Avodah Mailing List

Volume 10 : Number 087

Sunday, January 12 2003

• loshan Hara :Concerning the dead?
• Shabat business question
• To: Avodah - High Level Torah Discussion Group
• [none]
• Re: Saducees in the Sanhedrin
• psycho/physical medical needs
• [none]
• Re: Melo Kol Ha'aretz Kevodo
• Bitachon and Hishstadlus
• Pshat vs Drash
• Re: RMF vs. RSBA
• tkufaseinu
• moshiach
• moshiach
• Working for a living
• Mishnah Berurah and Chasam Sofer
• avot/mitzvot, sanhedrin
• Re: Eldad HaDani
• Re: Eldad HaDani
• Re:TINOK SHENISHBA
• Makkos 7 - Tinok She'Nishba
• ein osin g'raf shel rei'i l'chatchila and plastic shopping bags for diaper disposal
• Disposable Containers etc. and Muktzeh
• Re: Makkos 7 - Tinok She'Nishba
• Re: Melo Kol Ha'aretz Kevodo

> I wonder that anyone might even flirt with an
> issur d'oraisa of L"H -- which the chofeitz chaim assures us applies to
> meisim as well.

Just came across the following Emes L'Yaakov Bereishis 37:18

"I was asked by one student how to explain that the Torah recounts
the story about Yosef's brothers? Isn't this considered lashon harah? I
answered that in fact the prohibition of Lashon harah only applies to the
living. That it is in fact permitted for the dead according to the din of
lashon harah. The prohibition concerning derogatory statements about the
dead is only because of an ancient cherem [Shulchan Aruch 606:3]. This
cherem however applies only to slander and not lashon harah..."

Rav Sternbuch acknowledged the above as a valid shitah halacha l'maaseh.

                                                Daniel Eidensohn

Interesting question:

1.A person who owns a business in the US and owns in office in Europe or
Asia, can he contact his non Jewish workers and direct them to do melakha
Friday morning when Shabbat has started in that part of the world. The
Jew has no Shabbat prohibitions as of that time and the non-Jews have
no obligations of observance.

2.In case he owns a store, would he be permitted to keep the store open
even when Shabbat has began in that part of the world? Is there marit
'ayin in such a case?

3. Would the ruling change if there are two Jewish partners one living
in the Us and the other in Israel or Europe?

4. Would amira legoi apply when the US resident has no Shabbat obligations
yet? Can the partner abroad benefit from this Shabbat labor, or even
both partners?

Do you know about teshubot on this matters?

For the "stira" concerning the opinion of the avadim of Paro in the
beginning of Parshas Bo, see Ohr HaHaim.

Shlomo Goldstein

Posted by: sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu
> According to Reb David Hojda's reference to Egyptian mythology one can
> propose an interesting pshat.
> <http://www.biu.ac.il/JH/Eparasha/vaera/ros.html>
> <http://www.biu.ac.il/JH/Eparasha/vaera/spe.html>

May I make a pedantic point. An explanation of a posuk no matter how
interesting (as this one is) cannot be called pshat if it relies on
information that is inaccessible to an average reader or is not easily
availalbe to all. When one introduces esoteric information to explain
a verse this is called drash.

New archeological discoveries are engendering a new kind of drash. It is
no illegitimate but it maust be understood as drash, not pshaht. M. Levin

Akiva Miller wrote:
>This is news to me, and I think the ramifications go way beyond
>Kiddush Hachodesh. To my history-challenged mind, the idea of
>Tzidukim taking over the Sanhedrin is about as reasonable as
>Hebrew Union College taking over the Moetzes Gedolei HaTorah,
>or the Rabanut HaRashit.

>I have to wonder how did such a thing could occur?

