Avodah Mailing List

Volume 10 : Number 025

Wednesday, October 9 2002

• Re: More on Klapping during Selach Lanu
• Re: Chol HaMoed Sukkos Eating bread in an airplane
• RMF and microphones
• Re: Chol HaMoed Sukkos Eating bread in an airplane
• RE: air conitioning, kvius, and tzaar
• Re: air conitioning, kvius, and tzaar
• Re: Violating the will of the majority
• Re: Violating the will of the majority
• CI - was Violating the will of the majority
• BR"Y
• Re: Violating the will of the majority

>>>I remember very distinctly asking Rabbi Goldberg z"l (Micha Berger's
great uncle, IIRC), our sixth grade Rebbe, how one klaps during Selach
Lan and he said once by Chatanu and once by Pashanu....>>>

This reminds me of something I meant to ask a few weeks ago.  When is one
supposed to klap during the "Al Cheits" on Yom Kippur?  I grew up klapping
at the moment that I would say the word "cheit," but perhaps it should be
done at the moment that one says "Chatanu", similar to Selach Lanu.  I
checked the "Vidui Booklet" and the Artscroll machzor, and, IIRC, they each
said different things.

KT
Aryeh

On 9 Oct 2002 at 15:07, Carl M. Sherer wrote:
> On 8 Oct 2002 at 20:57, kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:
>> I'm not sure what he meant. I see two possibilities:

>> (1) If I have a Succa available but I choose to drink water and eat
>> dates and not eat in a Succa that's okay, but to go where a Succa is
>> not available and there's no reason to go there is wrong/assur, EVEN
>> if I plan to eat only water and dates.

>> (2) If I have a Succa available but I choose to drink water and eat
>> dates and not eat in a Succa that's okay, but to go where a Succa is
>> not available and there's no reason to go there is wrong/assur, if I
>> am planning on relying on Holchei Drachim to have a Seudas Keva. BUT
>> if I plan to drink water and eat dates it is okay.

>> If he meant #2, then he and I think alike. 

> Nope. I meant #1.

Now that I re-read it, I didn't mean #1 either. I didn't mean #1 because
I don't think there's any problem in going on a trip, even without a
real purpose, and consuming things like dates and water which do not
require a Succah on the way. After all, eating dates and water in the
Succah is characterized by the Gemara as a chumra! I would, however,
have a problem with taking such a trip overnight (at least in climates
like EY where people generally do sleep in the Succah), and with consuming
items that require a Succah (such as mezonos and bread) on such a trip.

But I definitely did not mean #2 either. When I'm at home, I try not to
consume anything outside the Succah. Sometimes I will drink a cup of
coffee while I am learning in the house (I don't recall where I heard
this, but I heard that if one will be distracted by learning in the
Succah, one should learn in the house or in a Beis Medrash. For me, that
depends partly on what I'm learning and when, but it is often the case
that I learn in the house), but this year I did not even do that. The
only thing I recall this year that I might have consumed outside the
Succah was the day we took the kids to the Hebrew U Science Fair, where
I drank two bottles of Diet Coke in a Succah that might have been pasul
(chamasa m'ruba mi'tzilasa).

And while the ptur of Holchei Drachim may allow me to consume a sandwich
outside a Succah while on a business trip, I would not feel right about
doing so, unless I was actually in transit (on a plane or maybe a train)
and no other alternative (i.e. foods that don't require a Succah)
were available.

I'm not bothered by Rebbetzin Luntz's claims that I am thereby forsaking
bentching, but I'm having some difficulty articulating why. Clearly,
people avoid eating bread to avoid bentching year round. One could also
argue that the d'oraisa chiyuv of bentching is only if one is full, a
feeling which many of us don't have so often. Or one could argue that
even if one doesn't have to bentch, there is still bracha achrona in
its place. But in any event, I am less bothered by avoiding bentching
than I am by avoiding eating in the Succah.

-- Carl

With regard to RMF and microphones, I think that RMF's position was somewhat
different and more nuanced than represented, and therefore is actually quite
compatible with R R Wolpoes' position.

In the late 70s, when I became engaged, my mechutanim went to a MO shul in
Baltimore with a "Baltimore heter" microphone.  I asked my LOR for a psak
about the shul, and he told me that he spoke to Rav Moshe and got the
following parameters:

1) As the shul relied on a heter by a valid bet din, it did not have the
status of mumarim, etc, and one may daven there.

