Avodah Mailing List

Volume 07 : Number 054

Tuesday, June 5 2001

• RE: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• RE: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• RE: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• Re: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• RE: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• RE: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• RE: Halicha B'Keri
• RE: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• RE: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• Re: Halicha B'Keri
• Re: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• Re: Ve'imru vs. Venomar Amein
• RE: Brit Mila on dead babies
• Kdushei ktana
• ktana
• Yiud
• Re: Yiud
• Forbidding the Permitted and Permitting the Forbidden.
• Re: Yiud
• shower on YT
• Rambam
• Re: CI
• Nidda/Beis Ha'Kevaros
• RE: suffering and repentance
• RE: suffering and repentance

From: gil.student@citicorp.com [mailto:gil.student@citicorp.com]
> I was assuming that we were working within the framework in 
> which everything is biydei Shamayim and that there is no mikreh, unlike the 
> Rambam and Ramban.  [If we hold like]
> them, there is nothing to talk about.  Mikreh is mikreh, and 
> you have to work harder to think about/be davek with Hashem so that mikreh 
> does not affect you.

All along I have written that I am assuming like Rambam/Ramban/Rabbeinu
Bachaya al HaTorah/[Sforno]. (Note that even according to Ramban, there
is what to talk about when the event occurs to the tzibbur rather than
the yachid; that is why I continue to harp on this point.) BTW, Rabbi
Shalom Carmy in his aforementioned article suggests that the other
position creates very difficult philosophical problems--I suggest that
you read his article.

Note also that many of the mussar philosophers base their concept of
biydei Shamayim on their understanding of Nes v'Teva in the Ramban.
But (Rabbi) Dr. David Berger IMHO convincingly argues that these sections
of the Ramban are taken out of context, and are to be understood in
conjunction with other Rambans which are clearly based on Rambam. I found
interesting that in Michtav MeEliyahu vol. 5 p. 309, Aryeh Carmell (the
editor) has a very long footnote discussing the Ramban and concluding
as did Dr. Berger--this is astounding in light of Rav Dessler's long
exposition on Nes v'Tevah and Hishtadlus & Bitachon in vol. 1.

Question: which *Rishonim* clearly disagree with Ramban/Rambam?

Kol tuv,
Moshe 

Moshe Feldman wrote:
> Note also that many of the mussar philosophers base their concept of biydei 
> Shamayim on their understanding of Nes v'Teva in the Ramban.  But (Rabbi) Dr. 
> David Berger IMHO convincingly argues that these sections of the Ramban are 
> taken out of context, and are to be understood in conjunction with other 
> Rambans which are clearly based on Rambam.  I found interesting that in 
> Michtav MeEliyahu vol. 5 p. 309, Aryeh Carmell (the editor) has a very long 
> footnote discussing the Ramban and concluding as did Dr. Berger--this is 
> astounding in light of Rav Dessler's long exposition on Nes v'Tevah and 
> Hishtadlus & Bitachon in vol. 1.

I haven't seen R. Aryeh Carmell's footnote, but another talmid of Rav
Dessler (and co-author of the MME), R. Chaim Friedlander, discusses
the Rambam's opinion in his Sifsei Chaim - Emunah uVitachon. He quotes
the various relevant passages and says that, according to the Rambam,
mikreh is just another term for hidden hashgachah peratis. I've been
told that Rav Wolbe says the same in his Alei Shor and quotes the Alter
of Kelm in his Chochma uMussar as saying it as well. That might be what
R. Carmell means.

> Question: which *Rishonim* clearly disagree with Ramban/Rambam?

R. Saadia Gaon, for one. I believe that R. Chasdai Crescas and R. Yosef
Albo do, as well (I count them both as Rishonim). The Kuzari might (see
the discussion in Avodah in the thread titled Kuzari and Hashgachah).
I don't recall seeing the concept of mikreh in the Derashos HaRan either
but I could be mistaken.

Of course, many rishonim believed, to a degree, in astrology, which
would also alter the discussion.

