Avodah Mailing List

Volume 07 : Number 068

Thursday, June 28 2001

• bearing bad news
• sechar ve-onesh
• Re: sechar ve-onesh
• Re: elu ve-elu
• Re: tztizit on shabbat; was Re: Tzitzis on Shabbos - d'Rabanan?
• re: Tzadik gozer
• Re: Tzadik gozer
• rape vs yibum
• Curious Chabad Minhag
• Re:
• Re: Tzitzis on Shabbos - d'Rabanan?
• kedushei ketana
• Re: sechar ve-onesh
• Re: sechar ve-onesh
• Ketanim saying Kaddish
• The Eigel and Mei Meriva

Eli Turkel writes:
> However, my question was that in practice in many cases not giving bad
> news does harm to the person involved.

actually the RAMA writes in Y"D 402:12 that the minhag is to tell the sons
(in order that they can say kaddish) but not the daughters. look there.

with blessings
Yosef Stern

On Mon, Jun 25, 2001 at 03:35:22PM +0200, Eli Turkel wrote:
>: The minute you say that a mitzva has an ulterior motive in terms of
>: improving oneself or in terms of some sechar you are saying that the
>: mitzva is not important in itself but as a way of achieving 
>: a higher end.

[Micha Berger replied:]
> There is a difference between knowing that there is some function
> to a mitzvah that has a positive personal impact and saying that one
> performs the mitzvah for the sake of that personal gain.

Agreed and therefore one does the mitzva not because it teaches some
lesson but because that is what the Torah teaches. Any personal gain is
beyond our capability to judge.

As a simple example is shemitta nowadays. Chazon Ish points out that since
it only rabbinic therefore we are not guaranteed any of G-d's blessings
given in the Torah. So we are left with the obligations without any of
the specific schar of keeping shemitta (of course there is the general
schar of keeping rabbinic laws but that is different)
 
...
>: Thus, the only conclusion is that Hashem gave us mitzvot as an end in
>: themselves and not as a way of getting sechar ve-onesh.

> So what's your position on Euthyphro's dilemma? Could HKBH have equally
> dropped the "Lo" from "Lo sirtzach?" Or is there a real reason why one
> was commanded and not the other?

> You seem to be saying that acknowledging that there is any reason --
> knowable or not -- is identical to "al menas lekabeil peras".

I am saying that G-d has his reasons and they are not arbitrary. However,
we cannot know the reasons, in general, and the reasons are irrelevant
to us in terms of keeping the mitzvot.

As the gemara points out there were cases of children keeping shiluach
ha-ken and also kibud av both of which guarantee a long life and then
falling off the tree and dying.

BTW if Micah or someone else can spell out in more detail the position
of RYUBS on this I would appreciate it.

kol tuv,
Eli Turkel

On Thu, Jun 21, 2001 at 11:23:53AM -0700, Harry Maryles wrote:
: When I speak of Schar VeOnesh I should really limit myself to spiritual
: Schar VeOnesh. Obviosly we know that there is physical Onesh. The Tochacha
: certainly tells us that...

I read the newspaper this morning, I don't find it so obvious. I find it
difficult to assert something that is so at odds with experience.

So what about the tochachah?

Perhaps it only applies communally, as I've suggested in the past. IOW,
we can identify something bad that happens to the kehillah as an onesh,
but that doesn't mean that the people who are the actual victims are the
ones deserving of the onesh. They are victims for other reasons.

Or, it occured to me recently, that this is exactly the hedter panim
associated with galus. The tochachah and berachos only apply bizman
habayis. This would explain the placement of "Hashivah Shofeteinu",
"Velamalshinim" and "Al haTzadikim" in the order of berachos dealing
with ge'ulah -- between "Teka beShofar" and "VeliYrushalayim Ircha".

On Fri, Jun 22, 2001 at 01:25:49PM -0400, Stuart Goldstein wrote:
: I believe we have reduced the issue to basic semantics. I have long assumed, 
: based on various Musar works etc... that the concept of "S'char" is defined 
: by its inclusion in the maxim "S'char Mitzvah B'Hei Alma Leka", i.e., one 
: cannot define S'char in terms of Olam HaZeh because of the apples-oranges 
: problem....

OTOH, I can't assert this extreme either.

