Avodah Mailing List

Volume 08 : Number 052

Tuesday, November 20 2001

• Re: herzl
• Herzl
• Re: Avodah V8 #51
• Re: ikkarim as halacha
• Re: Ikkarim as Halakha?
• Re: Avodah V8 #49
• Mitzvos einum tzerichos kavanah
• Re: Herzl
• Re: TIDE and TuM
• Re: TIDE and TuM
• Re: Ikkarim as Halakha?
• Re: Ikkarim as Halakha?
• Re: "Un-saneh Tokef" (was "ikkarim as halacha")
• Halachic Definition of Tzaddik
• Definition of zaddik

Dr. Shinnar's views are non-normative. They are not heretical - simply
wrong. Nevertheless...

At 10:14 AM 11/16/01 -0500, Shinnar, Meir wrote:
>I would like to thank Rena for educating me (RYGB and RMB can tell you
>it isn't an easy job:-) :-)_. However, the alleged error isn't mine -
>I was citing RAYK in his hesped of Herzl (to be found in his ma'amare
>reayah) To complicate matters, AFAIK, the former sephardic chief rav
>of tel aviv, Chaim Yosef Dov Halevy, called David Ben Gurion mashiach
>ben yosef.. Rena is of course entitled to object, as many others have,
>but please be aware of who the real ba'al plugta is, before one becomes
>certain of one's opinions and the falsity of others

Don't be nasty to Rena. It is you who misunderstood. They were of the 
opinion that MBY is a political leader, and that if follows that just like 
there is a person ra'ui to be MBD in every generation, so too there is a 
person ra'ui to be MBY in every generation. Kinda like R' Akiva and BK. But 
if that person does not do teshuva, he may have accomplished a nitzoz of 
what MBY is supposed to accomplish, but ehr bliebt a rosho.

>WADR, my understanding of the tanach and gemara is that the way to
>become a tzaddik (and therefore accumulate the zchuyot) is to conquer
>one's yetzer hara, and lefi za'ara agra. Is there any textual support
>for this distinction between zaddik b'dino and zaddik for zt"l? (not
>a zaddik elyon, not a zaddik in a hasidic sense, but one for whom the
>term zt"l would be appropriate??)I would be happy (as I think most on
>the list would be) to be one who fits the rambam's definition of a zaddik.

Chalila v'chas!!!

"Chayav Odom lomar mosai yagi'u ma'asai l'ma'asei Avosai!"

The Rambam's definition of the persona of a tzaddik is in the Moreh, p. 413 
of RYK's ed. Herzl met none of those criteria.

>(I would add, that there is something strange about the whole discussion
>- I can not remember a single previous time when asking for the textual
>sources was jumped upon as unnecessary (RMB - "The textual basis? What
>about simple translation of the word.?" ) and when a clear source to the
>contrary was found it was dismissed immediately as not relevant without
>evidence. Again, RMB and RYGB posited that the scale of zchuyot (allowing
>for status in olam haemet) is different than the scale for zaddik -
>and I wonder about such a distinction - and think it is quite a hiddush.

If you really need mekoros, read the Mesillas Yeshorim from beginning to 
end, and you will get an idea of how one becomes the tzaddik of zt"l, but 
if that does not suffice, I will get you more.

>RYGB
>> The issue of lishma is critical to one's status in the Olam ho'Emes. See
>> the last Rambam in the Peirush ha'Mishnayos in Makkos.

>Yes, doing a mitzva lishma is better than lo lishma and Yeshaya Lebowitz
>has a whole theology over lishma. However, what precisely lishma means

Not better - only lishma counts.

Who cares what Lebowitz thought?! Surely since you found my purely abstract 
analogy to Hitler repugnant (see below) you will join me in excoriating an 
individual who actually called temimus'dike Jews Nazis! Afrah l'pumei!


>is of course not quite so clear - Herzl was not doing it (at least
>to start - the issue of his children is a strange saga that I don't
>know what the truth is. Remember, that the Haaretz is in some ways as
>antizionistic as the yated, albeit from the opposite end of the spectrum)
>for personal aggrandizement, but for the sake of the mitzva of saving jews
>(even if he might not have phrased it as for the sake of the mitzva..).
>What the proper definition and kavana of lishma means is a source of
>much controversy. However, in general, when we have someone with major
>accomplishments, we don't sit there picking at them and saying maybe
>they weren't lishma. we especially tend to be dan lkhaf zchut those who
>helped save israel (hayonatan yamut asher asa hayeshua hazot..)

