Avodah Mailing List

Volume 11 : Number 061

Wednesday, September 3 2003

• Re: HaKalir's era
• Re: minyan in women's section
• giving anonymously
• web sites on shabbos
• Re: taf
• Re: German Jews and TIDE
• Re: Freedom of choice vis-a-vis other people
• Re: Everett and bechira
• Re: "el ishech teshukasech"
• RMF and Newspapers
• Re: RMF and Newspapers - correction
• Re: RMF and Newspapers - correction
• multiple universes
• Re: Kaddish
• Re: Kaddish
• Re: taf
• Re: taf
• Wedding Deroshos and Tsniut
• RE: Everett and bechira
• tefillin on Rosh Chodesh
• Re: who gets kibbudim
• bechira
• Re: who gets kibbudim
• Re: Women and kaddish

Re my wondering whether HaKalir lived in the 6th c. CE when he didn't
author a K'rovetz l'Purim stanza for the "es tzemach" Amidah b'rocho
even though it presumably was a separate b'rocho at (and before) that
century, a lurker (and someone I know) who wishes to remain anonymous
(but is bcc:ed) had the following relevant reply:

I am an occasional lurker on Avodah and saw your post asking whether
a possible one-time amalgamation of ve-liyerushalayim and es tzemach
could be the reason why the krovetz for Purim doesn't have a stanza for
es tzemah.

You may have heard this, but since your post doesn't mention it, I will
pass it along just in case: As the Sefer HaTodaah has it, since Purim
is Mordechai and Esther's day, and they are descended from Shaul, the
author felt it inappropriate to include a stanza for "Es tzemach David",
who took over the melucha from Shaul.

(For the record: I only have the English translation of Sefer HaToda'ah
at home, and it doesn't translate KiTov's thoughts on the K'rovetz.
Now y'all know what to buy me for my next birthday :-).)

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

RMB wrote:
> However, I never heard of a mishnaic era mechitzah, in all the shuls dug
> up. Dr Robert Goldenberg (who personally is C), cited once by RGStudent
> (joys of Google!), attributes it to the paucity of shuls from that period
> that were studied. Although I would think that it does argue that mechitzos
> were not made of sturdy stuff.

The same was suggested in an article published in Biblical Archaeology
Review sometime in the last 2 years. However, one ought to take seriously
the possibility that the reason was that women didn't come too often to
shul. Why is a different question.

Arie
-- 
If an important person, out of humility, does not want to rely on [the Law, as 
applicable to his case], let him behave as an ascetic. However, permission 
was not granted to record this in a book, to rule this way for the future 
generations, and to be stringent of one's own accord, unless he shall bring 
clear proofs from the Talmud [to support his argument].
	paraphrase of Rabbi Asher ben Ye'hiel, as quoted by Rabbi Yoel
	Sirkis, Ba'h, Yoreh De'ah 187:9, s.v. Umah shekatav.

In a message dated 9/1/03  Joelirich@aol.com writes:
> A somewhat unrelated question - if someone came to a posek and said -I'm
> going to give the same $ to this charity in any event- should I put my
> name on the building or give it anonymously? What would be the response
> all other things being equal?

I don't know what a posek would say, and I suppose it would depend on who
is asking and what the circumstances are, but I have heard it said that
gevirim should NOT give tzedakah anonymously, since other gevirim tend
to be inspired (or shamed?) into giving more tzedakah by hearing about
each other's exploits. I assume you are talking about sizeable amounts,
which is why I speak of gevirim.

Toby Katz 

My mother came home from shul on shabbos and said that the Rav in the
shul where she davened (who is well known and respected here in Brooklyn)
gave a brief dvar halacha and he discussed the issue of web sites being
open on shabbos. He said that after much debate and consultation with
gedolim from EY they concluded that it's no different than keeping a
store open on shabbos and is therefore assur.

