Avodah Mailing List

Volume 08 : Number 111

Tuesday, February 12 2002

• Re: CY/ChC
• Re: CY/ChC
• Re: Avodah V8 #110
• RE: kesuvah
• Re: kesuvah
• [none]
• Re: ksav Ashuri
• Re: astronomy in the Jewish / religious community
• Eisav
• Changing the names in halacha
• Bris Vort
• Bris Vort
• RE: CY/ChC
• Re: CY/ChC
• Re: CY/ChC
• Re: Misquoting (was: CY/ChC)
• Re: Compassion for criminals
• Re: Isha psulah ladun
• Re: Segulos
• Halachic permissibility of viewing movies
• Re: Halachic permissibility of viewing movies
• Re: Halachic permissibility of viewing movies
• Re: Halachic permissibility of viewing movies
• Re: Halachic permissibility of viewing movies

Interesting (particularly for RSBA) tidbit:
R' Herschel Schachter verbally listed the CI when listing those who were
meikil on ChC.

-mi

In a message dated 2/11/02 11:55:34am EST, kennethgmiller@juno.com writes:
> R' Chaim Markowitz asked me to explain what I meant. My point was that
> (as I understand it, and has been cited before in Areivim-Avodah) halacha
> DOES allow a person to deliberately misquote a well-known posek in order
> to induce the audience to follow the proper halacha, despite the fact
> that the quoted posek actually did NOT give the quoted p'sak.

But I wonder if this rule applies when it's a misstatement that will become 
known as such?

KT
Joel

> <<<I'm not so surprised.
> What should we expect from a system that allows people to quote one
> posek's halacha in the name of a different posek, in order to insure
> that the audience will accept that p'sak as binding?>>

> Huh? Please elaborate.

I think I understood the point. In order to get people to accept an idea
developed by a distinguished thinker with a somewhat controversial
reputation -- RYBS comes to mind -- they may offer the idea in
conversation in the name of another Gadol with a more comforting
image. This happens all the time.

David Finch

On Friday, February 08, 2002 1:18 PM, Eli Turkel <Eli.Turkel@colorado.edu>
wrote:
> Illuminated ketuvot have existed for hundreds of years and appear in
> numerous museums because of their beauty. One hangs a ketuva on the wall
> of his home because it is pretty document. I have never seen a standard
> ketuva bought from a store hung on a wall.

WADR, R'EMT didn't say it was a recent trend. He merely pointed out
that the 'minhag' makes no sense. The only thing proven by the facts
presented above is that people have been doing something that makes
no sense for a long time. FWIW, I don't know of any litvak with an
illuminated museum-quality kesuva. I've seen one or two signed by Rav EY
Henken and they looked kind of sad compared to my $3.99 Eichlers special.

Fine wine may improve with age, silly customs don't.

kt
sk

Eli Turkel, turkel@colorado.edu on 2/8/2002:
> It is obvious that for many years the ketuva was considered a special
> document and lavished with expensive drawings and not viewed as merely
> a business document.

though it's interesting to note that the Munkac'er Rebbe (Michas Eluzer)
was makpid to handwrite in regular, cursive ksav--and refused to use
anything more elaborate (check Darchei Chayim v'Shalom--minhagei Munkac)

Shlomoh

Chana Luntz wrote:
>I also don't quite understand how we got from dayanus to rabbanus. They are 
>distinct titles even today (Yoreh Yoreh vrs Yadin Yadin)?

Correct. See the Pischei Teshuvah on Choshen Mishpat 7:4 that makes
the same distinction.

Gil Student

I have gotten a couple of requests for the reference to the Rambam's
tshuva about how k'tav Ashuri was restricted and k'tav 'Ivri was used
for secular matters.

The matter is found in #268 in the Blau edition. This is the t'shuva
where someone asked the Rambam about embroidering p'suqim on a tallis.
The Rambam responds that it is completely forbidden to ever use an entire
pasuq, even in responsa, but rather you either change the script or
you write three words or less, or you do not write out the words fully.
(Those places that write entire p'suqim on the aron or wall are obviously
not following this; interestingly, the oldest shul that survives intact
[i.e. not redone inside] in Europe, the Altneu Shul in Prague, uses
roshei teivos for the psuqim quoted on the ceiling.)