2) One should avoid the actual use of the microphone (eg, during an aliya)

3) There were times when the use of the microphone becomes especially
problematic in being yotze, as one is not hearing the actual sounds - as,
for example, tekiat shofar, and one should then daven elsewhere.

This was somewhat different than the published psak given to the shochet,
cited by RDE.  However, the circumstances were quite different. While I do
not know Rav Moshe's rationale, the issue of whether a shochet who wants to
be accepted by us is following our psakim seems (IMHO) quite different than
a general issue of labeling people who follow a psak as being  mechallel
shabbat.

Thus, it would seem that while rav moshe held that one could hold the psakim
of some communities to be in error, he did not quite condemn them all as
mumarim.

Meir Shinnar

On 9 Oct 2002 at 15:07, Carl M. Sherer wrote:
> On 8 Oct 2002 at 20:57, kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:
>> I'm not sure what he meant. I see two possibilities:

>> (1) If I have a Succa available but I choose to drink water and eat
>> dates and not eat in a Succa that's okay, but to go where a Succa is
>> not available and there's no reason to go there is wrong/assur, EVEN
>> if I plan to eat only water and dates.

>> (2) If I have a Succa available but I choose to drink water and eat
>> dates and not eat in a Succa that's okay, but to go where a Succa is
>> not available and there's no reason to go there is wrong/assur, if I
>> am planning on relying on Holchei Drachim to have a Seudas Keva. BUT
>> if I plan to drink water and eat dates it is okay.

>> If he meant #2, then he and I think alike. 

> Nope. I meant #1.

Now that I re-read it, I didn't mean #1 either. I didn't mean #1 because
I don't think there's any problem in going on a trip, even without a
real purpose, and consuming things like dates and water which do not
require a Succah on the way. After all, eating dates and water in the
Succah is characterized by the Gemara as a chumra! I would, however,
have a problem with taking such a trip overnight (at least in climates
like EY where people generally do sleep in the Succah), and with consuming
items that require a Succah (such as mezonos and bread) on such a trip.

But I definitely did not mean #2 either. When I'm at home, I try not to
consume anything outside the Succah. Sometimes I will drink a cup of
coffee while I am learning in the house (I don't recall where I heard
this, but I heard that if one will be distracted by learning in the
Succah, one should learn in the house or in a Beis Medrash. For me, that
depends partly on what I'm learning and when, but it is often the case
that I learn in the house), but this year I did not even do that. The
only thing I recall this year that I might have consumed outside the
Succah was the day we took the kids to the Hebrew U Science Fair, where
I drank two bottles of Diet Coke in a Succah that might have been pasul
(chamasa m'ruba mi'tzilasa).

And while the ptur of Holchei Drachim may allow me to consume a sandwich
outside a Succah while on a business trip, I would not feel right about
doing so, unless I was actually in transit (on a plane or maybe a train)
and no other alternative (i.e. foods that don't require a Succah)
were available.

I'm not bothered by Rebbetzin Luntz's claims that I am thereby forsaking
bentching, but I'm having some difficulty articulating why. Clearly,
people avoid eating bread to avoid bentching year round. One could also
argue that the d'oraisa chiyuv of bentching is only if one is full, a
feeling which many of us don't have so often. Or one could argue that
even if one doesn't have to bentch, there is still bracha achrona in
its place. But in any event, I am less bothered by avoiding bentching
than I am by avoiding eating in the Succah.

-- Carl

> I started by asking whether emotional pleasure counteracts physical
> discomfort to the extent that someone feeling both is not mitztaer? You
> think the answer is yes, but have not explained how you know that.

What do you mean, how do I know that? I'm a person, no? And I know that
this is a very common situation amongst people, including myself; when
you are very happy from where you are or what you are doing, you are
much less likely to notice many physical details or discomforts that you
might otherwise be bothered by.

> I also don't understand what you mean by "solve a problem ..." How does
> one air condition or heat a sukka? I suppose a thatched roof might
> be kosher and provide enough insulation, but it would be difficult to
> reinstall every year.

I think that I mentioned that we use a standing fan in our sukkah and
someone else on the list said that they do as well. I suppose if you
wished to spend the money you could drag an a/c out there, but it would
seem rather a waste just for a family sukkah. Actually, in the Toldos
Aharon [or was it Toldos Avraham Yitzchak?] sukka this year, there was
a whole air conditioning system set up for all those sitting in the
sukkah. They had huge blowers, shaped something like your dryer vent
hose but much larger, venting to different parts of the sukka. I think
the sukka seated at least 1000 people, so they really needed some way
to cool it. So far as heat [for very cold climates] I suppose one could
put a heater in to the sukka and the sukkah is small enough that you'd
be comfortable, but in such cold climates it also rains so you might
not be able to do much about cold climates anyway.