Huh? Dan l'kaf zechus? On what basis? Was he a Marrano-like Ma'amin?! As 
the CC (whom, of course, you probably regard as no greater than Herzl!) 
said, l'kaf zechus, not l'kaf shtus.

>If I could summarize your argument (insofar as I understand it) initially,
>you had argued that my logic was so tortured that it could justify great
>evil (Hitler, Haman, Osama.(great company, and their use does prove
>the ideological bent of the discussion (regardless of any denials) -
>today any comparison with Hitler is not ideologically neutral or a purely
>logical point). I hope that that line is abandoned.

Nope.

>Now, (if I understand it) you are arguing something quite different - not
>that my logic can be used to justify evil, but that the mere act of doing
>good does not guarantee status, as the issue of lishma arises. While that
>can be discussed (as is partially done above) , I am one who has always
>argued for the validity of multiple viewpoints, and would point out that
>this was argued from a RZ perspective, which, as cited by RAYK and the
>DR, seemed not to have the problem giving Herzl the status I do (the DR
>does specifically give it in olam ha'emet,,) We are told olam haemet is
>an olam hafuch, and the ribbono shel olam will make his own heshbonot.
>However, we do have an obligation to be makir tov, and the sources cited
>seem adequate justification for my using the honorific ztl for herzl,
>While RYGB and I have frequently disagreed, this is the first time that
>I just do not comprehend the logic (although I do comprehend the emotion).

It is wrong from a RZ viewpoint. I am sorry you have a problem with the 
logic. I was not arguing any perspective, just simple truth.


[A 2nd email... -mi]

I deeply apologize for my wrong response to the raising of the Rambam Hil 
Teshuvah. I was right about the distinction between the persona of a 
tzaddik and a tzaddik b'dino, but I left an imp[roper inference that Herzl 
was by definition a tzaddik b'dino!

My own reference to Mesillas Yeshorim brought me jarringly back to reality.

To brazenly assert that one who was not Oved Hashem, did not to our 
knowledge to teshuva, and besides was a Mechallel Shabbos, Ochel tereifos 
etc., because of some collateral zechus is therefore a tzaddik b'dino, is 
nothing lessthan the Christian doctrine of saving grace, and inimical to 
Jewish concepts of reward and punishment!

Kol Tuv,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

 From an anonymous Oved:
>See Tanya Perek 1.
>Since when do we pasken "mitzvot eyn tzrichot kavana" (esp. by deorayso)?
>Bichlal this whole discussion is unbelieveble.

> Again, this is confusion of ends and means. Cheileq li'olam haba is the
> yedi'ah. Knowledge is a noun. Learning is a verb, the means to obtain
> that noun -- it is only the means to the reward. And the only reason
> why it is the means is because Hashem chose to create us without innately
> having that yedi'ah. Why?

I'll go back to something I said yesterday. The reward cannot be
appreciated unless one lives his or her life enmeshed in the struggle. The
process of dealing with this enmeshment, of using Torah to find a way out,
is the process of obtaining true knowledge. In that sense knowledge is
the only means to the reward.

Put another way, there is no true Torah learning without concomitantly
challenging life experience. The ups and downs, the joy, the fear,
the horror of life are the tools through which that which is learned in
shiur is learned in the heart.

I see Micha's point, but I don't see it as a paradox.

David Finch

>Putting it into the Siddur does not in and of itself make it normative
>Rather having been in the Siddur w/o Mach'ah is a pretty good raya
>that it IS normative.
...
>Those who dissented agianst Yigdal include the Ari. AIUI - I have
>not seen this ARI inside - that is because there are MORE than 13
>ikkarim leda'ato.  AFAIK he does not dispute any of the 13, rather
>he objects to the implication that there are ONLY 13.  Kach
>shama'itti.

why the Ari objected to Yigdal is not clear and there are numerous
theories. Rav Dovid Cohen suggests that the author (whom he guesses)
wrote love poems and so was disqualified for a piece in the siddur.
RYBS doesn't like yigdal because he feels it resembles a catechism.
Chabad leaves out the 13 ikkarim (didn't look at yigdal) because some
people feel that this denigrates other mitzvot etc.