The Rambam then says [Arabic I have transalted to English, and the Hebrew
is the original in the t'shuva, and my comments are in square brackets]:

    "What you must know is that this script, viz. k'tav Asshuri,
    since the Torah was given in it as it is stated 'uvah nikht'vu
    luhot hab'rit,' it is improper to use it for anything other than
    kitvei haqodesh. Furthermore, Jews always observed this, and so
    letters, and compositions of the rabbis and scholars and kitvei
    hol shelahem were bikhtav 'Ivri. Because of this, you will always
    find the inscriptions on shiqlei haqodesh d'varim shel hol bikhtav
    'Ivri, and you will never find even a single word k'tav Asshuri in
    the archeological remains of the Jews, not in coin inscriptions and
    not in stone inscriptions, but rather all of that is bikhtav 'Ivri.
    And it is because of this that the Spanish [Jews] altered their
    script and use different forms for the letters, until it is almost
    like a k'tav aher, so that [the script] could be used for divrei hol.

    "Rabbenu Yosef haLevi [Migash] strongly condemned writing a get in
    this cursive script of ours, saying that it would result in mashma'
    t'rei lishanei b'gitta, which would pasel it. Then the sofrim wrote
    it, i.e. the get, in square letters, i.e. k'tav Asshuri k'sefer Torah,
    and he condemned this as well, and said 'how can this script, mikhtav
    Eloqim, be used in something that might be mishandled?' Rather,
    things such as this should be written in the script that we call
    'mudhabdhab' [apparently a non-Asshuri script that is not cursive
    either, something like the so-called Rashi script].

    "Anything of these things that a person does is bikhlal k'vod haTorah
    and fear of God."

That is what the Rambam says. Note that he does not say that using k'tav
Asshuri is completely osur, but rather it is not right; this goes back
to the fact that the Rambam divides up all of our religious obligations
not only into the categories of osur and obligatory, but also into the
categories of "encouraged" and "improper."

As I also said, this t'shuva is the source of the SA in YD that says
k'tav Asshuri should not be used for divrei hol.

See that? You make the mistake of asking me for a reference, and you get
a whole dissertation. Maybe next time these people will know better...

Seth Mandel

A while back, we had a short, desultory discussion (started, IIRC,
by R. Mordechai) about whether Jews should learn astronomy. I opined
that they should learn basic astronomy, that it wasn't really that hard,
and that it would help at least with understanding hil. qiddush haHodesh.
In the course of preparing to say a few words about the Rambam's view of
the hiyyuv to bentch gomel, I came across a t'shuva which I only vaguely
recalled when I wrote that, and so did not wish to mention in my post
lest someone ask for the reference.

The Rambam was asked (Blau edition #150) about the maamar of Hazal in
Shabbos 75a that says "hayodea' l'hasshev bitqufot umazzalot v'einu
m'hasshev...": a) what sort of hisshuv are Hazal talking about, b)
what is the purpose of it, and c) whether this is halokho.

The Rambam's reply:
    "Hisshuv t'qufot umazzalot refers to the entire science of
    astronomy. When they said 'kol hayodea' v'einu m'hassev' it means
    someone who is capable of understanding this, has the necessary
    intelligence and has mastered the required precursors of this science,
    yet does not occupy himself with it at all. As far as your question
    about what is the purpose of it, R. Meir explained it in the braita,
    saying 'histakkel b'ma'asav, shemittokh kakh atta makkir et Mi
    She'amar v'haya ha'olam.' We have explained this principle at the
    beginning of our major work [i.e. the Mishne Torah]."

Indeed, the Rambam when talking about the mitzva of Ahavat haShem says
that they way a person achieves that is by studying the Torah (the Word of
God) and the sciences (i.e. the study of the Works of God), since when a
person sees the Creator's Words and Deed he is drawn to love Him and to
be in Awe of him. The same idea is in the Sefer haMitzvot, Mitzva #3,
to love God, where he says that you achieve this love by studying His
Words and Works.

He goes on to say that this necessarily leads you to praise HQB'H to
others, just as if you have a friend that you love and admire, you
will incessantly praise him to others. And then he quotes the Sifri,
that the pasuq "v'ahavta et Hashem" in qriyat sh'ma' means "ahhavehu 'al
habriyot" (cause others to love Him), just as Avrohom Ovinu drew others
to the love of God, as is referred to in the posuq "v'et hanefesh 'asher
'asa b'Haran." That is the connection with bentching gomel, that telling
others about the miracles and wonders that HQB'H has done to you is part
of the mitzva of Ahavat haShem.

And, according to the Rambam, so is astronomy.