Yannai HaMelech was a tzaduki. He tried to kill all of the Perushim,
who had to go into hiding (see Kiddushin 66a). While they were in hiding
the Tzadukim took over the Sanhedrin. This ended when Yannai allowed his
brother-in-law back due to pressure from Persia and from his wife (see
Yerushalmi Berachos 7:4). Yannai then slowly took over the Sanhedrin
and replaced the Tzadukim with Perushim. The day when they regained a
majority was celebrated as a holiday (Megillas Ta'anis ch. 10).

Chanoch Albeck suggests that Tzadukim on the Sanhedrin was a reason
that machlokes existed during the time of the Sanhedrin. Originally,
there were no machloksim because the Sanhedrin decided all disagreements.
But, the baraisa tells us (Sanhedrin 88b), once the students of Hillel
and Shammai grew and they did not serve their teachers sufficiently there
were machloksim. Why? Couldn't the Sanhedrin still pasken? Albeck (Mavo
la-Mishnah, end of ch. 3) suggests that there were still some Tzadukim
on the Sanhedrin. When Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel agreed they were
in the majority and decisively controlled the Sanhedrin. But when they
disagreed there were then three parties - Tzadukkim, Beis Shammai, and
Beis Hillel - and none of them could gain a majority. So any issues
on which B"Sh and B"H disagreed could not be decided by the Sanhedrin.
An interesting suggestion.

Gil Student

Can anyone point to resources (shiurim, shu"t, etc.) which discuss the
possibility that treating someone for emotional or psychological illnesses
(not necessarily chemical - also abuse, depression, low self-esteem)
might warrant the same considerations that physical medical realities
allow for? For instance, having a nurse take your blood pressure does
not violate negia (according to many opinions), maybe allowing for some
sort of physical contact (as part of treatment, e.g. an encouraging
hug, etc.) with a person with certain emotional needs would also be
allowed? The obvious difference (one of them at least) is that in most
(successful) cases with emotionally unhealthy people in treatment, the
patient develops a certain bond of trust with their therapist and by its
very nature any such physical contact would probably be b'derech chiba
(according to certain definitions of the term). Another example: a choleh
is patur from many mitzvos - and one doesn't need to be life-threatingly
sick to be considered a choleh - how much emotional sickness does a person
need to be put in that category? At what point is a person considered
just 'unhealthy' and at what point are they 'sick'? Has anyone seen this
issue explored? Is it in the archives?

Avi Burstein

Posted by: Chana@KolSassoon.net
> I am not sure that anybody with a pet animal more sophisticated than
> a goldfish would agree. If anything it would seem to be the reverse.
> Childbirth, to take your example - can be a positive experience only
> because there is an awareness of the ultimate purpose, i.e. the production
> of a baby. Without any understanding of why this pain is occurring
> (take the case of a woman who is intellectually unable to understand
> the concept of labour and childbirth) and the natural interpretation
> would seem to be one of suffering as you have defined it (i.e. she would
> interpret it in the same way as she and anybody else would interpret
> chronic back pain). Similarly, my baby when he screams from colic is
> suffering - he does not understand why he has this pain, in the same
> way as the chronic back sufferer does not understand why they have this
> pain. It is certainly not value neutral or a positive experience to him.
> A tzaddik, on the other hand, may be able to understand chronic back pain
> (or colic) as a form of yissurim shel ahava - making the pain purposeful.

I don't mean to obfuscate the question but let us take a step back and
realize that suffering is an abstraction that describes a whole many
different experiences. The problem here is that what is described as
animal suffering is something other than what is perceived and felt
by the humans hearing the words - especially as their own memories of
suffering well up and interfere with the true cognition of the term.

Without consciousneees, the ability to place oneself into a framework of
time, commuity, history and destiny, there can be no suffering. There are
only synaptic connections which, with a stretch, one may call pain. Even
that is unlike human pain which is reworked through the conscousness
and placed into some meaningful framework.