Gil Student

From: gil.student@citicorp.com [mailto:gil.student@citicorp.com]
> I haven't seen R. Aryeh Carmell's footnote, but another talmid of Rav
> Dessler (and co-author of the MME), R. Chaim Friedlander, discusses
> the Rambam's opinion in his Sifsei Chaim - Emunah uVitachon. He quotes
> the various relevant passages and says that, according to the Rambam,
> mikreh is just another term for hidden hashgachah peratis. I've been
> told that Rav Wolbe says the same in his Alei Shor and quotes the Alter
> of Kelm in his Chochma uMussar as saying it as well. That might be what
> R. Carmell means.

It's not what he means.  The footnote is quite detailed.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

On Mon, Jun 04, 2001 at 03:35:55PM -0400, gil.student@citicorp.com wrote:
:                                     R. Chaim Friedlander, discusses
: the Rambam's opinion in his Sifsei Chaim - Emunah uVitachon. He quotes
: the various relevant passages and says that, according to the Rambam,
: mikreh is just another term for hidden hashgachah peratis....

In the Moreh, III:17, the Rambam clearly states that people who do not
earn hashgachah peratis are abandoned to teva. Actually, that to the
extent that someone doesn't earn the title "person" through his yedi'as
HKBH, he is abandoned to teva and is only subject to hashgachah minis,
like animals.

I therefore find RCF's position hard to understand. Of course, I haven't
seen it inside yet.

One co worker that I learned some of the Moreh with suggested that this
statement can only be true as a first order approximation. After all,
such abandonment would itself be an onesh, and therefore a manifestation
of hashgachah. IOW, Hashem choosing not to bend teva is itself a reaction
from Him.


I'm not sure how the conversation made the jump, though, from saying that
not everything a person experiences is sechar va'onesh to saying that not
everything is hashgachah peratis. You can assert one and not the other.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

From: Micha Berger [mailto:micha@aishdas.org]
> I'm not sure how the conversation made the jump, though, from saying that
> not everything a person experiences is sechar va'onesh to saying that not
> everything is hashgachah peratis. You can assert one and not the other.

I was making the converse (?) argument: Because not everything is hashgacha
pratis (i.e., most is hashgacha klalis), that must mean that not everything
is schar v'onesh.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

Moshe Feldman wrote:
> I was making the converse (?) argument: Because not everything is hashgacha
> pratis (i.e., most is hashgacha klalis), that must mean that not everything is
> schar v'onesh.
     
Why isn't hashgachah kelalis also sechar ve'onesh?

Gil Student

>From: "Stein, Aryeh E." <aes@ll-f.com>
>To: "'areivim@aishdas.org'" <areivim@aishdas.org>
>CC: "'stugolden@hotmail.com'" <stugolden@hotmail.com>
>Subject: RE: Halicha B'Keri
>Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2001 15:29:12 -0400
>
>On 4 Jun 2001, at 9:46, Stein, Aryeh E. wrote:
> > >>The message to do tshuva is a general message. What is missing
> >is a connection between any individual aveira and any individual
> >onesh. That's what we don't have in this world. >>
>
> >>>FWIW, we have been threatened with the exact opposite, which implies 
>thatwe hould be able to figure out the connection in many instances. Where 
>the Posuk says: "... VaHaLachtem Imi B'Keri. V'Halachti Imachem B'Chamat 
>Keri .."  (B'CHukotai 26:27) the meaning I have always heard is that when 
>we are extremely bad, Hashem's punishments will be so unrelated to our 
>Aveiros that we won't see the connection, depriving us of the opportunity 
>to learn and
>better ourselves. Does this not mean that when our behavior does not quite 
>reach such an egregious state, the punishments will relate to our aveiros, 
>enabling us to correct it ?
>-----------------------------------------
>(Actually, R' Carl wrote those words, but.....)
>
>Perhaps that is only when we had a navi to tell us exactly what we need to
>be mesaken.  B'avonosainu harabim, we don't have neviim anymore....
>
>KT
>Aryeh
>aryehstein@yahoo.com


