Avodah Mailing List

Volume 07 : Number 097

Thursday, September 6 2001

• Re: Fwd: TSBP
• Re: TSBP
• writing TSBP
• Re: Barekhu nikkud
• Ayin hara
• Re: Man beast hybrid: a matter of consciousness raising?
• Re: TSBP
• reported actions of sons of niftar at levaya / kvurah of Rav Pam z"l
• sheva berachot
• Shor shel C'naani
• Re: responses during khazarat hasha"z
• RE: Milchemet Mitzva in the time of Yehuda HaMaccabbee
• Re: Milchemet Mitzva in the time of Yehuda HaMaccabbee
• Re: TSBP to be only BP in future?
• Re: Ayin hara
• Rav Steinberger on chiddush, shemua', mesorah and TSBP
• Re: Shor shel C'naani
• RE: Ayin hara
• yehoshua
• What is Emunah
• [none]

On Mon, Sep 03, 2001 at 03:04:50PM -0400, Joelirich@aol.com wrote:
: I was doing some research and found the gemora in temurah 14a of great
: interest. Unless I'm missing something(quite likely the case) it seems
: clear that the issue of not writing down TSBP was still controversial
: in the time of the amoraim...

I thought we established that a number of Rishonim, including the Ba'alei
Tosafos and the Rashbam, held that Rebbe composed but did not publish
the mishnah. That in fact the mishnah was first written down at about\
the same time as the gemara, by the Savoraim.

This would be a ra'ayah leshitasam.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905             - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

Joel Rich wrote:
>I was doing some research and found the gemora in temurah 14a of
>great interest. Unless I'm missing something (quite likely the case) it 
>seems clear that the issue of not writing down TSBP was still controversial 
>in the time of the amoraim. This would seem to be against the school of 
>thought that the issur was hutra.

There is a machlokes between Rashi and Rambam over when the Mishnah was 
written down.  It was either written by R. Yehudah HaNasi or composed by him 
and relayed by heart to the various yeshivos and eventually written down 
with the talmudim.  Maharatz Chajes favors the latter view.

According to the second view, there is no ra'ayah from Temurah because even 
the Mishnah had not yet been written down.

Gil Student

RYGB>R' Tzadok Hakohen argues (not by name) on R' Nosson Adler who held eis 
la'asos in this case is only a dechuyah. He holds that it is now part and 
parcel of the mitzvah of kesivas Torah to write down TSBP.

where is the R' Zadok?

Shlomo Goldstein

On Fri, Aug 31, 2001 at 07:32:38AM +0300, D. and E-H. Bannett wrote:
: What is better than a quote from ben Asher himself (Baer-Strack edition,
: Siman 14): ...

The text is available as part of a fax RSM shared with the
Mesorah list (the Ben Asher section of the fax runs pp 1-10) at
<http://www.aishdas.org/dikdukei/page8.html>, the section labeled Sha'ar
19 contains RDB's quote.

-mi

In Areivim 7:407, Shlomo (SBA) gently criticized me (among others) about
my "enlightened" views concerning "ayin horas" and elimination
procedures.

"So it seems quite clear that the whole concept of AY and
methods in getting rid of it, goes back to the times of Chazal,
which therefore makes me uncomfortable when seeing it being
mocked as 'superstition' and  'kishuf-macherai'."

However, I did not mock the belief in "ayin horas",  I was primarily
critical of  the use of certain "magical" type practices to supposedly
neutralize one.   As is illustrated by this part of my post that SBA did
not cite.

"Concerning the idea of an "ayin ha'ra",  it is difficult to be
completely dismissive of something that is ingrained in the talmud and
tradition,  but belief in the efficacy of certain procedures that have
the aura of "magical" practices is something that should not be
countenanced by thinking religious Jews."