I beleive that this is an interpretation of the Gemoro in Brochos 33a(asur
lrachem al mi sheein lo dea) - it is forbidden to have pity on he who
has no understanding. It does not mean that one should not care for
those less accomplished but only to bring our the idea that I expressed.
Please let me know what you think. Thank you,

M. Levin

At 10:04 PM 1/8/03 +0200, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
>> REED in the fifth volume has a very nice piece on Tzimtzum:

>The Lubavitcher Rebbe felt strongly that the Michtav M'Eliyahu
>misrepresented the dispute in his attempt to show that there was really no
>dispute. He strongly criticized the Lubavticher chasid that Rav Dessler
>relied on for his information. He also asserts that the Nefesh HaChaim
>(3:7) disagreed with the Gra and followed the view of the Lubavitch.
>[See Shaarei Emuna volume I page 74-75] There is a recent Lubavitch
>publication which has an article on Tzimtzum.The author of the article
>notes that it is ironic that the Lubavtichers are the ones who are
>correctly describing the shitah of the Gra while the Litvaks are
>misrepresenting it.

I do not know how the LR could have critcized a volume of MME that was
not published b'chayav. I believe, also, that Reb Itche Masmid is held
in extremely high regard in L circles. It is customary in L circles to
say that the Gr"A held of tzimtzum k'peshuto, but I have yet to see where
this Gr"A might be. The MME about tzimtzum b'ratzon (with a source!) seems
very reasonable.

Recently had a disagreement with one of today's most popular teachers
of hashgafa concerning the view of the Chovas HaLevavos concerning
hishstadlus. Would appreciate some feedback from the chevra.

R' Yisroel Salanter (Even Yisroel Derash #3) describes a resolution of
the conflicting views of the Chovas HaLevavos and Ramban concerning
bitachon. He cites the Nefesh HaChaim to bolster his claim that the
Chovas HaLevavos is describing the average person while the Ramban is
describing the high level tzadik. There is also an important discussion
of this in Emes L'Yaakov (Vayikra 26:11).

1) My problem is that it seems obvious from Shaar HaBitachon chapter
3 that Chovas HaLevavos would agree with the Ramban that there is no
hishstadlus at the highest levels of bitachon. Yet this is not mentioned
by either R' Yisroel or R' Yaakov.

Support for my contention is found in the Lev Tov edition summary of
this discussion:=20

"Because of two reasons G-d decreed that man must make histadlus in order
to have his sustainence 1) to test his integrity 2) to keep him so busy
that he has no time to sin...therefore a tzadik who withstands the test
and he will devote himself to avodas HaShem if he does not have to work
and thus the two reasons for histadlus don't apply - then G-d provides
him with parnosa without hishtadlus and actions from him."

My disputant claims that I am misreading the Chovas HaLevavos and that
he clearly holds that there is required hishtadlus for every level of
bitachon and that I should discuss it with his rebbe R' Wolbe - which
I hope to do soon.

2) Related to this issue is the question of the Ramban's view of the need
for doctors. It seems from my research that he is not a daas yachid e.g,
Taz 336, Avnei Nezer, Ibn Ezra, R' Bachye, etc. [Contrary to a well
known encyclopeida of medicine and halacha which claims it was only
a have amina and that only C' Science takes this view seriously] This
has major halachic ramifications concerning refusing medical treatment
on Shabbos or even all together as well as insisting on fasting on Yom
Kippur against advice of doctors.

3) Looking through Chazal and the Rishonim it seems that a person was
either a baal bitachon or he chose to follow nature and thereby loses
hashgocha protis. This is stated by Ramban, Akeidas Yitzchok, Chovas
Halevavos. Rav Elchonon Wasserman attempts something similar to say that
big people such as Yaakov Avinu and Shmuel were not interested in Bitachon
[though he ultimately rejects it]. Ramban (Emuna and Bitachon 1) states
that the fear of sin caused the big people not to have bitachon. In
contrast modern descriptions seems to hold that there is no option of
nature and that bitachon applies to all. In particular the Beis HaLevi
and the Chazon Ish insist that there is an inverse relation with regard
to bitachon and histadlus.

Thus two more questions. 1) does a person have the option of relying
totally on his own hishtadlus as seems clear from the rishonim? 2)
where does the concept come from that as bitachon increases hishtadlus
must decrease?