Of course, not only astronomy. Basic chemistry and physics and other
sciences as well. But in the Rambam's eyes it was clear that Hazal singled
out astronomy, probably since basic astronomy like planetary orbits and
the revolution of the earth (or, in his science, the revolution of the
universe around the earth) are things of relevance to every man, do not
require scientific equipment to study, are matters whose basic elements
are fairly easy to understand, and, perhaps more than other sciences,
achieve the objective of mavelling over His wonderful deeds.

Seth Mandel

Is anyone familar with a source (I think it is somewhere in the Shem
MiShmuel) for a concept that Eisav will present himself le-asid lavo
among the tzadikim, and only Hashem will be able to identify him?

Changing the names in halacha
    Gittin 44b ofchuha
    Pesachim 48a mishmei d'gavra raba

Shlomo Goldstein

Anyone who has mareh m'komos regarding someone serving as sandak 
twice in the same family (pro and con), please send them. I figure I 
ought to prepare SOMETHING :-) IIRC there's a Nodah b'Yehuda 
somewhere out there that discusses it. Anyone who can save me the 
searching with mareh m'komos would be greatly appreciated. Thanks. 

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

I decided I had better be a little more specific about what I'm 
looking for. I found the basic sources for the question of whether 
someone can be a sandak twice in the same family (or I know where to 
find them). 

The original source for Sandak is a Medrash that learns from Aner, 
Eshkol and Mamrei "v'Hem Baalei Bris Avraham." A Sandak is considered 
a baal bris - it's docheh minhagei aveilus and he is entitled to an 
aliya before the mohel is. The Medrash implies that they actually 
held Avraham during the bris. 

There's a Maharil, Tzavoas R. Yehuda HaChassid and Rema (YD 265:11) 
that are basic sources regarding the minhag of not allowing someone 
to be a sandak twice in the same family. The Maharil and the Rema 
make the association with Ktores (that you cannot be sandak twice in 
the same family because it's like bringing Ktores - it's ma'ashir so 
only once). The Gra asks on the Rema and says that if sandakous is 
like Ktores you should only be allowed to do it once period - not 
once per family. The Chassam Sofer (OH 1:159) says that the Rav of 
the community is an exception to the rule because he is like a Kohain 
Gadol who can do the Avodah whenever he wants. According to some, 
there's also an exception for someone within the family, which I 
think is brought in the Chasam Sofer. 

The Noda b'Yehuda (YD MK 86) seems to answer most of the questions 
that arise from the Gra (I got a quick look at it in shul tonight). 

But I saw in a couple of places (including IIRC the Aruch 
HaShulchan), that the Gra is right, and that Ktores really has 
nothing to do with it, and that the Rema was toleh it in Ktores to 
distract people from the true sode. The Rema, the Maharil and R. 
Yehuda HaChasid all knew the true sode. Okay - what's the true sode 
behind the minhag? If it has nothing to do with Ktores, why did the 
Rema connect it to Ktores? And if it is connected to Ktores, what is 
the connection and what is the answer to the Gra's kashya. 

The NbY is toleh it in the relative rarity of opportunities to serve 
as a sandak, and suggests that by not letting anyone have it more 
than once in a family,  you are spreading the wealth. He connects 
this to a Gemara in Eruvin that says that you're allowed to give all 
your matnos kehuna to one Kohain, but if you do you are starving the 
world. 

Personally, I'm inclined to some connection with Lashon Hara (for 
which the Ktores was mechaper), but I'm having trouble making the 
connection between a kapara for Lashon Hara and serving as a sandak. 
Anyone want to help? 

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

Carl and Adina Sherer
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

See pictures of Israel. Point your browser to:

http://www.members.home.net/projectonesoul/israel/israel.htm
http://www.bereshitsoftware.com/kdoshim/index.htm

> R' Herschel Schachter verbally listed the CI when listing
> those who were meikil on ChC.

Liquid milk, or powdered milk?

There is a tradition here (which the Rabbanut follows) to allow powdered
milk.

Akiva

On Tue, Feb 12, 2002 at 12:50:39AM +0200, Akiva Atwood wrote:
:> R' Herschel Schachter verbally listed the CI when listing
:> those who were meikil on ChC.

: Liquid milk, or powdered milk?

Liquid ChC. RHS said that the CI pashut holds that ChC is mutar.

