Avodah Mailing List

Volume 07 : Number 053

Monday, June 4 2001

• Re: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• Brit Mila on dead babies
• Re: Torah vs rape
• Re: Yi'ud
• yiud, yibum, kedushei ketana, and rape
• Rabbi Bechhofer's Principle
• Re: CI
• Re: CI
• Re: Hirhur/Machshava
• Re: Hirhur/Machshava
• RE: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• RE: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• RE: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• Re: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• CI - (Rambam)
• Re: Yiud
• Re: Yi'ud
• Ve'imru vs. Venomar Amein
• RE: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• RE: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)

On Sun, Jun 03, 2001 at 03:58:34AM +0400, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
: And if R"L MY child is sick, how is that a punishment to the Klal? 

You remind me of RYBS's explanation of how a "Mi Shebeirach" works.

When someone is caught robbing, he is sent to jail. There is a measure of
injustice to this. Because not only is the theif being punished, but so
is his wife being deprived of his company and his ability to help out with
the workload, his children don't have their father's presence, his parents
have to live with all their friends whispering behind their backs, etc...

HKBH, however, is better at din than that. Every person impacted directly
or indirectly by an onesh got exactly what He intended for that person.

"Kol hakahal mispallelim ba'avuram" -- the whole community is praying
for them. The entire community shares the tza'ar of the choleh. If even
one person deserves not to be saddened by things not going well, then
the event would no longer be Just.

Obviously this was said before Mi Shebeirach for cholim became a long
list of names read by the gabbai.

The whole mechanics of MS changed from being a community's expression
of unity and empathy for one of its own to a statement about the unity
of Klal Yisrael globally.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

In Nefesh Harav, R H' Schachter mentions a situation where in the late
1800's early 1900's the Maskilim felt that the din that a dead baby
boy should receive a brit before burial was "barbaric" and refused to
do this. The chevrei kadisha apparently did not want to bury these
babies in a Jewish cemetary (interesting how chevrei kadisha can be
such a point of friction again). R' Chaim Soloveitchik paskened that
they could be buried in the Jewish cemetary since even though they were
areilim, they were still Jews. R' Schachter notes that apparently this
disagreement somehow was in the local court system until it died out at
WWI (an example of HKB"H reminding us of who the real enemy is??)

Is anyone aware whether there were any conflicting psaks to that of R'
CS? Does anyone know any history of the outside court issues?

KT
Joel

On 1 Jun 01, at 7:33, Harry Maryles wrote:
> While it is true that in some cases it may be beneficial to one's daughter
> to force her into marraige while she is a minor, I would think that there
> should be at least some degree of willingness on the part of the little
> girl. There are, unfortunately, all too many people in this world who
> are interested in only themselves and are willing to harm even their
> own children in a self serving enterprize.

I think it's important to realize that neither a master nor a husband
can marry a little girl without her father's consent - indeed without the
father's initiative. Until very recently, certainly until 100 years ago,
it was safe to assume that a father always had the best interests of
his daughter in mind. It's only (seemingly at least) in our times that
fathers R"L have interests that are more important to them than those
of their children.

It should also perhaps be pointed out that a girl as young as 12 may
halachically accept Kiddushin for herself. I trust you would find that
no less objectionable.

My father in law's parents were betrothed to each other when he was 13
and she was 14. They married when he was 16 and she was 17, which was
sometime around the turn of the twentieth century. They stayed happily
married until he was niftar sometime in the 1970's, despite the fact
that neither of them ever had the opportunity to "play the field."

Life was different.

-- Carl

mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

In the matter of halacha and rape there are several issues here that
are being lumped together as one, which they are not.

The issues were Yibum, underage child-wedding and slave/maid.

In Yibum, before any physical contact can take place, there has to be a
marriage. Yes, marriage is possible by Bi'ah, but in most sources this
has not been recommended in centuries (to say the least). So, nowadays
(for example) the couple can be married -- and then the wife can refuse
any physical contact. She is now his wife and the regular Hilchot Ishut
apply. So, we reach Rambam Hilchot Bi'ah where he brings that LaHalacha
it is forbidden that a husband have relations with his wife against her
will. This forbids rape of any woman who is the man's wife -- including
the 3 ladies mentioned here.