Daniel Eidensohn

> May I make a pedantic point. An explanation of a posuk no matter how
> interesting (as this one is) cannot be called pshat if it relies on
> information that is inaccessible to an average reader or is not easily
> availalbe to all. When one introduces esoteric information to explain
> a verse this is called drash.

Source please?

Chavas Ya'ir (Mar Kashisha): page 29. "Pshat is not that the simple
meaning of the words according to what a child or ignoramus says but
rather that which the highly trained mind sees. Therefore if the simple
translation of the words do not make sense and it is necessary to explain
them differently so that they make sense - that acceptable explanation
is called pshat."

The terms pshat and drash are used in many varied and contradictory
ways. An interesting survey through history is found in "How do we
know this? Midrash and the fragmentation of Modern Judaism" by Prof
Jay Harris.

                                        Daniel Eidensohn

> Instread of arguing about who said what about Mendelssohn, why don't we
> talk about the shittos that are the issue?!

One of the reasons for being concerning about how Mendelson was viewed
in previous times is an interesting comment made years ago in the Jewish
Observer. It asked what in fact was the difference between Mendelson and
Hirsch? It concluded that there was not a great deal of difference. Both
in fact produced a German translation and explanation of Torah. Both
integrated secular concepts with Torah. Both were totally comfortable
with secular culture. The answer proposed was that the basic complaint
about Mendelson was that his activities came at an earlier time when
most people were frum and thus he facilitated the exit from frumkeit
into assimilation. In contrast Hirsch's activities came after Judaism
had hit bottom. Thus his approach served to bring people back in. In
fact the interfaces they both provided were not terribly different.

Rav Shurkin mentioned the following story from Reb Chaim who addressed why
he tolerated Hirsch's deviations. "Reb Chaim said I'll tell you a parable
to explain. There was a man who smashed up the windows of a store. The
store owner of course called the police and had him arrested. The next
week another man smashed up the windows and the store owner brought the
man into his store and sat him down gave him a cup of tea and told him
not to worry since the damage was not significant. Why the difference
in reaction? The first man was a stranger who had no kesher at all the
store and was thus an opponent. The second was a valued customer whose
business had done alot to enhance the balance sheet of the store. For
a valued customer one tolerates the damage he does."

Thus the critical issue is not always the shita but the timing and by
observing the historic reaction one can sense whether the person was
viewed as an opponent or a valued colleague. The fact that the approach
of Mendelson or Hirsch might not be appropriate today doesn't give one
the right to label either of them the enemy - if it can be ascertained
that gedolim at that time had a positive evaluation of them.

                                                            Daniel Eidensohn

R' Elchonon Wasserman in the beginning of his article Ikvesa d'Meshicha
in the book Kovetz Maamarim defines terms.

What is called in TaNaKh "acharis hayamim" in the Gemara Sotah is called
"Ikvesa d'Meshicha" and in the Gemara Sotah is called "chevlei mashiach".
The first term also includes the geula period as well. The latter two
terms do not.

Shlomo Goldstein

From: Eli Turkel <turkel@math.tau.ac.il>
<<ikveta de-nosiach - footsteps of the Moshiach
atkhlatah de-geula - beginning of redemption
chevla moshiach - birth pangs of Moshiach>>

From: "Gil Student" <gil@aishdas.org>
<<The claim that aschalta di-geulah can be BEFORE moshiach is quite
controversial, to say the least. It probably started with R' Tzvi Hirsch
Kalischer and was continued by religious zionists of the twentieth
century.>>

The phrase originates from the description in Sanhedrin "shavua sheben
David ba" includes wars (presumably the same as chevlay moshiach/ikvesa
demeshicha), which the Gemara says are aschalta digeulah. Based on
the Gemara, they are apparently all descriptions of (approximately)
the same time period.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

Gil wrote
"The first and the last overlap but the second is controversial.
According to many, not least of whom is the Rambam in Hilchos Melachim,
the redemption will begin only AFTER moshiach comes. That means that
ikvesa de-moshiach and chevlai moshiach are before aschalta di-geulah.
The claim that aschalta di-geulah can be BEFORE moshiach is quite
controversial, to say the least. It probably started with R' Tzvi
Hirsch Kalischer and was continued by religious zionists of the twentieth
century."

