollag in Higayon 3 (5756). The same
> volume includes a mathematical treatment of the material by David Garber
> and Boaz Tzaban. (I can send the volume to anybody who wants it.)
> Munk published his observation about KV/KVH in Sinai 51 (5722) and Hadarom
> 27 (5728). He did not attribute the observation to the Gr"a. Apparently,
> the first published attribution to the Gr"a appears in a paper by
> Posamentier and Gordan in The Mathematics Teacher (Jan. 1984) but no
> specific reference is given and none has ever been found.
...
> Micha, can you check that Newton reference? Thanks.

I found a claim on the web, which I traced back to
    J. Brook 1988: The God of Isaac Newton,
    in: eds. J. Fauvel, et al., Let Newton Be!, Oxford Univ. Press, pp. 166-183.

which attributes this gematria to Newton.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

David Glasner:
> As there has been a discussion about how long it is appropriate to
> wait before declaring Shabbat to be halakhically concluded, with one
> factor weighing in favor of prolonging Shabbat, its d'oraita status,
> the question arises what is the appropriate time to wait after sunset for
> breaking a minor fast....

Some Rabbonim ARE more meikel legabbei taaneisim as opposed to Shabbos.

Some Rabbonim do a kind of lo plug about when is night.

FWIW, Breuer's KAJ does not adjust the zman biur chameitz except for the
adjustment for Dayliht time.  So the so zam achila is always 9:15 EST
10:15 EDT, regardless of the secular date of Erev Pesach.  This "lo
plug" was meant to make things less confusing.  This is an illustration
of using a chumra on the practical side in order to make the thinking
side less confusing.  In the Litivisher velt I grew up in, this went
against the grain, but in a yekkisher velt, uniformity and
standardization have more weight than does hair-splitting...

Shalom
Rich Wolpoe

I have posted several times my essay on "Good Chumros?" from the JO to the 
list and you will find it on the website, ayain sham.

For now, I note punkt fakehrt - mei'hechei tesei to be machmir if Poskim 
are meikeil?!

(I have seen people who are machmir on Chodosh and Sheki'ah d'R"t and they 
have remained Mush'chosim Gedolim. Their chumros become a glaring question...)

One who keeps 72 as a chumra,
YGB

At 05:32 PM 2/22/01 -0500, C1A1Brown@aol.com wrote:
> Can you explain the kashe better? - ki leika lishtalumei transfers
> hischayvus from one bar chiyuva to another; the dayan who did nothing
> wrong was never a bar chiyuva.

Perhaps you might reformulate your question on the question into a 
resolution :-) ?

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

> Perhaps you might reformulate your question on the question into a 
> resolution :-) ?

I think you have to explain he question better.  I said in the case of nezek 
each peron is a bar chiyuva, while the one dayan is not, so his chov is 
non-transferrable to other people, so how does the kashe get off the ground.  
The Ktzos explains this:(agav: for those who look it up, which is worth 
doing, the gemara in B.K. is on 53a, not 54) by pointing out that we pasken 
like the lishna kamma of the gemara of Rav Nachman that each party (ba'al 
ashor/ba'al habor) is liable independently for 100% of the damages incurred.  
The fact that it is shared chov mitigates each sides payment - really each 
should be liable for 100% damages, but since there is a shutfus, each pays 
50%.  Where the shor is tam and mitigates the ba'al habor's payment by 25%, 
m'meila the ba'al habor is obligated to pay the rest since he should have 
owed 100% anyway.  By the dayanim case: each dayan acc. to this logic is 
liable for causing 100% of the loss caused.  The fact that part of the loss 
can be shared by another person mitigates each person's obligation to a 
certain extent.  But each independently has incurred an obligation to pay 
100% of the damages caused - so what difference does the 3rd dayan not paying 
make?  The chov is on the other 2 to make 100% restitution.

(The ktzos goes on to explain how this works acc. to  other rishonim who 
learn R"N din differently, but this is enough to set up the kashe.  I think 
its significant that the lomdus can't start before the kashe is strong enough 
so that a simple chiluk doesn't answer it up - were it that easy, what would 
be the gadlus of the Ktzos!)

Now to work of the teirutz(im)...

-CB

On Thu, 22 Feb 2001, Micha Berger wrote:
> One of the first footnotes to Ish haHalachah raises the subject of
> dialectic, and RYBS names Kirkegaard when he places himself in the
> "unresolved dialectic" camp. Unless you are saying that doing so is so
> far litzad chov that ein adam meisim atzmo rasha applies, I stand by
> that bit of characterization. 

He can identify K as a similarly moved person. That soes not mean he built
his derech on K. I am tempted to add a C"V to that!

> Second, I would appreciate some examples of Tanya-esque hashkafah
> playing a central role in RYBS's thought. I could only think of a couple
> of cases where he used an idea from the Ba'al haTanya to explain a point
> in tefillah, but nothing central to his machshavah or derech halimud. 

The drive for Why's. And emotional Avodas Hashem. Suppressed by Brisk.

> Third, it looks like a tarta disasrei -- or is it merely a dialectic?
> <grin> -- you say that Tanya is a component in RYBS's thought and that
> he fought against it. Please explain further. 

Kana"l.

KT,
YGB
Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

On Thu, Feb 22, 2001 at 06:24:01PM -0600, RYGB wrote:
: [RYBS] can identify K[irkegaard] as a similarly moved person. That does
: not mean he built his derech on K. I am tempted to add a C"V to that!

Would you be similarly tempted WRT statements about the Rambam's connection
to Aristotle?

I think you're judging RYBS from outside his own hashkafah. After all,
he did embrace TuM and TiDE, according to some definition of those terms
that would render them identical.

-mi

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