So, theoretically, a woman can marry her Yavam (who is blackmailing for
example) and then refuse to have relations. Now, if she knows enough
halacha, when the rabbis come to question her, she can make the correct
statements and get the Beit Din to force the Yavam to divorce her.
No rape.

As to the underage child, I'm going by memory, and I could be mistaken.
First, no relations can take place while she is a minor. IIRC, I heard
stories from yeminite women how their mothers slept with them until
they got their first period. Also, in Ketuvot (I don't remember the
exact source) there is a statement (as Carl mentioned) that when she
becomes of age (Mar'a Simanim) she is asked if she wants to be with him.
If the answer is no, the marriage is disolved. No rape.

The Amma Ivriyah is in a special situation. She is poor and her father
wants a wealthy husband for her. She can be sold only into a family where
there is someone suitable to marry her. But, as soon as she comes of age
(Mvi'a Simanim) -- if she is not wed, she goes free. So, basically a
very poor father who can't take care of his daughter could, in times
when there were no social services, use this as a kind of "adoption"
to care for her. Chazal have little good to say about this father who
would sell his daughter and some go so far as to say she is better off
out of his care. In any case, again, there is marriage and then there
is physical contact, and she has the same rights as any wife.

Shoshana L. Boublil

All work that is done, should be done out of love.
Then it ceases to be difficult, or boring, or embarrassing.
Even a cup or a plate can be washed with devotion until they shine,
out of aspiration for  perfection and completion.
Rav A.Y. HaCohen Kook

A number of listmembers have expressed concern about the justification
of certain practices going back to biblical times that would appear to
involve forcing a minor girl into marriage. "How would such practices
differ from rape?", is the tenor of the questions. I believe that, at
least, a partial answer lies in understanding the sociological conditions
of biblical, talmudic, medieval, and modern times - as well as a better
understanding of the actual halachot.

In the context of a strong family and clan structure, there would be
little need for legislating the sale of a minor daughter to be a maid
or concubine (the expected result of the sale). The extended family
and clan would simply not stand for such a demeaning of their status,
and would prevent such an occurrence - or quickly redeem the girl.
The torah legislation is, rather, intended for those who don't have such
a family structure and who might feel forced by poverty to take such
a drastic step. An example would be a convert who has neither family
nor an ancestral homestead for support. In such cases, the mothers of
these girls would prepare them as best they could to face the life ahead
of them. Its not a pretty picture, but it beats starvation or being
sent out into the streets. Its an example of the torah dealing with the
world as it is rather than legislating things that might read well, but
would have no chance of implementation in the times that it was given.
The sages ameliorated much of the problem in their times by insisting that
a father could not sell his minor daughter if he had any assets whatever,
and could be forced to redeem her if he should aquire the money for
her redemption. Nor could the girl be forced into marriage (yi'ud) with
the "master" or his son (T.B. Kiddushin 19a, "Eyn yi'ud elah mida'at").
At any rate, this is the understanding of the Rambam (M.T. Hilchot Avadim
4: 2, 8) which has been brought down as the governing halacha.

Similarly, the sages legislated against marrying off a minor daughter
(below 12 years). "Asur le'adam she'yekadesh et bito ke'she'hi ketana,
ad shetigdal vetomar beploni ani rotza" (T.B. Kiddushin 41a). This
halacha has been rephrased as a negative mitzvah rather than an outright
prohibition in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch. Such strictures were, however,
ignored in Ashkenaz from at least the times of the Tosfot through the
times of the Remah. These later authorities argued that conditions in
their lands and times mandated arranged early marriages. Subsequently,
the prohibition against child marriages was reinstituted in Europe,
and is now universal. So, sociological conditions did play a role in
the development of this halacha. It is not clear if child marriages were
practiced in biblical times (there is no need to assume that Rivka was
3 when she married Yitzchak), but it seems that in post-biblical times
there were, largely, strictures against such practice.

Concerning leviritical marriage to the brother of a deceased childless
husband (yibum), it would be rather peculiar to force a grown woman into
a marriage that she disdains. Nor is this the tenor of the halachot that
I have read on the subject. Even the Shulchan Aruch, which considers
yibum to be preferable to chalitza, takes into account the arguments
of the widow against yibum. If her arguments appear to have substance,
then chalitza is dictated. Moreover, the sages have ordained that
yibum be preceded by a public ceremony akin to kiddushin at which time
the consent of the widow is required (S.A., Even Ha'ezer 166: 2, 3).
The Ashkenazi practice, however, rejects yibum in almost all cases -
as stated by the Remah (ibid, 165: 1), and it is simply no longer done.

