Avodah Mailing List

Volume 08 : Number 112

Wednesday, February 13 2002

• illuminated kesubos
• Re: Halachic permissibility of viewing movies
• Re: Halachic permissibility of viewing movies
• Re: Eisav
• CI and ChC
• Re: Halachic methodology and chalav hakompanies
• ayin hara
• Re: Halachic permissibility of viewing movies
• Re: Halachic permissibility of viewing movies
• Re: Halachic permissibility of viewing movies
• Re: Segulos
• some excellent tapes on Purim from RYBS
• Re: Isha psulah ladun
• Re: Kesav Ashuris
• Re: calendar
• Re: Criminal Compassion
• Bris Vort
• Tehillim Chart (Nakh Guide)
• Re: 'Hanukah
• Re: ayin hara
• Q on Rosh on Brachos 2a
• Re: Q on Rosh on Brachos 2a
• Re: Criminal Compassion
• How to Detect a Counterfeit

Having actually purchased a decorated keseubah today, I think there is one
very good reason for it: something that is framed and hanging on the wall
is not likely to get lost. Having had too many riends who had headaches
with lost kesubos, I thought it might be nice to elimanate that problem
me-rosh. And having something scrawled on a piece of paper framed and
hanging on the wall looks crazy.

Gershon Dubin wrote:
>I think there is a misunderstanding here. Letayel does NOT mean as it does 
>in Modern Hebrew, to take a leisurely stroll. In halacha, AIUI, it means to 
>go someplace not for a mitzva, (mitzva here including parnasa).

I'm not sure this is correct. This is what the Rama wrote in Orach
Chaim 248:4

"Some say that any place one goes for business or to visit a friend is
considered a 'devar mitzvah' and not 'devar ha-reshus' except when one
walks 'letayel'".

Here, "letayel" is clearly not for business or for a mitzvah. It is
not even to visit a friend. The way I understand the Rama, this is
regarding what we call "shpatziring".

Gil Student

On 11 Feb 2002 at 22:02, Gershon Dubin wrote:
> I think there is a misunderstanding here. Letayel does NOT mean as it
> does in Modern Hebrew, to take a leisurely stroll. In halacha, AIUI,
> it means to go someplace not for a mitzva, (mitzva here including
> parnasa).

If that's the case, are you allowed to drive somewhere with your wife when
she is a nida that's not l'tzorech mitzva? AIUI, you are allowed to drive
anywhere with your wife when she is a nida - including to a vacation spot
- but you are not allowed to go for a drive just to look at the scenery
without a destination (I'm not sure that you would be allowed to take
101 instead of I-5 in California - anyone who's traveled there would
understand the difference. 101 is the scenic route). The SA refers to
going for a drive without a destination - or taking the scenic route -
as being "metayel."

Your standard would be much stricter (because you've defined l'tayel
to include any non-mitzva related travel), and has implications that go
beyond issues of histaklus.

-- Carl

It's a Yerushalmi in NEdarim 12b (3:8): "atid Eisav ha'rasha la'atof
tallit v'leishev im ha'tzadikkim b'gan eden l'atid lavo v'hakadosh baruch
hu gorrero u'motzi'o misham".

Josh

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
> R' Herschel Schachter verbally listed the CI when listing those who were
> meikil on ChC.

I quoted the tshuvah in Chelkas Yaakov stating the views of the CI
strongly denying this..

But AIUI the source for the view of such a kulo from the CI comes because
he is meikel in milk powder. (But I have to check it up.)

In any case, I strongly doubt that ANY CI'nik consumes CA or ChC.

SBA

RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com wrote:
>What many are saying is times change so the Gzeira does not apply. 

No, the "many" are saying that the gezeirah was never formulated in such a
general sense as to apply to everything that www.chumrahoftheday.god wants
to associate it with. A gezeirah has to be precisely worded and defined.
Although I have no time right now to look up the sources (see "IMPORTANT
ANNOUNCEMENT" on Areivim, available upon request), I do remember from
my first rosh hayeshivah, I believe (that was rav Yehudah Aryeh Treger,
mhhalahl - as per RSM on Areivim on the shlitah thread ;-)), that one of
the conditions for a gezeirah to be valid is that it has to be precisely
defined and limited (mugbakl). Lomdut tried to uncover the precise terms
of that gezeirah, as in the case of reading by wax candles' light on
Shabbat. Tos. and other Ashk. rishonim merely innovated in that they
considered minhag a source for such lomdut.