In the modern era one almost never sees a prayer removed because people
object. Have you ever seen a machzor that leaves out the prayers to the
angels (machnisee rachamim)? Once it is there no one will eliminate it.

On Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2001 14:11:00 EST, RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com wrote
> IOW, while there is a machlokes, while the matter is in flux it is OK
> to dissent.

> BUT once the matter has been paskened, dissent is no longer OK.

> Psak evolves chronologically. Just Because RT wore RT Tefilin does
> not necessarliy mean we are yotzei today with RT Tefillin.

> OTOH some things have never been paskened finally. Zmanei Hayyom and
> the issue of davening Maariv after Plag are still in flux.

I have a problem with the idea that psak is strictly chronologoical and
that once something has been paskened, we cannot dissent (theoretically,
in the case of ikkarim) anymore.

First, whatever happened to the special status of 'hatimat hasas? "Hatimat
hashas was (or so I thought) the last event when we had a real hierarchy
that had some power to pasken definitely, and even then some matter
that had been in flux since days of tannaim could not be resolved
(i.e. teiku, etc.).

Second, whatever happened to the notion of ein lekhah elah shofet
shebeyamekha?

Third, all this assumes that the case had really been ruled upon. However,
often it is minhag, the charismatic personality of a leader and politics
that dictated what was perceived as the prevalent psak.

Thus, if French talmidei 'hakhamim were not as involved in philosophical
inquiry as the Middle Eastern ones, it was easy to say that they al
agreed with rabenu Yonah who was extremely opposed to Moreh Nevukhim etc,
whereas the reality was that it didn't quite catch on sufficiently for too
many people to resist the adherents of rabenu Yonah. Likewise, a general
tendency to read www.chumraoftheday.g-d will give an impression that in
all matters of shiurim, the halakhah is really according to 'Hazon Ish
plus, rather than rav 'Haim Noeh. This is a more common case of lo rainu
eino ra'ayah as many, including the Beit Yossef, argue that there is no
impediment for women to act as sho'hatim (YD 1:1). At least in that case,
the ma'hmirim (Ramo, etc.) have a logic why lo rainu should be a raayah,
but that does not work in many cases.

Likewise, it is hard to say that a certain issue was ruled upon when
instead it was not dealt with because of a political decision which was
important to klal Israel. It is not difficult to make the case that the
'Hatam Sofer's attitudes toward innovations in 'hinukh did not come
about becuse of thorough consideration, but because he felt that the
time was wrong as all of klal Israel's might had to be used to resist
Reform. This may or may not be correct, but it is reasonable, and in
no way diminishes his stature, as his main job was the future of klal
Israel, not any particular question.

Fourth, I believe it is the CI who pointed out that in psak, you cannot
count the rishonim who hold one way and those who hold the other way,
and count which is the majority opinion, as they never debated the matter
with each other, and often just reitterated their rebbi's opinion. Thus,
when Ramban says something and Rashbah & Ritvah repeat it, you have
one opinion, not three. We therefore almost never have majority among
rishonim, and must always understand halakhah in terms of rishonim's
shitot.

The principle that you must evaluate in terms of rishonim's ideas was
used frequently to resist silly combination 'humrot, such as the desire
of some to require a tzurat hapessa'h on a pirzah pa'hot me'esser in a
neighborhood/citywide eiruv on the grounds that we are generally ma'hmir
to consider streets as not being a mavui. Rav Zalman Margulis explained
that rishonim only spoke about the doubt of our streets being 'hatzer
or mavui, and since even for a 'hatzer, a pirtzah pa'hot me'esser needs
no tzurat hapessa'h, a le'hi or korah of the mavui suffices.

The principle that talmidim who confirm a rebbi'ss opinion are counted
as one bar plugta rather thanseveral was, according to a story about
establishing the correct date for Yom Kippur when the Mirrer yeshivah
was in Shanghai, used against the psak of the CI.