There are numerous gemaros that associate gifts be'olam hazeh with mitzvos.
Such as being the first to greet everyone you meet as a means of earning
arichas yamim. Mezuzah and shemirah. Or the resha'im who get sechar in
olam hazeh rather than olam habah. Etc... And of course "Eilu divarim
sheha'adam ocheil peiroseihem *ba'olam hazeh*".

And yet, as I said above, you can't count on it lima'aseh. I don't think
the rate of bunks that burn down is smaller in frum camps than in the
general population -- despite mezuzos. 

Li nir'eh, the "leika" in "sechar mitzvos behai alma leika" means "is
lacking", not "is totally absent". There is some measure of sechar which
does impact this world. It's not the only factor by which HKBH runs
the universe, and it can only be a pale shadow of the "keren kayemes
lo li'olam habah", but it's still some modicum of berachah.

: NO ! Good for you is NOT S'char. It may be healthy, it may be fun, it may be 
: wise and it is to be recommended and probably "rewarding" but it is not 
: S'char.  At the end of Parshat Nitzavim, the Pasuk says: "HaChaim V'Hamavet 
: Natati Lefanecha HaBeracha V'Haklalah UVaCharta BaChaim".

Actually, this is a ra'ayah Rashi uses to show that chayim is bidavka
a consequence of choosing Torah uMitzvos.

I had a little pshetl on parashas Nitzavim that argued a causal connection
between mitzvah and sechar. It's at <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/nitzavim.html>.
Here's what I wrote on that Rashi:
> In Eichah 3:38 Yirmiyahu Hanavi writes, "From the 'Mouth' of the One
> Above, come neither the evil nor the good." Rashi comments on this,
> using two pisukim from this week's parashah.

> Yirmiyahu is not implying that what happens to us is by chance. "Chai
> gever al chata'av -- a man lives on his sins." The evil does not come
> from Hashem, because it is a natural consequence of the sin. Similarly,
> R. Yochanan comments on the more famous pasuk, "Behold I have placed
> before you, the life and that which is good, and death and that which
> is evil. Choose life!" Choosing between good and evil is not choosing
> between whether Hashem will reciprocate with life or death. By choosing
> between good and evil, you bring on yourself one or the other.

:                                  To be sure, HKBH facilitates or makes it 
: easier for some to do mitzvot, and that could very well be the result of 
: their past mitzvah performance. However, this is not S'char and therefore, 
: all discussion which attempts to correlate S'char or Onesh with such mundane 
: terms as "gain" or "consequence" or even physical "reward" must fail.

This entire paragraph boils down to an assumption. You write toward the
end, "However, this is not s'char", but you don't prove it. R' Gil
Student's web page sites a few rishonim who DO define sechar that way.

Another ra'ayah I brought on that web page on Nitzavim (really written
because Nitzavim is in Elul):
> R. Chaim Vilozhiner (Derech Hachaim 1:21) shows the same idea from the
> Gemara in Eiruvin. "The wicked deepen gehennom for themselves." What
> you get in the World to Come is merely the consequence of the mitzvos
> you do.

> R. Chaim takes this one step further. Each sin, he writes, causes
> a flaw in your soul. The punishment that is the consequence of this
> flaw heals it.


On Tue, Jun 26, 2001 at 10:54:19AM +0200, Eli Turkel wrote:
: I am saying that G-d has his reasons and they are not arbitrary.
: However, we cannot know the reasons, in general, and the reasons are
: irrelevant to us in terms of keeping the mitzvot.

Agreed. We were discussing very vague outlines about what those reasons
are. Giving a motivation to the concept of mitzvah altogether, not to
any particular mitzvah or din.

: As the gemara points out there were cases of children keeping
: shiluach ha-ken and also kibud av both of which guarantee a long life
: and then falling off the tree and dying.

Exactly my objection to RHM, above.

: BTW if Micah or someone else can spell out in more detail the position
: of RYUBS on this I would appreciate it.

RYBS considers exploration into ta'amei hamitzvos to be "halachic
hermeneutics". He coined the expression, not I. The impression I got
was of useful limudim one can weave into pshetlach for mussar purposes,
but not HKBH's motivation for the din. RYBS is still a Brisker for whom
din stands on din and nothing else.