> Nearly this entire list and RMF deal with the Gzeira having already taken 
> hold at one time and finding {IMHO} really dochack constructs to evade or 
> avoid the issue of repealing a Gzeira that has taken hold.

Nothing dochak about it. Just see below.

> As I present it, Lo Nispashet is a post facto justification. That means
> any gzeira not ALEADY compromised may not be compromised. This is good
> news for those who rely upon Tradition/masorah/Precedent
>
> As others present their ratoinales, you use Lamdus to Defacto Defaeat or to
> nullify the Gzeira. Tell me which gzeira is NOT subject to finding a good
> chiluk between the original and the way the facts are today?! ...

I disagree on two points.
First, lomdut is not in order to rationalize nullifying the gezeirah,
and lomdut is dochak, it is no less an attempt to discover the historical
circumstances under which the gezeirah was promulgated than your attempt
to find the areas that historically did not accept a certain gezeirah.

Second, I have not ever heard of a gezeirah that was intpashet in one area
but not in another. You find that with minhag and with local takkanot
(that may later develop into universal ones, such as 'haramim of RGS,
butnot gezeirot. On the contrary, one of the things that the nitpashet
vs. lo nitpashet rule of the gemarah (I believe elaborated in TB AZ
WRT shemen shel nokhrim) tries to achieve, is that the gezeirah should
be universal.

Arie Folger

As someone who has joined this list recently, I am impressed by the
eclecticism of the group and would like to pick its collective brain
(if that's okay.)

Can anyone suggest teshuvot (contemporary or earlier) that discuss the
validity or non-validity of the concept "ayin hara?" I am particularly
interested in two issues: (1) a source for the idea that ayin hara affects
only those who believe in its power to affect them, and (2) any discussion
(whether in shutim or in scholarly articles) of the relationship between
the concept "ayin ra'a" as used by Chazal and the popular conception of
ayin hara.

Kol tuv,
Simi Peters

R Willroth wrote:
// To argue that the bowling or the movie or whatever particular form of
entertainment we're discussing is the _need_ itself, and not simply one
of many viable avenues by which to fulfil that need, whether intentional
or not, is subterfuge. The need is entertainment..., the movie is simply
the derech one chooses to get to the intended destination. //

I don't think that that is pshat in darka achrita, but that darka achrita
refers to your choosing a specific road to get to your destination
rather than an alternative road. The "destination" refers to a specific
activity you have in mind, and as RCS pointed out, it need not be
a mitzvah. The "road" vs "alternative road" refers to how you travel
to your destination, not which destination you choose. (In the case of
l'tayel, you have no destination.)

R Elinson (in explaining R Moshe's tshuvah) in Hatzne'a Lechet p. 75
gives an example of going to an uncrowded beach (where you pass by women
but sit alone) as qualifying as "sh'ar tzrachav" even where there is no
medical need. Undoubtedly, there are alternative leisure activities.

R Elinson says that this is mashma from the makor in Bava Basra. I assume
that his point is that the gamara's statement "ee d'ika darcha archrisa
rasha hu" implies that if he's going there for a (non-mitzvah) personal
reason and there's no other path, it's hard to categorize him as a rasha
(as opposed to a case where he could have chosen an alternative route,
which shows that the reason he chose this route was to ogle women).

This also answers the point R Jay Spero made on Areivim.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

>>  To argue that the bowling
>> or the movie or whatever particular form of entertainment
>> we're discussing is the _need_ itself, and not simply one of
>> many viable avenues by which to fulfil that need, whether
>> intentional or not, is subterfuge.  The need is entertainment..., the
>> movie is simply the derech one chooses to get to the intended destination.

> I don't think that that is pshat in darka achrita, but that darka achrita
> refers to your choosing a specific road to get to your destination rather
> than an alternative road.  The "destination" refers to a specific activity
> you have in mind, and as RCS pointed out, it need not be a mitzvah.  The
> "road" vs "alternative road" refers to how you travel to your destination,
> not which destination you choose.  (In the case of l'tayel, you have no
> destination.)

The destination is entertainment, the route is via movies and television.
To view movies as the destination is to avoid the whole issue - you
would have already assumed that the destination (movies and television)
as well as the underlying motivation (entertainment) are valid a priori.
It's not so simple an issue.

