Avodah Mailing List

Volume 07 : Number 067

Monday, June 25 2001

• RE: URL - Aliyah/Krias HaTorah For Orthodox Women
• Re: Torah brachot
• Re: Schar VeOnesh
• RE: tztizit on shabbat
• tztizit on shabbat; was Re: Tzitzis on Shabbos - d'Rabanan?
• Re: Tzadik Gozer
• Re: definition of 'tinokos shel beis Rabban'
• Re: kana'us
• definition of 'tinokos shel beis Rabban'
• Re: Machzorim change for Yomim Noro'im
• Tzadik Gozer
• Machzorim change for Yomim Noro'im
• Interesting Observation
• coin flip = nichush?
• elu ve-elu
• Re: coin flip = nichush?
• bearing bad news
• Re: coin flip = nichush?
• Re: coin flip = nichush?
• schar ve-onesh
• Re: schar ve-onesh
• Re: Terms for Bnei Yisroel

>>>Is it possible that RSZA's words--that she was laining "k'raoui ach
b'li nigun shel hata'amim"--refer to laining with tropp but in a tuneless
a manner as possible? (I.e., RSZA didn't say "b'li ta'amim").>>>

Except that he does say that "kriah b'ta'amim haraihi zemer." Also, is
it possible to lain with tropp without it being considered "singing"?
I don't really know.

(Also, I don't know if we should be so medayek from the lashon of the
Halichos Shlomo, since it is possible the lashon used was not RSZA's
*exact* words (Halichos Shlomo was written by his grandchildren.) FWIW,
the footnotes cite Nishmas Avraham chelek 5, page 77.)

KT and Gut Shabbos
Aryeh
aryehstein@yahoo.com

In a message dated 6/19/01 8:30:25 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
jjbaker@panix.com writes:
> Rambam (Hil Tefillah 6?), 

7:10, and see Lechem Mishan there (S"A Horav O"C 47:5)

Gut Shabbos, v'Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

--- R' Harry wrote:
>Also, I don't see how you can divorce the nature of
>what you call consequence and the punishment that IS
>the consequence. They are one and the same.

--- R' Micha wrote:
>When psychologists discuss negative or positive reinforcement they >break 
>it into two categories: natural consequences and imposed >consequences. Say 
>a child touches a stove. A natural consequence >would be that the child got 
>burned. Alternatively, a parent could >decide to impose a consequence, slap 
>the child's hand, rather than >run that risk. In either case there is 
>negative reinforcement.

I believe we have reduced the issue to basic semantics. I have long assumed, 
based on various Musar works etc... that the concept of "S'char" is defined 
by its inclusion in the maxim "S'char Mitzvah B'Hei Alma Leka", i.e., one 
cannot define S'char in terms of Olam HaZeh because of the apples-oranges 
problem. A new Cadillac, or even Nachat from the children could hardly be 
the "reward" intended by HKBH for the proper performance of mitzvot. 
S'char/Reward must be spiritual. To be sure, HKBH facilitates or makes it 
easier for some to do mitzvot, and that could very well be the result of 
their past mitzvah performance. However, this is not S'char and therefore, 
all discussion which attempts to correlate S'char or Onesh with such mundane 
terms as "gain" or "consequence" or even physical "reward" must fail.

--- R' Harry wrote:
>If you reduce the issue of Schar VeOnesh post mortem,
>then my question remains. Essentially I am saying that
>in a just world both in the here and now... and the
>hereafter, one must have Schar VeOnesh. This is
>definitive to ultimate justice or Divine justice. The
>existence of Schar VeOnesh is therefore is a "given"
>that is irrefutable.

No argument here. But that is not the issue. We were discussing whether 
there was any value to doing mitzvot without the underlying concept of 
S'char V'Onesh. In fact, it is very difficult to interpret every mention of 
S'char in the Torah as referring to Olam HaBa, but if that is the Gemara's 
premise .....

--- R' Harry continues:
>Knowledge of this fact makes it inseperable from doing any Mitzvah >without 
>knmowledge of ultimate reward of some kind. So to define "Lo >Al Menas 
>L'Kabel Pras" one must concede that there IS a
>Pras of some kind and that our job is to try and
>ignore it and do the Mitzvah L'Shma. But if there were
>no Schar VeOnesh at all, there would be no need to do
>the Mitzva. As Micha pointed out:

>"If the person actually had nothing to gain, then HKBH
>wouldn't have commanded it. Not that sechar is for a mitzvah, but
>that a mitzvah is instructions about how one is capable of getting
>sechar."
>G-d would not have given us the Mitzva to do if there
>was absolutely no gain at some level. G-d would not
>say "Do it but nothing will be gained" because we
>would not do it.

