Avodah Mailing List

Volume 08 : Number 056

Friday, November 23 2001

• Re: Herzl
• Re: ZT"L, Z"L and A"H
• Re: Ikkarim and Yigdal
• Re: be-khol levavkha
• Re: Ikkarim as halakhah
• Re: Ikkarim as halakhah
• Re: Re: Ikkarim as Halakha?
• Re: zaddik
• RE: zaddik
• Re: when did zal morph into zatsal
• mitzvot tzrikhot kavanah o ein tzrikhot kavanah
• techelet
• divrei hesped on Maran haRav Elozor MM Schach z"l
• RE: Herzl
• RE: zaddik

On Tue, Nov 20, 2001 at 01:57:17PM -0500, Shinnar, Meir wrote:
: Finally, RMB asks about why I bring a halachic source for the definition
: of zaddik. Quite simply, many people have many different definitions of
: a zaddik, and there are many levels of zaddikim. However, I would have
: thought that in general, a definition in a halachic setting carries more
: weight than a purely hashkafic one, and that the use of a term that is
: sanctioned by a halachic definition would be, at the minimal, acceptable,
: even if people would have other preferred definitions....

There are times where the meanings are not related all that closely.
So, getting greater precision or authority would not help.

For example, compare tum'ah as discussed in Mesilas Yesharim or Chovos
Halvavos and tum'ah as a halachic concept.

-mi

In a message dated 11/21/2001 2:10:34 PM EST, Joelirich@aol.com writes:
> Interesting-Where did alav hashalom come from and why isn't the use of the
> clear choice in the gemora (either zichrono Lvracha or zichrono lvracha
> ulchayeh haolam haba)universal? When did the use of ZT"L rather than
> Z"L come into play and what definition of tzaddik is used? It seems to
> me that it isn't the definition of perfection that has been posited here.

For A'H see R. Michale Boyde's article on same

Shalom and Regards
Rich Wolpoe
Moderator - TorahInsight@yahoogroups.com
"Knowledge without Insight is like a horse in a library" - Vernon Howard    

R' Chaim Markowitz wrote" << I asked him how we pasken bzman hazeh in
regards to what is an ikkar and he said although he is not a poseik
he feels that it is clear from the siddur (yigdal) that we pasken like
the Rambam.>>

In Avodah it was mentioned in the past that many siddurim, especially
hasidic, omit yigdal for reasons that were discussed then, including
the Ar"i.

K"T,  David

In v8n53, Yisrael Dubitsky <yidubitsky@JTSA.EDU> writes:
: Re the "uve-khol nafshekha": notice how all mekorot have the same
: explanation at first ("afilu Hu notel et nafshekha") but the Mishnah is
: the only one not to include an added explanation. The other two have a
: memra by Ben Azzai, which can be seen as a development of the original
: idea above. However, only the Tosefta has the added "davar aher: be-khol
: nefesh va-nefesh she-bara bekha." Does this not parallel exactly the
: limud of "bi-shenei yitsarekha," which is really just another way of
: saying "be-khol lev va-lev she-bekha"? ...

Since I think the language of kol vs shnei is relevent, I do not see this
as an exact parallel.

: What can be seen, then, is that the structure of the sugya must have
: intended one type of limud. Namely, each of the "kol"s in the pasuk
: were darshened for to include an opposing doublet: two (opposing) hearts
: (i.e. inclinations), two (opposing? cf Zohar cited below) nefashot, two
: (opposing) midot (=slices of life?) that HKBH grants each individual...

I do not see anything indicating two nefashos. "Bekhol nefesh vanefesh",
similar to saying in English "each and every nefesh", implies a large
number.

Actually, I am now inclined to believe that both elements are relevent.
Yes, kol is all, which in the case of two means both yetzarim. Therefore,
kol levavkha is the only consistant way to refer to it; kol libecha
would mean all of a heart-in-a-limited-sense.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                        ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                           - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

On Wednesday 21 November 2001 15:08, reb Micha reacted to my post and wrote:
> Halachah is a series of actions as well. And within the absolute truth,
> there is eilu va'eilu. In particular here: within the boundries of
> what is true, we can have machlokesin and subsequent piskei halachah
> about which ones are mandatory.

> Not to be confused with aggadic arguments over which non-mandatory
> beliefs are true.