> The major point of my initial post was that improvements in technology
> have left us more sensitive to small changes in temprature.

But as someone else mentioned, RMF I believe didn't get a/c so as not
to get so used to such things. If living this way [being used to being
in an air conditioned environment only] makes us less able or willing
to do a mitzvah, then is it really an improvement? I'm not so sure.

> > However, homes in EY are still more
> > comfortable than sukkot here, as I have never worried that a spirited 
> > child will knock down the walls of my home the way that I must be 
> > concerned about the wooden panels of my sukka.

> How is that related to physical comfort?

Ahem. If a child knocks over one of the walls [or a wooden panel making
up a wall] then the sukka will either not be kosher anymore -- in which
case the child will experience a measure of physical discomfort after
being warned a number of times about the issue and then someone will
have to kosherize the sukka again, assuming that it is not Yom Tov; or
it will have a big hole in it -- which will cause someone the physical
discomfort of putting the wall back together after causing physical
discomfort to the child who knocked it over.

Besides, there is emotional tzaar in worrying whether or not you will
be sleeping with all your walls that night :-)

---Rena

Mishpachat Freedenberg wrote:
>> I started by asking whether emotional pleasure counteracts physical
>> discomfort to the extent that someone feeling both is not mitztaer? You
>> think the answer is yes, but have not explained how you know that.

> What do you mean, how do I know that? I'm a person, no? And I know that
> this is a very common situation amongst people, including myself; when
> you are very happy from where you are or what you are doing, you are
> much less likely to notice many physical details or discomforts that you
> might otherwise be bothered by.

But we started with my observation that I did notice the tzaar.
Your initial response was that if I adjusted my haskafa my tzaar would
disappear. You still seem to believe that, and I am still skeptical.
In any case, should I make a bracha (or even remain in the sukka) while
I have tzaar? If I can sit an hour in the sukka but no longer is that
teishvu k'ein taduru?

>> I also don't understand what you mean by "solve a problem ..." How does
>> one air condition or heat a sukka? I suppose a thatched roof might
>> be kosher and provide enough insulation, but it would be difficult to
>> reinstall every year.

> I think that I mentioned that we use a standing fan in our sukkah and
> someone else on the list said that they do as well.

Admittedly I grew up in an area where snow was more of a problem on
Sukkos than excessive heat, but now that I live in tropical New Jersey I
am skeptical about how effective such techniques are in an environment
that's difficult to insulate. Certainly inside our house fans do not
adequately replace air conditioners, and it's hard to envision an air
conditioner powerful enough to drop the temperature and humidity in my
back yard.

>> The major point of my initial post was that improvements in technology
>> have left us more sensitive to small changes in temprature.

> But as someone else mentioned, RMF I believe didn't get a/c so as not to
> get so used to such things.

Are you proposing this as normative practice? It certainly doesn't
address the question of those of us who already use air conditioning,
and I've never heard of anyone suggesting that air conditioning is assur.
The bottom line is that it's easier to feel tzaar due to small temperature
variations nowadays. The question is, if I do feel tzaar, can I make
a bracha in my sukka?

> If living this way [being used to being in
> an air conditioned environment only] makes us less able or willing to do
> a mitzvah, then is it really an improvement? I'm not so sure.

But is it assur?

>>> However, homes in EY are still more
>>> comfortable than sukkot here, as I have never worried that a spirited
>>> child will knock down the walls of my home the way that I must be
>>> concerned about the wooden panels of my sukka.

>> How is that related to physical comfort?
>
> Ahem. If a child knocks over one of the walls [or a wooden panel making
> up a wall] then the sukka will either not be kosher anymore -- in which
> case the child will experience a measure of physical discomfort after
> being warned a number of times about the issue and then someone will
> have to kosherize the sukka again, assuming that it is not Yom Tov; or
> it will have a big hole in it -- which will cause someone the physical
> discomfort of putting the wall back together after causing physical
> discomfort to the child who knocked it over.