I should add to my previous note regarding the relevance of an Onesh to the 
Aveirah, except where we are in a Tochacha-like situation  (Chas V'Chalilah) 
and Hashem behaves towards us "B'Keri" so we have no idea what the Onesh is 
for. The Rambam (Taanis 1:1-3) obligates us to recognize a Tzibur's Tzarah, 
to awaken the nation via blowing Shofar and crying, and he calls this 
"MiDarchei HaTeshuvah". But if we do not cry out or sound the Shofar, but 
complacently accept such tragedies as natural phenomenon (plural ?) this is 
"Derech Achzoriut" - cruelty, since we thereby prevent the evil-doers from 
changing their ways. See also (Halacha 17) where the Rambam describes how 
Beit Din would sit every morning after Shacharit until noon, "U'Bodkim Al 
Maasei Anshei HaIr" in order to discern the cause of the Tzarah and to 
remove "MichSholot Shel Aveirot" by admonishing and giving Musar to those
who deserved it for their particular sins, while also being "Mashpil" those 
who need some cutting down to size.

    IMHO, even without Neviim to guide us, not only are we thusly obligated 
to cry out at every Tzarah, but if we do not have a Beit Din to follow 
through, we must do what we can to call attention to the obvious Aveirot 
that undoubtedly contribute to the mounting Tzarot, even if there is no 
exact match.

Stuart Goldstein

_________________________________________________________________
Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com

I wrote:
> Why isn't hashgachah kelalis also sechar ve'onesh?
     
Moshe Feldman wrote:
> Hashgacha klalis means that one is subject to nature.  People die in
> earthquakes, building collapses, etc. all over the world.  When people are
> subject to hashgacha klalis, Hashem (directly) does not cause them, or not
> cause them, their misfortune.

It was just a misunderstanding of terminology.  I assumed that hashgachah 
kelalis means that HKBH guides the kelal, i.e. the entire nation (the Rambam 
says that in Moreh Nevuchim, no?).

Gil Student

From: gil.student@citicorp.com [mailto:gil.student@citicorp.com]
Moshe Feldman wrote:
>> I was making the converse (?) argument: Because not everything is hashgacha
>> pratis (i.e., most is hashgacha klalis), that must mean that not everything
>> is schar v'onesh.

> Why isn't hashgachah kelalis also sechar ve'onesh?

Hashgacha klalis means that one is subject to nature. People die in
earthquakes, building collapses, etc. all over the world. When people
are subject to hashgacha klalis, Hashem (directly) does not cause them,
or not cause them, their misfortune.

What you may be alluding to is that if people merit it, they will receive
hashgacha pratis and thereby escape the misfortunes of hashgacha klalis.
Thus, if a person receives hashgacha klalis, this shows that is not
on the madreigah to receive hashgacha pratis. But still, what that
person experiences (e.g., a building collapse) is not an onesh--all he
experienced was olam k'minhago noheg. There is, of course, the indirect
message that he is not on the level to have been miraculously saved
based on hashgacha pratis. But that is not classic schar v'onesh.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

On Mon, Jun 04, 2001 at 04:23:58PM -0400, Stuart Goldstein wrote:
: I should add to my previous note regarding the relevance of an Onesh to the 
: Aveirah, except where we are in a Tochacha-like situation  (Chas V'Chalilah) 
: and Hashem behaves towards us "B'Keri" so we have no idea what the Onesh is 
: for...

How is that so? HKBH in the tochachah tells us what being subject to
"bikeri" is for -- it's a clear midah kineged midah.

I would argue that unless we had the potential to see what it is we should
be doing teshuvah for, I have absolutely no idea what the point of onesh
would be. What theory of penology are we ascribing to the Dayan haEmes?

It has no deterrent value, as that would require knowing what it is we
should avoid. Whether we're talking about warning others away from his
mistake or warning himself.

I guess someone more mystically inclined than I would argue that there is
a tikkun even if the person is totally unaware of what is being corrected.
Li nir'eh, though, that if the person isn't dissuaded from whatever caused
the cheit, and is therefore just as likely to repeat it, one is hardpressed
to show in what way he was repaired.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On Mon, Jun 04, 2001 at 03:16:30PM -0400, Feldman, Mark wrote:
: Question: which *Rishonim* clearly disagree with Ramban/Rambam?

