Avodah Mailing List

Volume 07 : Number 098

Monday, September 10 2001

• Re: writing TSBP
• Re:
• Reward for a Metzuveh and Aino Metzuveh
• Re: What is Emunah
• Sheidim and tum'ah (was: Ayin hara)
• Bitachon
• Lubavitch Philosophy
• RE: Reward for a Metzuveh and Aino Metzuveh
• Re: Reward for a Metzuveh and Aino Metzuveh
• sheva berachot
• OK, Let's Get Lomdish Again
• RE: Lubavitch Philosophy
• Esrogei Shmitta
• Re: Lubavitch Philosophy
• RE: Lubavitch Philosophy
• Re: Lubavitch Philosophy
• Re: OK, Let's Get Lomdish Again
• Re: OK, Let's Get Lomdish Again
• Re: OK, Let's Get Lomdish Again
• Re: sheva berachot
• RE: Reward for a Metzuveh and Aino Metzuveh
• Re: Reward for a Metzuveh and Aino Metzuveh
• Re: Reward for a Metzuveh and Aino Metzuveh

At 09:00 AM 9/4/01 +0200, S. Goldstein wrote:
>RYGB>R' Tzadok Hakohen argues (not by name) on R' Nosson Adler who held eis
>> la'asos in this case is only a dechuyah. He holds that it is now part and
>> parcel of the mitzvah of kesivas Torah to write down TSBP.

>where is the R' Zadok?

Machasheves Chorutz 57a.


At 04:57 PM 8/31/01 -0400, Joelirich@aol.com wrote:
>By what mechanism did R' Tadok understad that this become part of a mitzvah
>duraita?

Halachically, based on the Tur YD 270, but philosophically, on the 
hishtanus hoittim that underlies the eis la'asos.

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

At 01:28 PM 9/6/01 -0400, 'micha@aishdas.org' [forwarded]:
>Here is a summary of R' Ahron's piece, all errors a result of my bad
>memory and bad interpretation (so take a look at it inside!):

I believe this whole discussion may be found in Kovetz Shiurim chelek 2 (not 
yet unpacked!).

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

Recently on Areivim, R' Carl Sherer wrote <<< Almost no one here smokes
on Yom Tov (which leads me to further question why if they can quit
for Shabbos and Yom Tov - sometimes even for a three-day Rosh HaShana -
they cannot quit altogether). >>>

Here's another example of the same phenomenon: Many people (and I am
too good an example of this) find it very difficult to avoid various
nosherei in general, but have no problem avoiding it on a taanis.

Put these two phenomena together, and I am led to suspect that mitzvos
strengthen our yetzer tov and help us to do the right thing. This is
contrary to the oft-quoted explanation of why a metzuveh gets more
s'char than an aino metzuveh, but I have found it to be true. A clear
and unambiguous mitzvah like no fire on Shabbos or no eating on a taanis,
is much easier to observe than a vague one like preserving one's health
(which is easy to rationalize on the grounds that "just this one" won't
hurt me).

The truth is, I've *NEVER* really understood why Chazal felt that a
man's yezter hara to violate Mitzvah X (be it learning, minyan, shofar,
whatever) is greater than a woman's. If this were so, wouldn't we find
more women observing them than men? No, because even if the man's yetzer
hara is strengthened by the obligation, his yetzer tov is strengthened
even more. Does this make sense to anyone? Can someone explain to me
why Chazal felt as they did?

Akiva Miller

On Thu, Sep 06, 2001 at 07:35:02PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote:
: It would seem that to Chazal, the word connotated a different set of
: ideas than it does today. Not whether a person trusts certain truths,
: but whether that person can himself be trusted.

Judging from some private email, I could have been more clear. And,
I should have waited until the idea was more fully baked.

Obviously "ma'amin" and "amein" are about belief. Equally obviously,
"ne'eman" is about trustworthiness. My statement was only about "emunah"
itself.

One email asked why this wasn't merely a linguistic point, suitable for
Mesorah more than Avodah.