She explained that it wasn't a detailed shiur, only a 'd'var halacha', so
he didn't go into any details about the psak, but I find it very difficult
to fathom. Besides the fact that I doubt that all of shemayisrael.com,
aish.com, and other frum sites (aishdas.org?) go down on shabbos, there
are a whole host of issues that complicate this subject. Without actually
basing myself on or endorsing his psak, I would like to put forth certain
questions that were raised in my mind regarding this issue.

Is there a difference between a commerce site vs. a general web site?
His initial query was about a general web site but his answer compared
it to a brick-and-mortar store, so I'm not sure if he was making a
distinction. It's more understandable that a commerce store shouldn't
be allowed to make transactions on shabbos.

Who is the one that is actually doing something assur? If it's a commerce
site, then I can see how the person running it is doing something
wrong. But if he's referring to a general site that just gives info,
then I don't see how a person who leaves their web server on is doing
anything wrong. How is it different from someone who leaves any electrical
appliances on for shabbos? It's true that when a browser calls up a page,
the server does something, but that is the problem of the person browsing,
not the hoster. If he's saying that even such activity must be prevented,
then the server would need to be turned off, not just for the shabbos
of the person who runs it, but throughout the shabbosos of anyone in
the world that can access it, which can be almost 2 whole days!

What about the fact that most organizations don't actually own their web
servers, they usually are hosted by ISP's. Couldn't that be comparable
to owning stock in a non-Jewish company that runs on shabbos, which
AFAIK is not assur?

Micha, has the shaila ever been asked about having to turn off aishdas.org
on shabbos? Personally, this seems to me to be another manifestation
of rabbonim finding something new to asser, especially after not fully
understanding the dynamics of the activity, (after all, am I expected to
believe that the hundreds of web sites out there that are run by respected
talmidedi chachomim are being mechallel shabbos?) but being that I don't
know much about halacha, I'm open to being enlightened on this subject.

Avi Burstein

>> Is there any other mitzvah where a pasuk says "Not only you have to do
>> this mitzvah, but your child has to do it too?"

> Aliya la'regel. 

The obligation of katan for aliyah l'regel is mid'rabanan, for chinuch, as
the g'mara states in Chagigah 4a (uk'ra asmachta b'alma). The obligation
of katan for hakhel is a posuk in the Torah, and the g'mara states
that the reason was litein sachar lim'vieihem (Chagigah 3a). It's not
"your _child_ has to do it;" it's "_you_ have the obligation to bring
your child."

EMT

In a message dated 8/5/03 Rabbi Bechhofer quoted from a pamphlet by
George D. Frankel:
> "For the German Jew, TIDE was more than a way of life....The creative 
> tension generated by living simultaneously in two worlds gave rise to
> a sense of irony,
> which was the hallmark of the singular German-Jewish Weltanschauung. This
> was the secret behind Rav Hirsch's legendary humor and the sparkle that
> was always present in Rav Breuer's eyes. But take away TIDE, and all
> the pettiness in the German-Jewish soul emerges. That is why German Jews
> without TIDE make such good fanatics. One finds them today in Lakewood
> and Bnei Brak or at functions of Agudas Yisroel, grim and humorless men,
> speaking together in hushed whispers like conspirators."

Frankel then goes on to describe the old-time German Jew in laudatory
terms, and concludes:
> "This figure, the TIDE personality, more than anything else, constitutes
> the only real legacy of the German Jew.
> 
> "The tragedy of our kehilla and yeshiva is not just that we no longer
> produce such personalities but that we no longer want to!"

I'm sorry for responding to this so late.

I don't know if R' YGB quoted this because he agreed with it, or just
because he found the essay interesting, but I do want to say it does a
grave injustice to German Jews.

My father zt'l was one of those who deplored the fact that the Germans
had left their TIDE roots and abandoned their beautiful heritage--one
which particularly resonated with my father's unique soul.

At the same time, he noted that their drift rightward rather than
leftward--if they were going to drift anywhere--betokened the essential
yiras Shomayim that was the bedrock of R' Hirsch's legacy.