That said, I'd point out that l'shitaskha, movies depicting a normal
New York City street scene (I realize that you'd prefer to limit the
discussion to Reb. Boubil's "Afternoon Specials", but the original
thread began with a "suggested viewing list" of contemporary theater
releases) would be prohibited because there is a derech achrita (the
"Afternoon Special"). R' Moshe would require the derech achrita and R'
Henkin's habituation is limited from the pritzus one finds in the street
today. And this is _even if_ you accept that entertainment is a "need"
and the movies are the only type of intertainment capable of fulfilling
that need - that's a great deal to propose without reasonable sources.
("Point to the source in halacha...")

> R Elinson (in explaining R Moshe's tshuvah) in Hatzne'a Lechet p. 75 gives
> an example of going to an uncrowded beach (where you pass by women but sit
> alone) as qualifying as "sh'ar tzrachav" even where there is no medical
> need. Undoubtedly, there are alternative leisure activities.

Again, even if I accept R' Elinson's pshat in R' Moshe, you've still
left short of matiring the movies on the original list - the beach you're
heading for isn't empty, it's filled with pritzus!

> R Elinson says that this is mashma from the makor in Bava Basra. I assume
> that his point is that the gamara's statement "ee d'ika darcha archrisa
> rasha hu" implies that if he's going there for a (non-mitzvah) personal
> reason and there's no other path, it's hard to categorize him as a rasha
> (as opposed to a case where he could have chosen an alternative route, which
> shows that the reason he chose this route was to ogle women).

How's that implicit? I'd argue even if he were going _for a mitzva_
and there were another route, he'd fit the gemara's label. And I'm
certainly not ready to allow that entertainment is a mitzva and kol
sh'kein movies...

R' Yitzchok Willroth asks for a source in halacha that entertainment is
a need.

The 1st perek of Mesilas Yeshorim clearly states (quoting from memory)
that a person is created "elo l'his'aneg".

IIRC Horav Avigdor Miller zt"l said to stop there. A person was created
to enjoy himself.

We all know that when you enjoy doing something you'll try do it as often
as possible. Your life can evolve around it. The purpose of our life
is to shteig to the point where this all encompassing "entertainment" =
"Al Hashem" - the next words in the MY.

Now the question becomes: - May one indulge in other forms of
entertainment if one's not up to the level of enjoying "Al Hashem"
to the extent that it can relax one from the stress of daily living.

- May one indulge in other forms of entertainment in order to shteig in
Sholom bayis?

We see e.g. that one may indulge in various forms of entertainment to
amuse a Choson & Kalloh. However, at weddings chazal were very clear
about the rules of tznius et al. specifically because of the levity to
be found there.

How do we go from wedding to entertainments that are on the border of
"Asu Soyeg LaTorah" (and we've been debating which side of this fence
movies fall into.)

- Danny

Micha Berger wrote:
> I did not see an answer in either place....
>  Can you tell me which of his discussions of which postulte I should look?

I'll try the prolix version. According to the philosophers one of
the consequences of God's unity is His simplicity, and one of the
the consequences of that is His immutability. The Mekubalim concur
(with many more details). As a result, the Rambam rejects the Kalam's
views and has to postulate laws of nature so that an immutable God has
a mechanism for controlling a mutable world.

But what about miracles? The Rambam (peirush on Avoth) adopts Chazal's
"hithna hkb"h im maaseh breishith" as a solution: miracles are not
violations of the laws of nature, they are instead loopholes built into
the system.

There are obvious problems with this solution. Hence the Ramban
postulates what I once called "supernatural law", a physics of the
miraculous. Of course any mechanical system, once understood, can
be exploited. The Ramban identifies the exploitation of supernatural
law with "kishuf", which is Biblically prohibited. As a contrast,
the exploitation of physical law leads to email lists.

I was suggesting that those who believe in seguloth view them as a
(permissible?) example of supernatural law.

Your question is why bother with causality at all? Just let it work if
it induces virtue, and fail to work if it induces vice. I was a little
puzzled at that, since you had said you had no objection to causality
with respect to laws of nature. The same question should apply there.

The answer to both is "to preserve free will." Since I have no idea (in
spite of the Ramchal) why God wants us to have free will I will stop here.

David Riceman

Those listmembers who have access to the Nordlicht tapes of RYBS shiruim
should listen to a series of shiurim circa 1969 about Purim whicn are
simply magnificent.

1)Ever wonder why there is so much detail on the decadent Persian court
and its happenings ?

2)Did Mordechai draft Esther and what was her response and Mordechai's
answer?

3) What lessons can we learn in the wake of the 1930s , the Holocaust
and the rise of Israel from the Megillah?

4)What halachic ruling was Mordechai trying to impress upon Esther?

5) Why is the book called Megilas Esther?