I guess that when it comes to lashon Chazal, I apply the Sapir-Word
hypothesis, that language shapes the the thought of those who speak and
think in it, and its reverse, that language adapts to reflect the thoughts
of those who use it. There's a feedback look there. In any case...

I took this linguistic oddity to imply something about chazal's
thought. Which is why I mentioned connotation. Ad kan explaining the
earlier post.

To chazal, the concept of "ma'amin" is someone who is both a believes
and an honest business man. Who believes to the point of realizing he'll
get what he's supposed to whether or not he cheats. And someone who is
honest in his relationships enough not to deny the truth. An oveid Hashem
to the point of carrying His ne'emanus through to the person's activity.

However you want to say it -- emunah isn't bein adam lamakom and chovos
halevavos alone. The same word, and thereforepresumably the same family
of idea, is used for a chiovas haguf bein adam lachaveiro. The word
describes the unity, a seemless whole.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org            for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org       the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

On Thu, Sep 06, 2001 at 12:23:44PM +0200, Akiva Atwood wrote:
: yet chazal used this "mei'uta d'meiuta" as the basis for a halacha. Why?
: Either they had first had knowledge/experience if sheidim, or they were
: speaking metaphorically.
: 

Sheidim could pose a real threat without being real. Being in a dark
place alone at night, or being in a churvah (as two examples), isn't
condusive to avodas Hashem bisimchah. The parallels between an attack
by sheidim and psychiatric disorder are spelled out.

Not taking a position, just airing possibilities.

I too have philosophical questions with the subject, not that I'd reject
the chazal's stance over my questions. In particular, I'm very sympathetic
to RYZ's ta'anah that worrying about attacks from incomprehensible forces
is a worldview I was taught to associate with paganism.

Also, does the Rambam hold by this din? If so, why?

:> IOW, unless someone we know had a first
:> hand experience with sheidim it makes no sense to make an issur based
:> upon this.

: But via the gemara we apparently *have* someone we "know" who had first-hand
: experience -- and based an issur on it. (Fish and meat would be another
: example -- or any of the Tumah/tahara halachot, since we don't have
: *first-hand* experience of Tumah or Tahara.

Actually, we could very well have first hand experience and not recognize
it as such. If tum'ah is a chok, then we can't understand it. How then
are we to recognize it when we feel it?

FWIW, I argued in the past that at least two aspects of tum'ah are
comprehensible, that lefi Mesilas Yesharim tum'ah is a mental state,
and lefi RSRH, objects that are tamei are those that tend create an
attitude that is akin to the state the MY describes.

See <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol06/v06n161.shtml#05>. It's also
somewhat seasonal, as I try to also wrap "kapparah" into the discussion.
(The connection? "Ki bayom hazeh yechapeir aleichem litaheir escham..."
implies a connection between kapparah and taharah.)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org            for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org       the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

Interesting Gemara Berachos 60a, more dramatic in the Yerushalmi 66b: While 
to daven l'she'avar is a tefillas shov, to have bitachon l'she'ava is 
permitted and encouraged.

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

One of my Lubavitcher cousins once asked me something like this:
"You think like a chosid, you talk like a chosid, you learn Chassidus,
why are you not a Chosid?" There are other replies I might give about
why I am not a Chagas Chosid, but to answer his query, which was really
why I am not a Chabad Chosid, I repleid: "Because I do not accept the
doctrines of 'Yechida Kelolis' and 'Bittul.'"

I have not followed this whole discussion, but it seemed to me that
Micha raised the YK point and was essentially ignored. One cannot have an
educated (and dispassionate!) discussion of this topic without, first,
some familiarity and understanding of these two concepts that, I think,
underlie modern Chabad.

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

-----Original Message-----
The truth is, I've *NEVER* really understood why Chazal felt that a
man's yezter hara to violate Mitzvah X (be it learning, minyan, shofar,
whatever) is greater than a woman's. If this were so, wouldn't we find
more women observing them than men? No, because even if the man's yetzer
hara is strengthened by the obligation, his yetzer tov is strengthened
even more. Does this make sense to anyone? Can someone explain to me
why Chazal felt as they did?