Which is why I was using the Chinuch's "mishoreshei hamitzvah" which
does imply teleological content while denying our ability to fully
explain why HKBH does anything.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On Mon, Jun 25, 2001 at 03:23:50PM +0200, Eli Turkel wrote:
: However, if I understand Micha correctly he is arguing that (for example)
: R. Yochanan would say to resh Lakish that your arguement is false in
: terms of halacha though it contains truth in terms of taamei hamitzvot
: through elu ve-elu.

I would argue that R' Yochanan agrees that Reish Lakish's view is
fully true. Paskening halachah doesn't relate to the question of
true/false but legal/illegal. It's about what aspect of the truth is
going to become practice.

Therefore, learning the ta'am of Reish Lakish has value because it's
part of the emes AND because it reflects on the ta'am of the mitzvah
as a whole beyond the machlokes.

: However, I understand as R. Yochanan and Resh Lakish telling each other,
: I am right and you are wrong.

: That leaves the possibility that although R. Yochanan tells R. Lakish he
: is 100% wrong and we pasken like R. Yochanan the fact that it is quoted
: in the Talmud gives metaphysical legitimacy to Resh Lakish.

The view I'm presenting (which dates back to a long thread in volume 1 on
RYGB's JO article on the subject <http://www.aishdas.org/rygb/eilu.htm>,
you might want to search the archives) is that Reish Lakish is
metaphysically legitimate because it is emes. No one is wrong.

The R' Tzadok RYGB quotes there asserts that the seichel can -- and
is bound to -- entertain conflicting truths, while bipo'el we can only
follow one. Fans of RYBS's exploration of unresolvable dialectics might
enjoy playing with this idea.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On Fri, Jun 22, 2001 at 01:24:29PM -0400, Miller, Ken wrote:
: How can such a thing be possible!?! If the Torah has not been violated
: by my failure to put tzitzis on this beged, then it must be that the
: Torah did not ask me to put tzitzis on this beged. And if the Torah did
: not ask me to put tzitzis on this beged, then the kiyum cannot be on a
: Torah level either.

I was thinking that perhaps the ikkar hadin of tzitzis isn't a mitzvah
chiyuvis or even a machshir (like shechitah or gittin) but a pure
mitzvah kiyumis. If so, then the issur of wearing a begged with neither
techeiles nor laval is that of "oker mitzvah biyadayim" -- passing up
an opportunity to do a mitzvah for no reason. This is a 2nd din, not
specific to tzitzis. (Even though I personally never came across it in
another context. If anyone can find me other usages, it would help me
understand the concept. TIA.)

The only other mitzvah kiyumis that I can think of that is both bein adam
laMakom (to exclude tzedakah and the like) and are kiyumis on everyone
(as opposed to a mitzvas asei shehazman gerama that is performed by a
woman) that I can think of is teshuvah.

I noted here a couple of years ago that tzitzis and teshuvah have another
feature in common, at least if you count techeiles and lavan as a single
mitzvah amongst the 613. They're the only two mitzvos that allow for
a partial kiyum. (There I suggested that the reason is that teshuvah
is the ta'am of tzitzis -- "velo sasuru" in the future about things
"asher atem zonim achareihem" in the present.)

The problem with all of the above is that Sepharadim make a mitzvah on
tzitzis. Whereas in the other cases of mitzvos kiyumos, Sephardiot do not
make a berachah on the 4 minim. Because they do not consider something
that isn't obligatory a "mitzvah" -- you don't *command* somebody to do
something if they'd like to. If I were right, the same reasoning and
pesak would apply to tzitzis.

However, as RAM writes:
:           But, as the Mishna Brura very explicitly pointed out in 13:9,
: <<< the Torah never said, "Don't wear a beged without tzitzis." >>>

The MB validates the notion of tzitzis being a mitzvah kiyumis as opposed
to a machshir. So I'm comfortable asserting what I did despite the
unanswered question.