I started by guessing that until two hundred years ago sukkot were
more comfortable than houses in warm weather (they're cooler, less
smoky, and likely to have fewer flies and a nicer breeze). As a result
mitztaer was an unusual condition (recall that the Shulhan Aruch treats
mitztaer and rain separately, cf. Bach 639 about the shiur of rain).
You asserted that, on the contrary, your house is more comfortable
(the following should be italicized) because you need not worry about
it being knocked down. Mah inyan shmitta eitzel har Sinai?

It's true that your thesis is that tzaar is not physical comfort but
emotional comfort. If so your sukka is passul since it induces emotional
discomfort. Build it stronger next year. But how are you addressing
my problem?

David Riceman

In the discussion about RMF and the use of microphones, and specifically
about the role of Agudas Horabonim, I suspect that the writers are looking
at that organization today, and projecting on fifty and sixty years ago.

 From its formation in the early years of the twentieth century until the
late 60s, the Agudas Horabonim was one of the foremost rabbinic bodies,
and -- beginning with WWII -- *the* foremost, having as its members
virtually every posek of consequence in the United States and Canada.
Although the practice of Yiddishkeit in America was abysmal, it possessed
talmidei chachamim of stature far beyond anything we have today. Indeed,
RMF was far from the dominant Torah personality in the Agudas Horabonim
of those days; there were many who were considered on his level as a
talmid chacham, and several who were equally rated as poskim, albeit
few were as accessible as he.

When the Agudas Horabonim made a takanah, it was considered by virtually
all rabbonim as binding. Thus, for instance, because of a famous (or
better, infamous) ma'aseh shehayah, a takanah was made, circa 1930,
that kashruth supervision not be given to an entity dealing in meat, if
that same entity also owns a non-kosher meat establishment, even if at
a location far removed from the kosher one. This became a nation-wide
norm, until the Star-K took it upon itself to violate it about 50 years
later. (The wisdom of the takanah became apparent when that disregard of
it led to an incident in which a cruise under that agency's supervision,
which had been advertised and was patronized as glatt, ended up being
ma'achil t'reifos.)

In view of the above, a unanimous p'sak of the Agudas Horabonim meant
that virtually no one qualified to pasken felt otherwise. In the
specific instance of the microphone issue, there was only one t'shuva,
to the best of my knowledge, written l'heter, and its author was and is
not considered of a magnitude approaching the osrim.

RMF was not asserting on his own authority that use of the microphone
makes one a m'chalel Shabbos, because he felt the need l'migdar milsa.
He was reiterating a p'sak which had the backing of rov minyan and rov
binyan of the American rabbinate qualified to pasken.

Since the Agudas Horabonim was overwhelmingly European educated, with the
lessening of their numbers and with the difficulty the aging members had
in coming to New York, the organization began stagnating in the late 60s,
then became politicized and reduced to its current status as a virtual
non-entity. This should not detract from what it once was, and its
rulings indeed were accepted as normative halachah by frum American Jewry.

Elazar M. Teitz

In the discussion about RMF and the use of microphones, and specifically
about the role of Agudas Horabonim, I suspect that the writers are looking
at that organization today, and projecting on fifty and sixty years ago.

 From its formation in the early years of the twentieth century until the
late 60s, the Agudas Horabonim was one of the foremost rabbinic bodies,
and -- beginning with WWII -- *the* foremost, having as its members
virtually every posek of consequence in the United States and Canada.
Although the practice of Yiddishkeit in America was abysmal, it possessed
talmidei chachamim of stature far beyond anything we have today. Indeed,
RMF was far from the dominant Torah personality in the Agudas Horabonim
of those days; there were many who were considered on his level as a
talmid chacham, and several who were equally rated as poskim, albeit
few were as accessible as he.

When the Agudas Horabonim made a takanah, it was considered by virtually
all rabbonim as binding. Thus, for instance, because of a famous (or
better, infamous) ma'aseh shehayah, a takanah was made, circa 1930,
that kashruth supervision not be given to an entity dealing in meat, if
that same entity also owns a non-kosher meat establishment, even if at
a location far removed from the kosher one. This became a nation-wide
norm, until the Star-K took it upon itself to violate it about 50 years
later. (The wisdom of the takanah became apparent when that disregard of
it led to an incident in which a cruise under that agency's supervision,
which had been advertised and was patronized as glatt, ended up being
ma'achil t'reifos.)