Oops, now you are confusing me. And I thought that only the Ritva extended 
the Elu vaElu principle to matters on which we can argue that there is only 
one position which is true. Note also that the term absolute truth carries 
with it the meaning that there is no other contradictory, absolutely, true 
position.

Arie Folger

P.S.: Since reb Akiva Miller posted rav Bleich's article, I plan on asking 
him personally this coming week or the week thereafter.

On Thu, Nov 22, 2001 at 02:09:14PM -0500, Arie Folger wrote:
:> Halachah is a series of actions as well. And within the absolute truth,
:> there is eilu va'eilu. In particular here: within the boundries of
:> what is true, we can have machlokesin and subsequent piskei halachah
:> about which ones are mandatory.

:> Not to be confused with aggadic arguments over which non-mandatory
:> beliefs are true.

: Oops, now you are confusing me...

I do that often. I am not the world's more lucid author. Sorry.

:                                 And I thought that only the Ritva extended 
: the Elu vaElu principle to matters on which we can argue that there is only 
: one position which is true....

Agreed. I did not try to imply otherwise.

When it comes to apikursus there are two issues: finding truth, and
determining what is permissable. There are beliefs that are not true,
but believing in them would not make one an apikoreis.

Determining which truths must be believed lehalachah is itself an issue of
pesak. Therefore, there can be an eilu va'eilu about which are mandatory.
Not about which are true.

:                             Note also that the term absolute truth carries 
: with it the meaning that there is no other contradictory, absolutely, true 
: position.

There are plenty of non-absolute truths for which eilu va'eilu holds.
Cases where we can not understand the full truth, and therefore deal
only with the part we can comprehend. The five blind men who try to
describe an elephant also argued, and yet each spoke the truth.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org            And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

> Was this Rambam's position? My understanding (albeit probably flawed)
> is that Rambam recognized that human thought has limits and can never
> arrive at the entire truth of the Torah. 

True. Ramban believed that human thought could not arrive at the entire
truth of Torah. OTOH, he also believed once established, the truth of
Torah would always be consistent with perfected human logic. IOW, Rambam,
like Aristotle, could not accept the notion that a transcendent truth
might actually contradict human logic.

A great discussion of this point can be found in R' Isadore Twersky's
"Rabad of Posquieres," particularly Twersky's discussion of the Rabad's
objections to the technique underlying the composition of Mishneh Torah.

Another reference: The current issue of a mass-circulation magazine
the readership of which I flatly deny contains an interview with Charles
Townes, the 86-year-old Nobel laureate who invented the laser beam. Townes
appears to be a gentle, reflective man. He said this: "Some people would
say that because we don't know, it can't be. I would say that because
we don't know, we don't know." Rambam and Rabad would both reject the
idea that if we don't know, it can't be. Rambam, however, would be quite
uncomfortable with the second proposition, that because we don't know,
we don't know. Rabad would have accepted the proposition as a sign of
true faith.

[A 2nd email. -mi]

> The only principle of faith that Rambam claimed to prove on the basis
> of logic (and I'm not sure how "human" logic differs from logic) is
> existence of G-d (& scholars debate even that).

> Those who assert that the Rambam "insisted" on something he didn't hold
> know less than they pretend to. Such are the snares of [fill in the blank]
> on [fill in the blank].

Your assert that the "only principle that Rambam claimed to prove on
the basis of logic . . . is the existence of God." You say this as a
sort of statement of limitation, i.e., you imply that Rambam recognized
the limits of human (meaning, in Rambam's mind, non-Platonic Greek)
logic *except* when it came to the narrow question of the existence of
HaShem. Proof of the existence of HaShem, however, is hardly a narrow
exception to the lack of proof of other things Judaic. Surely it is
the exception that swallows the whole. If, as you appear to agree,
Rambam thought that HaShem's existence was subject to deductive proof,
then all halacha must be subject to deductive proof.

A parallel can be drawn to RYBS. RYBS's cosmopolitan understanding of the
world caused him to compartmentalize Brisk vs. Kant through a private
dialectic that is almost impossible to replicate in other people's
lives. The Rambam's cosmopolitanism created a similar difficulty. The
Rambam engaged RYBS-like process when he used essentially ex cathedra
techniques to infuse "logic" into the question of HaShem's existence
while declining to use the same logic to "prove" the Divinty of halacha.