We all learned that the yetzer hara to violate a mitzvah is stronger in
a metzuvah, and this is why an aino metzuvah doesn't get as much schar.

There is a facet of human nature that causes people to be very resistant
to being "told what to do". In other words, I am much more likely to
do something if I can say it's my idea than if I'm just doing something
because you told me to. Thus, the minute I am commanded to do something
[no matter by whom] I am much more likely to look for excuses to "get
out of it" than if I am doing it stam because I want to.

Many mitzvot are forbidden for women to observe [teaching them Gemara,
making up a minyan, tefillin, etc.] and so even if women would do them
voluntarily, they are prevented from doing so either by social pressure
or by training. Those mitzvot that women are not prevented from doing
and are socially acceptable, such as listening to shofar, they most
certainly do with as much zerizus as men do. Therefore, if women were
not prevented from doing men's mitzvot they *would* be doing them with
much more zerizus than men do them.

The only exception I can think of is making it to davening at a shul
three times a day, but even then women are prevented from fulfilling
the mitzvah by both lack of space [many shteibelach don't even have
an ezrat nashim] and by social pressure. [Hmph. It's hard enough now
getting daughters into Bais Ya'akov -- you want we should wear tefillin
and daven naitz yet?? :-)]

-Rena

I think the question is easily answerable once one goes a layer deeper
into the onion, as per our conversation following RGS's article on
the nature of onesh.

Why would HKBH obligate one more than the other? Doesn't this imply
that for one group the mitzvah is more essential for what they need
in terms of deveikus and temimus than for the other?

So the change the pe'ulah has on the gavrah is more necessary and
more fundamental for the metzuvah.

If you then look at sechar as the neshamah experiencing the benefits
of that effect, then since the metzuveh is more effected, he ends
up with more sechar.

To put it another way, the fact that his neshamah is such that it
would get greater sechar for that action is the whole reason why
he's the metzuveh.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org            And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

From: Eli Turkel <turkel@icase.edu>
> I just went to a wedding in NJ with a temani groom and they had 8 
> sheva berachot (sorry for the self contradiction). The second beracha was
>  boreh minei besamim.
 
> I don't reacll seeing this at sefardi weddings. Does anyone know 
> the origin if this minhag and how widespread it is.>>

AIUI, fairly common. Every Syrian Jewish wedding I've been too has
done this.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

Things have been kinda dull around here lately...

I recently began, BEZ"H, saying my shiur at Beis Medrash Harav Shmuel 
Yaakov, The IDT Center for Torah and Technology in Newark, NJ, where we 
have a very nice Olam of about 60 talmidim pursuing a dual curriculum of 
Gemara b'Iyun and Yeshiva learning in the morning and Computer Networking 
and Business in the afternoons. we are learning Kiddushin.

So, Rabbosai, there are many diyyukim to be made in the Rashi's on the 
Mishna, as I am, sure you have all noticed over the years.

Nu, let's try this Rashi: V'kona es atzma: "Lee'heyos b'reshusa l'hinosei 
l'acher." Why are the two statements in Rashi not redundant?




KT,
YGB

ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

In response to a private query:
>Hi. Can you explain b'kitzur, what the doctrines of "yechida kelolis
>[kelolit?]" and "bittul" are? I have not followed the whole discussion,
>either, and cannot find the post from Micha to which you referred.
thanks

There are knowledgeable Lubavitchers here - and in another (family)
group in which I participate, to which I am cc'ing this e-mail - so
perhaps you will receive more elucidation later, but b'kitzur:

The doctrine of yechida kelolis exists in many Kabbalistic and Chassidic
systems of thought. Its axiom is that the neshamos of certain individuals
are connected to On High via the pipeline that run through other,
higher placed, individuals. This takes place on various levels, with
relative yechidos for numerous groupings. The term is taken from the
Kabbalistic term for the highest realm of the Neshomo, the yechido,
which means Connection. In Lubavitch, it is axiomatic that there is one
Yechida Kelolis - individual in each generation, that is the Grand or
General Connector to On High, and that position is not one of merit,
i.e., there are not multiple candidates for the position, but, rather,
since the time of the Best, it is assigned to the Head of Chassidus,
which, since the Ba'al haTanya, is the Lubavitcher Rebbe of the Dor.