The Gemaras cited by Shlomo do not provide much support for a belief in
the prevalence of the baleful influence of the "ayin ha'ra".  B.M. 107b
contains the view of Rav that death is due predominantly to "ayin
ha'ra", but this is disputed by Shmuel and other Amora'im who find other
causes for death.  Berachot 55b provides an interesting prescription for
defending against an "ayin ha'ra".  One hugs oneself and says, " I am
descended from Yosef who is not subject to an "ayin ha'ra".   Now, very
few people in the times of Rav Ashi (one of the participants in the
discussion) could claim knowledge of such ancestry - and none, today.
Yet, this was given as an allegedly practical prescription for warding
off the "evil eye".   It seems to me that the message here is that if
you are not concerned about an "ayin ha'ra" then you're "immune".   That
should be the advise given to those who ask, in all innocence, whether
they need fear such a thing.

I am not familiar either with the Zohar or the Chida on this subject.
Without knowing the specific language used by the Zohar, is it not
possible that the point was to walk, dress, and act modestly as not to
arouse the envy of others, and certainly not to be envious of others -
which may also underly what Rav was saying in BM 107b?   As to the
Chida, he was, presumably, addressing an audience that fully believed in
the baleful influence of an "ayin ha'ra" and may have been offering a
popular folk remedy - rather than some Mesoritic tradition.  A citation
of the language of the Zohar and the Chida would be helpful to clarify
this question - if someone wished to pursue it.

My main objection to having an active belief in "ayin ha'ra" is that it
is psychologically disabling and religiously destructive.   A "true"
believer looks at the world as a mysterious, hostile environment filled
with "evil eyes".   Whatever untoward happens to the believer is
attributed to those hostile eyes rather than "natural" causes, or as a
divinely sent message.   There is then no progress for that individual
in understanding himself (or herself) and the world, and no real
amelioration of their situation.   Those who are not so driven by the
"ayin ha'ra" concept, but who will buy one of those "protective" hands
or a red string to ward off a possible "evil eye" are primarily not
acting rationally.  They, however, are also not excelling - to say the
least - in the biblical injunction of "Tamim tih'yeh im Hashem.."

Yitzchok Zlochower

On Wed, Aug 29, 2001 at 06:40:46PM -0700, Michael Frankel wrote:
:> What would be the din on this? Man-beast hybrid beyond talking stage
:> Human DNA in cow egg Scott Foster The Edmonton Journal ... Melding man
:> and beast may sound like the stuff of science fiction, but it's not....

: Now most professional biologists do not take this suggestion seriously.
: those few that think about it at all tend to consider consciousness as
: an emergent property that attends some threshold level of complexity of
: neuronal connectivity...

One thing interesting about emergent properties, which is what makes
it possible to have a generic Chaos Theory, is that often the structure
of how the peices combine produces certain effects regardless of certain
differences in the peices themselves.

So, even if Penrose correct, that it's the quantum statistical nature
of the neuron that makes the brain capable of doing things a digital
computer inherently can't, such a being might still have a mind.

There is also a second issue -- does having a mind have ethical or halachic
impact? Someone without brain stem activity, who will therefore never again
experience unity of mind and body, could or could not have the same halachic
status as anyone else with a heartbeat.

Would such a creature, even without a mind -- or with a mind that is different
in kind than that of the rest of us -- be a cheftza, or would he be a gavra?

Third, this raises questions not only of mind-body but of mind-soul. Des
Cartes believed hainu hach. Bechirah chafshi, which seems to be described
both as what my conscious mind does when it makes a choice and what the
neshamah (in the broad non-Naran sense) gets judged for, seems to argue that
as well.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 "The most prevalent illness of our generation is
micha@aishdas.org            excessive anxiety....  Emunah decreases anxiety:
http://www.aishdas.org       'The Almighty is my source of salvation;  I will
Fax: (413) 403-9905          trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya

In a message dated Tue, 4 Sep 2001 12:20:10pm EDT, "Gil Student"
> There is a machlokes between Rashi and Rambam over when the Mishnah was 
> written down.  It was either written by R. Yehudah HaNasi or composed by him 
> and relayed by heart to the various yeshivos and eventually written down 
> with the talmudim.  Maharatz Chajes favors the latter view.
> According to the second view, there is no ra'ayah from Temurah because even 
> the Mishnah had not yet been written down.

I understand, but certainly those of the first view were aware of this
sugya or is there a consistency between the first view and those who
hold dchuya?