David Finch

When I dispute you, Dr. Shinnar - and that happens more often than not,
and is one of the reasons that I made you one of the charter members of
baistefila - I often get the feeling that you are not arguing with me
as a person, but as a persona - i.e., I am to be classified as a member
of the Artscroll/Agudah etc. stratum of Orthodoxy, and the arguments
then proceed against the stereotype, rather than against me. That was
definitely the impression I received when we argued the HhB issue, and
now the Herzl issue. You cannot accept that my position is nuanced. This
causes me great agmas nefesh.

At 10:34 AM 11/22/01 -0500, Shinnar, Meir wrote:
>RYGB (I think) comes down squarely on the side of perfect role models.
>Those who hold this side, the avot (and neviim) represent the possibility
>of human perfection. Therefore, downsizing the avot strikes squarely
>at this possibility, which therefore directly impacts our own avodat
>hashem. This is also (as per past discussions on avoda) at the heart
>of the prototypical Artscroll biography of the gadol....

Frankly, for the most part I cannot stand Artscroll biographies (my
publisher is Feldheim :-) ). I love the idea of imperfect role models
and eschew gedolim stories as vicarious Avodah.

>There is, however, another view that emphasizes becoming over being -
>the process of struggling to achieve perfection rather than the actual
>achievement of perfection as our role models. In this view, pointing out
>faults in avot/neviim/gdolim may be acceptable, as long as the emphasis
>on what they overcame...

Which makes it even more imperative that we know who are the tzaddikim whom 
to emulate and who are not. See below.

(deleted)

>I think that therefore are at least three schools of how best to encourage
>avodat hashem:

>1) Emphasize models of human perfection (baale tshuva can be role models,
>as long as one clearly distinguishes a pre perfection and post perfection
>period)

>2) Emphasize the struggle to achieve human perfection, while still
>maintaining that certain people (avot etc) actually reached this
>perfection as a role model to us

>3) Emphasize the struggle to achieve human perfection, without focusing
>on whether it is actually achieved.

I find #1 flawed as an educational model. I like #2, but subscribe even 
more so to #3.

(deleted)

>My own bias is that all three schools represent authentic trends, and
>the proper model for an individual to choose varies with the individual -
>what will best motivate him, and what will discourage him. I understand
>that the first school (with perhaps occasionally the second) are fairly
>dominant in RW circles today,which may partially reflect the influence
>of Slobodka.

Nope. #1 is fairly useless for a Mussar-based educational system. #2 and
#3 are closer to the mark. I believe you are conflating, inaccurately,
the "Parshanut" a la Slabodka with its system of Mussar.

(deleted)

>The hilkhot tshuva tzaddik is within all of our reach. Although some
>(RYGB) might argue that it sets too low a goal - I am not sure that the
>Rambam would agree, and this tzaddik is not the ultimate goal.

I am sure the Rambam would *NOT* agree that that is the goal - the Rambam 
in Hil. Teshuva there is not discussing goals in Avodah. At the end of Hil. 
teshuva you will find his prescription for shleymus, which he encourages 
for all.

>This is also Rav Saadia, who defines as a zaddik those with more zchuyot,
>as distinct from a shalem, vehu hanikra zaddik gamur.

I already noted that I do not think RSG is relevant here.

(deleted)

>With regard to the current argument, I think that RYGB, who holds by
>either the first or second (probably first), is upset by my use of zt"l,
>as herzl does not represent human perfection (we do agree on that..),
>and the notion of the zaddik as a model to aspire to is fundamental to
>his avoda (I hope I am being accurate)

See above. I do not like #1 at all, and like #3 over #2. I do believe with 
emunah sheleimah in the Rambam's explanation that the Avos were above and 
beyond any of our perceptions, but I am always looking for emulate-able, 
hence generally imperfect, role models. B"H I have found quite a few.

>However, as R Saadia and the rambam show, even if one accepts the
>possibility of human perfection, there is an important role for those
>who do not fully achieve it, and they also merit the term of zaddik,
>and (I think, and am still puzzled at the vehemence of the opposition)
>therefore also zt"l, which is commonly used not merely for the perfect
>humans, but others with major spiritual achievements.