In private email someone pointed me to Chullin 7b, "ein adam koeif
etzba'o...

So as I see it, the question is how can so many rishonim argue with
what is befeirush in the gemara?

Perhaps it has something to do with the difference between the two
versions of "hakol biydei Shamayim". "... Chutz myir'as Shamayim seems
to support the "universal hashgachah" idea. OTOH, "... chutz mitzinim
upachim" seems to say that the person is getting the natural results of
his actions.

-mi

In V7#53, MBerger replied:
>> Anyone want to comment on the chiluk...?
> Let's start with the grammatical issue....
> Why wouldn't he be saying "amein" to his own kaddish himself?...
> I don't have an answer.

Well, that _is_ a comment of sorts :-). You may be interested in Baer's
take on "oseh shalom... v'im-ru omain" -- essentially, AIU him, the sayer
of a private Amidah should leave out the word "v'im-ru." Sounds to me
like "v'im-ru omain" might only be part of phrases said in the presence
of a minyan, while no such criterion applies to "v'nomar omain"; if so,
the same reasoning should also apply to BhM, and I'm led to radically
wondering why we're all saying "oseh shalom" at all, especially when we
can end w/ words of Shalom as we do (using "HaShaim oz... basholom"),
unless
(a) that phrase was originally said by the BhM leader when there was a
minyan; and
(b) given the custom to, unlike Baer's proposal, say "v'im-ru" even in
one's private Amidah, there was no obstacle to not only saying "oseh
shalom" in BhM as per the Amidah but also to say "v'im-ru."

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

The Mechaber Yoreh Deah 263:5 indicates that mila is performed at the
kever on an infant who is under 8 days old. However, if mila wasn't done,
see the Pitchei Tshuva there (YD 263 s"k 11) quoting the Noda BeYehuda
Tinyana Chelek 14 Siman 164) that the kever isn't reopened. Ergo, the
infant was buried. Even in the case of a mumar, the Shach YD 345 s"k 1
and the Pitchei Tshuva YD 345 s"k 3 quoting the Chatam Sofer 341 indicate
that he is buried. So surely there should be no problem with an under-8
day infant who didn't have mila.

Josh

RHM>Remeber the fellow who did Kedushei Ketana on his daughter without
> revealing who the Chasan was so as to gain leverage on his wife in a
> divorce procceding? He was roundly condemned for doing so but I don't
> remember anyone disputing his right to do it.)

I remember Rav Moshe Shternbuch among others disputing the father's
credibility that he actually did such a thing.

Shlomo Goldstein

SLB>As to the underage child, I'm going by memory, and I could be mistaken.
> First, no relations can take place while she is a minor.

Not true.

> IIRC, I heard in Ketuvot (I don't remember the exact source) there
> is a statement (as Carl mentioned) that when she becomes of age (Mar'a
> Simanim) she is asked if she wants to be with him.

Not if her father married her off (kiddushei ktana).

Shlomo Goldstein

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
"Why is a father's power to marry off a ketanah without her permission
different than his authority to make other life-changing decisions?

"For example, we require parents to assume responsibility over medical
treatments. Even if one choice would be disfiguring, we don't question
the morality of his chiyuv to choose what he believes to be the refu'ah
most likely to be effective.

"Parents make permanent decisions for their kids. Thiis is merely one
of them."

I'm not convinced by your example. Are you saying Kedushei Ketana is
like a Pikuach Nefesh situation? Somehow, I don't think that this is
what the Torah had in mind.

What the Torah DID have in mind... I don't know.

HM

On Mon, Jun 04, 2001 at 02:09:00PM -0700, Harry Maryles wrote:
: "Parents make permanent decisions for their kids. Thiis is merely one
: of them."

: I'm not convinced by your example. Are you saying Kedushei Ketana is
: like a Pikuach Nefesh situation? Somehow, I don't think that this is
: what the Torah had in mind.

No, my point was the summating paragraph at the end (the one part of my
earlier post included here). Parents have the right and responsibility to
make decisions about what is best for their children. We don't limit that
responsibility to decisions that only impact childhood. Parents who abuse
that power in some measurable way are punished by the courts. Those that
do it in some non-prosecutable way have to answer to the Dayan haEmes.