Given that, I assume that the chivuv the M"B refers to in...:
:                                                       As the MB states
: in 17:5, <<< We pasken that tzitzis is both Chovas Gavra and Not Chovas
: Gavra, and both go l'kula: Chovas Gavra is a kula... because as long as
: he is not wearing it... it is patur from tzitzis. And it is Not Chovas
: Gavra because he doesn't have to buy a tallis to become obligated in
: tzitzis... >>>

... can't be the chiyuv of tzitzis, but the chiyuv not to pass up an
opportunity to do a mitzvah. It's a chovas gavrah, since it's an
opportunity isn't a cheftzah. Which explains why we're lekullah both
ways: in both cases he doesn't have an opportunity upon which the
issur would apply. Similarly on Shabbos, he has no opportunity to tie
strings on, so he isn't passing one up.

: R' Markowitz seems to feel that even though the Torah cannot tell me to
: tie tzitzis on Shabbos, nevertheless, if I had the foresight to prepare
: it before Shabbos, then the Torah is happy and will give me a Kiyum
: Aseh D'Oraisa if I wear it on Shabbos. Such a thought is very appealing,
: but I don't see it in the words of these poskim.

Li nir'eh, the kiyum mitzvah is a non-issue. It's the fact that only
opportunity creates a chiyuv to perform that kiyum that makes Shabbos
relevent.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

RGS asks:
> Does anyone know the origin of the phrase and/or concept of "Tzadik
> gozer veHKBH mekayem"?

and RSG responds:
> Conceptually, the Gemara in Moed Katan 16b quotes HKBH as saying that He
> is Moshel over man, while a Tzadik is Moshel over Him...
> But the ultimate and original source for this is the Gemara in Taanit
> 23a, where Choni HaMeAgel plays rain man...

to which RYZ adds:
> See also Shabbos 56b (Kesubos 103b) based on the Possuk Vatigzor Omer
> Vayakam Lach.

First, I think RYZ meant Shab. 59b. 

Second, RSG's (and others) suggestion certainly covers the *concept* about
which RGS asks, but hardly the terminology. I think the terminology comes
ultimately from BaMidbar Rabbah 14:4 (near the end). See also *Batei
Midrash* II, Midrash Iyov; Sefer Hasidim 224; Rashi to Ber. 31:32;
Yaarot Devash (by R. Y. Eybeshuetz [d. 1764]), II:7.

Further, Shemuel Ashkenazi (of *Otzar Rashei Teivot* fame) wrote a five
page article on just that phrase in *Moreshet* 9 (1973). Unfortunately,
I do not have access to this journal so cannot summarize his findings.

Yisrael Dubitsky

In a message dated 6/26/01 5:15:53pm EDT, yidubitsky@JTSA.EDU writes:
> to which RYZ adds:
>> See also Shabbos 56b (Kesubos 103b) based on the Possuk Vatigzor Omer
>> Vayakam Lach.

> First, I think RYZ meant Shab. 59b.

Yes! thanks for correcting it.

> See also... Rashi to Ber. 31:32;

Slightly different issue Geder of "Kililas Chacham" See Maakos 11a, Brochos 
56a. 

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

>S. Goldstein writes:Yibum can be performed without the wife's consent,
>I think, according to all tanaim. Abba Shaul is discussing >motivation...

>The question is can a woman be forced into marriage(yibum). I think
>you are agreeing that the answer is yes. An ugly/obnoxious man could
>want the mitzvah to help his brother without a motivation of lust,
>much to the concern of his yavamah. Therefore, really, Abba Shaul is
>irrelevant to the discussion of a forced marriage.

see Shulchan oruch even hoezer 165:1.  at worst she would be considered
a moredes no one says he could force her at all

yosef stern

Joelirich@aol.com writes concerning saying bnei bris in bentching:
> Why wasn't it brought down in M"B?

actually the M"B states and the end of chapter 189 to see the Elya Rabba in
chapter 187 for diyyukim in birchas hamozon. and there the ER brings it!

yosef stern

[A question asked off-line to RYGB. -mi]

...
>I am doing a research paper for my masters course on the theological 
>opposition to Jewish intermarriage. I only have the basic sources, i.e. 
>Rambam, Shulachan Aruch, Avodah zara 36, and a couple others.

>Would you be able to help me by using this CD stuff to get other sources 
>(in all of gantz Torah) discussing intermarriage, precautionary measures 
>against it (pas akum etc.) and other issues between Jews and goyim.

>Out here in Edmonton my resourses are severely limited so any help you can 
>give me will be tremendously appreciated.
...