This paragraph still totally amazes me that I simply believe that we
are in different orbits, different trajectories. Perhaps, indeed, R'
Elchonon was right in the line that always turned me off, so much so
that I cannot read the Ikvasa d'Meshicha, that line about RZ being Avodah
Zarah b'shittuf. I always found that line abhorrent, but unless we would
regard Le'umiyut as an equal and separate spiritual path I am dumbfounded
how one can ascribe major spiritual achievements to Herzl. Do *we*
not equate "spirituality" with Avodas Hashem? R' David Finch was on the
mark: Accomplishments that were not contextually part of an Avodas Hashem
framework are laudable, perhaps even emulatable-able - but in the vein of
"Chochmo ba'Goyim Ta'amin", just as we might laud Truman or Churchill
and try to emulate them - but not classify them as "flawed tzaddikim."

>It is within this partial achievement model of still struggling zaddikkim,
>that I think that the apocalyptic zioni school would place herzl -
>not perfect, struggling, with different types of zchuyot than your
>prototypical zaddik...
>Such a model may be strange to some, and perhaps undercut one's own notion
>of a zaddik and its meaning for avodat hashem. One may wish to reserve
>the term zaddik solely for the perfect model, but that is clearly not
>the common usage,or that of the rambam or R Saadia. Semantic discussions
>should not generate that much heat.

There is a vast gap between struggling tzaddikim (a tzaddik, in the 
mystical model *is* one who struggles, as opposed to a "yoshor" or 
"chossid") who are grappling with yetzorim and aspiring to grow b'ma'alos 
ha'Torah v'ha'Avodah, and people who "happened" upon zechuyos.

>On avoda /areivim, I think that one determining principle is recognizing
>authentic differences within avodat hashem within the mesora, and that the
>mesora recognizes many different, even antithetical models. The attempt
>to homogenize the mesora and declare aspects of it non normative is
>(IMHO) the other real issue of the debate, which I have focused on.

The mesorah on the use of "Tzaddik" in ZT"L is most assuredly subject to 
normative use, and its misuse is indeed the issue that I have focused on as 
well.

Kol Tuv,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

>              I often get the feeling that you are not arguing with me as a 
> person, but as a persona - i.e., I am to be classified as a member of the 
> Artscroll/Agudah etc. stratum of Orthodoxy, and the arguments then proceed 
> against the stereotype, rather than against me. That was definitely the 
> impression I received when we argued the HhB issue, and now the Herzl 
> issue. You cannot accept that my position is nuanced. This causes me great 
> agmas nefesh.

I recognize that your position is nuanced. I, however, am only able to
go by what is written, and (especially on this occasion), I have had a
tough time following the logic. I therefore extrapolated, and am sorry
if I misrespresented your position.

Let me try again (on several different fronts)
with regard to the avot, if I now understand you, you agree that perfect
models are not valuable from a mussar perspective, yet insist on the
actual perfection of the avot (apparently based on a rambam - citation??)

The natural consequence of that is that the avot are not useful for
us to learn from - rather a strange conclusion, and one that I am
sure misrepresents your intentions. However, given the fact that you
acknowldege that imperfection in the role model is actually of benefit
to us, I am not sure why you are so adamant against sincere, motivated
criticism of the avot (I agree with opposition to shtut).

RYGB
> Do *we* not equate "spirituality" 
> with Avodas Hashem? R' David Finch was on the mark: Accomplishments that 
> were not contextually part of an Avodas Hashem framework are laudable, 
> perhaps even emulatable-able - but in the vein of "Chochmo ba'Goyim 
> Ta'amin", just as we might laud Truman or Churchill and try to emulate them 
> - but not classify them as "flawed tzaddikim."

This might be the crux of the issue.

RAYK wrote a great deal about the avodat hashem of the halutzim, even
though they were not aware of it. This notion of avodat hashem and
spirituality coming unintentionally was of course very controversial,
although RAYK does bring earlier sources for it. R Yeshaya Lebowitz
has written the most extensive (AFAIK0) and withering criticism of this
notion of actions having religious value without the deliberate intention
of the doer (lishma) and is at the heart of much of his criticism of the
Mizrachi. However, this position (not talking about the label zaddik),
but the issue of religious value and significance (not just that they
are laudable and emulable) of actions) seems quite clear in Orot, as
well as othe writings.

Meir Shinnar

On Wednesday 21 November 2001 15:08, reb Joel Rich wrote:
>When did the use of ZT"L rather than
> Z"L come into play and what definition of tzaddik is used? It seems to
> me that it isn't the definition of perfection that has been posited here.