Again, gain is not S'char. It is only a positive consequence resulting from 
a positive act. Loss is not necessarily Onesh. Avoiding Timtum HaLev by 
eating only kosher is likewise not S'char, any more than is avoiding a burn 
by not touching the hot oven. Marijuana can also produce injury to the 
spirit. It is simply good sense to avoid it.

When I said:
 > Your mother's promise of
 > ice cream if you eat your
 > vegetables does not mean that the only good thing
 > about eating vegetables is
 > the ice cream that follows.

-------- R' Harry replied:
>Again, to say (as you imply) that there is some change
>in our soul's well being that we are not aware of
>because of our diminished, less than infinite
>perspective,  (as in your example of eating vegetables
>being inherently good for you but we don't know that,
>as  children), concedes that there is Schar. This is
>what the inherent goodness of eating vegetables is.

and when I said:
 > Granted, "Ratzah HKBH
 > L'Zakot Et Yisrael" and
 > therefore we have 613 mitzvot instead of 25, so as
 > to accumulate Schar. But
 > I think we subscribe to the belief that mitzvot are
 > good for you.

----- R' Harry replied:
>Good for you? Isn't that Schar?

NO ! Good for you is NOT S'char. It may be healthy, it may be fun, it may be 
wise and it is to be recommended and probably "rewarding" but it is not 
S'char.  At the end of Parshat Nitzavim, the Pasuk says: "HaChaim V'Hamavet 
Natati Lefanecha HaBeracha V'Haklalah UVaCharta BaChaim". Thank you very 
much, HKBH, for the advice. Who wouldn't choose life ?! Isn't that what all 
the mitzvot are supposed to provide for us, and what the aveirot threaten  ? 
But that is the point. The Torah is telling us, look at everything 
objectively for a moment. Life is good. Choose it.  Once you have decided 
that you wish to live, the Torah will show you how to achieve it. If you 
spend 6 months climbing Mt. Everest and reach your goal, you have the right 
to feel successful, exhilirated, powerful, confident etc... But reaching the 
peak is not the reward for all your hard work; it is the result. The reward 
might be getting knighted by the Queen, much later. Our S'char will come 
from the King, also "L'Achar Meah V'Esrim".

Stuart Goldstein

R' Akiva Miller wrote:
>>My point is this: If the "bittul aseh" is not d'Oraisa, then how is
it possible for the aseh itself to be d'Oraisa? How can such a thing
be possible!?! If the Torah has not been violated by my failure to put
tzitzis on this beged, then it must be that the Torah did not ask me
to put tzitzis on this beged. And if the Torah did not ask me to put
tzitzis on this beged, then the kiyum cannot be on a Torah level either.>>

The bittul aseh in it of itself is d'oreisa. Shabbos is a unique situation
in that there is another factor involved-namely the issur of tieing a
knot. For some reason this downgrades the issur to at mosta d'rabanan. My
question asking for a sevara to this still stands. However, this outside
factor should not affect the kiyum.

I asked <<< Why does the fact that one can't tie a knot on Shabbos change
the bittul aseh from a d'oreisah to a d'rabanan. I'm being m'vateil an
aseh - who cares why I can't change the situation. Do we ever find a
similar idea elsewhere ? >>>

R' Akiva Miller answered: 
<<<<In our case here, if a person has a tzitzisless beged on Shabbos,
the Torah cannot demand that he tie tzitzis to it, for that would be a
melachah. But, as the Mishna Brura very explicitly pointed out in 13:9,
<<< the Torah never said, "Don't wear a beged without tzitzis." >>>
The Rabbis can give a person a k'nas and say "You should have put
tzitzis on that beged yesterday, therefore we forbid you to wear it
today". But the Torah does not issue such penalties, and allows one to
wear a tzitzisless beged on Shabbos - as do the Rabbis, if it is a Kavod
Habrios situation.>>>>>>

This doesn't answer my question. The issue isn't one of knas or
not. The issue is what is the nature of the bittul aseh-is it d'oreisa or
d'rabbanan? Furthermore, the Torah doesn't allow one to wear a tzitisless
beged on Shabbos. rather what we are saying is if one does wear it he
isn't mevateil an asseh. I don't know if this is the same thing as being
allowed to wear a tzitisless beged on Shabbos.

