Avodah Mailing List

Volume 07 : Number 087

Thursday, August 16 2001

• Re: anvatnut of R. Zechariah b. Avkilus (was Mitzvat yishuv Eretz Yisrael and Misc.) (fwd)
• Re: Avodah V7 #86
• kavod of rabbis
• Hilchos waiting in line/Kovod HaRav
• Re: hilchot waiting-in-line
• Re: tsavuah
• knowledge and proof
• Re: Belief or Proof?
• FW: when chazal and science conflict
• Re: kavod of rabbis
• RE: knowledge and proof
• Re: Yerushalayim
• Re: Shelled eggs, and peeled garlic/onion left overnight
• Re: knowledge and proof
• RE: knowledge and proof
• Re: Belief or Proof?
• various types of salt in halocho - update
• The SR's views on yishuv EY
• Stem Cell Research
• RE: The SR's views on yishuv EY
• Re: knowledge and proof
• Re: knowledge and proof
• Forgetting and remembering
• Re: Stem Cell Research
• re:source for gilgul teaching

On Mon, 13 Aug 2001 07:57:49 -0400 "Ari Z. Zivotofsky" <azz@lsr.nei.nih.gov>
writes:
> can you provide a brief summary?

Chasam Sofer Gittin 56a: To understand Rashi who explains "anvasnusoy
(of R.Zechariah b. Avkilus) - Savlanosoi": RZ's chashash not to kill Bar
Kamtza was that this will bring to chilul Hashem since everyone knows
that one who makes a mum in kodoshim is not chayiv misah, therefore people
would find out that he became a mosor as a result of the lack of machooh
of the chachomim, which would bring a negative impression by simple people
(towards the chachomim). The truth however was that Bar Kamtza was a
known Rasha who would not have sat down to a seuda with such a person,
that was also the reason of the baal habayis in order that the chachomim
shouldn't leave - therefore there is no chilul hashem. However RZ was
very tolerant ("savlan") and was able to tolerate this Rosho, therefore he
felt that throwing him out was a chilul Hashem since they weren't mocho.

They same idea in the machlokes of Shabbos 143a which in Tosefto (perek
17) is also connected to his anivus (tolerance) because according to
the other opinions their the peels etc are "graf shel rei" (see Pnei
Yoshou beg. of Beitza) therefore can be removed, however according to
RZ who is tolerant they cannot be removed, therefore they have to be
put somewhere else, therefore his tolerance is the same tolerance that
caused the churban.

similar idea in CS al hatorah that I brought previously.

Chaim G. Steinmetz
cgsteinmetz@juno.com

> Even your understanding of Rambam, the greatest Jewish rationalist, is 
> not unassailable.  It is well known that while the Rambam wrote in a number 
> of places that it is a mitzvah to "know" God, in his Sefer HaMitzvos he 
> wrote that it is a mitzvah to "believe" in God....

Rambam was not so much a "rationalist" as he was an afficionado of 
Aristotelian verbal proofs. Anyhow, Rambam's idea of "knowing" HaShem had 
more to do with appreciating His works (and thereby affirming His existence) 
through the human instrument of thought than it did with reaching a 
transcendent connection with HaShem, i.e., with "knowing" Him in the 
fundamental sense implied by faith or avodah. Effective thought -- including 
Maimonidean and Aristotelian thought -- requires a great deal of ex post 
facto belief. 

David Finch

>How does this reconcile with  the gemora's re: not using or appearing to be 
>using your learning for personal gain?

I just read that when RSZA came late to shul he would daven outside
until a place that the kahal got up anyway so that people would not
get up special for him.

I usually get upset when I am at a rabbinic event and several rabbis
seem to consistent enter late with the result that everyone gets up
for them.

Eli Turkel

But the issue is more than appearing to use one's torah learning for
personal gain -- perhaps  a better example is in many chassidishe shuls
and yeshivos people wait [or should wait] for the Ruv for everything --
including beginning davenning, repeating Shemonah Esrei, etc. --
additionally, mispallelim who are davenning at the Ruv's minyan or
Rebbe's minyan are less likely to come late.   

From: Joelirich@aol.com
>> Despite any differences in what they hold one MAY do, they would probably 
>> all agree that one SHOULD give up one's place in line to a Rosh Yeshiva 
>> etc... whose time is presumably "worth more" if he could get to the Yeshiva 
>> a few minues earlier....