I believe that 'hassidim started the trend, and even extended it (and still 
do) to zetsokelelehehe (zekher tazddik vekadosh livrakhah ule'hayei ha'olam 
habah). This would, of course, argue for a 'hassidic definition of the term 
tzaddik for this particular epitaph. After all, nobody called rav Sha'h admor 
miPonievez or the Satmerer rebbe Maran. I will let rYGB and rMS figure out 
whether Hertzel fits the picture and whether this is relevant.

Arie Folger

From: "David Glasner" <DGLASNER@ftc.gov>
> Rabbi Bechoffer (8:52) forwarded the following anonymous query:
>> Since when do we pasken "mitzvot eyn tzrichot kavana" (esp. by deorayso)?

> Of course we pasken "mitzvot tzrikhot kavanah." But that is simply
> to exclude putative mitzvot committed without any intention to perform
> the act, in other words, mitaseik.

In other words, the one who holds "ein tzrichos kavanna" holds "misasek"
fulfills the mitzvah?!

> No one holds that one is obligated
> to perform a meritorious act with a specific intention to fulfill the
> mitzvah of performing the meritorious act. v'zeh barur.

See SA OC 60:4 that we pasken "tzrichot kavana" - meaning "Kavana Lotzais"
and without this kavana you didn't fufill the mitzva (see MB 7-9, and
other poskim there).

> The only case
> where such a shitah has gained any wide acceptance is in connection with
> shmurah matzah where there are many who hold that it is necessary to
> prepare the matzah with the intention of fulfilling the mitzvah of matah.
> But there is a special limud from which those who accept this shitah
> for matzah derive and it applies only to this single mitzvah.

Diffrent issue - Lishmo in making the matzoh (also by tzizis), we're
discussing kavana lotzais.

> All those
> who eat machine matzah and even many of those who eat hand matzah agree
> that it is sufficient that the matzah be prepared for the sake of being
> used for matzah, without any specific intention to fulfill the mitzvah
> of matzah.

AFAIK they hold that through a machine is also lishma, not that you don't
need lishma. Which is the reason many (who eat machine matzos during
pesach) will fulfill the mitzva with hand matzos.

> And that is why, to my knowledge, no one holds that one is
> obligated to say hinini mukhan u'm'zuman before performing any mitzvah.

Knal from MB that you need the kavana lotzais - but why say it.

Chaim G. Steinmetz
cgsteinmetz@juno.com

I am pleased that Mendel Singer agrees that the, apparently, current
Radzin process for dyeing tzizit is problematic. His argument seems to
rely primarily on the fact that as a result of that high temperature
process, many organic compounds containing nitrogen of animal, vegetable,
or mineral origin could be used as the source of the cyanide that,
together with iron, constitute the Radziner dye (ferric ferrocyanide -
Prussian blue). He suggests, further, that if the cuttlefish is truly
the species to be identified with the hilazon, then a process is needed
for making a colorfast blue dye that utilizes some unique or unusual
property of the cuttlefish ink. That ink, from my limited internet
readings consists of a dispersion of melanin or melanic acid salt which
is, apparently, an oxidized and polymerized derivative of 5,6-dihydroxy
indole. If one considers that indigo is the dimer of 3-hydroxy indole
formed under oxidizing conditions, then such an indole-based chemical
conversion may be difficult, but not impossible. However, melanin is
widely distributed in animal life, and the cuttlefish (sepia officinalis)
ink is, apparently, very similar to squid ink. I am puzzled at Mendel's
assertion that the cuttlefish ink has much iron. I have not seen such
a reference. In fact, even the cuttlefish blood (which is blue) is not
iron-based (haemoglobin), but based on copper-containing proteins as
the oxygen carrier [the Cu(I) turns to blue Cu(II) in the presence of
oxygen]. If the Radziner Rebbe focused on cuttlefish ink rather than
cuttlefish blood, it was probably due to the difficulty in making a
colorfast blue dye from the blood. Of course, blue blood is not specific
to the cuttlefish.