R' Akiva Miller then wrote:
>>>>>>I think a big part of our confusion lies in the lack of clarity
over the exact nature of this mitzvah. Is the act of tieing tzitzis to
the beged a mere hechsher mitzvah, or is it the mitzvah itself? >>>>>>

Sorry, I'm not confused. :-) 
Also I don't see how chovas gavra or chovas beged answers any questions.


>>>>>R' Markowitz seems to feel that even though the Torah cannot tell
me to tie tzitzis on Shabbos, nevertheless, if I had the foresight to
prepare it before Shabbos, then the Torah is happy and will give me
a Kiyum Aseh D'Oraisa if I wear it on Shabbos. Such a thought is very
appealing, but I don't see it in the words of these poskim.>>>>>>>>

the poskim don't say anything on this issue-neither negative or positive,
The only thing they say is one is not mevatel an asseh on Shabbos. They
don't say anything about a kiyum aseh.

R' Chaim Markowitz wrote: <<< The MG"A holds that since on Shabbos you
can't put tzitzis on (since it is assur to tie a knot) the bittul aseh is
only a d'rabanon.... However, this in no way tells us what kind of kiyum
you get for wearing the tzitzis. Even on Shabbos if I wear tzitzis I am
m'kayeim a d'oreisah. The only issue is if the bittul aseh is d'oreisah
or d'rabanan. >>>

My point is this: If the "bittul aseh" is not d'Oraisa, then how is it
possible for the aseh itself to be d'Oraisa?

How can such a thing be possible!?! If the Torah has not been violated
by my failure to put tzitzis on this beged, then it must be that the
Torah did not ask me to put tzitzis on this beged. And if the Torah did
not ask me to put tzitzis on this beged, then the kiyum cannot be on a
Torah level either.

R' Markowitz also asked <<< Why does the fact that one can't tie a knot
on Shabbos change the bittul aseh from a d'oreisah to a d'rabanan. I'm
being m'vateil an aseh - who cares why I can't change the situation. Do
we ever find a similar idea elsewhere ? >>>

In our case here, if a person has a tzitzisless beged on Shabbos,
the Torah cannot demand that he tie tzitzis to it, for that would be a
melachah. But, as the Mishna Brura very explicitly pointed out in 13:9,
<<< the Torah never said, "Don't wear a beged without tzitzis." >>> The
Rabbis can give a person a k'nas and say "You should have put tzitzis on
that beged yesterday, therefore we forbid you to wear it today". But the
Torah does not issue such penalties, and allows one to wear a tzitzisless
beged on Shabbos - as do the Rabbis, if it is a Kavod Habrios situation.

I think a big part of our confusion lies in the lack of clarity over the
exact nature of this mitzvah. Is the act of tieing tzitzis to the beged
a mere hechsher mitzvah, or is it the mitzvah itself? As the MB states
in 17:5, <<< We pasken that tzitzis is both Chovas Gavra and Not Chovas
Gavra, and both go l'kula: Chovas Gavra is a kula... because as long as
he is not wearing it... it is patur from tzitzis. And it is Not Chovas
Gavra because he doesn't have to buy a tallis to become obligated in
tzitzis... >>>

It is only when one chooses to put the beged on, that the Torah says "Put
tzitzis on that!" But the Torah say that on Shabbos, for it is a melacha.
Nor does the Torah penalize me for not having tied the tzitzis before
Shabbos, because the beged was sitting on the shelf and was not obligated
in tzitzis until I chose to wear it.

R' Markowitz seems to feel that even though the Torah cannot tell me to
tie tzitzis on Shabbos, nevertheless, if I had the foresight to prepare
it before Shabbos, then the Torah is happy and will give me a Kiyum
Aseh D'Oraisa if I wear it on Shabbos. Such a thought is very appealing,
but I don't see it in the words of these poskim.