-- 
Micha Berger                     Life is complex.
micha@aishdas.org                    Decisions are complex.
http://www.aishdas.org                   The Torah is complex.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                                    - R' Binyamin Hecht

> So I still stand by what I originally wrote: In an issue such as this,
> where Rav Moshe's writings were somewhat ambiguous, and where the issue
> is emotionally charged in some quarters, I am not surprised that we have
> recieved contradictory reports of how his descendants act. I beleive
> that it is POSSIBLE that at least SOME of these reports (though I have NO
> idea which) ORIGINATE with well-meaning people, who are acting IN ACCORD
> WITH HALACHA to convince us to follow the opinion which they believe to
> be the correct one.

There are a couple major issues involved in the above which I think
need to be sorted out in a systematic way to do justice to the halachic
issues as well as the psychological context. 1) Under what circumstances
is it permitted to deceive others 2) Are the apparently conflicting
reports concerning a gadol's personal conduct indicative that someone is
lying? 3) When faced with a confusing collection of reports concerning
the conduct of rabbinic authorites - is it appropriate to assume the most
derogatory interpretation when other - equally reasonable interpretations
are available.

Regarding the first - there are many of sources dealing with deception 1)
to persuade people to accept a particular halachic view that a compentent
halachic authority feels is the correct one but also feels he lacks the
ability to convince others on his own say so. There is a major discussion
in the Sdei Chemed vol 5 page 310-311. There is also the Magen Avraham
OH 156. Of relevance the Mishna Berura cites the entire Magen Avraham -
except for the hetair to misquote the halacha in the name of a higher
authority. Berachos 58a - "Does G-d do miracles for liars?", Berachos
63a, Yam Shel Shlomo Bava Kama 4:9 2) there is also the related issue
of avoiding embarrassment by deception as found in Berachos 43, Bava
Metzia - 23b things one can deceive others about and Kesubos 17a.

My point being that the issue of deception is not simply the ends justify
the means but rather involves the more important issue of ratzon Hashem
i.e., what exactly is emes. As Rav Dessler points in Michtav M'Eliyahu
vol I page 94 (as well as Emes L'Yaakov 27:12 and Maharal Bereishis
47:29) emes - is not the statement of facts as they are found in physical
reality. If one reveals the location of someone being persued by murders -
that is not emes. Telling a kallah at her wedding that she is ugly is not
emes. On the other hand concealing distressful information is not always
emes. All this requires very careful consideration concerning the full
consequences. There is no blanket hetair to lie for a good cause. Nor
is there a necessity of mechanically presenting all the facts - without
considering other factors.

2) Conflicting reports concerning gadolim as well as everything else -
do not necessarily indicate that someone is lying. The facts can possibly
be explained by factors such as - 1) there was a change in attitude
of various family members after Reb Moshe was niftar. Thus it makes a
difference what time period is being described 2) There is not a uniform
position taken by the children and grandchildren towards the issue. 3) the
issue of bal nefesh is such that Reb Moshe notes himself that he himself
would be lenient concerning blended whisky to avoid offending someone. 4)
There is a possible distinction between milk and yogurt 5) the existence
of commercial milk products in someones house does not necessarily
mean they consume them. In sum - none of the facts cited are inherently
contradictory and can possibly be explained by appropriate context.

3) Perhaps the most important issue is why assume that someone is lying
in order to deceive others about the halacha? I obviously don't deny
the possiblity - but there is a requirement of giving everyone the
benefit of the doubt. As the Chofetz Chaim once noted - there is no
halachic obligation to be stupid and ignore the possiblity that some
one is trying to harm or deceive - but there are halachic requirements
how you act towards those people prior to receiving proper evidence.

Daniel Eidensohn

I mentioned a halacha allowing a person to deliberately misquote a
well-known posek.

I am indebted to R' Daniel Eidensohn for setting me straight on this
issue.

My source was Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan, who brought several sources including a
lengthy Magen Avraham in 156:2. I am particularly struck by R' Eidensohn's
comment <<< There is also the Magen Avraham OH 156. Of relevance the
Mishna Berura cites the entire Magen Avraham - except for the hetair to
misquote the halacha in the name of a higher authority. >>>

But I am still bothered by the conflicting reports of the positions taken
by specific individuals. R' Eidensohn correctly points out that not only
are the various children and grandchildren of Rav Moshe entitled to differ
from each other, but their own positions might also change over time.

There are several posters who were rather vocal in their posts, when they
wrote that one rav or another did or did not drink Chalav Hacompanies. I
invite those posters to restate those observations PROVIDED that they
can clearly cite the time and circumstances of the incident. For example,
if you do not know which descendant the story relates to, or even when it
occurred, then please do not bother posting it. But if you do know such
details, let's collect them, and perhaps we can sort them out, and resolve
the conflicts if we see that an individual changed his position over time.