[His reply:]
IU actually do not have the Bar Ilan. I am cc'ing this to Micha Berger,
moderator of the Areivim ad Avodah e-mail lists. If you pose your query
on Avodah, I am sure you will get good answers in short order.

[Private email to me, forwarded with reshus, on the topic of okeir
mitzvos biyadayim (OMbY). As I posted to the chevrah roughly the same
idea as the one RAM is replying to, I think his email is understandable
without reproducing he whole discussion. -mi]

<<< OMbY is a term found in hilchos tzitzis, and I haven't seen it
elsewhere. Simply, it's assur to pass up an easy opportunity for a
mitzvah. >>>

I have heard and seen many times and many places, how Chazal stress the
importance of wearing tzitzis, but I have not seen anyone anywhere
actually say that it is assur to avoid wearing tzitzis. It is certainly
not a great idea, but they seem to stop short of declaring it assur.

I have even seen a couple of poskim who quote the line about "saying Shma
without tzitzis is edus sheker", and they explain it to actually mean
that "saying Shma with a tzitzisless 4-corner beged is edus sheker".

If you can find somewhere that actually says that it is *assur* to avoid
the mitzva of tzitzis, AND it uses the word "assur" in a literal manner
(rather than for rhetorical effect), I'd love to see it.

Actually, I think you are trying to straddle both sides of this
literal/rhetorical fence. On the one hand you taske the literal angle
when you wrote <<< OMbY says that one has a chiyuv not to pass up a
mitzvah kiyumis for no reason -- so it ends up a chiyuv anyway. >>> But
then you follow that with <<< IOW, it's a closer relative to mitzvah
habah liyadecha al tachmitzenah. >>> which I have always understood as
good advice, not a chiyuv d'Oraisa.

Perhaps we should start a new thread on Avodah (or perhaps its been done
already?) on whether all activities can be classified as chiyuv or issur
(which seems to be the view you are following) or whether there is also a
category of reshus, which includes the whole range of very advisable to
really stupid activities.

Thanks
Akiva Miller

Harry Maryles responds to the following:
"Harry seems to still labor under the impression that a father has the
right to marry off his minor daughter without her consent...."

Harry's response:
"I disagree. It isn't just the worldview that is problematic. It is a
common sense view of right and wrong which I am unable to reconcile it to."

Please see the gemarah kedushin 41:a omar R yehudah omar Rav... and Kesubos
57:b omar R abo bar levy

yosef stern

On Fri, Jun 22, 2001 at 01:25:49PM -0400, I wrote:
> I believe we have reduced the issue to basic semantics. I have long assumed, 
> based on various Musar works etc... that the concept of "S'char" is defined 
> by its inclusion in the maxim "S'char Mitzvah B'Hei Alma Leka", i.e., one 
> cannot define S'char in terms of Olam HaZeh because of the apples-oranges 
> problem....

On Tue, 26 Jun 2001 08:51:27 -0400, R' Micha Berger wrote:
: OTOH, I can't assert this extreme either. There are numerous gemaros
: that associate gifts be'olam hazeh with mitzvos....

: Li nir'eh, the "leika" in "sechar mitzvos behai alma leika" means
: "is lacking", not "is totally absent". There is some measure of sechar
: which does impact this world. It's not the only factor by which HKBH runs
: the universe, and it can only be a pale shadow of the "keren kayemes lo
: li'olam habah", but it's still some modicum of berachah.