ON THE OTHER HAND, does anyone have an unambiguous source for whether
or not a woman can wear a tzitzisless beged? If the worst we can about
a man who wears one is that he is mevatel an aseh (rather than violating
a lo saaseh), then why would it be wrong for a woman, who does not have
the aseh to begin with? If this is discussed anywhere, it might shed
light on our Shabbos question.

Chodesh Tov and Good Shabbos,
Akiva Miller

In a message dated 6/21/01 4:58:33 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
stugolden@hotmail.com writes:
> Gil writes:
>> Does anyone know the origin of the phrase and/or concept of "Tzadik gozer 
>> veHKBH mekayem"?
...
> Conceptually, the Gemara in Moed Katan 16b quotes HKBH as saying that He
> is Moshel over man, while a Tzadik is Moshel over Him...
> But the ultimate and original source for this is the Gemara in Taanit
> 23a, where Choni HaMeAgel plays rain man...

See also Shabbos 56b (Kesubos 103b) based on the Possuk Vatigzor Omer Vayakam 
Lach.

Gut Shabbos, v'Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

The gemara in Bava Basra 21a applies the term to children beginning
at the age of 6 or 7. I'm not sure if the fact that children go off to
school earlier nowadays would change that definition.

Gil Student

From: Gershon Dubin <gershon.dubin@juno.com>
> A little in advance of parashas Pinechas, can someone provide mar'eh
> mekomos on the mida of kana'us (as applied or not by man, not as a mida
> of HKB"H)?

On the subject of Kanain Pog'In Bo for a Boel Aramit:
Sanhedrin Perek 9 Misnha 6 and accompanying Gemara 81-82 with Rishonim
Avnei Miluim 16:4

On (possibly misplaced) Kanaut, see Avot D'Rav Natan - Perek 6 and the  
related Gemara in Gittin that deals with the Churban, where the Kanaim  
burned the food warehouses etc..

Stuart Goldstein

From: Phyllostac@aol.com
> What exactly is the definition of 'tinokos shel beis Rabban'? ...`

I am told that the sefer Chovos Hatalmidim (p16) explains a Midrash
Eicha that all children studying b'veis rabbon are considered tinokos.

[Added in a 2nd email -mi]

See also the gemoro Yuma 23a - where a 20-year is called a tinok.

Sefer Megodim Chadoshim (Brochos 4a) writes:
ayin sefer Otzar Hamelech re the geder of Tinok

SBA

From: "Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>
>>> Do other Machzorim besides the Machzor Rabbah change for Yomim Noro'im?

> SBA wrote:
>> All the Ashkenaz machzorim that I have seen.

> Not the Metzudah. Someone should check the Roedelheim. I do not have a
> Roedelheim Machzor.

The Likutei Maharich brings b'shem the Kol Bo, Levush and sefer Haminhogim
that even those who follow nussach Ashkenaz, change for RH to remind us
the zechus of Rivkah.

SBA

From: "Gil Student" <gil_student@hotmail.com>
> Does anyone know the origin of the phrase and/or concept of "Tzadik gozer
> veHKBH mekayem"?
> I think the earliest I've seen it quoted is in Noam Elimelech...

Good question! I have just checked my Bar Ilan and best I got was from
the Shu't Tzitz Eliezer: "K'mo shekosuv tzadik gozer...."

So it's obvious that he like most of us is under the impression that it
is a posuk or maamar chazal...

Someone suggested: see Bovo Metzia 106a and Rashi there.

SBA

From: MPoppers@kayescholer.com
>Change from Shabbos v'Chagim confirmed.  BTW, I also checked an old set of
>Machzorim from my late father (Amsterdam, 1792) -- same difference in them.

Interesting!

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

Please correct me if I am wrong, but I believe the penalty of Kareis does 
not appear at all in Sefer Devorim. Ha'lo dovor hu...

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

Are there any poskim who comment on whether acting based on a coin toss is
considered nichush?  (Maybe someone w/ a Bar Ilan CD could check...)

Kol tuv. -Herschel (ainspan@watson.ibm.com)

[Micha Berger:]
> There (Collected Writings vol 3) RSRH is clear that he isn't saying that
> the halachah is like necessarily the Rambam, but that this hashkafic
> connection could well have been part of the Rambam's (or his makor's)
> motivation for paskening the way they do.

> To add my 2 cents: Given eilu vi'eilu, even the eilu we do not follow
> is an expression of the mitzvah's ta'am.