Akiva Miller

Moshe Feldman wrote on Areivim:
>One source for having compassion on criminals (rather than take the 
>attitude "who cares about them") is the halacha of eenui hadin--once a bais 
>din has sentenced a person to death, they must kill him that day rather 
>than make him wait. Can anyone bring other examples of compassion?

Kesuvos 37b - "Ve'ahavta lerei'acha kamocha - Choose for him a good
death." The gemara learns from "ve'ahavta lerei'acha kamocha" that
execution must be as swift and painless as possible.

Gil Student

On Sun, Feb 10, 2002 at 08:07:14PM +0000, Chana Luntz wrote:
: We know that a person who is posel to be a dayan (eg a karov) can be
: a dayan if both parties accept that person (mishna, Sanhedrin 24a) -
: it is one of the bases that a modern day dayan (who of course does not
: have smicha) is able to judge. Is a modern day dayan not a "dayan"?

Perhaps not. It's a good thing you raised this question as it forces
disambiguation.

The Sanhedrin is composed of dayanim. A modern day dayan is not a "dayan"
in this sense of the word.

Dayan in the more minimal usage is actually less than a poseiq. He is
providing a one-time ruling, more like a moreh de'asra than an IM. And,
if the dayan is operating by force mutual consent, it may be more because
of the rules of pesharah than those of din.

It is unclear which usage the Targum means when speaking of Devorah.
If you assume the latter, then I would say that Chanah is right.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Life is complex.
micha@aishdas.org                    Decisions are complex.
http://www.aishdas.org                   The Torah is complex.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                                    - R' Binyamin Hecht

On Fri, Feb 08, 2002 at 09:41:37AM -0500, David Riceman wrote:
:> Why should there be a metaphysical causality beyond din or
:> "gam zu litova"? Why would HQBH create these rules by which hatavah or
:> pain can reach someone by changing something that doesn't change his
:> tzidqus?

: See Ramban on Deut. 18:9, Guide [not that he'd agree with the Ramban]
: I:73, discussion of the sixth proposition.

I did not see an answer in either place. The Ramban (on the issur of kishuf)
discusses that there is a metaphysical causality. Interesting to contrast
it with Nefesh haChaim on the subject.

The Ramban argues that the kochos ha'elyonim are tied to those of this
world, that each thing below has a force above. Therefore, manipulating
one side of the correspondance will have effects on the other.

R' Chaim speaks of man being the unity of all the kochos, and therefore
it's man's ma'aseh, dibbur and machshavah that bedavka connect the
higher olamos to this one. It's the po'el, not the nif'al, that brings
out these effects.

The Ramban, however, discusses the "how" not the "why". He doesn't explain
the role of a causality that only a ma'amin would know of (and therefore
doesn't enable hester panim) and doesn't aid us in planning our choices,
and yet still allows for people to get something other than din or
"gam zu litovah".

I didn't see anything relevent in the Rambam you cite. There he rejects
the Kalam, and discusses atoms, void, whether time can be quantized,
whether animals think, completed vs potential infinities and whether
either can exist, and more along those lines. Can you tell me which
of his discussions of which postulte I should look?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Life is complex.
micha@aishdas.org                    Decisions are complex.
http://www.aishdas.org                   The Torah is complex.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                                    - R' Binyamin Hecht

From: "Feldman, Mark" <MFeldman@CM-P.COM>
<<The way Rav Moshe explains it is that if there is a tzorech
("l'farnesa'so, v'la'avodaso u'lshaar tzerachav") one may go there, but
one may not go there simply for a leisurely walk ("l'tayel"), where by
definitely there is no tzorech. Rav Elinson in Hatzne'a Lechet explains
that l'tzorech means any reasonable need, not a great need. >>

I think there is a misunderstanding here. Letayel does NOT mean as it
does in Modern Hebrew, to take a leisurely stroll. In halacha, AIUI, it
means to go someplace not for a mitzva, (mitzva here including parnasa).

Thus, Rav Moshe's letayel is equivalent to your example of taking the
subway to go bowling.