To which Gershon responded
"The phrase originates from the description in Sanhedrin "shavua sheben
David ba" includes wars (presumably the same as chevlay moshiach/ikvesa
demeshicha), which the Gemara says are aschalta digeulah. Based on the
Gemara, they are apparently all descriptions of (approximately) the same
time period."

I would further state that the order in the shemonei esrei indicates
that the ingathering of the exiles and other events start before
Moshiach. Hence, this order goes back to anshe knesset hagedola.

I will conceed to Gil that the order of events in the days before and
after Moshiach are controversial and unclear. However, I argue that
current events show that the correct order is that partial results are
achieved before Moshiach. Remember we are talking about Achtalta degeula
and the Geula itself.

I read over shabbat in the sefer of R. Zilberstein (Layenu Leshabeach)
that he asked his brother-in-law R. Chaim Kanevsky what to say at a
gathering about the situation in Israel. RCK answered that we are in
the midst of Chevlei Moshiach.

We all pray that he is correct. But if Moshiach truly does come in the
near future (which can still be years away or today) it means that the
ingathering of exiles that has so far occurred in EY was indeed part of
the processs of Moshiach. I stress that not only has the iron curtain
fallen with the result mass immigration from the old USSR (agreed with
its problems) but that other anti-semitic climates in South America,
France etc have caused aliyah in many other communties. This is in
addition the "old" aliyah from Arab countries in the 1950's with the
result that Sephardic Jewry exists mainly in Israel with other scattered
communities in other places (I assume the largest would be in France
which is heavily sephardi with only small Ashkenazi communities and
France is the largest Jewish community in Europe). Similarly it would
imply that our control of Jerusalem was part of the Messianic march and
other events in EY in the last some 50 years.

In my mind there are only 2 options for anyone that believes in
Moshiach. Either we are in ikevei de-meshicha which on historical grounds
means that that atachalta de-geula has begun at least in some areas. The
only alternative is to believe, Chas Veshalom, that the community in
Israel will not continue and that this is not part of the ultimate
ingathering of exiles - which of course means that this is not ikvasa
demoshiach and chevla moshiach.

I would further argue that whether atchalta degeula begins before or
after Moshiach depends is variable and not fixed. Thus, Ramban who felt
that Moshiach would come in his days (800 years ago!) felt that the
geula would not necessarily come before Moshiach since the situation
was bleak throughout the middle ages. In our days when we are Zocheh
to see many positive events it appears that the Geula can strat before
Moshiach. With all the problems in EY I think we need to stress that
there are many positive things in particular that the Jews in EY still
have some minimal control over the destiny compared to the Jews in the
Galut has happened in Tach-ve Tat or the Shoah.

kol tuv,
Eli Turkel

--
 Prof. Eli Turkel,  turkel@post.tau.ac.il on 01/12/2003
Department of Mathematics, Tel Aviv University

Isaac A Zlochower wrote:
>The Chatam Sofer in his commentary on T.B. Succot 36a (the Gemara on
>etrog hakushi), and, I believe, in a teshuva maintained that the heter
>for not teaching your son a trade and teaching him only torah applies
>specifically to the golah....
>In eretz yisrael, however, it is a mitzvah to develop the land, and the
>conclusion of the Gemara in T.B. Berachot 35b, is like Rebbi Yishmael (and
>not like Rebbi Shimon bar Yochai), that torah with work (derech eretz)
>takes precedence over learning torah exclusively...