Finally, in the case of articles of belief, one can readily make a
case that belief cannot be paskened upon just like actions (habitual
psak), because belief is a search for the truth, and you cannot
pasken truth. Either it is or it isn't truth. Many of the ikkarim
flow from Rambam's love of aristotelian thought, and many who came
after him rejected this philosophy in favor of neoplatonism, kabbalah,
younameit... If we reevaluate the Rambam's formulation of the ikkarim and
the philosophy behind them, we may no longer find all of it so ocnvincing,
at least not to the point that they are so obvious and important that even
"women, bondsmen and children" should be taught about them.

Rambam's approach to ikkarim is that you have to shove it down everybody's
troat, because they are so basic. If it turns out they are not so basic,
then, ipso facto, they should no longer be ikkarim.

Reb Carl mentioned about a month ago that ikkarim are to be treated as
regular halakhah, as is implied by zaken mamre. I am not sure (i.e. I
didn't check the sources recently) but I recall that zaken mamre does not
come about unles (a) the person is a zaken, it est a member of Sanhedrin,
AND (b) he doesn't just disagree with the majority, but orders others to
do so. Thus, the halakhot of zaken mamre explicitly exclude disagreement
in thought, and concentrate on the orders to violate the majority opinio,
which undermines the power of the Sanhedrin. Think of the mishnah in Rosh
Hahshanah, were raban Gamliel ordered rabbi Yoshua to travel to him on
the day when the latter believed should be declared Yom Kippur. Rabban
Gamliel did not order him to recant, but merely to accept the majority
opinion _lema'aseh_. There is no discusison there about what one believes
is true, and about convincing rabbi Yoshua. This is further indicated
by the argument that otherwise, we would always have to go after "kol
beit din u-veit din miymot Mosheh rabenu".

Coming back to the beginning of this paragraph, only such beliefs which
are clearly axioms with which we function, can be definitely raised to
the level of ikkarim lekhol hade'ot. I will repeat that I propose rav
Yossef Albo's three ikkarim as more workable, and as for the thirteen
ikkarim, we should produce a (number of) work(s) that investigate the
ikkarim in depth both historically and philosophically. If it succeeds,
we will then be able to have a discussion on whether they are binding
and most importantly, why. How about starting a wiki (see for example,
www.wikipedia.org, it is a collaborative work, which fits avodah areivim
perfectly. Comments?)

Arie Folger

On Thu, Nov 15, 2001 at 10:15:11PM -0500, DFinchPC@aol.com wrote:
: Alas, I'm not sure I buy all of it. At their best, RYBS's philosophical
: writings, if perhaps not his psak, reveal him to be tortured man. He
: might have preached that Torah and Maddah are "twin peaks which remain
: forever asunder," that "no synthesis exists," but deep down I don't
: think he really believed it.

RYBS's hashkafah is firmly grounded in the Kantian idea that man in
in constant tension between different sides of unresolvable dialectics.
Therefore, in experiential terms, many things are "twin peaks which remain
forever asunder even if ontologically they could be unified.

In this case, yes both are expressions of the same Creator. However, RYBS
did not tend to discuss things on that level. Rather, he focussed on the
fact that existentially, they are going to remain unfusable in the human
experience.

Man's goal is not to unify them -- as that is beyond us. Rather, it is
to constantly strive for their unity.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                        ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                           - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

On Fri, Nov 16, 2001 at 01:55:54PM -0500, RYGB forwarded an anonymous post:
:> Since when do we pasken "mitzvot eyn tzrichot kavana" (esp. by deorayso)?

I thought biderech kelal we do, with exceptions for avodah shebaleiv and
the like.

In any case, the expression has to do with being yotzei chovaso, not
sechar. If you say METK, chiyuvim exist to provide opportunities for
kavanah. HQBH realized that we lack sufficient control of our thoughts
to require be able to utilize every opportunity. Therefore, hirba lahem
Torah uMitzvos (again, see Rambam sham).

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                        ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                           - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

I do not have much to add that would not simply be repeating myself. A
couple of connected observations:

The halachic definition of tzaddiq was raised. I wonder why halachah
would have a need to define it. Unlike apikursus, meenus or kefirah,
where we were able to make a list of halachos that are impacted. I
also wonder why we all jumped to the notion of halachic definition
when the conversation until then was aggadic.

Another was RMS's comment:
: Rather than focusing on zaddik (with its emotionally laden
: connotations), I will focus on zechuyot, as the initial discussion
: was precisely whether Herzl gets credit for his actions, and
: (as above), I for one am willing to equate zechuyot and zaddik.