KVCT
Joel

From:   MFeldman@CM-P.COM (Feldman, Mark)
> I thought that they are allowed to be mitamei for their parents but not for
> anyone else.  That's why kohanim's graves are at the edge of the cemetery.
> Perhaps for some reason, Rav Pam's sons couldn't get near their father's
> grave without being m'tamei b'ohel to someone else.

How common is this - that Kohanim cannot / do not go to the keiver for
the above reason (intervening kevorim)?

Also - the idea of the kivarim of Kohanim being at the edge of the
cemetery - how common is that? Is it universal or near universal among
various eidos that are shomrei mitzvos?

Is the reported action of Rav Pam's sons meikar hadin lichol hadeios or
are there are any reliable opinions that are matir Kohanim going to the
keiver itself bizman hazeh in such a case (e.g. burial of parent R"l)
even if there are other kivorim in the way, in which case it may have
been somewhat of a chumra?

Also, I wonder if the children of Rav Pam were at least able to see
the kever from where they were standing, or perhaps it was too far
away? Perhaps they appointed people as shluchim to participate in the
kevura for them (e.g. place some dirt on the aron) ? Was anyone on the
list at the kevurah?

Mordechai

I just went to a wedding in NJ with a temani groom and they had 8 sheva
berachot (sorry for the self contradiction). The second beracha was
boreh minei besamim.

I don't reacll seeing this at sefardi weddings. Does anyone know the
origin if this minhag and how widespread it is.

kol tuv,
Eli Turkel

Eli Turkel <turkel@icase.edu> wrote [to Areivim]:
>> Is it pure coincidence that this weeks daf yomi says that a Jew's
>> ox that gore's a goy's ox doesn't pay for damages while the in the
>> reverse case the Goy has to pay.

See the notes on the lower right side of the the gemara Bava Kama 37b
quoting Rambam Hil. Nizkei Momon 8:5 saying that we treat them like
their own laws in that the C'naanim didn't obligate a person to pay
for damage caused by his animal, which explains why the Jew is patur.
The reason why C'naanim pay if their animals are mazik a Jew is because
otherwise the C'naanim wouldn't guard their own animals to prevent them
from damaging others.

KT 
Avrohom Weidberg

On Sun, Sep 02, 2001 at 02:01:43AM -0700, ben waxman wrote:
: In many adut hamizrach minyans, people say things during the repetition
: of the Amidah; things like l'bracha when the SZ says morid hatal.

: Given that the SA explicitly says that during the repetition one is to
: say nothing except amen, kedushah etc, what is the source for saying
: these phrases?

Perhaps they hold that such affirmations of what the chazan said qualify
as "amein"? IOW, perhaps the S"A's "amen" refers to the idea, not the
word itself.

-mi

From: Gil Student [mailto:gil_student@hotmail.com]
> since this was not for 
> kibush Eretz Yisrael, this was not a milchemes mitzvah.  The land was 
> already conquered.  Granted, there was a mitzvah of self-defense.  But this 
> might only have been a mitzvah of pikuach nefesh, and not one of milchemes 
> mitzvah.  

I thought that one of the categories of milchemes mitzvah is a war of
self-defense.

> I added that there was not even a need of self-defense because the 
> Greeks did not necessarily want to kill anyone.

So if an enemy comes and says, "I won't kill anyone if you all surrender and
give up your sovereignty," that's not milchemes mitzvah?  Moreover, that
would be the opposite result of kibbush Eretz Yisrael (whose purpose is to
put all of E"Y under Jewish sovereignty).

Kol tuv,
Moshe

On Sat, Sep 01, 2001 at 11:30:27PM -0400, Gil Student wrote:
: [RY Hirsch] offered two possible answers. One was that, since this was not
: for kibush Eretz Yisrael, this was not a milchemes mitzvah.  The land was 
: already conquered.  Granted, there was a mitzvah of self-defense.  But this 
: might only have been a mitzvah of pikuach nefesh, and not one of milchemes 
: mitzvah.  I added that there was not even a need of self-defense because the 
: Greeks did not necessarily want to kill anyone.

I seem to recall a not-yet-published article <grin> that discusses the
notion that threats to further avodas Hashem may very well qualify as
piku'ach nefesh.