Many of the principles of TIDE have insinuated themselves, often
subconsciously, into the right-wing Torah world, especially in America,
because we live in a society in which total intellectual and cultural
isolation is simply not possible. But there is no TIDE community today
anywhere in the world; there are only TIDE yechidim, dwelling within
other communities.

So it may be that just as a "Torah-only" perspective does not really work,
neither does a Torah-im-Derech-Eretz ideology; instead we find ourselves
working on an ad hoc basis with variations and blendings of the two.

I have my disagreements with the Lakewood weltanschauung. It is not
really my world. But to say that German Jews who have abandoned TIDE for
Lakewood have thereby lost all their positive traits is really outrageous.
Now "all the pettiness in the German-Jewish soul emerges." Now they are
"fanatics," "grim and humorless men."

Is it only German Jews who lose their sense of humor when they move to
Lakewood, or all Jews? Is everyone in Lakewood a fanatic, or only Germans?

Is it Torah that makes people grim and humorless? Was it only Derech
Eretz--secular culture--that gave German Jews the overlay of humanity
that they now so sadly lack, in Frankel's eyes?

I can't help thinking that a true exemplar of Torah im Derech Eretz
would not talk about Torah Jews this way.

Toby Katz

On Wed, Aug 27, 2003 at 07:51:20AM -0400, kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:
: But I suspect that if He would intervene *all* of the time, we might
: notice a pattern, and that would interfere with out bechira...

Would it? Not all HP is din (sechar or onesh). Much of it would
only make sense if you were able to know what would have been
and what HQBH is aiming your life toward.

: (Hmmm... According to my view, is He "preserving the illusion that the
: world runs on its own", or is He creating a *reality* that the world
: runs on its own, by refraining from intervention? Not sure. I think it's
: still an illusion, since He would decide when to intervene or not...)

Mah beinaihu? How are these not equivalent statements?

HQBH created the rules the world would run on as well as the
intervention. From His perspective, He does both "at the same time",
Hashem has no earlier and later.

If following the Rambam, you believe teva is a beryah then you also
don't believe in universal HP, and never had a question. There was no
expectation that Hashem ought to intervene all the time.

On Thu, Aug 28, 2003 at 12:05:56AM +0200, Mishpachat Freedenberg wrote:
: Sometimes one's bechira is compromised. In the chumash it says that Hashem
: hardened Paro's heart. The classic and obvious question on that pasuk is
: "well, so if Hashem hardened his heart, then why did Hashem punish him? He
: was only doing what Hashem forced him to do, so to speak." The answer,
: as you have surely heard, is that at first Paro did have free will and
: could have chosen to be a nice guy. When he continued to choose to be a
: rasha, then Hashem hardened his heart and did not allow him to choose
: any more. Paro was still punished, though, because it was the choices
: he made earlier that caused his heart to be hardened.

That works for "hichbid as libo", when Par'o did it; not "hichabti",
where HQBH takes credit.

The Ramban offers an answer with an opposite conclusion of the answer you
seem to think is the only one. The Ramban suggests that normally Hashem
would not do such a thing, tamper with bechirah in this way. However,
Par'oh's witnessing the makos was itself supernatural intervention in
his bechirah. Hashem balanced things out by making Par'oh unmoved by
what he witnessed.

BTW, "hichbadti" doesn't mean "harden". It's "I made heavy" (or gave
honor, but I don't think that's relevent here). I would suggest "made
massive, immobile".

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes exactly
micha@aishdas.org            the right measure of himself,  and holds a just
http://www.aishdas.org       balance between what he can acquire and what he
Fax: (413) 403-9905          can use."              - Peter Mere Latham

On Wed, Aug 27, 2003 at 08:01:32PM -0400, Leonid Portnoy wrote:
: No, it doesn't work that way. There are NO choices made, at all. All
: possible outcomes take place. Thus, for example, if someone has in
: front of him treif food, two universes will be created - one in which
: he ate it and one in which he didn't. This will happen 100% of the time,
: automatically. If you say choice was exercised, then by whom? ...