A number of points:

1. If you read the Chatam Sofer carefully, he does not poskin like
R' Yishmael in eretz yisroel. Rather, he says that R' Yishmael only
argued with R. Shimon ben Yochai in e.y., as opposed to chutz laaretz,
where everyone agrees to R. Shimon's approach. The psak is left open.
Considering that neither the Rif, Rosh, or Rambam posken considering
the machlokes in Brachos, it would be hard for the Chatam Sofer to offer
an opinion.

2. In terms of R. Yishmael's opinion, see Nefesh Hachayim 1:8. R. Chaim
derives from R. Yishmael's lashon "hanheg imahem minhag derech eretz"
that R. Yishmael never suggested leaving learning. Rather, while totally
occupying one's mind in learning, a person is allowed to simultaneously
pursue a parnasa.

3. In Kiddushin, both the Rif and Rosh only bring R. Nahorai's opinion
and do not mention R. Meir

4. In terms of the chareidim in Israel... At first I thought that I
was reading an excerpt from a Haaretz editorial. Grouping all of the
charedim together as loafers is a gross overgeneralization. Virtually all
chasidim have businesses. As far as the litvaks, by the age of thirty
five virtually all charedi men are working (Note: education is all a
field of work)

motya

I'm not sure who first stated that the MB never quotes the CS, but it
certainly isn't true. I did a search and came up with the following
33 places. This does not count the references in Sha'arei Tzion.

MB 32:128, 67:3, 75:14, 114:41, 135:18, 143:25, 229:8, 318:39, 386:30,
436:32, 453:7, 509:25, 568:20, 617:6, 618:21, 648:65, 695:24.

Biur Halacha 32 sv harei eilu, 32 sv le-sak'no, 69 sv omer avos, 132
sv kuntres, 150 sv be-osah ha-ir, 154 sv tashmishei kedushah, 271 sv
shel revi'is, 331 sv afilu, 398 sv 283 amos, 409 sv kefi mezono, 448 sv
be-davar mu'at, 448 sv lo mehani, 475 sv be-tibul rishon, 614 sv afilu
latzeis, 638 sv kol shemonah, 648 sv pachos.

Gil Student

I'm trying to put together source sheets on 2 topics:
1. How do we understand the gemora that says the avot kept kol hatorah,
even drabbanans(which avot,which mitzvot...).

2. How did the sanhedrin in yerushalayim interact with the other
batei dinim including those of the shvatim(what cases went where, what
independent authority existed..)

If you have any sources you can share (or comments for that matter),
please share.

KT
Joel Rich

RGS wrote:
> Is the story told by Eldad HaDani taken as historically accurate?
> What do frum historians say? Poskim? Yes, I know about shechitah
> without a beracha. But what about his stories of what happened to the
> various shevatim? If he was correct, what happened to those shevatim?
> Any mareh mekomos?

All cases I know of where posqim discuss Eldad's halakhot (off the
top of my head, Rosh, Mordechai, BY, a number of nosei keilim on Tur
and on ShA, Maharyu, possibly also Maharay), they are either rejected
outright or accepted for a stated, different reason (Mordechai does
this WRT birkhat she'hitah, and one of the NK on the ShA demonstrates
that the interpretation of Mordechai on this matter runs counter to the
text of EhD's Sefer EY). IOW, the posqim did not accept them by dint of
his great story and the text of his writings where every halakhah comes
"mipi hazkeinim, mipi Yehoshu'ah, mipi Mosheh Rabbenu, mipi haGvurah".

OTOH, the posqim did quote him without getting into lengthy arguments
about whether or not he is an impostor. This fits nicely with what was
often stated in this forum, that in halakhah we ultimately care little
about the source of an opinion, and debate its content instead. The
exception being those Ashkenazim who look for trustworthy accounts of
minhag Ashkenaz (mostly Rema, & Bakh).