BTW, this suggests how "venishmartem me'od lenafshoseichem", a phrase
used in discussing the issur of A"Z, can be taken to also be an issur
against physically hazardous activity. Both are piku'ach nefesh (note
the word!).

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org            for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org       the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

In a message dated 9/2/2001 4:31:15pm EDT, free@actcom.co.il writes:
> But the quote is discussing two separate issues. If the newly
> re-constructed Sanhedrin becomes the ikkar TSBP, why would that indicate
> that their rulings would be only oral? 

You're right, it is ambiguous
What seems obvious to me and controversial to some
is that the authority of EXISTING written texts would "wither away".

IOW Mishnah/Talmud text would no longer be binding as "oral law",  just a 
source of information ABOUT Torah Law... 


In a message dated 9/3/2001 7:51:49pm EDT, micha@aishdas.org writes:
> I thought we established that a number of Rishonim, including the Ba'alei
> Tosafos and the Rashbam, held that Rebbe composed but did not publish
> the mishnah. That in fact the mishnah was first written down at about
> the same time as the gemara, by the Savoraim.
> This would be a ra'ayah leshitasam.

FWIW: Dr. Feldblum noted that in Talmudic debates re: the proper Girsa of the 
Mishnah no text was consulted.   Rather students memorized the Mishnah.

KvChT
RW

In a message dated 9/4/2001 12:21:13pm EDT, zlochoia@bellatlantic.net writes:
> My main objection to having an active belief in "ayin ha'ra" is that it
> is psychologically disabling and religiously destructive.  

A chavrusa and mine were discussing not davening in a Churvah due to
the possible presence of Sheidim.

I insisted that this did not literally mean sheideim, but was a method
for discouraging people from davening ion a churvah

My chavrusa cahllenged me - Was I after all denying the existence
of Sheidim?

I Replied: "No I neither deny nor affirm." Frankly I don't know one
way or the other first hand. But I can say as a Halachic imperative,
sheidim are less than a mei'uta d'meiuta and therefore Halachically
irrelevant in a literal sense. IOW, unless someone we know had a first
hand experience with sheidim it makes no sense to make an issur based
upon this. However, that does not mean that sheidim cannot be used as a
method of discouragement and neither does it mean that Sheidim don't exist
at all. However, seeing sheidim "everywhere" is a not healthy mindset.

KvChT
RW

This week's email from Yeshivat haKotel's list <hk-rambam@hakotel.edu>.
R' Steinberger again touches on a number of our perennials.

-mi

"The Status of 'Chiddush' Versus the 'Shmua'"

The Rambam emphasizes that part of the Oral Law is whatever a scholar
has heard from his masters. But he does not mentioned novella of the
scholar himself (not having heard it from the previous generation).
Likewise, the Rambam mentions by the layman's studies, only the material
"as he had heard". Only, when discussing the "Thirteen Middot" does the
Rambam mention "chiddush" -- an innovation. What has happened to the
famous concept of the "Chiddush of the Talmid Vatik" -- the novella of
the expert -- veteran student of Torah?

There are two possible answers to these omissions: a) The very Chazal that
mentions the "Talmid Vatik" and his "Chiddush" offers three points that
shed light on the fact that everything ahs to do, either with a direct or
at least an indirect, Torah Messorah -- Heritage. Noting functions in the
Oral Law as a totally original idea. If it is so then apparently it does
not qualify as Torah. That is the suggestion of using the term "Talmid"
-- student (rather than "chacham" or Rabbi). That is also the reason for
the word "Vatik" -- veteran, old. These terms refer to a subservient
person who surrenders his spiritual independence and originality and
bows down to the awesome heritage of previous generations. The third
point, to substantiate our approach, is the concluding paragraph of the
same Chazal: "Keilu Kiblah M'Sinai" -- any novella is considered as if
received directly from Sinai.