> How does this reconcile with  the gemora's re: not using or appearing to be 
> using your learning for personal gain?

The Siman is Chelek Aleph, Siman 532. I don't think the RY in this case 
would be characterized as using his learning for personal gain. This is a 
Chiyuv on others waiting in line to give up their spot in order to benefit 
the Talmidim waiting for the RY to arrive. Which should take care of your PS 
as well.

Stuart

Eli Turkel wrote:
> Does anyone have an explanation of the next gemara that a person's spine
> changes into a snake 7 years after death except if he bent down at Modim.

In one of his books Aryeh Kaplan (anachronistically?) relates this to Tantric
symbolism; the technical term is kundalini.  Unfortunately I don't recall
where he says this.

David Riceman

> However, in his Al HaTeshuvah (pp. 195-201), R. Yosef Dov Soloveitchik 
> investigates what it means to "know" God.  As he points out, it is 
> impossible to know God.  Rather, the Rambam means that we are obligated to 
> constantly recognize God's existence.  As it says in Mishlei (3:6), "In all 
> your ways know Him."  Cf. Rabbeinu Yonah's commentary to Mishlei, ad loc.

People who throw around big words on these subjects always seem to take
for granted things that I don't.

The people who keep insisting that it's necessary to prove things about
G-d, including His existence, seem to take it for granted that devising
these proofs is identical with knowing G-d.

Now if I know a human being personally the last thing I'd do, except as a
purely intellectual exercise, is prove his or her existence.

In a message dated 8/12/2001 9:01:15pm EDT, gil_student@hotmail.com writes:
> 4. In addition to the Kuzari, the Rivash writes in his famous 
> anti-philosophy teshuvah (45), "They [the Greek philosophers] also wrote in 
> their books that perfect knowledge is attainable only through investigation, 
> not through tradition.  But we have received the truth that our Torah, which 
> came to us at Sinai from the mouth of God, through the intermediation of the 
> master of [all] the prophets, is perfect.  It is superior to everything and 
> all their investigations are null and void compared to it."

> To the Rivash, philosophical investigation is unnecessary when we have a 
> tradition.  The investigations are null and void compared to tradition.

I didn't see the Rivash. I could say simply this:
Re: the authority of Halachah we have a tradition and we need no further 
investigation to obligate ourselves (i.e. Na'aseh) 

OTOH, when it comes to making sense out of Torah (Nishmah) Tradition is not 
enough. Each Jew must come to their own personal relationship with their 
Creator.

This is alluded to by Elokei Avraham, Elokei Yitzchak V'eilokei Yaakov which 
is redundant -- it could have said Elokei Avraham Yitzchak v'Yaakov (and yes 
it does once in the Torah).  The point?  Each one of the Avos had a personal 
discovery of HKBH. 

Similarly we have the dichotomy
Hanistaros Lashem
V'haniglos Lanu

Actions are a matter of public, communal concerns
One's heart {Chovos Halvavos} is a personal matter between an individual and 
HKBH - unless perhaps one goes public by advocating a specific believe to 
others, e.g. Meisis, Meidi'ach etc.  
 
K"T
Rich Wolpoe

From my brother in law, Dr. Eddie Reichman <Saraneddie@aol.com>:

For those on your list who are interested, they should read 
Neria Gutal, Sefer Hishtanut haTeva'im, as well as the entry "hishtanut 
hateva'im" in Avraham Steinberg's Encyclopedia Hilchatit Refuit, vol. 2. 
There were a series of exchanges on the topic in the journal BD"D from Bar 
Ilan which were precipitated by a review of Gutal's book BD"D 4, as well as 
by a review of a book on Chullin by Prof. Shlomo Sternberg BD"D ?4 or 5. The

comments on Sternberg's article appeared in BD"D 6 and 7. Two articles that 
provide a nice, brief summary of the positions wrt halakha/science conflict 
are 1) Sternberg's article in BD"D 
2) Dr. Leiman's article, "R. Israel Lipshutz and the Mouse that is Half Flesh 
and Half Earth," in Chazon Nachum. 

On 13 Aug 01, at 9:08, Eli Turkel wrote:
> I just read that when RSZA came late to shul he would daven outside
> until a place that the kahal got up anyway so that people would not
> get up special for him.