Other than their being well outside our social conventions, how are your
examples any different?


I also do not understand the couple of posts that try to explain the
ethics of these dinim by focussing on the time and place the Torah was
given. The Torah is just as true now, it wasn't given for the bayis
rishon community alone.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

From: Isaac A Zlochower <zlochoia@bellatlantic.net>
"A number of listmembers have expressed concern about the justification
of certain practices going back to biblical times that would appear to
involve forcing a minor girl into marriage. "How would such practices
differ from rape?", is the tenor of the questions. I believe that, at
least, a partial answer lies in understanding the sociological conditions
of biblical, talmudic, medieval, and modern times - as well as a better
understanding of the actual halachot."

Impresive though your knowledge is, after reading your rather lengthy
post on the subject, it doesn't really address my essential concern about
the intrinsic justice of Kedushei Ketana. It seems to lack a fundemental
sense of justice and right for anyone to have such totality of control
over another human being, even if it IS a father over a daughter.

As you point out in the above quoted paragraph, your post is more of a
demostration of how the Torah addressed sociological considerations of the
times that are not extant today. However, there is one interesting point
to be gleaned here and that is that even a Torah Mandated Halacha may be
rabbinically legislated away if societal evolution demands it. This is
in essence the point of The Rama Paskining that Yivum is not done today,
only Chalitza. There are other instances of this type of legislation
throughout the ages such as the Cherem D'Rabenu Gershom on polygamy
(multiple wives) which, again, was brough on by societal evolution.

The question arises when and under what circumstances are we allowed to
tamper with D'Oraisos. As I've learnt through (or should I say "listened
to RYBG go through") Shas in Daf Yomi, it seems to be that Chazal did it
all the time. Does it apply only to to assuring the permitted, or does
it sometimes include even Matiring the forbidden. If the latter exists,
what would be an example of that and how would it work?

HM

"civility and common sense dictate that there should be an opportunity
for the minor to get out of it if she so chooses yet the Torah does not
allow for it."

Could be then (we have to say) that "civility and common sense" are wrong?
This is not to say that we cannot / have not descended to such depths
that Chazal will not enact takanos to save us from ourselves.

RAS>I believe R' Frand held that, nowadays, it was undoubtedly shoveh l'chol
> nefesh to shower daily.

Is shove l'chol nefesh pertinent when there is no mlacha and only a
drabannan?

Shlomo Goldstein

SLB>Rambam Hilchot Bi'ah 

That is Hilchot Issurei Biah.

Shlomo Goldstein

> I am unclear as to the stretch! I believe the extrapolation is simple and
> readily followed.

> BTW, see the CI Igros 2:41 who compares "Rabboseinu asher me'pihem anu
> chaim" to "Sanhedrin b'Lishkas ha'Gazis."

The above is an example of very problematic stretching. If the Mishna
Berura and others cited in that letter had in fact the status of Sanhedrin
- it follows that those who disagreed l'maaseh with their psakim - such as
the Chazon Ish himself and many others - would have the status of zakein
mamre?! Without specifying precisely what you mean by the comparison it
is equivalent to upgrading the nature of authority - such as calling
a minhag or a derabbon - a doreissa din. The Chasam Sofer himself did
such upgrading in order to get people to observe mitzvos they were
ignoring under their actual label. The Rambam prohibits such behavior
while the Ra'avad would apparently permit it. This is not pure psak.
If you want to argue that the Chazon Ish's psak is widely perceived as
needed for the well being of the community even if the basis is not known
or not accepted - I have no problem with that. However such extralegal
approaches (Choshen Mishpat 2) do not justify making a general principle
which would apply even in cases where no perceived need existed.

I would appreciate your explanation of how the Chasam Sofer's ruling that
you cited is relevant to the case under discussion where someone claims
that the circumstances have changed and thus the ruling of the Chazon Ish
is not applicable. Or where a competent rav has decided - after his own
evaluation of the facts that he has a different psak than the Chazon Ish.