And therefore the soul itself also bifurcated. (Actually, it's not lines
branching, it's lines fanning out into planes.) Each version of the soul
is the product of the branch points that produced it. While this implies
a very different meaning to "bechirah" or "choice" than we're used to,
it doesn't eliminate the concept altogether.

I should point up that Rabbi Love, while somewhat aware of Everett's
theory is not a science or sci-fi efficiando who would have an affinity
for such ideas.

His basis was actually akin to Rn Gila Atwood's old signature file.
(In fact, we last discussed this notion when it was frequently seen
on list.) She wrote that "We are all pixels in G-d's imagination."
In Rabbi Love's opinion, Divine knowledge /is/ existance. Since HQBH
could imagine any possible outcome, and His imagination is what we call
existance, they all exist.

: Furthermore, the Torah as a historical account of creation and subsequent
: events, must be viewed under Everett's interpretation as a history of
: just that universe which we happen to be in currently. For other worlds,
: there are other Torahs, substantially different than ours. Yet we know
: that the Torah is one and immutable!

Just as events fan out, and souls fan out, so does the Torah. The
"room" to absorb these conflicting outcomes could well be the
reason for "Eilu va'eilu".

: And as far as the example with Moshe is concerned - he could have just
: been looking at what his descendants would become IF the mitzri will
: not die...

Can you see something that doesn't exist? Are you suggesting that
Moshe's re'iyah was idiomatic rather than literal? Does the Torah
use the word "re'iyah" to mean "think about it to make a determination"?

On Thu, Aug 28, 2003 at 07:15:29PM +0300, Akiva Atwood wrote:
:> No, since Everett does not assume one world per person, but one world per
:> choice.

: Doesn't Everett assume one world per *quantum* event/choice?

Yes. But we're talking about human events. If the mind's choice enters the
world as a quantum event then Everett would include them. (Brains are
well equipped with positive feedback loops that magnify quantum level
events involving handfuls of particles into macroscopic outcomes.)

As I noted, though, Rabbi Love is unlikely to have directly applied
Everett's idea.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes exactly
micha@aishdas.org            the right measure of himself,  and holds a just
http://www.aishdas.org       balance between what he can acquire and what he
Fax: (413) 403-9905          can use."              - Peter Mere Latham

In a message dated 8/5/03 Isaac A Zlochower <zlochoia@bellatlantic.net> 
writes:
> R' Toby asked an excellent question concerning our understanding
> of the role of women as depicted in the beginning of Bereishit,
> (Areivim 11:302 - "El ishech teshukasech"). This thoughtful, serious,
> and non-polemical exposition of 2 related verses belongs on Avodah. The
> verses in Gen. 4:7 and 3:16 use strikingly similar language to describe
> Kayin and his "chatat" (4:7) vs. Chava and her subordination to Adam
> (3:16). The conventional peshat in 4:7 is that "chatat" (chatos, b'laz)
> refers to sin which lies in wait, longingly, for Kayin and for mankind,
> but can and must be mastered. When similar language is used to describe
> Chava's fate to long for Adam who dominates her, R' Toby is impelled
> to ask whether this indicates that the woman in marriage is seen as a
> temptress who must be controlled? Is she really to be compared to the
> yetzer ha'rah?
> 
> My answer is that the analogous language does not imply an equivalence
> of Chava and the "chatat". 

<snip>

> In any case, it
> certainly does not suggest that Chava and womankind are necessary evils
> who must be controlled.

I am just getting around to reading carefully what I read hastily
last time around. I don't remember whether I responded to you, but
I appreciate your kind words and thoughtful response to my posting.
However, you have not answered a basic question here, which is: does
"hu yimshol bach" imply that the husband will resist and overcome the
blandishments of his wife? (Or more broadly, that he will not love her
as much as she loves him?) WHY is the language so strikingly similar
in the two pesukim, about Chava and Kayin?