Here we have a case where the torah commands yibum - assuming that the
widow would insist on it, but allows for halitzah if the brother is
unwilling. In tanaitic times, the sages largely frowned on yibum. From
medieval times, the Ashkenazim basically forbade yibum. The reason
for the changes is not difficult to find. The torah was given to the
generation that was to inherit the land by divine oath (Ex. 6: 8).
Unfortunately, that generation was fated, instead, to die in the desert.
Some men who had title, in principle, to a portion would die childless.
What would happen to their portion considering the divine oath? The
ancient mideastern custom of yibum provided an answer. A brother would
take the widow as well as his brother's land inheritance, which would
be known as the dead brother's land, and their son(s) would inherit it.
Thus, the name and inheritance of the dead brother would remain intact.
Much later, no one lived on or even recognized their family's ancestral
homestead. In fact, urban living was as common or more common than farm
life. The main point of leviritical marriage was no longer germane,
and the objection to overriding a general prohibition against marrying
a sister-in-law gained sway. In Ashkenaz, the prohibition against
multiple wives made leviritical marriage highly problematic, and so it
was abandoned.

Finally, the relatively light treatment that seems to be accorded the
rapist in the torah bothers some of our listmembers. Actually, that is
not the case. During the early period of tribal existence, the primary
protection that was afforded the individual came from the extended family
and clan. Just as there was a well-ingrained ancient practice of avenging
the death of a clan member, so was there the practice of avenging any
dishonor to the family - particularly the rape of a female member of
the clan. If the woman was married, then the rapist had no options.
He would either kill the husband or avenging clan members, or would be
killed - unless the law got to him first. If the girl was unmarried and
unbetrothed then the clan might allow him to marry her instead of engaging
in a drawn out blood feud. The latter was sanctioned by the torah, if the
girl was agreeable, in order to calm the passions and prevent bloodshed.
In later times, the civil authority took over the perogatives of the
clan and would decide on the form of punishment of the rapist. Since
long-term imprisonment was unknown, a serial rapist would presumably be
executed by the state as a public danger. Even in biblical times, anyone
who witnessed someone trying to rape a woman was bidden to thwart that
effort by any means - including killing the would-be rapist. In medieval
times, the ghetto walls and the strong stigma against any form of violence
acted as a powerful protection against rape by a Jew. In modern times,
the rapist is jailed. Unfortuneately, without therapy rapists will tend
to continue their violence against women. The complaint should therefore
be lodged against modern civil law rather than the biblical prescription
which was intended for a much different type of society.

Yitzchok Zlochower

Alas!

Rabbi Bechhofer's principle is no more.

Rabbi Chaim Twerski noted that I was preceded in the formulation of this
principle by the Chasam Sofer, Chelek 6, Likutim siman 50. There it is,
in the form of a resolution between the Gemara RH Perek 2 of RG and RY
and the Gemara in BB, in the 130's, concerning Rava's piskei din.

Ayain sham heitev.

Future correspondence must therefore refer to the principle formerly
known as Rabbi Bechhofer's as "The CS's Principle"

So be it :-) .

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

At 08:43 AM 6/1/01 -0400, Micha Berger wrote:
>This is quite a stretch. First, we're extrapolating from beis din to
>a poseik. Then, you're comparing a pesak that we don't understand to
>a takanah. However, even if we understand the reason for a takanah,
>the Rambam's rule applies. (Except if the takanah is made so as to be
>conditional on its reason.) The difference between derashah and takanah
>is /not/ based on our ability to follow its sevarah.

I am unclear as to the stretch! I believe the extrapolation is simple and 
readily followed.

BTW, see the CI Igros 2:41 who compares "Rabboseinu asher me'pihem anu 
chaim" to "Sanhedrin b'Lishkas ha'Gazis."

>I also wonder about the problem of undocumented reasons. Even when we
>understand a pesak of Chazal, the Gra (and, as noted here in the past,
>followed lima'aseh by RAY Kook) warns us that it is likely that we only
>know one reason amongst many. And therefore such reverse-engineering
>can be cause for going lechumrah, but not lekulah.