Many positions stem from this idea.

Bittul is, indeed, to the best of my understanding, a po'al yotzei of
yechida kelolis: Since one must be mevattel one's ratzon to HKB"H, and
since the Rebbe is the representative of HKB"H here Below, the extension
of Bittul to HKB"H is Bitul to the Rebbe. If I understand correctly, there
is inherent in this principle a form of the Emunah Peshutah espoused by
Chassidus in general, directed concurrently and congruently to the Rebbe.

I apologize if I am not doing justice to the concepts and invite
correction.

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

[See also the archives v2n94 to v2n101. -mi]

Over Shabbos, I spoke to my esrog macher. He told me that he's not
selling esrogim this year - only lulavim. I asked him if that could
potentially be machshil people who buy a lulav from him and then buy
a non-otzar beis din esrog from someone else (because the standard in
Motzei Shviis is that you buy the esrog agav the lulav). Comments?

As to otzar beis din esrogim, my argument is that all the beis din can
charge for is transport, and therefore all esrogim, regardless of quality,
should cost more or less the same thing. He argued that higher quality
esrogim should cost more because they have more shomrim to prevent
bletlach at the beis din's expense. Anyone know how it works?

Anyone know why we can't solve the whole problem (at least in Israel)
by cutting all the esrogim after Rosh HaShanna? (Esrog goes basar l'kita.

Finally, for those of you in chutz la'aretz where are you getting
esrogim this year? Otzar beis din is assur to take out of Eretz Yisrael,
and according to many (if not most) shitos, any yivul shviis (including
heter mechira and land of goyim - and I doubt there are any Arabs growing
esrogim) is assur to take out of Eretz Yisrael. I remember once during
shmitta getting an esrog from Greece when I was in the US - do they
still do that?

Seven years is a long time to remember....

-- Carl

Carl M. Sherer, Adv. Silber, Schottenfels, Gerber & Sherer
Telephone 972-2-625-7751 Fax 972-2-625-0461 eFax (US) 1-253-423-1459
mailto:cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il             mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

"Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu> wrote:
>                               I repleid: "Because I do not accept the
> doctrines of 'Yechida Kelolis' and 'Bittul.'"

> I have not followed this whole discussion, but it seemed to me that
> Micha raised the YK point and was essentially ignored. One cannot have an
> educated (and dispassionate!) discussion of this topic without, first,
> some familiarity and understanding of these two concepts that, I think,
> underlie modern Chabad.

I'm not exactly sure what discussion you are reffering to.

If the belief is that at the very least the Rebbe (who is now dead) will
arise to be Moshiach to the exclusion of all others... is this Apikursus.

How do the concepts of Yechidah Klalis and Bittul have any bearing on
this and does it make any difference?

HM

> I'm not exactly sure what discussion you are reffering to.

There have been TWO interwoven discussions:

1) The Rebbe as Moshiach pre-petira
2 Rebbe rising from the dead to be moshiach

>
> How do the concepts of Yechidah Klalis and Bittul have any bearing on
> this and does it make any difference?

It makes a big difference with #1 -- most of the chabad comments/attitudes
have been understood by list members from a NON-CHABAD worldview. IOW, they
have been taken out of the metaphysical worldview in which they were said
and understood.

Akiva

RHM:
>How do the concepts of Yechidah Klalis and Bittul have
>any bearing on this and does it make any difference?

The a priori assumption is that the YK (the reigning L Rebbe) is the 
presumptive Moshiach of the generation. The po'al yotzei of Bittul is that 
it is extremely difficult, if not outright impossible, to contradict or 
dispute statements of a Rebbe.

The entire internal debate in Lubavitch is based on these two yesodos. A 
Misnaged, and probably many Chagas Chassidim, would reject, or, at best, 
accept only to a very limited extent, those presumptions, and is thus 
generally incapable of understanding the Chabad dilemma.