The explanation, for attributing every "chiddush" to Sinai, is due
to the fact that there is a clear system that subjects any legitimate
Torah innovation to certain rigors. Once those specific rules are met,
automatically one can assume that the "chiddush" stems from Sinai. The
implication is that we always deal with a tradition "Kemo Sheshama" --
something, that at least on the general outline, had been heard from
a Rebbe of a previous generation. Indeed one cannot say a "chiddush"
that disagrees with a a ruling or a decree of a previous and greater
Beit Din. But, when it comes to an idea, it is possible to disagree,
even with a former and greater Beit Din. (See Rambam, Mamrim Chapter II,
Halacha 1 and 2). When it comes to the interpretation of a certain law,
mentioned in the Mishna or even in the Talmud, one is bound to accept it
(regardless whether it is a decree or a commentary). See "Kessef Mishne":
Mamrim, ibid.). A student, who was not ordained, cannot rule, especially
in the lifetime and in the vicinity of his master (see Eruvin 62b).
Innovations, lacking any basic backing, especially in dramatic issues,
can be introduced only by the absolute greatest Torah illuminaries of
the generation. And even then, such innovations would be accepted only
on a limited level, assuming that such a Sage must have a certain source,
which he prefers not to reveal. Thus, even such a "chiddush" is considered
"MeHaShmuah". Indeed, Sages who often have voiced revolutionary Halachic
philosophical ideas, have been sometimes ignored because of their zest
for innovation.

[There was an opposition to the rulings of the Rogatchover Iluy -- R'
Yosef Rozin (the "Zafnat Paneach") on the grounds that he had skipped the
chain of Halachic pesikkah and based his rulings on Rambam and Rashi.
somewhat similarly, many poskim disagreed with the rulings of the
"Chazon Ish", despite his towering status as "Gadol Hador"].

b) Since the Rambam does mention "Chiddush", referring to the "Thirteen
Middot" -- we can possibly assume, that any innovation is anchored in
one or more of the Thirteen Middot, especially the Middah of "Binyan
Av" or "Bameh Matzinu" which refer to a simple method of comparison
(comparing a new question to some existing law in the Written Law), also
a "Kal Vachomer" (discussed at length in the previous shiur). But this
approach would contradict the Rambam's own statement that anything based
on the Thirteen Middot requires the approval of Beit Din. this negates
the possbility, according to the Rambam, of anchoring a "chiddush"
as a completely independent process, if it is part of the "Thirteen
Middot". Yet, it might be possible, that the Rambam's insistence here,
that only something "Mepi HaShmuah", based on what had been heard from
one's master, corresponds to the dictum of having any chiddush originating
form the use of the "Middot" needs approval. Approval equals "shmuah".

As long as we deal with the concept of originality, "chiddush" as stemming
from "Binyan Av", etc. we should try to clarify whether indeed a "sevarah"
-- a logical assumption, is identical to one of the logical "middot"
among the thirteen. Probably not. Then, our second approach would be
void. We often find in the Talmud the saying: why do we need a pasuk (a
verse of the Scripture if the same idea can be learnt from a "sevarah"
-- a logical conclusion? If, indeed a "sevarah" would be identical to a
"kal vachomer" or a "bameh matzinu", such a question would not exist,
since there is a rule "Milta Deatya BeKal Vachomer Tarach veKatav la Kra"
-- an idea learnt out from the "Middah" of extrapolation (from an easier
towards a stricter issue) still justifies a clear Biblical source. The
Ran (in Nedarim (3a: "lindor") and others) apply this rule also to a
"bameh matzinu" (and other certain "middot"). Yet, when it comes to
"sevarah", a pasuk seems to be totally obsolete (see for instance,
Baba Kamma 46b referring to the concept of "Hamotzi mechaveiro alav
haraayah" -- when one wants to take away a property from the hands of
his fellow man, the instigator has to bring the proof and not the holder.
In the beginning the Talmud tries to learn this out from a pasuk. Then,
the Talmud mentions a "sevarah", a logical argument, and dismisses the
derasha from the pasuk as unnecessary. The same seems to apply to a
different concept "Hapeh sheassar hu hapeh shehitir" in Ketubot 22a).
Obviously a "sevarah" is a completely independent logical argument and
is not an offcast of one of the "Middot".