> I usually get upset when I am at a rabbinic event and several rabbis
> seem to consistent enter late with the result that everyone gets up
> for them.

IIRC there's a story about this in RYK's biography that he once 
b'davka came in late at the Aguda convention (he may have walked 
with with R. Aaron Kotler - I don't recall all the details) so that 
people would have to stand up for them, and their wives would get 
nachas. 

In general, you're right, but there are always exceptions. 

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

From: Shalom Carmy [mailto:carmy@ymail.yu.edu]
> The people who keep insisting that it's necessary to prove things about
> G-d, including His existence, seem to take it for granted that devising
> these proofs is identical with knowing G-d.

> Now if I know a human being personally the last thing I'd do, except as a
> purely intellectual exercise, is prove his or her existence.

Your point is well taken.

Of course, (with the exception of Moshe Rabbeinu) one can never know G-d in
the same that one knows another human being.  When I see my friend, discuss
important matters with him, joke with him, etc. I feel that I know him
pretty well.  But I can't see G-d, can't discuss things with Him, etc., so
it's pretty hard to build up an analogous relationship, especially if there
is some small doubt in my mind as to whether He exists at all.  So maybe
devising proofs of G-d is at least a prerequisite to knowing Him.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

On Fri, Aug 10, 2001 at 10:24:59AM -0400, Gershon Dubin wrote:
: If ein maskirin batim birushalayim, and some say even mitos, lefi she'ena
: shelahem, how did those people get those houses in the first place?

As R' Aharon Soloveitchik often discusses, in addition to kinyan there
is also kibbush. Y'laim predates Avraham avinu, never mind Yehoshua.

-mi

On Thu, Aug 09, 2001 at 07:13:23PM -0400, kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:
: When modern medical opinion conficts with ancient medical opinion, many
: poskim offer the simple conclusion that "nature has changed". Is no one
: willing to suggest that the ancients were wrong?

Actually, according to R' Avraham ben haRambam, "nishtanah hatevah" means
"scientific theory has changed" not that the reality being studied has.

-mi

--- Shalom Carmy <carmy@ymail.yu.edu> wrote:
> The people who keep insisting that it's necessary to prove things about
> G-d, including His existence, seem to take it for granted that devising
> these proofs is identical with knowing G-d.

> Now if I know a human being personally the last thing I'd do, except as a
> purely intellectual exercise, is prove his or her existence.

I have noticed that people often confuse fact with belief assigning
greater value to fact. But this is IMHO a mistake. IIRC this was
discussed on previous Avodah threads. Simply stated, belief is a higher
value than fact and they are not one and the same. I am fond of saying
that G-d is not a fact but a belief. Facts are provable usually through
perception by one of the five senses or through deductive or inductive
reasoning, beleifs are not. G-d's exixtence cannot be proven, hence
He cannot be defined as a fact.Belief in the exitnce of G-d is just
that... Belief. Yet Judaism's entire exitence is based on belief in
the imperceptible existense of G-d and his dictates. The fact that
His existence cannot be proven does not deter believers in acting in
accordance with His wishes. The entire life experience of the man of
G-d is to follow his BELIEFS, and finds an excersize in proving G-d's
existense wasteful and ultimately futile.

So eventhough G-d cannot be conclusively proven although much ink has
been spilled in the attempt, belief in Him has guided the Jewish people
since the days of Abraham and civilization has increasingly recognized
that belief as true without evr being able to prove it.

HM

> Of course, (with the exception of Moshe Rabbeinu) one can never know G-d in
> the same that one knows another human being.  When I see my friend, discuss
> important matters with him, joke with him, etc. I feel that I know him
> pretty well.  But I can't see G-d, can't discuss things with Him, etc., so
> it's pretty hard to build up an analogous relationship, especially if there
> is some small doubt in my mind as to whether He exists at all.  So maybe
> devising proofs of G-d is at least a prerequisite to knowing Him.

I have known people for whom the Ribbono shel Olam is a presence. If they
are philosophically sophisticated, they don't seem too impressed by the
proofs. If not, they don't seem to suffer for lack of the proofs. My
father z"l was a factory worker. When I was 3-4 (if not earlier) he
offered me a version of the teleological proof. When I studied these
matters later on, I pointed out areas where one could question his
inferences. It didn't seem to bother him.