First of all, IIRC, this whole discussion began as an exercise to
determine if there was any value to doing mitzvot if there was NO
tangible, worldly S'char associated with them. Which means, all references
to reward in the Torah and Chazal are, as R' Yaakov asserted (when
witnessing the young boy fall to his death after fulfilling Kibud Av and
Shiluach HaKen together), designated for Olam HaBa. Eating "Peirotayhem
B'Olam Hazeh" is not S'Char - it is ancillary to S'char. Since, as
I have maintained, S'char cannot be mundane and physical (and I will
cite proofs for this presently), then it is only through such "fruit"
of our mitzvah labor that HKBH shows us that we are doing good. The
MaHaral in Tiferet Yisrael (59-60), even in dealing with the question
of why all S'char is expressed in Olam HaZeh/practical/physical terms,
continues to maintain that "S'char Mitzvah" is not Tivi'i and THEREFORE,
whatever fruits one enjoys is just HKBH being good to us, presumably
when we deserve it. I think he also implies a sort of comparison to the
positive non-S'char results of Kibud Av or V'Ahavta L'Rayacha etc...which
are still positive results from performing a mitzvah, without being
labeled S'char. The MaHaral further deals with the Rasha getting his "due"
in this world, despite S'char being non-Tivi'i, by correlating S'char,
which belongs only to Olam HaEmet, with a person's true being. Thus,
if a person is B'Emet a Rasha, then there will not be any S'char for
him in Olam HaEmet. Any would-be S'char of his must then be "demoted"
to non-Amiti S'char, since it is not consistent with his true self. As
such, it may be doled out to him in this Olam, which is also non-Amiti.


I had further written:
> NO ! Good for you is NOT S'char. It may be healthy, it may be fun,
> it may be wise and it is to be recommended and probably "rewarding"
> but it is not S'char. At the end of Parshat Nitzavim, the Pasuk says:
> "HaChaim V'Hamavet Natati Lefanecha HaBeracha V'Haklalah UVaCharta
> BaChaim". The Torah is telling us, look at everything objectively for
> a moment. Life is good. Choose it. Once you have decided that you wish
> to live, the Torah will show you how to achieve it.

To which R' Micha replied:
: Actually, this is a ra'ayah Rashi uses to show that chayim is bidavka
: a consequence of choosing Torah uMitzvos.

Yes, Rashi does connect Chaim with doing good. But that is in Pasuk 16,
which begins a 4-Pasuk description of how our actions breed appropriate
results. However, afterwards, in Pasuk 19, the Torah goes back one more
time, sort of as a last plea, to suggest that one choose life because
it is the better choice, and Rashi adds: "Ani Morah Lachem, Bacharu
B'Chelek HaChaim", like a father advising his son to make the wiser
choice, and there is no reference to anything else (Ayin Sham).

I futher opined:
> To be sure, HKBH facilitates or makes it easier for some to do mitzvot,
> and that could very well be the result of their past mitzvah performance.
> However, this is not S'char and therefore, all discussion which attempts
> to correlate S'char or Onesh with such mundane terms as "gain" or
> "consequence" or even physical "reward" must fail.

To which R' Micha replied:
: This entire paragraph boils down to an assumption. You write toward
: the end, "However, this is not s'char", but you don't prove it. R'
: Gil Student's web page sites a few rishonim who DO define sechar that way.

I did not see any Rishonim on R' Gil's web page that define S'char as you
imply. The closest might be Rabbeinu Saadya Gaon, who is reported to have
said: "since G-d commanded us to do certain things and not to do others,
it is only proper that He encourage us along the path of obedience
by rewarding those who fulfill these obligations and punishing those
who do not". However, based on the MaHaral's clear distinction between
true S'char Mitzvah and any good thing that happens to us B'Olam HaZeh,
any reference that even R' Saadya makes to reward need not mean true
S'char Mitzvah. The Maharal wrote in Netivot Olam 1, Netiv HaTorah (17)
that when the Mishnah says: "LeFum Tzaara Agra", it does not mean that
the S'char from this mitzvah will be greater B'Olam HaBa because of your
effort. The S'char Mitzvah remains constant, regardless of the effort,
put away for Olam HaBa. There is additional S'char for the effort but
"V'Ain Zeh Nikra S'char Mitzvah" (the MaHaral's words). Also see the
Or HaChaim HaKadosh in Bechukotai on "V'Natati Gishmaychem B'Itam",
that rain is not S'char Mitzvah (which is Ruchani) but rather falls to
faciliate the continuance of Torah U'Mitzvot. This is the Or HaChaim
L'Shitato, who gives a fascinating explanation for Rasha V'Tov Lo, for
Hevay Zahir B'Mitzvah Kalah, and other such Divrei Chazal, at the end
of Acharei Mot, on the Pasuk "Al Titam'u Bchal Aileh". He suggests that
what appears to us as S'char B'Olam HaZeh, is really the result of doing
those specific mitzvot that are a Segulah for wealth, for long life, or
for other positive beneficence from HKBH. This may explain your examples
of Mezuzah providing Shemirah and being Makdim Shalom as causing Arichat
Yamim. But these are not S'char Mitzvah.