> That said, I'm sure there are cases where each would say the other's
> implication WRT hashkafah is also not the derech we are following,
> not just the halachah.

I have no problem that differing shitot in halacha may be based on
differences in meaning. In fact the gemara in several places says
that R. Shimon holds of taamaei hamitzvot and therefore comes to some
conclusion while the chachamim dont hold of taamaei hamitzvot and
therefore come to a different conclision for halacha.

However, if I understand Micha correctly he is arguing that (for example)
R. Yochanan would say to resh Lakish that your arguement is false in
terms of halacha though it contains truth in terms of taamei hamitzvot
through elu ve-elu.

However, I understand as R. Yochanan and Resh Lakish telling each other,
I am right and you are wrong.

That leaves the possibility that although R. Yochanan tells R. Lakish he
is 100% wrong and we pasken like R. Yochanan the fact that it is quoted
in the Talmud gives metaphysical legitimacy to Resh Lakish.

Eli Turkel

In a message dated Mon, 25 Jun 2001  9:31:19am EDT, Herschel Ainspan
<ainspan@watson.ibm.com> writes:
> Are there any poskim who comment on whether acting based on a coin toss is
> considered nichush?

If so, what about the sair lazazel?
KT
Joel

Yitzchok Zirkind:
>> By why only by death and not other cases as indicated by the gemora - perhaps
>> it's more a mida tova than an issur?

> I had pointed also to the Gemara in Megila "Ein Meshivin Al Hakalkala"

I again raise my question. The various people have brought the source
for not giving bad news.

However, my question was that in practice in many cases not giving bad
news does harm to the person involved.

e.g. most people want to sit shiva for a close relative and one is not
to doing a favor by delaying the news until the sheloshim is up and
there is no need for a normal shiva.

Eli Turkel

> Are there any poskim who comment on whether acting based on a coin toss is
> considered nichush?  (Maybe someone w/ a Bar Ilan CD could check...)
     
NOT FOR HALACHAH LEMA'ASEH:

The gemara in Chullin 95b says that any nachash that is not like
Eliezer's and Yonason's is forbidden. IIRC, Radak writes in his peirush
to Shmuel 1 (around 14:8) that Yonason's sign was permissible because
it made sense. If the enemy acts friendly then they are not suspecting
an attack and will be easily defeated. That is a good sign that Yonason
will defeat them. Similarly, Eliezer's sign was that the woman (Rivka)
act with good midos. That is a logical sign that she is worthy of
marrying Yitzchak. A meaningless sign, however, would be forbidden.
The Rema (YD 179) paskens like this Radak.

It would seem from this that flipping a coin would be prohibited.
But that would only apply if you were using it as a sign - if you thought
that a "heads" would mean that your endeavor would succeed.

If you were choosing between two options and were flipping a coin, not
because you think whichever the coin "chooses" will succeed, but because
you prefer not to choose, then I don't think nichush is involved at all.
You are not using the coin flip as a way to see which choice is better,
but as a way to choose between two equally good (or bad) choices. KNLA"D

Gil Student

From: Herschel Ainspan <ainspan@watson.ibm.com>
> Are there any poskim who comment on whether acting based on a coin toss is
> considered nichush?  (Maybe someone w/ a Bar Ilan CD could check...)

In what way is a coin toss different than a Goral? Both depend on chance
(or Hashgacha, if you wish) and if a Goral is Mutar, so should a coin
toss be Mutar, barring any Kuvia analogies. The problem of acting on
its basis would seem to focus more on whether one profits from it (see
MB 323:19) or simply uses it as an allocation divider.

IMHO, Nichush might be restricted to acting on events outside oneself
(both Eliezer and Yehonatan based their behavior on what someone else
would do), rather on what one's own (e.g.) coin toss might produce. OTOH,
if I were to base my behavior on the results of YOUR coin toss, some
might consider it Nichush because of the totality of my dependence on
your behavior, like a black cat crossing my path, but not per se because
you tossed a coin.

Stuart Goldstein

> If the person actually had nothing to gain, then HKBH wouldn't have
> commanded it. Not that sechar is for a mitzvah, but that a mitzvah is
> instructions about how one is capable of getting sechar.

> The metaphor of stopping for a red light is apt. The law exists for our
> own benefit -- if it didn't reduce risk of an accident, they wouldn't
> make us stop for street lights.

I always understood the opposite.