See also R. Lichtenstein's concise article in Jewish Action and the Rav
zt"ls discussions at many points.

It may be worth citing one of Wittgenstein's aphorisms (if one cares for
the judgment of the man often regarded as the greatest philosopher of te
20th century, but no fan of proofs): "The goal of philosophy is to be able
to stop doing philosophy if one wants to."

IMHO, the difference between "belief" and "knowledge" is quantitative,
not qualitative. IOW, the better the proof, the more likely one is to
call it "knowledge".

I think this thread was based on a rabbi who confused a number of things
when writing his web site.

First, proving that there is a value to philosophical, complex belief
doesn't disprove the need for emunah peshutah. In RYBS's terms, this is
the dialectic between gadlus hamochin and katnus hamochin.

Second, there are three forms of "complex" emunah: 1- trust in mesorah
that has much detail about our relationship to HKBH; 2- studying nature
to gain an appreciation of "mah norah ma'asecha Hashem!"; 3- philosophical
inquiry -- theological proof.

The first is close to emunah peshutah except than it limits the simplicity
of the faith to proof; it does not preclude studying in depth that which
is believed.

In Hil Yesodei haTorah, the Rambam pushes studying nature and philosophy.
In his day, the two weren't all that seperate of disciplines. The Kuzari's
approach is that of trusting in mesorah -- but once that is established,
the fifth cheilek explores the rest of theology: tzadik vera lo; hakol
tzafui vehareshus nesunah; bechirah vs hashgachah, etc...

Third, one can condemn "faith" without condemning emunah peshutah.
Emunah is TRUSTing a priori data. One's own senses, one's own tradition,
etc... Faith is a more vague term that is used by some Protestant groups
(and Tertullian) to speak of belief even in the face of contradictory
evidence. Whereas emunah is trust in one's postulates, upon which one
builds a logical structure.

Emunah peshutah is therefore when one doesn't go that far into the a priori
to dig for postulates.

What is being discussed here is neither emunah nor faith, but mysticism:
the belief that "direct knowledge of God, spiritual truth, or ultimate
reality can be attained through subjective experience (as intuition or
insight)" (to quote m-w.com). which is why R' Shalom Carmy comments:
: The people who keep insisting that it's necessary to prove things about
: G-d, including His existence, seem to take it for granted that devising
: these proofs is identical with knowing G-d.

: Now if I know a human being personally the last thing I'd do, except as a
: purely intellectual exercise, is prove his or her existence.

Something I was always jealous of "The Fiddler on the Roof"'s Tevya.
To him, HKBH was a constant companion. I wonder how common this attitude
was in the historical Anatevkas.

The Rihal is happy relying on the direct experience at ma'amad Har Sinai,
and the mesorah we have from those who were there. To R' Moshe Feldman's
reply into the terms I've been building, he apparantly considers that
level of indirection to be too uncertain to be labeled "knowledge"
and would rather call it "beleif". Here's his own words, so that you
can compare them to my conclusion:
: Of course, (with the exception of Moshe Rabbeinu) one can never know G-d in
: the same that one knows another human being.  When I see my friend, discuss
: important matters with him, joke with him, etc. I feel that I know him
: pretty well.  But I can't see G-d, can't discuss things with Him, etc., so
: it's pretty hard to build up an analogous relationship, especially if there
: is some small doubt in my mind as to whether He exists at all.  So maybe
: devising proofs of G-d is at least a prerequisite to knowing Him.

This touches on our fourth item: note the underlying assumption. OT1H
we talk about proving that G-d exists, something the Rihal discourages.
OTOH we take that from knowing Him, which would seem to be knowing
something about Him -- or in the case of a Perfect Unity, knowing
something about how Hashem relates to creation. I would have thought it
possible to prove that there is a Borei and/or a Manhig without proving
anything else about Hashem.

The Rambam seems to assume otherwise, I don't know why.