But the whole topic under discussion is an emotional one!

Between these two factors, we are Brisk-izing an inherently unBrisk
subject.

One last nequdah: Tzidqus (as used in this context) is an absolute.
Someone who lacked the background or opportunity to be a tzadiq still
is not a tzadiq. Zechuyos are lefum tza'arah, and therefore can be
accrued even without succeeding in an absolute sense.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                        ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                           - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

> RYBS's hashkafah is firmly grounded in the Kantian idea that man in
> in constant tension between different sides of unresolvable dialectics.
> Therefore, in experiential terms, many things are "twin peaks which remain
> forever asunder even if ontologically they could be unified.

Could you give an example/define unify and unity?

KT
Joel Rich

On Tue, Nov 20, 2001 at 09:48:49AM -0500, Joelirich@aol.com wrote:
:> RYBS's hashkafah is firmly grounded in the Kantian idea that man in
:> in constant tension between different sides of unresolvable dialectics.
:> Therefore, in experiential terms, many things are "twin peaks which remain
:> forever asunder even if ontologically they could be unified.

: Could you give an example/define unify and unity?

Well, say we found some hashkafic reason why the few givens in physics
had to be the way they are. Then we would have a single system of thought
that includes both. And yet, we would still find science and Torah to
be different callings, often giving us conflicting priorities.

Another example: Adam I and Adam II are clearly unifiable. People do have
both worldviews and self-perceptions. And we can intellectually understand
how man can be both the pinacle of creation and capable of mastering it, and
yet also the seeker of redemption and a covenant with G-d. And yet, in real
life, these are sources of dialectic tension, of differing values and
priorities.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org            And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

In a message dated 11/20/01 8:43:42am EST, Arie Folger afolger@ymail.yu.edu
writes:
> Coming back to the beginning of this paragraph, only such beliefs which
> are clearly axioms with which we function, can be definitely raised to
> the level of ikkarim lekhol hade'ot. I will repeat that I propose rav
> Yossef Albo's three ikkarim as more workable, and as for the thirteen
> ikkarim, we should produce a (number of) work(s) that investigate the
> ikkarim in depth both historically and philosophically. If it succeeds,
> we will then be able to have a discussion on whether they are binding
> and most importantly, why....

I'll make this simple
R. Yehoshua MIGHT have been correct re: his caluclatoin of Zmin over and
aobve R. Gamleil, but if his shita became normative it would cause chaos.
See R. Akiva nd R. Dosa Ben Hyrcanos.

I posit that if we take the Svar avenue that Albo's Ikkarim are sjuperior
and ignore the way it devloped we can trump Msaorash with Svara. The
implications are that NO Halachah is ever paskened forever. See Arvei
Pseachim (kuf) re: RSBG and R. yosei and R. Yehudah.

The alternative is that no psak after the Gmara is permanent. Good luck
with that one! <smile>.

I am not challenging one's intlelletual right to agree with R. Yeshohusa,
but I agre with R. Gamliel, you cannot undo psak just to promote ones'
ideosyncratic opionion of how Halachah SHOULD have evolved instead of
how it DID evolve.

Yiphtach bedoro kishmuel bedoro is simple. You cannot go back and undo
the way a call was amde. Imagine baseball if we could appeal/reapel
every controversial call by every umpire made since the tart of the
major leagues. When an umpire makes a call, it is final and the results -
no matter how flawed - are the basis for the record books.

E.G.: I know that the Yankees benefitted in 1996 from a "bad" call. I
am not proposing that they return their World Series Rings either.

Maybe those Rishonim who objected to Kol Nidre were correct. But I am
not about to rip it out of my machzor at this point in time!

If every decision is subject to revision, where is the sof davar?

Regards and Kol Tuv,
RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com

In a message dated 11/20/01 I wrote that
>> only such beliefs which
>> are clearly axioms with which we function, can be definitely raised to
>> the level of ikkarim lekhol hade'ot. I will repeat that I propose rav
>> Yossef Albo's three ikkarim as more workable <snip>

On Tuesday 20 November 2001 11:50, RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com replied:
> R. Yehoshua MIGHT have been correct re: his caluclatoin of Zmanim over and
> above R. Gamleil, but if his shita became normative it would cause chaos.
> See R. Akiva nd R. Dosa Ben Hyrcanos.