In view of the above, a unanimous p'sak of the Agudas Horabonim meant
that virtually no one qualified to pasken felt otherwise. In the
specific instance of the microphone issue, there was only one t'shuva,
to the best of my knowledge, written l'heter, and its author was and is
not considered of a magnitude approaching the osrim.

RMF was not asserting on his own authority that use of the microphone
makes one a m'chalel Shabbos, because he felt the need l'migdar milsa.
He was reiterating a p'sak which had the backing of rov minyan and rov
binyan of the American rabbinate qualified to pasken.

Since the Agudas Horabonim was overwhelmingly European educated, with the
lessening of their numbers and with the difficulty the aging members had
in coming to New York, the organization began stagnating in the late 60s,
then became politicized and reduced to its current status as a virtual
non-entity. This should not detract from what it once was, and its
rulings indeed were accepted as normative halachah by frum American Jewry.

Elazar M. Teitz

[Re-sending. Got lost in the system. -mi]

In a message dated 10/9/2002 8:41:35AM EDT, micha@aishdas.org writes:
> : Perhaps that is true of the C process, but it is NOT true of CI {Catholic 
> : Israel} as a concept....
> 
> How can you distinguish the two? Someone C would include C in his
> definition of CI. Which means that his version of "CI" gave its endorsement
> to the C process. Which in turn he can point to justify his inclusion
> of C in CI, since they follow a CI endorsed definition of Halachah!

> This is the whole problem with the circularity. Nothing in particular
> need be true of CI.

IMHO You are conflating and confusing the Modern C movements use of CI
with the original intention of its original protagonists

The idea or ideal of CI is rooted in Tradition. What C is doing today
is using CI to uproot Tradition.

See the Chazon Ish's {CI} definition of CI {i.e. Catholic Israel} that
if Psak is wrong it is still binding valid or authoritative in the fact
that Hashem would not allow His people to err. See the quote of R. Aryeh
Kaplan on this, etc.

Any group that is self-defining is by definition circular, but in fact
what WE call Torah Judaism is by definition self-defining because many
competing groups make a similar claim. In fact Catholics claim to
be the New Israel but that does not mean they subscribe to Catholic
Israel either.

Any time you have a heim amru and a heim amru you can claim circularity.

E.G.: a Rabbi claimed that Bavli {TB} has been endorsed by Rishonim as
a Halachic Canon

So then I asked him, "Nu so how about when Rishonim overrule a Bavli in
favor of another text or Minhag?"

He then tried to propose "Ravina and Rav Ashi" were sof hor'aha - a
statement in the Bavli. So then I asked: "how could the Bavli endorse
itself!"

Point: He conceded the fact that his reliance upon Bavli as
the sole source of Halachic imperatives was based upon circular
logic. Nevertheless, he did NOT surrender his shita one iota. He is
convinced base upon Rif and Rambam {et. al.} that this is correct.
Circularity impeached his logic a bit but did not lead him to a different
conclusion.

I am not convinced that CI is truly circular. But for the sake of
argument let's concede that it IS circular. That is not in and of itself
an impeachment of its legitimacy by Torah Standards. AIUI, the psul of
circularity is NOT a Torah/Halachic construct that must be accede to
in all matters. This sounds like an appeal to secular rules of logic -
which I understand is not permitted - or am I missing something here?

FWIW, I don't think everyone subscribed to CI. But it is my opinion
as a student of Jewish History that ignoring CI is the direct cause of
opening the Pandora's Box of Halachic Revisionism.

Question: What is wrong with going back to the TB and allowing women
to have aliyos so long as you can give a good svara that it no longer
violates Kavod Hatzibbur?

If Tosafos can say Mayyim Acharonim no longer is need because Melach
Sdomis is obsolete, why not argue that the issue of Kavod Hatzibbur is
now obsolete, too?

Either:
A) Adhere to Talmudic Gzeiros despite shifting circumstances
Or:
B) Repeal Gzeiros when they are no longer applicable
Or:
C) Eclectically allow for sticking to some and ignoring others.  

If you choose C than each Poseik can call the shots on his own and claim
that the Talmud allows for calling women because it gives a specific
reason.

Or Choose the GRA and say that reason is not relevant because many
reasons remain unarticulated. Then how can we revise dina digmara in
matters such as Chalav Hacompanies or burying on YomTov?