The authority of one to use his own human logic for halachic decisions is
thus unclear. If it were part of the "Middot", one could say it is a Sinai
Halacha -- that one can use the method of the Middot (see the previous
shiur). But if it is something else, we need a source for permitting us
to use our own logic. Probably this is anchored in the dictum of "Lo
BaShamayim Hee" -- the Torah is not in Heaven. It was given to humans
implying that human logic is applicable to Torah learning. Even when it
concerns the most dramatic halachic issues, like executing a sinner --
"dinei nefashot", it says "ein ledayan elah mah she-einav ro-ot",
"the judge uses his own eyesight or brains" (Tanchuma Parshat Mishpatim).

The very fact that the Rambam pays obviously so much attention to the
concept of tradition in this specific issue (of defining the Oral Law only
in terms of material passed on by one's master) in particular, indicates
the Rambam's ruling in a very important dispute. The Talmud (Horayot
14a) brings a dispute whether "Sinai" is preferable or "Oker Harim"
-- the first defining a well versed learner who strives towards knowing
everything passed form previous generations, all the way from Mount Sinai;
the second -- an original innovative thinker who is capable of figuring
out many conclusions on his own but does not wield an expertise (bekiut)
like the first one. The Talmud seems to rule in favor of the "baki" who
masters the material and creations of previous generations. The Rambam
does not rule, at least on the surface, in any direction.

Assuming that the immense significance he attributes to the "Mesorah"
and its transmitters, here, stems from favoring "Sinai", (in the above
mentioned dispute), we have an indirect source for the Rambam's decision
in this important issue. Yet, there is a different source, where it
seems that the Rambam holds to the contrary. Describing the correct
way of dividing the day incorporating the three components of the Torah
(the Written Law, the "Mishna" and the "Talmud"), the Rambam says the
following: one should devote a third of his day learning each part of
the Torah and giving each equal time. But this is valid only in the
early years of one's education. Once the Torah scholar becomes well
versed in everything, he should secure enough time for retaining the
knowledge he had already acquired. But the bulk of his learning should
be devoted from then on to the third part of the Torah -- "Talmud" --
i.e. the skills of understanding profoundly the texts and mastering the
ability of exegesis, interpolation -- and halacha ruling (Hilchot Talmud
Torah chapter I: 13,14).

"Talmud", accordingly, seems to correspond to the concept of "Oker
Harim", mentioned above. In other words, the Rambam seems to favor the
development of originality and innovation. But close scrutiny of the
Rambam's text shows a more complex approach. He never says that one
should prefer originality over knowledge. On the contrary -- one should
continue forever to maintain his knowledge, memorizing the whole corpus
of the Written and the Oral Law. The Rambam just advocates making the
most of the already accumulated information, by getting to the "Talmud"
and learning how to use independently the knowledge. The "Talmud" is the
implementation of the knowledge, the exploitation of the data. Actually
the Rambam seems to say that there is a process which combines "Sinai" and
"Oker Harim". Obviously, according to this, the whole dispute regarded
only the preference in the beginning. But in the long run, it could
be that both faculties should be incorporated as previously described.
Definitely, the insistence of the Rambam, on devoting the first two thirds
of one's time to "Torah ShebeKtav" and "Mishna" and continuing to memorize
these even after, indicates that he rules like the opinion: "Sinai adif".
The thinking skills, constituting the "Talmud", based on the knowledge of
the Written and the Oral Law apparently are recommended even according
to the opinion emphasizing the significance of "Sinai". Knowledge that
cannot be used by the student of Torah, is faulty.

The ramification of our explanation is that the opinion which favors
"Oker Harim", would probably disagree with the Braita (in Kiddushin 30a)
that is the basis for the Rambam in Hilchot Talmud Torah. That opinion
would recommend, accordingly, that one should learn more "Talmud"
already at the beginner stage.

(C) 5761/2001 by Rav Steinberger and American Friends of Yeshivat Hakotel
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freely, but must be obtained. (And was. -mi)

In a message dated 9/5/01 7:13:22pm EDT, eweidberg@tor.stikeman.com writes:
> See the notes on the lower right side of the the gemara Bava Kama 37b
> quoting Rambam Hil. Nizkei Momon 8:5 saying that we treat them like
> their own laws in that the C'naanim didn't obligate a person to pay
> for damage caused by his animal, which explains why the Jew is patur.
 
So if we live in a nonJewish society that does obligate payment, does
the din change?