In hakhi name, which means that disagreements which don't cause chaos,
suach as details of the ikkarim, should not be subjected to DNAs in
psak. Remember that the mishnah emphasizes the potential for chaos,
because if we follow rabbi Yoshu'a, we ave "leharher a'har kol beit din
u-veit din miyemot Mosheh rabenu".

> I posit that if we take the Svar avenue that Albo's Ikkarim are superior
> and ignore the way it devloped we can trump Masorash with Svara. The 
> implications are that NO Halachah is ever paskened forever. See Arvei
> Pesachim (kuf) re: RSBG and R. yosei and R. Yehudah.

I posit that rav Yossef Albo's ikkarim are superior because there are
too many details of the 13 ikkarim on which too many rishonim disagree
with Rambam, and that many of the sources of disagreement are accepted
as mainstream. Think of the implications of 10 sefirot for 13 ikkarim,
etc. Also,I do not think that choosing RYB's ikkarim over Rambam will
cause chaos. If anything, it i strict application of the 13 ikkarim as
halakhah which can cause chaos, because we will suddenly have to declare
too many of a'heinu bnei Israel as heretics.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger has a note somewhere (it should be either in hilkhot
gilua'h or in the halakhot re: 'herem and nidui) that nowadays we can't
put a Jew in 'herem simply because he shaves with a blade, because too
many Jews do so and it doesn't make sense that we should have to put
so many Jews in 'herem. The implication is that here too, unless there
is a potential for great chaos, we should find ways to avoid calling
people heretics.

> The alternative is that no psak after the Gmara is permanent.  Good luck
> with that one! <smile>.

Well, we do often call upon this principle.

> I am not challenging one's intlelletual right to agree with R. Yeshohusa,
> but I agre with R. Gamliel, you cannot undo psak just to promote ones'
> ideosyncratic opionion of how Halachah SHOULD have evolved instead of how
> it DID evolve.

As I mentioned in my post, ikkarim are predominantly concerned with
elementary absolute truth, which is itself not subject to psak, since
it either is or isn't truth. Unless you bring me proof that there are
2 dinim in ikkarim, which can evolve separately, so that we may opt
to rule on the heretic issue even if we are unsure about the ikkarim
status or truthfulness of a certain ikkar, I will maintain that you
cannot separate these into 2 dinim.

> Yiphtach bedoro kishmuel bedoro is simple. You cannot go back and undo the
> way a call was amde.  Imagine baseball if we could appeal/reapel every
> controversial call by every umpire made since the tart of the major
> leagues. When an umpire makes a call, it is final and the results - no
> matter how flawed - are the basis for the record books.

The umpire's calls are clearly psak, and there is no absolute truth
in baseball, it is a series of actions, not a philosophy. OTOH, I know
nothing about baseball other than that the Yankees and Mets play baseball
(I believe, but you may correct me).

> Maybe those Rishonim who objected to Kol Nidre were correct. But I am not
> about to rip it out of my machzor at this point in time!
>
> If every decision is subject to revision, where is the sof davar?

As I said, this is about absolute truths, and as such should be subject
to constant study. The numerous Jewish philosophers, including but
not limited to Rambam, considered it a duty of emunah to philopsophize
about these matters. The Rambam even wrote that he is convinced that
since Torah is truth, one will not arrive at proving Torah ideas wrong
by engaging in philosophical dialectic that follows strict logic
(as opposed to simply making nihillistic or relativistic statements,
which don't prove much positively, just may undermine proofs.)

Regards and Kol Tuv,
Arie Folger

In Avodah V8 #50, ETurkel asked:
> BTW Nesanei Tokef is from R. Amnon.
> Immediately afterwards we say berosh hashana
> Is that also from R. Amnon?

and CSherer answered:
> AIUI at least until "maavirin es roah ha'gzeira" is from R. Amnon.