Fifth, proving that the Rambam holds that the chiyuv of ahavas Hashem
is through learning about Him does not prove that this is instead of
actual ahavah. I would argue that in general, the Rambam finds some
act subject to bechirah to tie to every chovas haleiv. For example, in
the opening of Hil Teshuvah he says that the chiyuv is vidui. The Yad
never calls teshuvah itself, the state of mind, a chiyuv. Simiularly,
the Rambam's lo sachmod is about acting on it, not the mental state
of chemdah. Li nir'eh he'd argue that while there is a kiyum baleiv,
there are no chovos halvavos. Perhaps because we lack the bechirah to
be accountable. Albeit we have bechirah in preparing ourselves for the
situation -- ie the ma'aseh beforehand. This is the tack that the Ramban
(not a typo, I switched rishonim) takes on lo sachmod, li nir'eh the
Rambam generalized it.

For similar reasons, I can see someone taking the position that emunah
peshutah is primary, but since one can't eliminate and control all nagging
doubts, excericises in chizuk emunah are necessary.

The Rambam does identify the unity of ahavah with that of yichud hayodeia
veHayadua. Thereby cerebralizing what would otherwise be an emotional
mitzvah. I could see considering ahavah and yedi'ah to be separate mitzvos.

David Finch <DFinchPC@aol.com> wrote:
: Rambam was not so much a "rationalist" as he was an afficionado of 
: Aristotelian verbal proofs...

I would think that anyone who believe that theology is proper territory
for formal proofs (of any sort) is a rationalist. The Rambam only leaves
the rationalist stance when avoiding the answer to hakol tzafui veharshus
nesunah, where he argues that since we can't define Divine Knowledge,
we can't ask questions about it.

On Mon, Aug 13, 2001 at 10:57:01PM -0400, RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com wrote:
: OTOH, when it comes to making sense out of Torah (Nishmah) Tradition is not 
: enough. Each Jew must come to their own personal relationship with their 
: Creator.

This is saying that each person has their own mode of ahavah. It doesn't
necessarily mean that each person need to find their own path in yedi'ah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org            for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org       the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

I spoke to some people re my recent question re various types of salt
in halocho.

One person told me that salt found underground and mined, was also formed
from water via evaporation originally - albeit perhaps eons ago. Perhaps
some of it even goes back to the time of the mabul and / or brias haolom /
sheishes yimei bireishis.

I looked in an encyclopedia and it seemed to say the same.

Therefore it seems that my question / difficulty has evaporated.

Mordechai

From: Eli Turkel <turkel@icase.edu>
> ..SBA brings all the opinions from SR against settling
> in Israel (except for special individuals) in the present day.

The SR in VM does not give his own psak but brings the opinions of
of the gedolei yisroel on BOTH sides of the coin.

The short summary I brought IMO did not come out as being against
aliyah - unless the oleh is a baal aveiro, will have no parnoso or is
osek in an important mitzva in CL.

Just because the SR doesn't come out blazing for Aliyah doesn't mean
that he is against it.

> Similarly RMF in his teshuva on aliyah did not hint at anything like
> the opinion of SR.

Where is this tshuva?  

> Certainly all the gedolim who encouraged aliyah did noy agree with this
> approach including the present day Agudah not to speak about gedolim
> like Rav Kook and those presently affiliated with Merkaz haRav. As I
> previously pointed out even the Steipler who seems to agree with the SR
> states that it no longer applies after the establishment of the state.

Are you saying that the Agudah gedolim including the Steipler
encouraged and supported Aliyah of Poshei Yisroel?
Do you have a source for this?

> We also know that satmar and the Edah haCharedit have yeshivot in israel
> and I dont believe they have an entrance requirement limited to only the
> top talmidim.

This statement of yours just proves everything that I have been
saying, ie that the SR was NOT against living in EY.
(There is a BIG difference between being against and not agitating for it.)

It seems to me that according to RET there is some 'issur' by the SR to move
to EY. Where do you get this from? AFAIK, no one has ever 'assured' this.

> Bottom line halacha is determined not by the one who quotes the most shitot
> but by the one who wins acceptance by the klal.

Huh?
The leaders of Reform in the US would love that line...

[26 Av - Yartzeit of the Satmar Rebbe - zechuso yogen oleinu.]

SBA

From Today's NY Times:
"In the Jewish tradition, the embryo has no status outside the mother's
body, a view that also finds no fault with in vitro fertilization
treatments"

I've heard this ascribed to R' Tendler - does anyone know the source of
this chiluk or whether other orthodox opinions have been raised?