Arie Folger
-- 
It is absurd to seek to give an account of the matter to a man 
who cannot himself give an account of anything; for insofar as
he is already like this, such a man is no better than a vegetable.
           -- Book IV of Aristotle's Metaphysics

In terms of sources and attitudes: The Rosh in the very beginning of
Chulin qutes two halochos in the name of Hilchos Eretz Isroel - that
women are not kosher to shecht and that schitah without brocho is posul
bdieved. The Siltei Giborim says that these halachos were brought by
Eldad Hadani and that there are several other laws of shechita in these
halohos but that they are a "Chumra Yeseira".

M. Levin

Rav Nissm Gaon in the introduction to Brachos says "All mitzvos that are
(teluyim) based on sevara and the understanding of the heart, all people
are responsible to keep them from the day that God created Man on the
earth..."
Soddom was overturned for not giving charity (Yechezkel 16) even though
charity is not one of the Noahide Laws according to most Rishonim.

Yona Rothman

From: "Carl M. Sherer" <cmsherer@fandz.com>
<<The Chasam Sofer answers that as to murder, any human being should
know not to murder, and therefore there is no such thing as a tinok
she'nishba by murder. Thus the Chasam Sofer is (apparently) setting up
a chiluk between issurim that are intuitive and issurim that I need
the Torah to tell me are assur.>>

I've heard (forgotten in whose name) that the idea of a person not saying
"i efshi bivesar chazir ela efshi umah e'eseh" refers only to issurim
of the latter type. Those which should be intuitive, a person should
abhor naturally.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

Today's halacha-yomi from torah.org mentions this issur, which got
me thinking...

In the US, supermarkets typically pack your purchases in plastic shopping
bags. These bags are typically re-used in the home as carrying bags, trash
bags, and dirty diaper disposal bags. They're particularly convenient
on Shabbos because their long carrying handles can be tied in a single
knot to seal off the diaper odors.

Wouldn't one need to designate some of these bags for trash/diaper use
before Shabbos to avoid violating "ein osin g'raf shel re'ei l'chatchila"?
I assume regular trash bags are already considered "omeid" as g'raf shel
re'ei, like a regular trash can, so replacing a full mius-dike trash
bag on Shabbos would not be a problem.

If not, why not?

Good shabbos. 

From: "WARREN CINAMON" <w.cinamon@worldnet.att.net>
<<Rav Cahim Pinchas Sheinberg Shlita, however, is quoted in the Shalmei
Yehuda pg 60 as holding that if the reason for disposale is simply
because we don't reuse these items (because we can afford to discard
 etc) and not that they are intrinsicly unfit to be reused -they do not
become muktzeh as they are still kelim">>

Does the next step then follow, that he would hold that one can use a
disposable cup for kiddush or for netilas yadayim?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

> I've heard (forgotten in whose name) that the idea of a person not saying
> "i efshi bivesar chazir ela efshi umah e'eseh" refers only to issurim
> of the latter type. Those which should be intuitive, a person should
> abhor naturally.

Shemona Perakim 6th perek

                Daniel Eidensohn

> I do not know how the LR could have critcized a volume of MME that was
> not published b'chayav. I believe, also, that Reb Itche Masmid is held
> in extremely high regard in L circles. It is customary in L circles to
> say that the Gr"A held of tzimtzum k'peshuto, but I have yet to see where
> this Gr"A might be. The MME about tzimtzum b'ratzon (with a source!) seems
> very reasonable.

page 484 of the fifth volume it states "Behold I have already mentioned
in a letter to R' Yitzchok Masmid published in the fourth volume of the
Michtav M'Eliyahu letter 13 page 324 that there is a question whether
there was a substantive dispute between the Baal HaTanya and the Gra
regarding tzimtzum."

If you look at the fourth volume you will see a letter on this subject
dated 5698 which is the year that R' Masmid was a guest of R' Dessler
in London according to the note in the fifth volume. The Lubavichter
Rebbe's letter is dated 5699.

Will try and find out the exact chain of events concerning these letters
which obviously were circulating prior to being published in the Michtav
M'Eliayahu decades later. In addition will try to get information
regarding the other issues from my Lubavitch sources

                                                            Daniel Eidensohn

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