(RHM is well aware of my personal position on the matter. But that is, for 
now, irrelevant.)

				      =-=

From a very, very knowledgeable source (identity protected), my comments 
interspersed:

>Now re yechidoh haklolis and bitul. you make it sound as if the 
>interpretation you give is a Chassidic innovation. Incorrect. The concept of

I thought I had clarified that it is also a Kabbalistic concept. I am 
skeptical about the sources in Nigleh, however. I do not think that Rashi , 
for example, proves anything about YK. I believe I have quoted the Besht 
about RC before, and while it indicates the concept of tzinoros, I do not 
think it can be taken to be a literal affirmation of RCBD's status as the YK.

>neshomoh kelolis (compounding all neshomos and being the tzinor for them) 
>and its equivalent of tzadik yessod olam (in this sense) is purely Chazal. 
>See Shir Rabba on 1:3 (I:64); Mechilta on Shemos 15:13; cf. Tik. Zohar 
>70:138a; Zohar I:25a II:191b and III:9a. More specifically see Zohar 
>II:47a, and cf. Bamidbar Rabba 19:28 and Tanchuma Chukas:23 (cited by 
>Rashi for peshuto shel mikro (!!!) leben chomesh lemikro - that hanossi hu 
>hakol). Al pi Zohar and Kabboloh, tzadik yessod olam is the principle that 
>the tzadik is the sefiroh of Yessod which is the link between heaven and 
>hearth. Early meforshim, before Chassidus (where this was strongly 
>emphasized by Baal Shem Tov and Maggid), already interpret the mishnah kol 
>ha'olam nizon bishvil Chanino bni means that R. Chanino was the shvil 
>(tzinor) for all hamshochos to this world (Remak, Alshich, Shaloh etc.). 
>And just as Eretz Yisroel (and there itself  more spec. Yerusholayim) is 
>sha'ar Hashomayim (mitamtziso shel EY nizon kol ha'olam), so Am Yisroel is 
>for all mankind (bishvil Yisroel), and so is the tzadik within Am Yisroel 
>- the very core and heart of klal Yisroel (see Tikunei Zohar 21:50b, and 
>cf.Hilchot Melochim 3:6, and also ibid. 2:6).

Below my impeccable source claims Bittul is also a Misnagdic concept 
demanded by Halacha. Not quite sure, but I would like to relate a well 
known yeshiveshe joke in this context. They say that if R' Chaim had said 
that a table had a din of a cow R' Velvel (the Brisker Rav) would explain 
that both have four legs, both are gidulei karka , etc.

Reb Baruch Ber would proceed to milk the table.

>Likewise re bitul to tzadik etc. - that is straightforward halochoh 
>relating to kovod rabbo, with all the details of hameharher acharei rabbo 
>etc., emunas
>chachomim etc. (note Yer. Berochos 2:1 and Shekolim 2:5, cf. Yevomos 96b - 
>re R. Eleazar and R. Yochanan, and al derech zeh innumerable instances). 
>See "The Concept of the Rebbe-Tzadik" in Chassidic Dimensions. When Chabad 
>ascribes that to its Nossi, it is not spec. Chabad: every Chassidic 
>"dynasty" does so with its Nossi, and so do non-Chassidic (true) bnei 
>Torah with their Rebbes. When R. Boruch Ber would repeat teachings of R. 
>Chaim, he did so with precise copying of even all his physical motions - 
>interrupting with saying "and here the Rebbe coughed, and here the Rebbe 
>sneezed, and here the Rebbe did this etc.), and in total bitul to R. Chaim 
>he took all his words literal kipeshuto (was told a number of fascinating 
>details re this by some of his talmidim).

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

From: "Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" 
<sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>
> Nu, let's try this Rashi: V'kona es atzma: "Lee'heyos b'reshusa l'hinosei 
> l'acher." Why are the two statements in Rashi not redundant?