KT
Joel

> I Replied: "No I neither deny nor affirm." Frankly I don't know one
> way or the other first hand. But I can say as a Halachic imperative,
> sheidim are less than a mei'uta d'meiuta and therefore Halachically
> irrelevant in a literal sense.

yet chazal used this "mei'uta d'meiuta" as the basis for a halacha. Why?
Either they had first had knowledge/experience if sheidim, or they were
speaking metaphorically.

> IOW, unless someone we know had a first
> hand experience with sheidim it makes no sense to make an issur based
> upon this.

But via the gemara we apparently *have* someone we "know" who had first-hand
experience -- and based an issur on it. (Fish and meat would be another
example -- or any of the Tumah/tahara halachot, since we don't have
*first-hand* experience of Tumah or Tahara.

Akiva

Does anyone know where the medrash  that says that yehoshua was selected to 
replace moshe because yehoshua used to straighten the benches in the bet 
medrash appears?

KT
Joel

An interesting little excercise... To help someone find a quote
for a speech, I did a search of Shas for the word emunah. There are
(amazingly) only 11 results. In 8 cases, the reference was to being
honest in business! "Yisa viyiten be'emunah". In a ninth, it refers to
the ne'emanus of ovdei A"Z.

It would seem that to Chazal, the word connotated a different set of
ideas than it does today. Not whether a person trusts certain truths,
but whether that person can himself be trusted.

-mi

The following is private email that I got reshus to share on the tenai
that I do it without his name.

-mi

Here is a summary of R' Ahron's piece, all errors a result of my bad
memory and bad interpretation (so take a look at it inside!):

R' Ahron Soloveitchik writes in his sefer Perach Mateh Ahron (Hil T"T ch
6) that he recalls when he was 8 years old R" Elchanan Wasserman visited
R' Moshe Soloveitchik and claimed that l'asid lavo torah shba'al peh
would not exist as we have it now. R' Moshe disagreed based on the lashon
haRambam at the end of Hil Megillah - that Megillas Esther would never
become bateil similar to "chamisha chumshei Torah u'k'halachos shel Torah
shba'al peh...". R' Moshe took that to mean not just that the content
of torah shba'al peh would remain, but the texts themselves would remain
as well (1). R" Ahron then cites his brother as asking why we find that
the Rambam brings down the issur of not saying devarim sheb'ksav b'al
peh, but the Rambam never brings down the issur of writing torah shb'al
peh. The Rav answered that these are halachos in how the transmission
of Torah takes place. The halacha of not communicating Torah sheb'ktav
orally is not only an issur gavra, but defines a cheftza shel Torah
which must be commited to writing. Similarly, there existed a cheftza
shel Torah which remained oral (2). The Rav brought rayaos that there
exists a specific chain of people, "chachmei hakabbalah", responsible
for preserving that oral mesorah. Chasimas hatalmud terminated this
cheftza of mesorah preserved only through chachmei hakabbalah, and
therefore the issur of writing no longer applies (3).

My comments:

(1) I believe there is also a comment of GRI"Z on this Rambam also
learning that it refers to the text of megillah/nevi'im, not to the
content, but I haven't double checked. IOW: the content of nevi'im will
not be lost, just the cheftza of kitvei kodesh will be bateil.

(2) See the Rav's piece on 2 types of mesorah in Shiurim l'Zecher Aba
Mori for a similar idea.

(3) There is therefore no need to discuss whether the issur hagavra is
mufka or nidche. The chiddush of the Rav's is that this issur applies
only to a cheftza of unwritten torah which is transmitted through chachmei
hakabbalah. Once this cheftza ceases to exist, m'meila there is no issur.

R' Tzaddok's idea in Machshavos Charutz that the mitzva of "kitvu lachem
et hashira hazot" today applies even to torah sheba'al peh operates
(as I understand it) with the exact opposite assumptions. R' Tzaddok
assumes all Torah in cheftza is part of the "shira' referred to in the
mitzva of kesivas sefer Torah. However, there exists a chovas hagavra
which prevents parts of that shira from being communicated in writing.
Once the issur gavra is lifted, the mitzva m'meila includes all aspects
of Torah.

********************


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