Mendel Singer may well be correct in arguing that my characterization
of a dye based partly on an outside source such as iron as inherently
not kosher for techelet, is not obvious. He argues that a tosfot in
T.B. Menachot 42b (Samemanim) suggests that a techelet is defined by a
combination of samanim and hilazon "blood". However, the ba'alei tosfot
only offer such a combination as a possible answer to the question of
how can anything be placed in the dye bath together with the "blood"
of the hilazon. The implication of the question is that the techelet
dye must be purely derived from the hilazon. To which the possible
answer is offered that dyeing aids may be required in the dye bath,
and that only such an effective preparation can be considered as valid.
Such aids are needed to dissolve the hilazon liquid (alkaline medium),
possibly to make the dye colorfast, or even to deepen or lighten
the dye color. There is no implication in that tosfot, however, that
an extraneous material can be used to produce the dye color itself.
I do not recollect the citation from the Gaon Shmuel bar Chofni. Is the
language significantly different from the above tosfot?

Surely, Rav Gershon Henoch Leiner had some basis for a hava amina
that the cuttlefish is the hilazon mentioned in shas and medrashim.
Mendel is probably correct in attributing some of the Radziner's ideas
to the language in Rashi and the Rambam. It is curious that Rashi in
Menachot translates bri'ato as "its form" when it means "its formation"
elsewhere. It is likewise curious that Rashi translates potzoh in "hatzad
hilazon ve'hapotzoh" in Shabbat as squeezes rather than smashes, which
is its normal meaning. The Rambam's characterization of the "blood"
of the hilazon as black is also curious. One could characterize solid
indigo as being very dark. However, the traditional murex dyeing process
described by Pliny does not seem to consider starting the dye bath with
a solid derived from the murex extract, but with a liquid containing
the soluble murex material that had turned yellow or green under the
reducing conditions of the bath. Be that as it may, there is no evidence
that Rashi or even the Rambam had ever seen the dyeing process or heard
such descriptions from eyewitnesses. Moreover, the brief description in
shas is too general to give a real understanding of the process. It seems
to me that we need to be circumspect when we are dealing with accepting
something as the actual techelet dye rather than a pesak based on sevara
(their understanding of sugyot in shas). Their description of the hilazon
and its extract, as implied by the language that they use, should not,
I believe, be treated as definitive.

Following are some more of my recollections from the massive gathering
this past Sunday at Edward R. Murrow High School in Brooklyn, NY lizeicher
maran haRav Schach z"l (btw, tapes are available - I believe the number
given to get them was (718) 435-5793).

Rav Mattisyohu Solomon, shlit"a, cited the Chovos Halevovos as saying
that a person can make a mistake and say that since we know that 'kol
sheruach habrios nocha heimanu, ruach hamokom nocha heimanu', I will do
things to get popular / curry favor with people, etc., because that is
what Hashem wants (like making compromises in Yiddishkeit, etc.).

However, that is not what the Torah wants - it is a misunderstanding.....

(Rav Solomon may have cited the Maggid Meishorim here - maggid of Rav
Yosef Karo z"l).

What the mishnah means is that when a person does not deliberately to
things to cozy up to others and curry favor - but yet nevertheless, people
are 'nochah heimenu' (perhaps the correct translation of 'nochah heimenu'
should be along the lines of 'are at ease with / from him')(albeit perhaps
sometimes only after the passage of time)(and perhaps not every single
person, as it is impossible to satisfy all - see Ibn Ezra on Esther 10:3),
that is a siman that he is doing right with Hashem - because it is shelo
kiderech hatevah that people should be at ease with him even though he
doesn't try to curry favor with / flatter them, etc.

We saw this by Maran haRav Schach z"l. Even though he took very strong
stands at times that drew strong criticism, still he was 'ruach habrios
nocha heimenu'. The amount of people at his levaya - perhaps the most
ever in Eretz Yisroel - showed that.

A story was told by Rav Solomon about how Rav Schach was once giving a
candy to one of his einiklach. He said to the einekel 'mistoma ata rotzeh
adom' (probably you want a red candy). Rav Solomon said that (wondering
out loud how he had the 'chutzpah' to say that) he said to Rav Schach 'du
machst fun em an Eisav!' (you are making an Eisav of him) by steering him
to a (davka) red candy. This prompted Rav Schach to explain that red was
problematic only for adults, as it symbolizes the dominance of dimyon,
but that for children it was okay. Rav Solomon remarked on how great
the sichas chulin of Rav Schach was, as in the above episode.

A recurring theme was how much Rav Schach cared for others, the great
chasodim he did, and his great sensitivity.