The easy way to navigate through these gray areas is simply CI

Illustration:
A) the Gzeira of Mayyim Acharonim has been deemed obsolete by many
communities - based upon Tosafos' reasoning
OTOH
B) the Gzeira of "Mechikas Sammemanim" is NOT deemed obsolete even though
LOGIC could prove that to be the case
Similarly:
C) Calling women for aliyos is not an option that has been exercised even
though in theory there is a Halachic Pesach to permit it. {See the FIRST
Shach on Yoreh Dei'ah re: Schechita by women}

If your final court of appeal is Talmudic construct then there is room
to allow women to take aliyos and probably room for Rackman's solution
to Gittin, etc.

OTOH, if precedent and/or CI determines what is normative, there is no
room for such deviations because theoretical constructs cannot become
normative MERELY by Svara alone.

Where C is wrong today is simple. They presume that Tosafos manufactured
Halachah based upon Svara and made up kullos to exempt Mayyim Acharonim
or to allow for clapping and dancing on Yomim Tovim etc. And they
take THAT as a precedent to manufacture new Halachic Kullos based upon
reinterpretations and revisionist understandings.

But I counter that Tosafos ONLY goes into Textual revision of Talmud
WHEN he has a competing Minhag, and deems the Minhag a more reliable
barometer of Halachah than the plain meaning of the text. Otherwise
Tosafos would have castigated his community and sided with the TB over
the Minhag - as is the case amongst many contemporary Rabbanim today.
Rather Tosafos presumed that the Minhag has a valid basis and THEN
applied Lamdus to make it work. Or sometimes he brought in competing
texts {E.G. Yerushalmi, Tosefta, Psikta...}


The critical difference between my version of CI and today's' version
of CI is this:
In my construct I use CI to defend Minhaggim and Masoros that are in
violation of certain classic texts {just like Tosafos does - Might add}
While OTOH
C uses CI to justify revising Halachah that is preserved in texts...

The underlying motive and presumption is critical. Yes, we both use
a same process, but one is "conservative" in that it defines status
quo when possible and the other is "Conservative" in that it is really
Liberal Judaism.

I would suggest that Svara is similarly subject to the same kinds of
tests. Svara can be used to defend Minhaggim {for example the Aruch
Hashulchan} or to attack them.

Take your pick. Just give me YOUR underlying assumptions and I can
predict how Halachah flows from them.

Micha has mentioned a Constitution of sorts. We all agree that the TSBP
is THE constitution or the majority of said constitution. The question
is: What is TSBP?

[Email #2. -mi]

In a message dated 10/9/2002 8:41:35am EDT, micha@aishdas.org writes:
> You've lost sight of the definition of textualism. That formal evaluation
> comparing minhag to text is textual -- even if it decides is favor of
> the minhag!

Techincally, any TSBP that is in a text is no longer B'al Peh either. 
--smile--

WADR many Minhaggim are to found in texts. Your are confusing Mimetics
with Minhaggim.

Minhaggim -as I generally mean them - are those mimetics that had no
textual basis UNTIL the Rishonim.

Illustration: Zohar was not printed until R. M DeLeone. Does that imply
it did NOT have an earlier Masorah?

Simlarly, Many Minhaggim existed in Ashkenaz before they entered into
such Texts as Maharil and Rema, does that imply they had no Masorah, too?

See Arvei Psachim 103A and 104A were Rav Yochana uses "nahagu ha'am"
as a proof text equal to Tannaim as per the Rashbam and pashut pshat.

Of course ONCE Rav Yochanan ruled in the text, it was no longer MIMETICS,
but it does not mean it is not based upon Minhag - as oposed to a Mishnah
or a Memra or a psak, etc.

Kol Tuv - Best Regards
Richard Wolpoe
RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com

The Pitchei Tshuvah HM 7:4 says, in part, "... and it is written in the 
: book BR"Y [what? I can't find my otzar roshei teivot -jjb] chapter 12 
: that 

Birkei Yosef by the Chida

kol tuv, Shlomo

In Avodah V10 #24, Rabbi Rich Wolpoe has favored us with a lengthy
objection to the idea that Rav Moshe Feinstein would -- or even could --
obligate us to follow the p'sak of the Agudas Harabonim.

With all due respect, I suggest that this problem might be resolved
by remembering a bit about Eilu V'Eilu. What I mean is that without a
Sanhedrin, when a machlokes arises, none of us mortals can be absolutely
sure of what it is that HaShem wants us to do. (Even WITH a Sanhedrin,
all we know is that we are obligated to follow their p'sak, and NOT that
their p'sak is necessarily correct.)