KT
Joel

From: SBA [mailto:sba@blaze.net.au]
>> Bottom line halacha is determined not by the one who quotes the most shitot
>> but by the one who wins acceptance by the klal.

> Huh?
> The leaders of Reform in the US would love that line...

He meant the klal of shomrei torah u'mitzvos.  We find that we look at
minhag yisrael from that perspective as well--e.g., what constitutes tznius:
we look at the practice of bnos yisrael who are shomrei torah u'mitzvos.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

In a message dated 8/15/2001 1:58:32pm EDT, carmy@ymail.yu.edu writes:
> I have known people for whom the Ribbono shel Olam is a presence. If they
> are philosophically sophisticated, they don't seem too impressed by the
> proofs. If not, they don't seem to suffer for lack of the proofs. My
> father z"l was a factory worker. When I was 3-4 (if not earlier) he
> offered me a version of the teleological proof. When I studied these
> matters later on, I pointed out areas where one could question his
> inferences. It didn't seem to bother him.

Anyone who has fallen in love needs no proofs for love nor will any books, 
poems, or texts convey the experience.

Same with "knowing" or "loving" G-d.  Proofs are irrelevant, the only thing 
that is relevant is the experience itself. \

Note: I posted this years ago and its worth repeating.   

Shalom and Regards
Rich Wolpoe
Moderator - TorahInsight@yahoogroups.com
"Knowledge without Insight is like a horse in a library" - Vernon Howard    

Shalom Carmy wrote:
> Now if I know a human being personally the last thing I'd do, except as a
> purely intellectual exercise, is prove his or her existence.

IIRC this is one of those arguments-by-anecdote between the Kuzari and
the Moreh Nevuchim. Check their respective anecdotes about the king of
India. Rabbi Carmy is following the Kuzari's opinion.

David Riceman

On several occasions the Gemara suggests that certain practices were not
innovation, rather the practice was forgotten and later reinstituted. Some
examples:

Megilla 3a - Which letters belong in the middle of words and which at the
end (Sofiyot)
Megilla 18a - 18 Berachot
Succa 44a - Aravot on Hoshana Rabbah

Although the last example is an occasional Mitzvah, and as such could be
forgotten (Rashi says that many Mitzvot were partially forgotten during
Galut Bavel, and this one was totally forgotten), it is difficult to
imagine people who had written books forgetting the letters, or people
who davened forgetting Shmona Esrei.

Any suggestions or references would be appreciated.

Shalom Berger
Alon Shvut

In a message dated 8/15/2001 1:58:32pm EDT, Joelirich@aol.com writes:
> From Today's NY Times:
> "In the Jewish tradition, the embryo has no status outside the mother's
> body, a view that also finds no fault with in vitro fertilization
> treatments"
> I've heard this ascribed to R' Tendler - does anyone know the source of
> this chiluk or whether other orthodox opinions have been raised?

FWIW Rabbi Asher Brander gave a dvar Torah on this topic tonight in Teaneck.  
He made a bit chiluk between an embryo in a petrie dish as opposed to being 
inside the mother's womb.

E.G. For an embryo in the womb one would be mechallel shabbos on its behalf, 
but not for an embryo in a petrie dish.

I'm not sure of his source - it could be R. Tendler
  
Shalom and Regards
Rich Wolpoe
Moderator - TorahInsight@yahoogroups.com
"Knowledge without Insight is like a horse in a library" - Vernon Howard    

[Moved from Areivim]

Ari Z. Zivotofsky wrote:
>Several months ago Rav Ovadia Yosef in a
>speech stated that Rav Yaakov Berav wrote
>that Iyov was a gilgul of Terach and although
>Iyov was a tzaddik he was punished for Terach's idol worship. Does anyone 
>know where this can be found in the writings of Rav Yaakov Bera?

I have no access to anything written by R. Ya'akov Berav.  However, there 
are hints to this idea in the Ramban's Peirush to Iyov, introduction (ed. 
Chavel, vol. 1 p. 23), 33:19 (p. 100).  Rabbeinu Bachya ben Asher says 
explicitly that Iyov was punished because he was a gilgul but does not say 
of whom he was a gilgul.  Kad HaKemach sv hashgachah (ed. Chavel, pp. 
150-151,153).

Gil Student

********************


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