Rav Dovid Barkun shlit"a, of Telshe in Ohio, related how, when he came
to Ponevezh, Rav Schach came over to him and offered to make him eggs
(for breakfast, daily?), saying that since he was an American he was
probably accustomed to having eggs for breakfast (unlike the Israelis).

He said that some people do not realize that the public activities (some
of them controversial) of Rav Schach in recent years were just a recent
chapter in his life that followed over fifty years of concentrating on
Torah. He concentrated on Torah and was immersed in it for so many years
until he became like a sefer Torah himself......

It was also related how when there was a couple with sholom bayis
problems, he used to take a taxi after his shiur, for approximately
two years (!) and visit them to help them out (he was not a young man
already at the time).

Many stories were told, e.g. how Rav Schach used to give out candies to
people, how he looked after an almonah, bikur cholim, etc., etc.

Rav Barkun said that it was like a personal akeida for Rav Schach to go
against his loving nature and change his life in order to take necessary
strong and controversial stands on certain important issues for the klal.

Showing Maran z"l's dedication to Emmes, he related that when Rav
Schach was old and could not say his shiur anymore, he went to Rav
Y. S. Elyoshiv shlit"a to ask him a she'ela - if he was allowed to stay
in his apartment. He explained that since his apartment belonged to
the Yeshivah, so as long as he was saying the shiur, and the Yeshiva
had benefit from him, he understood that he could stay there, but now
that he was not giving shiur anymore, perhaps he had to move out. He was
prepared to move (to Yerusholayim IIRC) to his own apartment (at an age
of 90+ or so I guess) !

He also related that when Rav Schach was printing his sefer, he got a
rare haskoma from the Brisk'er Rov z"l. However, one should also know
that the Brisker Rov sent his son to Rav Schach to order him to have the
haskoma printed in the sefer (evidently Rav Schach was prepared not to
print it out of modesty, etc.)

It was also related that Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer z"l, when he was young,
didn't want to go to cheider. His older sister took him and sat with him
in cheider to get him to sit there. So Rav Isser Zalman said that all
he attained in Torah was thanks to his sister. So he said he paid her
back when he gave Maran haRav Schach z"l, to her daughter for a husband.

Mordechai

On Thu, Nov 22, 2001 at 12:44:11AM +0200, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
: There's a difference between z"l and zT"l. What RYGB was objecting to
: was the use of the T with respect to Herzl.

RMB wrote
> Yes, emotionally there is a difference. However, zichrono livrachah
> also harkens back to Mishlei 1:7 (zecher tzadiq livrachah, vesheim
> risha'im yirkav). It implies rather than states that the person so
> described is a tzaddiq.

R Moshe Neria (talmid muvhak of RAYK, and founder of Bne Akiva yeshivot)
refers to Herzl as z"l (eg Moade Haraya, p. 154)

Meir Shinnar

At 06:27 PM 11/22/01 -0500, Shinnar, Meir wrote:
>Let me try again (on several different fronts)
>with regard to the avot, if I now understand you, you agree that perfect
>models are not valuable from a mussar perspective, yet insist on the
>actual perfection of the avot (apparently based on a rambam - citation??)

>The natural consequence of that is that the avot are not useful for
>us to learn from - rather a strange conclusion, and one that I am
>sure misrepresents your intentions. However, given the fact that you
>acknowldege that imperfection in the role model is actually of benefit
>to us, I am not sure why you are so adamant against sincere, motivated
>criticism of the avot (I agree with opposition to shtut).

Moreh 3:51 in the he'oroh - I thought we agreed on the Avos? We cannot
strive to attain the personas of the Avos but we can attain a similarity
in our deeds and middos to them. This is pretty much explicit in the
Rambam there.

>RAYK wrote a great deal about the avodat hashem of the halutzim, even
>though they were not aware of it. This notion of avodat hashem and
>spirituality coming unintentionally was of course very controversial,
>although RAYK does bring earlier sources for it. R Yeshaya Lebowitz
>has written the most extensive (AFAIK) and withering criticism of this
>notion of actions having religious value without the deliberate intention
>of the doer (lishma) and is at the heart of much of his criticism of the
>Mizrachi....

True, RAYHK called the chalutzim's strivings glimmerings of teshuva -
a premise I am not sure I accept - but I took that position into account
when critiquing your use of zt"l. It is a far cry from glimmerings of
teshuva to the status of tzaddik inferred in the normative use of the
honorific zt"l!


Kol Tuv,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

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