Perhaps, but the Gr"o told RCV that he may argue up to the Remo b'sevoro 
nechona and up to the Rosh b'ra'ayos nechonos (note the chilluk similar to 
mine, Hakdomo to Shu"t Chut ha'Meshulosh) - probably the hidden reason 
proposition applies only to Chazal.

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

On Sun, Jun 03, 2001 at 12:35:40AM -0500, Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer wrote:
: >This is quite a stretch. First, we're extrapolating from beis din to
: >a poseik. Then, you're comparing a pesak that we don't understand to
: >a takanah. However, even if we understand the reason for a takanah,
: >the Rambam's rule applies. (Except if the takanah is made so as to be
: >conditional on its reason.) The difference between derashah and takanah
: >is /not/ based on our ability to follow its sevarah.

: I am unclear as to the stretch! I believe the extrapolation is simple and 
: readily followed.
: BTW, see the CI Igros 2:41 who compares "Rabboseinu asher me'pihem anu 
: chaim" to "Sanhedrin b'Lishkas ha'Gazis."

I made two points.

First, we're extapolating from B"D to a poseik. This you address, but as
I wrote elsewhere in that post, it was an extrapolotion I myself had
made a few months ago.

Then there's the bit about "then", commenting on the extrapolation from
a takkanah to a pesak whose reasoning we do not understand.

By which I mean do not understand by a large enough margin to believe we
don't know what the previous poseik meant. Not one where we understand
his reasoning, but feel that it is weak or that a different position is
more persuasive.

:> I also wonder about the problem of undocumented reasons. Even when we
:> understand a pesak of Chazal, the Gra (and, as noted here in the past,
:> followed lima'aseh by RAY Kook) warns us that it is likely that we only
:> know one reason amongst many. And therefore such reverse-engineering
:> can be cause for going lechumrah, but not lekulah.

: Perhaps, but the Gr"o told RCV that he may argue up to the Remo b'sevoro 
: nechona and up to the Rosh b'ra'ayos nechonos (note the chilluk similar to 
: mine, Hakdomo to Shu"t Chut ha'Meshulosh) - probably the hidden reason 
: proposition applies only to Chazal.

This seems consistance with my next paragraph (which you snipped),
suggesting that this is another inter-era issue. IOW, it's okay to think
that you fully understand an acharon, but not the Rama or earlier.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

At 07:52 AM 5/31/01 -0400, Micha Berger wrote:
>(Hirhur is to lishmah as machshavah is to kavanah.)

Huh?

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

On Sun, Jun 03, 2001 at 09:34:33AM -0500, Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer wrote:
:> (Hirhur is to lishmah as machshavah is to kavanah.)

: Huh?

You define machshavah as an intellectual contemplation, and hirhur as
a more emotional "har" that erupts from within.

I was suggesting that perhaps doing a mitzvah lishmah is feeling the
mitzvah on that emotional level, while having kavanah (in the "mitzvos
tzerichos kavanah" sense of the word) can be more cerebral.

I have a hard time believing that one needs to feel a certain way in order
to be yotzei Shema or Shemoneh Esrei. It's just too uncontrollable. I'm
sure all of us would have mornings spent saying birchas Avos over and
over again because they just can't "click". Whereas thinking about
peirush hamilim while saying it is more doable by an act of will.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

From: Carl and Adina Sherer [mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il]
> And if R"L MY child is sick, how is that a punishment to the Klal? 

Who said that it is?

Kol tuv,
Moshe

On 4 Jun 2001, at 10:22, Feldman, Mark wrote:
>> And if R"L MY child is sick, how is that a punishment to the Klal? 

> Who said that it is?

AIUI you were arguing that punishments could only be to the Klal 
and not to the prat.

-- Carl
Carl M. Sherer, Adv. Silber, Schottenfels, Gerber & Sherer
Telephone 972-2-625-7751 Fax 972-2-625-0461 eFax (US) 1-253-423-1459
mailto:cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il       mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

From: Carl M. Sherer [mailto:cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il]
>> Who said that it is?
> 
> AIUI you were arguing that punishments could only be to the Klal 
> and not to the prat.