So when Rav Moshe Feinstein says, "I am postive that the halacha is X,
and anyone who says otherwise is mistaken, and anyone who acts otherwise
should know better and is therefore a mumar", you have to remember to
include an unspoken point: "And although I'm sure I'm right, I have to
admit that I'm not infallible."

In other words, his p'sak is only for those who accept it. But he
can't say that, because he doesn't personally believe it, because he is
convinced that he is correct. That is Truth, from his perspective. And
it will be Truth from our perspective too, IF we've accepted him as
our posek. If not, then go figureout your own Truth. (But Rav Moshe
can't allow you to do that, because he is convinced that he's correct.)

Okay, I'll now comment on details of the post:

Exhibit A:

R' Rich Wolpoe wrote <<< Bepashtus one may dispute the authority and/or
the majority status of the Agudas Harabbonim... So RMF can legitimately
assert that the heter was a Taus gamur OTOH he should not assert that
relying on this heter is a tuas for those that do. >>>

R' Daniel Eidensohn responded <<< I find these assertion rather amazing
and totally unconvincing. We are discussing the nature of the halachic
process. I am presenting a description of a recognized authority. In
response you keep asserting that he was wrong!? It would be helpful if
you cited the basis for asserting that Rav Moshe's conduct in this area
violates the rules. >>>

RRW: <<< The basis is facts. Does the Agudas Harbbanim in fact represent
a Rov!? >>>

My view: Yes! Clearly, Rav Moshe held that - at least on this issue -
the Agudas Harabanim really was enough of a rov to make all other views
batel. And he is entitled to hold that way. But *you* don't have to
follow it! Don't take it so personally!

Exhibit B:

RRW: <<< I don't get it. I am not opposed to RMF making a statement
against microphones. I am amazed that his conclusion re: the ruling of the
Agudas Harabbanom can in any way be contrued as binding so as to label
anyone a Mechallel Shabbos. WADR to the Agudas Harrabonim what is their
offical capacity to make their psak binding on any other community? >>>

Their offical capacity to make their psak binding exists exactly as far
as whoever is willing to accept their authority. Not one man further,
and not one man less. Clearly, in this matter at least, Rav Moshe accepted
that they have this authority. You don't have to.

Exhibit C:

RRW: <<< Think about this. Were Chabad to say that anyone who is not
makpid on Chalav Yisrael mamash <pun intended> is ochlei Treifos and THEN
cite hundreds of Chabad Musmachim would that make their psak binding in
the Lower East Side or MTJ? >>>

No, except on whatever Chabadniks might happen to be there, if any. They
would *say* that it's binding on everyone, and they'd even *believe*
it, and I say, they'd even be *correct*! Yet you would be correct for
following someone else. Such is the conundrum that we call "Eilu v'Eilu".

Exhibit D:

RRW: <<< RMF never denied that his piskei Halachah could be challenged,
in fact I am to understand that he WELCOMED challenges. As Such, I am
surprised that you are opposing RMF's own will on this matter, i.e. he
made no assertions that his word was the last word on any matter. >>>

Exactly my point!

Exhibit E:

<<< And let's just say that 51% of Rabbanim in the world opposed using
microphones, does that create a Halachic imperative on the remaing
49%? Where is the Halachic authority to make that assertion? >>>

I'd like to say that without a sitting and voting Sanhedrin, the 51%
have no control over the 49%. On the other hand...

I often think about the Beur Halacha on the question of whether Shishim
Ribo is part of the criteria for a Reshus Harabim or not. As I recall,
he found 16 (was it 18?) poskim who held each way, and listed them
by name. Based on this 50/50 vote, he decided that one can be meikil,
but it's good to be machmir.

I find it remarkable that he took such an approach. Is there another
question where he points out that these 14 poskim held this way, but only
those 11 held the other way? Not that I can recall. Like most poskim,
he usually goes with the shita that makes most sense to him, or he goes
with the one that has the support of most of the "heavyweight" poskim. But
here he is uncharacteristically democratic, giving equal weight to all
the poskim, and simply counting heads on each side of the battle.

I always thought that "nimnu v'gamru" is valid only when they actually
sit together, discuss it, and vote on it. But the Beur Halacha seems
to suggest that if the count came to 17/15 instead of 16/16, then he'd
be paskening differently. And if so, if 51% of the world's rabanim held
a certain way on microphones, perhaps it would be binding. I don't know.

Akiva Miller

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