L'Aniyat Daati, although the gist is the same, the first half -  Lee'heyos 
b'reshusa - could additionally be meramez that her father no longer has 
Reshut over her, after the first marriage.

L'Shanah Tovah TikaTeiv V'TeiChateim
Stuart Goldstein

On Sun, Sep 09, 2001 at 12:11:15AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer wrote:
: Nu, let's try this Rashi: V'kona es atzma: "Lee'heyos b'reshusa l'hinosei 
: l'acher." Why are the two statements in Rashi not redundant?

Li nir'eh Rashi's difficulty is in defining kinyan in this situation.
I think it only SEEMS obvious to us because we're used to mistranslating
"ba'alus" into something that fits western legal concepts.

As I understood RGS's resolution to VIDC #7, with the exception of
"bal yeira'eh", ba'alus is generally defined in terms of two elements:
control over the object, and responsibility for the object. Not in terms
of an abstract concept of "ownership".

When we discussed the appropriateness of using the term "kinyan" for nisu'in,
I noted that according to RYBS, kinyan is a means of assuming responsibility
for an object. A man is koneh a wife because he is being mischayav himself
in she'eir kesus ve'ona'ah.

As the ishah is responsible for her own actions (e.g. nezek) before
geirushin, this is an interesting use of the word "kinyan". Here is
refers to the other side of ba'alus -- she gains a greater measure
of independence and self-determination.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                        ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                           - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

"Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" wrote:
> Nu, let's try this Rashi: V'kona es atzma: "Lee'heyos b'reshusa l'hinosei
> l'acher." Why are the two statements in Rashi not redundant?

This is only one statement, which I would translate as "so that she alone has
the authority to marry herself to another".

David Riceman

From: Eli Turkel <turkel@icase.edu>
>> I just went to a wedding in NJ with a temani groom and they had 8
>> sheva berachot (sorry for the self contradiction). The second beracha was 
>> boreh minei besamim.

From: Gershon Dubin <gershon.dubin@juno.com>
> AIUI, fairly common. Every Syrian Jewish wedding I've been too has
> done this.

As do many Sephardi Britot, as well.

L'Shanah Tovah TikaTeiv V'TeiChateim
Stuart

From: "Rena Freedenberg" <free@actcom.co.il>
> There is a facet of human nature that causes people to be very resistant to 
> being "told what to do"....

But this should play no role in Kiyum HaMitzvot at all. Putting aside any 
personal Hana'ah that a person may derive from doing a mitzvah, do we not do 
what we do because the Torah (or Chazal) says so ? I fulfill the Taryag 
mitzvot for that reason and I don't see the need to dream up or look for 
additional ways to serve HKBH, except perhaps to enhance the performance. 
I'm just fine with what HKBH has commanded me and don't need to come up with 
it on my own. IMO, this would flirt dangerously with Lo Tosifu. Only a fool 
would refuse the doctor's prescribed medicine because he wants to come up 
with the diagnosis and treatment himself.

L'Shanah Tovah TikaTeiv V'TeiChateim
Stuart Goldstein

kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:
> Here's another example of the same phenomenon: Many people (and I am
> too good an example of this) find it very difficult to avoid various
> nosherei in general, but have no problem avoiding it on a taanis.

There is something called "contextual memory".  Basically there are some
places and times that make it easier to remember some things.  A classic
example is that people do better on tests given in the classroom where they
studied the material than elsewhere.  If your problem is remebering not to
nibble rather than restraining yourself I suspect this may have something to
do with it.

David Riceman

On Thu, Sep 06, 2001 at 09:10:00PM -0400, kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:
: Here's another example of the same phenomenon: Many people (and I am
: too good an example of this) find it very difficult to avoid various
: nosherei in general, but have no problem avoiding it on a taanis.

: Put these two phenomena together, and I am led to suspect that mitzvos
: strengthen our yetzer tov and help us to do the right thing...

Another idea, which I believe to be another hesber of the same answer.

The ability for smokers to go 25 hours each week without a cigarette is
a ra'ayah for the existance of a neshamah yeseirah. After all, the N"Y
isn't addicted...

-mi

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