                                                Daniel Eidensohn

I have never heard of this minhag, of niddos not to go to levayos,
ad have no clue as to its validity, but I imagine it is based on the
Sforno's understanding of the nature of tum'ah: See towards the end
of "Kavonos ha'Torah", the Sforno's Foreword to his Peirush, in most
Mikro'os Gedolos Bereishis (but not in the Artscroll Sforno. They -
or the author - cut it out!).

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

[Bounced from Areivim. -mi]

From: Shalom Carmy [mailto:carmy@ymail.yu.edu]
>>> He told us in the Torah that we--presumably non-believers too--would suffer
>>> if we violated his Torah.  He did not say that the suffering would be a
>>> message to us to repent.  

> Rambam, Hil Taanit 1:1-- Misfortune obligates one to repent.

Let me review the context of my above-quoted remarks:

<<
>> [Moshe:] Question: when Hashem gives tochacha, isn't it more likely
>> to be aimed at those who are listening for it, i.e., the Orthodox.
>> If calamity befalls a secular person, how likely is he to realize
>> that this was divine tochacha?

> [Gil Student:] Doesn't Hashem love the secular people as well and want them 
> to do teshuvah? 
> Punishment, among other things, is a way to wake people up from their 
> sins.  Who says this will not affect a secular person?  

[Moshe:] On a practical level, it doesn't seem likely that a secular person
will view a calamity as being punishment for his sins.  Have people heard of
secular people who were chozer b'tshuvah because of suffering they endured? 

[Gil Student:]
> What should Hashem do, ignore the non-believers?  He told us in the Torah 
> what He would do, and He is now fulfilling His word.

[Moshe:] He told us in the Torah that we--presumably non-believers
too--would suffer if we violated his Torah.  He did not say that the
suffering would be a message to us to repent.  [(In a different email, I
added that Hashem does punish klal yisrael as a whole to cause it to
repent--that is the point of the tochacha.  Here we are talking about the
aveirah of mixed dancing practiced by *individuals* at a wedding.)]  The
discussion at hand is dealing with when Hashem punishes us in order to teach
us a lesson.  I am arguing that perhaps he does not punish non-believers
with that intent when it's clear that they will not reform their actions as
a result of the punishment.
>>

So my argument was that *of course* Hashem sends punishment to *believing*
Jews to cause them to repent.  And that is what the Rambam was talking about
when he said that misfortune obligates one to repent.  But if, from a
practical perspective, *non-believing* Jews are extremely unlikely to view
calamity as a message to repent (instead, they view such calamity in
naturalistic terms), does it make sense that Hashem would punish them to
send them a message which they are unlikely to hear?

The fact that the Rambam says that one who experiences misfortune should
repent could mean--in light of Rabbi Carmy's article "Tell Them I've Had a
Good Enough Life" pp 119-122 --that one who turns to  Hashem in times of
suffering merits receiving hashgacha pratis.  However, a non-believer, who
by definition does not turn to Hashem, experiences suffering as part of
hashgacha klalis.  In the latter case (which is the case of the nonreligious
mixed dancers), the suffering is not a message to repent.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

On Sun, 3 Jun 2001, Feldman, Mark wrote:
> The fact that the Rambam says that one who experiences misfortune should
> repent could mean--in light of Rabbi Carmy's article "Tell Them I've Had a
> Good Enough Life" pp 119-122 --that one who turns to  Hashem in times of
> suffering merits receiving hashgacha pratis.  However, a non-believer, who
> by definition does not turn to Hashem, experiences suffering as part of
> hashgacha klalis.  In the latter case (which is the case of the nonreligious
> mixed dancers), the suffering is not a message to repent.

According to the Halakha the message is always there. But it isn't always
attended to. The interpretation of my book is correct. I would add that
Hazal's dictum that "today" there is nobody capable of giving tokhaha. I
believe (though I'm not sure that I can prove this as pshat) that one
reason we cannot give tokhaha is that potential reprovers are unable to
identify sufficiently with others to get them to take the message
personally.

There certainly are cases where non-observant individuals are impelled to
teshuva by misfortune. I doubt very much that they are impelled to do so
by getting musar from people they don't identify with.

********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]