Just out of curiousity, has anyone who considers it permissible to look
at divrei erva (only long enough to know when to hit FF, of course)
so as to relax, asked a shaila of a posek if that is permissible?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

I wrote:
<<The way Rav Moshe explains it is that if there is a tzorech
("l'farnesa'so, v'la'avodaso u'lshaar tzerachav") one may go there, but
one may not go there simply for a leisurely walk ("l'tayel"), where by
definition there is no tzorech. >>

R Gershon Dubin replied:
// I think there is a misunderstanding here. Letayel does NOT mean
as it does in Modern Hebrew, to take a leisurely stroll. In halacha,
AIUI, it means to go someplace not for a mitzva, (mitzva here including
parnasa). //

While l'tayel may mean to do not-mitzvah-like activities in some
contexts, here R Moshe specifically states "k'gon...k'she'ain lo
tzorech laleches sham, she'holech rak l'tayel." And he also says
"aino mechuyav ...li'mno'a m'sha'ar tzrachav." The implication is
that any need--not necessarily qualifying as a mitzvah--is sufficient.
R Elinson in Hatzne'a Lechet p. 75 specifically says so, and gives an
example of a leisure activity as qualifying as "sh'ar tzrachav."

R Elinson says that this is mashma from the makor in Bava Basra. I assume
that his point is that the gamara's statement "ee d'ika darcha archrisa
rasha hu" implies that if he's going there for a (non-mitzvah) personal
reason and there's no other path, it's hard to categorize him as a rasha
(as opposed to a case where he went there for no reason, realizing full
well that uncovered women were there).

Gershon continued:
// Thus, Rav Moshe's letayel is equivalent to your example of taking
the subway to go bowling. //

IOW, you believe that it's assur to take the subway to go bowling, since
there will be women not dressed properly?  Do you know anyone who paskens
like that?

Kol tuv,
Moshe

On Mon, 11 Feb 2002 22:54:27 -0500 "Feldman, Mark" <MFeldman@CM-P.COM>
writes:
<<IOW, you believe that it's assur to take the subway to go bowling,
since there will be women not dressed properly? Do you know anyone who
paskens like that?>>

No I don't. Let's try this: if we posit that going on the subway is
deleka darka acharita, is *being* in the bowling alley with scantily
clad women permissible? (I know bowling is a bad example, but I mean
an activity where the risk is at the destination rather than on the way)

Do you know anyone who paskens that one may view movies which are known to
be problematic with one's trigger finger poised on fast forward? Despite
what you wrote in another email, the discussion (and recommendations of
movies by certain list members) was by no means limited to Alice Kramden.
(If you have to ask <g>.......)

This is essentially the question I ended with: has anyone asked a shaila?
Shouldn't they?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

> Thus, Rav Moshe's letayel is equivalent to your example of taking
> the subway to go bowling.

Worse, it's the bowling itself (or the nmshal - movies) that is the
equivilant of "letayal". To argue that the bowling or the movie or
whatever particular form of entertainment we're discussing is the
_need_ itself, and not simply one of many viable avenues by which to
fulfil that need, whether intentional or not, is subterfuge. The need
is entertainment (though I've yet to see a single source which gives
entertainment such a status vis a vis matiring viewing prohibited imagery
when there is not a derech achrita), the movie is simply the derech
one chooses to get to the intended destination. Even if entertainment
is to be considered a need, if there are viable alternatives, we still
don't have a heter for movies which show imagery typical of a busy New
York street.

Again, the formula is inescapable - point to the source in halacha that
(a) entertainment is a need and (b) there isn't a derech achrita from
movies as an avenue to fulfilling this need.

I wrote:
<<IOW, you believe that it's assur to take the subway to go bowling,
since there will be women not dressed properly? Do you know anyone who
paskens like that?>>

Reb Gershon replied:
// No I don't. Let's try this: if we posit that going on the subway
is deleka darka acharita, is *being* in the bowling alley with scantily
clad women permissible? //

Wait a minute. Before you go on with your own example, deal with mine.
According to you, taking a subway (containing average NY women) to
a chassidish bowling alley ought to be assur, as the leisure activity
does not constitute tzorech and therefore by definition there is a darka
achrita (I.e. to find a different leisure activity).

As to your example, according to me it would be permitted to go to a
bowling alley containing less than optimally dressed NY women provided
that you subjectively believe that you won't be meharher (that is a
requirement in R Moshe's tshuvah). If your first reaction is "these are
scantily clad women," then presumably you will be meharher. You would
also be required to situate yourself away from these women.

As to the movies we were discussing: I was specifically defending watching
"afternoon" movies described by Reb'n Boublil--she had noted that the
women depicted in those movies dress no differently than they dress on
the street. Any movie with scantily clad women likely to cause hirhur
would be forbidden (unless your wife has the FF button and will definitely
be able to skip over all those scenes).

Kol tuv,
Moshe

*********************


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