News to me; as I respect Carl's "understanding," I asked more than
one adam choshuv in my community (starting with REMTeitz) and didn't
find anyone who had the same understanding. For one thing, and along
the lines that have been discussed in a separate thread re what can be
inferred from published siddurim, a new paragraph ("b'RH yikosaivun")
starts long before "maavirin" (e.g. in an Amsterdam 1792 machzor
I inherited, different piyutim are noted as such before they start
[with commentary, etc.], and this new paragraph is thus annotated);
for another, the nitty-gritty "what happens at this time of year" tone
of this [2nd] paragraph is quite different than the elevated "what's
spiritually uplifting about this day" tone of "Un-saneh Tokef."

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

In a message dated 11/20/01 9:47:20am EST, micha@aishdas.org writes:
> The halachic definition of tzaddiq was raised. I wonder why halachah
> would have a need to define it. Unlike apikursus, meenus or kefirah,
> where we were able to make a list of halachos that are impacted....

FWIW
The Chachmas Adam has an entire hierarchy of where to bury people based upon 
whether they are a 
Chasid
Taddik Gamur
Plain old Tzaddik
etc.

I don't know his sources.. 

re: A Ba'al Teshuva he CAN be buried next to a Tzaddik Gamur but is NOT
the madreiga of a Chassid.

Point: These chilukkim can have Halachic Ramifications

Regards and Kol Tuv,
RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com

With regard to the Rambam, Hilkhot Tshuva, 3:1, where he defines mi
shezechuyotav merubot al avonotav zaddik

RYGB suggests that this is not the definition of a zaddik, but a zaddik
bedino.

I thought this polemical, but he said it twice as a clear pshat. I,
however, (IMHO) find this a strange pshat for several reasons:

1) linguistic. The Rambam brings three categories - zaddik, rasha,
benoni. While one might try to understand zaddik and rasha as not
referring to the individual, but zaddik bedino and rasha bedino, this
is quite difficult with regard to the third term (benoni bedino??)

2) The source of the Rambam for the tripartite division is in a braita
in Rosh Hashana 16:b

bet shammai omrim shlosha kitot hem leyom hadin echat shel zaddikin
gmurin veechat shel reshaim gmurim veechat shel benonim

The Rambam does not use the word gmurim - see the yad pshuta (Rav
Rabinovitz) for one explanation (there are different levels of zaddikim)
- but it is clear that the rambam is giving a definition of who is a
member of each kat.


3) The sefer Perah Mate Aharon on sefer hamada, by R Aharon Soloveichik,
brings down the question of the tosafot in ketuvot 30:2, d"h arba mitot
lo batlu, where the gmara says that even though arba mitot are now batel,
the din of arba mitot is not batel. Therefore, whoever is hayav skila
fallls from the roof, etc. Tosefot says that this is difficult as we
see so mayny sinners dying in their bed, and explains that clearly those
avaryanim had some zechut.

R Aharon brings in the name of Rav Haim according to the Rambam (3:3)
veeyn shoklin ela beda'ato shel kel deot vehu yodea haeych orchin
hazechuyot kneged haavonot.

Rav Haim explains that there is a fundamental difference between human
punishment and divine punishment. With human punishment, the court
can decide on a verdict only on the maaseh avera that he did, but the
sanhedrin lacks the power to issue a psak din on the individual himself
whether he is a good or bad man. Therefore, tshuva doesn't help for
someone who is mehuyav mitat bet din, as the man is obligated for the
deed that he did. However, with regard to divine punishment, even though
the sinner is obligated with some punishment from heaven on some avera
such as hillul shabbat, avoda zara, or arayot, however, the psak din is
based on level of rishut of the gavra. and therefore the tosafot writes
that many avaryanim who are obligated skila srefa etc on their averot
have peaceful lives becuase surely they have some merit of kibud av or
hazalat nefashot, etc. And this is the intention of the rambam when he
writes "ve'eyn shoklim ela beda'ato shel kel shokel deot, vehu hayodea
eydorchin hazechuyot keneged haavonot." ad kan R Aharon

I would add that this svara - that divine justice is based on the nature
of the gavra, rather than human justice which is based solely on an
action - implies that the difference between zaddik bedino and zaddik
disappears when the din is the din of the kadosh baruch hu...

Finally, one more source - R Saadia Gaon (Hanivhar beemunot vedeot,
maamar 5:2 (p. 173 in my Kapach edition), which is very close in language
and discussion to the rambam;s discussion

Trying to define the different levels of humans

Yikare zaddik mi shehayu rov ma'asav zchuyot

Meir Shinnar

********************


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