The minute you say that a mitzva has an ulterior motive in terms of
improving oneself or in terms of some sechar you are saying that the
mitzva is not important in itself but as a way of achieving a higher end.

This imples that if I could achieve that end in some other way one need
not do the mitzva.

Thus it may be better to do contemplation and work directly on improving
ones middot rather than doing a mitzva whose purpose is to improve
my midot.

This is similar to the machloket about the purpose of the mitzva of
shiluach ha-ken. If the purpose is to be kind to animals or rather to
teach me about the midah of being kind to animals I can perhaps do it
better by studying the laws or other meditation about being kind.

Thus, the only conclusion is that Hashem gave us mitzvot as an end in
themselves and not as a way of getting sechar ve-onesh.

Eli Turkel

On Mon, Jun 25, 2001 at 03:35:22PM +0200, Eli Turkel wrote:
: The minute you say that a mitzva has an ulterior motive in terms of
: improving oneself or in terms of some sechar you are saying that the
: mitzva is not important in itself but as a way of achieving a higher end.

There is a difference between knowing that there is some function
to a mitzvah that has a positive personal impact and saying that one
performs the mitzvah for the sake of that personal gain.

: This imples that if I could achieve that end in some other way one need
: not do the mitzva.

Sure. Now all you need to do is outguess the RSO about what that end is,
and suggest a better way than His in getting it. <grin>

: Thus it may be better to do contemplation and work directly on improving
: ones middot rather than doing a mitzva whose purpose is to improve
: my midot.

I thought the Chinuch's refrain about "adam nif'al lefi pe'losav" was
specifically to deny this premise.

: This is similar to the machloket about the purpose of the mitzva of
: shiluach ha-ken. If the purpose is to be kind to animals or rather to
: teach me about the midah of being kind to animals I can perhaps do it
: better by studying the laws or other meditation about being kind.

Assuming that there is a purpose is different than assuming we know
that purpose. And actually, there isn't going to be a single purpose.
Just like there is no single cause to a historical event; events are
the products of convergence of a number of causes and trends. So, asserting
that shelu'ach hakan develops a sense of kindness to animals doesn't
fully explain the mitzvah.

IOW, I'm focussing on the leading mem in the Chinuch's "mishorshei
hamitzvah". But I am not necessarily going as far as RYBS's position
that it's all homiletics that bears no resemblence to HKBH's real
reason.

: Thus, the only conclusion is that Hashem gave us mitzvot as an end in
: themselves and not as a way of getting sechar ve-onesh.

So what's your position on Euthyphro's dilemma? Could HKBH have equally
dropped the "Lo" from "Lo sirtzach?" Or is there a real reason why one
was commanded and not the other?

You seem to be saying that acknowledging that there is any reason --
knowable or not -- is identical to "al menas lekabeil peras".

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org            And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org       		- based on Mishlei 6:2
(973) 916-0287               

On Tue, Jun 19, 2001 at 10:30:22AM -0500, Shoshanah M. & Yosef G. Bechhofer wrote:
: > Li nir'eh a third position -- that "kahal" and "eidah" are different
: > positive traits. After all, if one were a higher level of the other
: > (same trait, to different extents) then why woul there be an idiom of
: > "kehal adas"? 

: A refinement of an Eidah to the level of a Kohol.

: Compare Bamidbar 10:3 to Bamidbar 10:7.

I agree that an Eidah can be refined to be a Kahal. I am arguing against
the idea that being a kahal implies necessarily also being an eidah. Which
is why there would be a use for saying both.

:> Which fits the two meanings given to "kareis", once you translate RYGB's
:> "kohol" to my "kehal eidah". The person who dies with no physical legacy
:> does not share in the community's destiny. He is therefore cut off from
:> the "am". And one who is cut off from olam habah is no longer amongst
:> "kol Yisrael yeish lahem cheilek". 

: But I do nott think the dichotmy is between kareis qua arriri (a very
: limied application of kareis) vs. kareis as a spiritual punishment.

You understood me correctly -- although I didn't think the Rambam
defined ariri that way. The machlokes about the meaning terms is why I
avoided them.

I don't know why you reject the idea, though. After all, you define "am"
in non-spiritual terms, why would being cut off from it be a spiritual
concept?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org            And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org       		- based on Mishlei 6:2
(973) 916-0287               

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