6)Did the Jews actions in killing their enemies constitute self
defense?All of these questions are explored in depth .

Here is one poor man's summary of the answers:

1) The society was decadent. A society which has lost its moral compass
yields easily to a totalitarian ruler Weimar Germany preceded Nazi rule.

2) Estrher was reluctant because she feared the time was wrong and that
any actionwould jeopardize her position. Mordechai responds by telling
that the Jewish people will be saved, that she is not indispensable and
that her position is not safe, regardless of her choice of action.

3) German Jews always wrote off pogroms in Poland as the product of
the ghetto. American Jews viewed themselves as remote from the events
in Europe and failed to protest against FDR''s choice not to bomb the
crematoria. Instead, FDR accepted Dr Steohen Wise's opinions and decided
not to bomb he camps

4) In times of persecution, the answer of tyhe Maranos in Spain is wrong
because it sends the message to the non Jew that the Jew is willing to
desert Judaism in a time of trouble. See Rambam Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah ,
discussion of Kiddush HaShem

5) Esther's actions were instrumental, even though she and Mordechai
had complementary and different roles.

6) Throughout history, Many gentiles and some Jews used the passage
about the Jews revenge in a self hating or anti Semitic manner. RYBS
called their actions a preventive war in self defense such as the Six
Day War. he recalled that Tito mentioned to an Israeli diplomat that
although Israel won the war by taking out the Arab air forces in a matter
of hours on the first day, the next war would not see a preventive strike.

If you have these tapes, the oratory and power of RYBS together with
his keen knowledge of history and the battle between the West as the
symbol of Dor Hamabool ( promiscuity and the relaxation of all mores in
the 60s ) and the East ( Maos' China) as the Dor HaFlaggah ( political
power) is veryscary because we are always caught in between these two
extremes. Despite some popular myths, Judaism as a teaching comunity
never functioned with a mob led by a leader, but rather on the ability
of the gifted teacher to reach his students. Even tefilah btzibur is
dependent on a minimum number of 10, because prayer is not a service
but rather a means of standing in judgment before G-d. Hopefully,these
notes will help some of us in understanding Purim and the Megilla ,
especially in light of current events.

Steve Brizel
Zeliglaw@aol.com

RMB wrote:
> Ein hachi nami. They all were final halachic authorities, but qua
> zeqeinim. I'm suggesting that the zeqeinim, being nevi'im (a feature
> Rashi mentions), are soferim not rabbanim.

Wadda?! I thought that zeqeinim are the rabbanim musmakhim par
excellance. Besides, what exactly are soferim that they may not fall
under the categories that exclude women from hora'ah?

BTW, why do you think that Devorah is necessarily not a precedent? I
believe that the presence of one case in massorah is a precedent. Only
when the exceptional nature of an event is emphasized (a la 2 ktuvim
habaim kee'had ein melamdim, or 3 ktuvim habaim kee'had ein melamdim)
do we state that it is not a useful precedent. And furthermore, even if
it isn't a useful precedent, we need to explain why, and anything short
of 'al pi hadibut shaani will bring about a useful precedent for some
(admittedly less common than rabbanit) cases.

I find the argument against women rabbaniot - bizman hazeh that we lack
smikhah - based on srarah most sound, and even that needs reinforcement,
as the whole idea of a rav having srarah is debatable, espescially
if we want to allow women to participate in government (ministers,
etc.) and also considering that Rambam's broad definition of srarah
(can't have a women or Druze sergeant in Tzahal, women as administrators
in institutionas that involve males, or even any administrative position)
is by no means accepted if current practice is any guide.

Rather, we accept Rambam's definition of srarah only very partially, and
wish that a rav would have real srarah that in a sense exceeds that of
a government minister or at least that of a mayor, and therefore accept
women in government and don't accept them in the rabbinate.

I hope that my assesment above is wrong in some way or another, so
please comment.

Arie Folger

RYD wrote:
> And now, in manner of correction and reference: My teacher and RSM's
> near neighbor, Dr Richard Steiner, has shown [Orientalia 62, 2 (1993):
> 80-82] that the Hebrew term "ketav Ashurit" was derived indirectly from
> the Demotic. It was used by the Egyptians probably bec of the political
> fact that Aram was part of the Assyrian empire in the 7th cen BCE...

Where does KA then come from, if it is not Assyrian. I mean from the 
eprspective of the 'hokrim. Please elaborate, and if possible, cite sources 
in contemporary scholarship.