First, my position is that punishments/rewards are either to (1)
individuals who are either tzaddikim (who almost always receive hashgacha
pratis), or reshaim gemurim, or *sometimes* individuals who aren't
tzaddikim but are righteous enough to sometimes merit hashgacha pratis,
or (2) to klal yisrael.

Second, not all misfortune is a punishment: (1) Sometimes, there are other
reasons that Hashem does certain things (e.g., in the case of a sick
child, Hashem may wish to provide an opportunity to others to improve
their middos, etc.) (2) If a person is controlled by hashgacha klalis,
then he is subject to the vicissitudes of nature. If .001% of children
are born blind, then .001% of Jewish children who are subject to hashgacha
klalis will be born blind. See Rabbi Carmy's article "Tell Them I've Had
a Good Enough Life" (in his Orthodox Forum volume regarding Suffering).

Kol tuv,
Moshe

Moshe Feldman wrote:
>The Holocaust happened to klal yisrael and therefore it is
>possible to say that it is part of the scheme of reward and punishment for 
>the klal (though hester panim may play a role).
>Is the death of 23 people and the injury of a couple hundred
>definitely viewed as an event which occurred to klal yisrael
>(as opposed to those specific individuals)?

Carl Sherer wrote:
>And if R"L MY child is sick, how is that a punishment to the Klal?

My understanding, and I'm not sure from where I got it or if it is
correct, is that a gezeirah on the tzibbur does not have to affect
everyone in the tzibbur. If the gezeirah on the tzibbur is that someone
will die, anyone in the tzibbur (except for a tzaddik gamur) is subject
to this punishment, regardless of personal liability.

Keivan shenitan reshus lamashchis... means that anyone is susceptible,
not that everyone will die.

Gil Student

From: Eli Turkel <Eli.Turkel@kvab.be>
> At this point I am completely lost. Do we paskin like Rambam because he
> was the greatest posek?
> Who makes these decisions?

It is arguable that the Beis Yosef was a greater posek than the Rema, but
Ashkenazim follow the Rema {ruba d'ruba} anyway...

Why?

it seems obvious to me that communities followed their derachim over and
above "greatness". 

Did Chassidim follow R. Moshe Feinstein over and above their own Poskim?  
If so, please sight me a case where Poseik within a Chassidic community
abondonced its own psak in favor of "the poseik hador". And in EY wasn't
RSZA frlatively more influential than in the USA  at least during RMF's era?


When I was in Ner Yisrael, R. Ruderman's psak superceded R. Moshe's - at
least within the daled amos of that community.  For example: saying kiddush
Rabba on Coke or Pepsi.

I was recently learning the Beis Yosef and the Darchei Moshe (O Ch. 91/92)
BY: Since Rif, Rambam and Rashba agree, we followed them
DM: Since Tosfos, Rosh, etc. dissent we follow them - (basrai ninhu)...
I asked my chavrusa, how come DM says Basrai?  It is clear that this is a
Sefard/Askenazi issue not a  basrai issue?  {tzarcih iyyun}

If you are a Teimani, you probably follow the Rambam straight.  But not
because the Rambam was greater than say the Rosh.

If you are Iraqi/Syrian you probably follow straight Ben Ish Chai straight,
but not necesarily because he was greater than the Beis Yoseph - {or even
the Mishna Brura for that matter}.
   
If you are from Chabad, you probably follow the Ba'al Hatanya (either his SA
or his Siddur) but not because he was greater than (for sake of
illustration) the Taz. 

If you are "yekke", you probably follow the Maharil {at least in most
cases}, but not because he was greater than the Rambam.

Were followers of BH saying that Hillel was a bigger Gadol than Shammai?
Was BS saying that Shammai was a bigger Gadol than Hillel?  Perhaps - but
didn't the schools have shitos that superceded the issues of "who was the
greater gadol"? 

And so on and so forth. 

Shalom and Best Regards,
Richard Wolpoe <Richard_Wolpoe@ibi.com>

From: gil.student@citicorp.com
> Your problem is really that a father has a very large say over what
> happens in a girl's life, including whom she will marry while you assume
> that she should have independence.

Regardless of what Tosfos says in other parts of Kiddusin, it is clear
from Tosphos in Kidushin 5A that RT holds that Yiud is Bal Korchah on
the Ketana and only requires the will of the father. The other Tosafists
you refference may not have been the Shittah of RT.