Stuart Goldstein

On Wed, Jun 27, 2001 at 04:27:51PM -0400, Stuart Goldstein wrote:
:               IIRC, this whole discussion began as an exercise to
: determine if there was any value to doing mitzvot if there was NO
: tangible, worldly S'char associated with them. ...

I do not recall RHM talking about tangibility or worldliness to the
sechar.

:                                        as R' Yaakov asserted (when
: witnessing the young boy fall to his death after fulfilling Kibud Av and
: Shiluach HaKen together), designated for Olam HaBa....

While it was R' Yaakov's explanation of Shema's "lema'an yarichun
yamecha", as well as the similar comment by shilu'ach hakan, but
he wasn't the one who witnesses the death -- Acheir did. Ironically,
R' Yaakov was Acheir's grandson.

:                                                          Since, as
: I have maintained, S'char cannot be mundane and physical...

What about the Ramban's shitah which says that Olam haBah and the ultimate
sechar refers to the physical life after techiyas hameisim?

But in any case, I agree that the ikkar sechar is in olam habah; it's
a semantic argument as to whether or not to refer to the berachos one
gets in olam hazeh as the tafeil of sechar.

Since reshaim may be given things in olam hazeh to use up his sechar
before olam habah, apparantly this terminology works.

But the substansive argument is whether sechar is imposed by HKBH or is
a *consequence* of the mitzvah (via a system that He created).

:                 The MaHaral further deals with the Rasha getting his "due"
: in this world, despite S'char being non-Tivi'i, by correlating S'char,
: which belongs only to Olam HaEmet, with a person's true being.

He doesn't deny that sechar can come and does come where it doesn't belong.
He just calls it, in your words, "non-amiti".

Furthermore, he posits a *causal connection* between mitzvah, and the
person's being and between that state and sechar.

: To which R' Micha replied:
:: Actually, this is a ra'ayah Rashi uses to show that chayim is bidavka
:: a consequence of choosing Torah uMitzvos.

: Yes, Rashi does connect Chaim with doing good...

You missed my point. He shows that chayim (in Olam haBah, as per that
Maharal, as well as the first intro to Gevuros Hashem) is a *consequence*,
of the choice -- a causal connection. And you're looking in the wrong
pasuk. See the Rashi on the original pasuk, not at the quotes he uses
to explain it.

: I did not see any Rishonim on R' Gil's web page that define S'char as you
: imply.

What do you call defining onesh as the product of dirt on one's soul or
a disease one causes in it?

And what about the Nefesh haChaim I cited?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                        ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org       		    - R' Zelig Pliskin
(973) 916-0287               

I have been attending a minyan of late where there are no adults who say
kaddish, but two children who are aveilim, do say kaddish. One of my
colleagues pointed me to an Arukh HaShulkhan that says that "Kaddish Yatom"
was instituted to allow those aveilim who could not be the Hazan to say
kaddish, and argued that this kaddish was instituted specifically for
ketanim. My understanding of the Arukh HaShulkhan is that not everyone can
be Hazan every day, so there is a consolation opportunity for those who
could not be Hazan at this tefilla.

Is there any problem with a katan saying kaddish by himself?

My thanks,
Shalom Berger

Quick thought:

There is a similarity in the motivation behind the cheit ha'eigel
and that of klal Yisrael during the mei meriva story in this
week's parashah.

Moshe (rhetorically?) asked klal Yisrael: hamin hasela hazeh *notzi* lachem
mayim? Are /we/ going to get water out of the stone? Apparently Yisrael
related to Moshe as a proxy for HKBH, not as a conduit for His Torah
and a model for our avodah. They were demanding the water from him, not
from Hashem Yisbarach.

(Similarly, Moshe gets blamed the morning after for the deaths of Korach
va'adaso in 17:6.)

The same error underlies the eigel. They made a replacement for Moshe
who wasn't coming down, and then they *worshipped* it.

As Rashi notes, the parah adumah is mechaperes for the eigel. Perhaps
that's a thematic connection to the story that follows it.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                        ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org       		    - R' Zelig Pliskin
(973) 916-0287               

********************


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