Arie Folger

Reb Eli Turkel <Eli.Turkel@colorado.edu> wrote:
> <<Which was by Hillel II -- not coincidentally the av beis din who
> disbanded / presided over the self-disbanding Sanhedrin (in 358ce).
> He made the calendar because it was the end of the mosad that could be
> meqadeish the chodesh.>>
>
> Though these facts are generally accepted in fact it appears no where
> in the Gemara and many rishonim seem to unaware of the details.
>
> One thing that has always bothered me. If the establishment of the
> calendar was such a momentous event how come it is never mentioned in
> the gemara. The gemara in beitzah is very vague and certainly does not
> mention Hillel II, a Sanhedrin or any such idea....

Could you elaborate on
a) where the well known facts came from
b) what is/is not elaborated in TB/TY
c) what you base your POV that the calendar was established over
   centuries on?

Arie Folger

> There is a Drasha of "V'Ahavta L'Rayacha Kamocha" 
> which teaches us "B'ror Lo Misah Yafa" - execute a criminal humanely.

There must be more to this drash than meets the eye - after all 3 of
the 4 misos are rather gruesome:

Consider: (Based on Sanhedrin Perek 6 Mishna 2 & 3)
- Skila and Sreifa have the criminal up to his thighs in dirt. 
- Pouring hot lead down a throat may be more humane than an
  auto-da-fe. (The Bartenura brings the above drash at this point.)
- Twisting a towel round a fellows neck till he suffocates.
- Throwing an unclothed criminal off the 2nd story and then pelting him
with boulders.

Makes prison and electric chairs look like a vacation.

- Danny

While preparing his bris-drosho, my good friend and neighbor R' Kadish
Mordochai (RCS) mentions:

"The Maharil and the Rema make the association with Ktores (that you
cannot be sandak twice in the same family because it's like bringing
Ktores - it's ma'ashir so only once). The Gra asks on the Rema and
says that if sandakous is like Ktores you should only be allowed to
do it once period - not once per family. The Chassam Sofer (OH 1:159)
says that the Rav of the community is an exception to the rule because
he is like a Kohain Gadol who can do the Avodah whenever he wants."

According to the above, in the midbar Aaron (the Kohain Gadol) had to
do the Ktores nearly every day. Do we have a mekor for this?

As to "having trouble making the connection between a kapara for Lashon
Hara and serving as a sandak." I cannot help, but both metzizah and LH
use the mouth. Unless you want to say that being sandek is using your
thighs and Aaron (the Kohain Gadol) was a rodef shalom - doing a lot of
walking - but I think the Adar atmosphere is getting to me. :-)

- Danny

Things work pretty fast on Avodah, and it was the first place where my
announcement about Guide Sheets for bekiut in Nakh went up. Because it
went up so fast, people who saw it on Avodah were the first to notice
a problem - that the file with the 6-month cycle for reading Tehillim
(Nisan thru Elul and Tishrei thru Adar) was missing online. Thanks to
those who let me know about the problem.

The problem has been fixed (thanks to the staff). To view the chart for
the Tehillim cycle, go to <http://www.lookstein.org/tanakh/guide.pdf>,
and then click on "Chart for Reading Sefer Tehillim" (six-month cycle).

Bivrakha,
Seth Kadish

RRW wrote:
> Tangentially I have suggested in other posts that the ORIGINAL Takkanah
> of Hanukkah was botel at the time of the Hurban, but it was re-instituted
> later.
> It probably was Observed all along, but the era of the Mishnah came after
> the original Takkanah was over and before the re-confirmation of the TB
> in Shabbos.

Could you elaborate what you base this on, please. (sources)

Arie Folger

>(2) any discussion (whether in shutim or in scholarly articles) of the 
>relationship between the concept "ayin ra'a" as used by Chazal and the 
>popular conception of ayin hara.

This is fairly recent, but R. Chaim Friedlander has a whole section on
this in his Sifsei Chaim - Emunah uVitachon. I think it is in vol. 1
but might be in vol. 2. Check the table of contents. He points to all
the relevant references in Michtav Me'Eliyahu that he helped edit.

Gil Student

The Rosh (first page of his perush, left colum, about 1/2-way down)
is explaining the minhag to say krias shema at shul even though it's
before tzeis. He rejects Rabbeinu Tam's explanation, and then talks
about the Mishna on 2a, various Tannaim, and then writes: "Even tho'
the halacha is not like R Eliezer as against R Yeshua and we're not like
R Meir as against R Yehuda -- nevertheless, in tefila were meikil."