My problem is that no matter how benevolent a father might be, the
daughter is totally taken out of the decision making proccess. While
minor children most often need that type of parental control, when it
involves a lifetime "sentence", civility and common sense dictate that
there should be an opportunity for the minor to get out of it if she so
chooses yet the Torah does not allow for it. Chazal themselves recognized
that fact when they instituted the practice of Miyun in cases of Kedushei
K'tana D'Rabbonan when a mother or brother were given the right to do it
post mortum of the father. The girl simply refuses and she is free. If
it was so beneficial to be forced into marraige, then why did Chazal
build Miyun into Kidushei K'tanna D'Rabbonan?

From: Joelirich@aol.com
> Without commenting on the specifics here, AIUI dracheha darkei noam is a
> principle that applies only when there is no clear guidance on the issue
> (similar to bror lo mitah yafeh if we're unsure of which death penalty
> applies) It would not apply to contravene an otherwise "clear"(through
> revelation or drashot) gilui of the ratzon hashem. Am I missing something?

You're may be right, Halachicly, I don't know. Never-the-less, the spirit
of the the phrase should apply in all cases of Torah Halacha. "All it's
paths are paths of pleasantness".

No?

HM

Why is a father's power to marry off a ketanah without her permission
different than his authority to make other life-changing decisions?

For example, we require parents to assume responsibility over medical
treatments. Even if one choice would be disfiguring, we don't question
the morality of his chiyuv to choose what he believes to be the refu'ah
most likely to be effective.

Parents make permanent decisions for their kids. Thiis is merely one
of them.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

R' Michael Poppers asked for comments about the difference between the
two beyond the obvious difference in translation. I don't have much to
offer, but neither did anyone else, so...

Let's start with the grammatical issue. The usual "vinomar" is a call for
people to join the Shatz in saying "amein". "Ve'imru" is the person saying
Kaddish (assuming that's the origin) calling for others to say "amein".

Why wouldn't he be saying "amein" to his own kaddish himself? Note
the similarity to most berachos. Why at the end of a chain of berachos
hasemuchos lechavertos (e.g. Binyan Y'laim in benching, the Sefaradi
closing of Birchas Shalom in the Amidah) do we expect the person to say
"amein", while for other berachos we do not.

I don't have an answer.

Thinking about how normal converstion works, lead me to wonder the
following... If I'm expected to reply in the affirmative, then I'm
confirming what he said. However, if he is expected to add something as
well, then apparantly we are adding to the thought already conveyed --
something the person saying Kaddish or benching didn't say yet.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
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From: Gil Student [mailto:gil_student@hotmail.com]
Moshe Feldman wrote:
>> The Holocaust happened to klal yisrael and therefore it is
>> possible to say that it is part of the scheme of reward and punishment for 
>> the klal (though hester panim may play a role).
>> Is the death of 23 people and the injury of a couple hundred
>> definitely viewed as an event which occurred to klal yisrael
>> (as opposed to those specific individuals)?
...
> My understanding, and I'm not sure from where I got it or if it is
> correct, is that a gezeirah on the tzibbur does not have to affect
> everyone in the tzibbur. If the gezeirah on the tzibbur is that someone
> will die, anyone in the tzibbur (except for a tzaddik gamur) is subject
> to this punishment, regardless of personal liability.

I agree with this. But my point was directed at a different issue.
I differentiate between events which occur to individuals qua individuals
(which, following Rambam & Ramban, I maintain is usually the result of
hashgacha klalis--olam k'minhago noheg) and events which occur to the
tzibbur (or individuals who represent the tzibbur). Building collapses
are (unfortunately) part of olam k'minhago noheg (e.g., earthquakes in
Turkey), though sometimes they could be a result of hashgacha pratis of
the tzibbur.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

Moshe Feldman wrote:
> I differentiate between events which occur to individuals qua individuals
> (which, following Rambam & Ramban, I maintain is usually the result of
> hashgacha klalis--olam k'minhago noheg) and events which occur to the tzibbur
> (or individuals who represent the tzibbur).  

I was assuming that we were working within the framework in which
everything is biydei Shamayim and that there is no mikreh, unlike the
Rambam and Ramban. Like them, there is nothing to talk about. Mikreh is
mikreh, and you have to work harder to think about/be davek with Hashem
so that mikreh does not affect you.

Gil Student
     

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