In tefila? What's he talking about? The inyan is k"sh!

OK. Look to note 'kuf' below at the Ma'adoni Yom Tov: Well, Rosh probably
is using 'tefila' here to mean 'k"sh', and MY"T brings some sources.
But then MY"T asks the obvious question: k"sh is d'oriasa! How can one
be meikil on d'oraisa?! (And even if tefila b'lev is d'oraisa, he notes,
the set times were rabbanan).

Good question!

Then it appears the MY"T goes on to answer the question.

Unfortunately, I can't make heads or tails of it.

Anyone want to discuss (on-line or off) ?

-- Sholom

At 12:45 PM 2/13/02 -0500, Sholom Simon wrote:
>The Rosh... explaining the minhag to say krias shema at shul even though
> it's before tzeis....  and then writes: "Even tho' the halacha is
>not like R Eliezer as against R Yeshua and we're not like R Meir as against
>R Yehuda -- nevertheless, in tefila were meikil."  ...

I'm doing this from memory, and will have to check this evening.

Tefillat Maariv, like Tefillat Shacharit, requires that Geulah
(redemption) be joined to Tefillah (the Amidah). The way that we do
that is to recite Kriat Shma, which in turn is preceded and followed
by Brakhot. The following Brakha immediately before the Amidah is the
Brakha of Geulah, and therefore creates the joining (s'mikhut).

Thus the recitation of Kriat Shma, with its attendant Brakhot, at Maariv
is technically independent of its recitation to fulfill the mitzvah of
Kriat Shma.

The "leniency" is to allow the recitation of Kriat Shma before tseit,
along with its Brakhot, so that Geulah can be joined to Tefillah.
This means that a permissible time for Tefillat Maariv, namely Bein
HaShmashot (the time between sundown and nightfall) begins earlier than
the earliest time for the recitation of Kriat Shma for the fulfillment
of the mitzvah of Kriat Shma. (The primary factor for the leniency
was to promote Tefillah B'Tsibbur, especially in generations in night
travel-even locally-was dangerous, and people would not return for Maariv
B'Tsibbur after tseit.)

Anyone who does so should repeat Kriat Shma, without the Brakhot, after
nightfall to fulfill the mitzvah of Kriat Shma itself, since the earlier
recitation is fine for joining Geulah to Tefillah but does not fulfill
the mitzvah of Kriat Shma itself.

         Chaim

"Most people would rather die than think, and most people do."-Bertrand Russell

Akiva Miller wrote:
>but still, this principle makes me wonder: Why didn't the Torah prescribe 
>shechita for the death penalty? Wouldn't it be the most merciful, most 
>painless method?

It did! Seyaf on the neck. The gemara in Kesuvos 37a quotes a baraisa
that asks: "From where do we know those executed with a sword are done
so in the neck?" Rabbah bar Avuha answered this question from the pasuk
"Ve'ahavta le-rei'acha kamocha".

Gil Student

A friend gave me permission to reproduce this. I thought this had
a great mashal. I'm cutting off some of the end which is not really
relevant to our context.

Gil Student

"This is paraphrasing what was told over by Rabbi Tovia Singer at his
lecture in Dallas on Feb. 10, 2002.

"Rabbi Singer has a friend, an observant Jew, who works for the United
States Secret Service. The Secret Service is not a the type of employer
that attracts observant Jews, but that's another story. This Jew does
not work on the Presidential Protection detail. He works to protect the
nation's currency. The Secret Service is, after all, an agency of the
Treasury Department...and protecting currency was and is its primary
function.

"This man's job is to teach other agents how to detect counterfeit bills.
Rabbi Singer, learning this was his friends area of expertise, posited
that the Secret Service had a large cache of counterfeit bills which are
studied in great detail by the agents to learn the various techniques
and signs of a counterfeit. He was somewhat shocked to learn this was
not the case.

"So how does the Secret Service train their agents? Not with counterfeit
bills but with real ones. They are taught everything from feeling the
unique texture of American money to the precise colors of the inks, the
shifting watermarks, the embedded ribbon, shifting ink colors, etc. The
idea being that a properly trained agent can detect a fake bill by touch
and sight.

"Likewise, the same is true when examining religion. When it comes to
determining the validity of a derivative religion, one need not learn
the derivative in any detail, if at all. All is required is knowing the
source. If the derivative contradicts the source, the derivative must
be false. Or to put it another way, if the replacement doesn't hold up to
the scrutiny of the original, then the replacement must be counterfeit."

*********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]