Toby Katz

We can leave the commentary on this for Areivim, but I just wanted to
share an interesting comment I found in Iggeros Moshe, Even Ha-Ezer 1:64.
R' Moshe Feinstein wrote that he does not read newspapers. I found
it interesting.

Gil Student

gil@aishdas.org wrote:
>We can leave the commentary on this for Areivim, but I just wanted to
>share an interesting comment I found in Iggeros Moshe, Even Ha-Ezer 1:64.
>R' Moshe Feinstein wrote that he does not read newspapers. I found
>it interesting.

Unless you have a different edition of the Igros, you are misreading the
Igros. He is not talking about newspapers but rather rabbinic journals.
[R' Moshe did in fact read newspapers.] He is simply contrasting rabbinic
journals which have a mass readership and responsa seforim which are
only read by genuine talmidei chachomim.

      Daniel Eidensohn

My mistake.  Sorry.

I guess now we know that he didn't read rabbinic journals.

Gil Student

September 2, 2003-NYT 
One Cosmic Question, Too Many Answers 

[Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/02/science/space/02STRI.html>
once you sign up. -mi]

Call it the theory of anything. 

Einstein once wondered aloud whether "God had any choice" in creating
the universe. It was his fondest hope that the answer was no.<snip>

The hope was that when all was said and done, there would be only one
solution to the theory's tangled equations, one answer corresponding
to only one possible universe. But recent progress in string theory
paradoxically seems to leave physics further than ever from that dream
of a unique answer. Instead of a single answer, the equations of string
theory seem to have so many solutions, millions upon millions of them,
each describing a logically possible universe, that it may be impossible
to tell which one describes our own.

 From today's NY Times - the whole article is pretty interesting given our
recent discussions on the parallel universes where all possibilities
are played out.

KVCT
Joel Rich

> I remember hearing a shiur once that discussed different conceptions
> of the purpose of Kaddish with one nafka mina being whether you would say
> kaddish at a minyan you weren't davening with (eg you walked into the main
> minyan after davening at hashkama and they were just finishing karbanot).
> Does anyone know of any sources which discuss this issue?

I don't remember the sources, but I do remember learning that, according
to all views (of what kaddish represents), an avel would not say kaddish
if a) he was at a minyan that he was not davening with; and b) there
is already an avel saying kaddish. IOW, if both conditions are present,
the avel should not say kaddish.

KT
Aryeh

In a message dated 9/2/2003 10:51:39 AM EDT, AStein@wtplaw.com writes:
> I don't remember the sources, but I do remember learning that, according
> to all views (of what kaddish represents), an avel would not say kaddish
> if a) he was at a minyan that he was not davening with; and b) there
> is already an avel saying kaddish. IOW, if both conditions are present,
> the avel should not say kaddish.

Even in our current situation where multiple individuals are saying
Kaddish anyway?

KVCT
Joel Rich

From: kennethgmiller@juno.com
> R' Carl Sherer wrote <<< I think the question is whether the children are
> being brought because of chinuch or because of an independent obligation
> to bring children. >>>
> If the children are brought because of chinuch, why would the pasuk have
> to tell me to do it in this particular case?
> Is there any other mitzvah where a pasuk says "Not only you have to do
> this mitzvah, but your child has to do it too?"

I have only been glancing at this thread so may be misuderstanding what
is being discussed or repeating something already said.

But if we are talking about Hakhel - would Rashi [quoting Chagiga 3]
be of any help?

Parshas Vayelech [31:12] on "Hakhel es ho'anoshim vehanoshim vehataf..."
Peyrush Rashi:

Ho'anoshim: "Lilmod"
Vehanoshim: "Lishmo'a"
VeHataf: "Lomo bo'u? Loseis s'char lemevi'eihem"

SBA

PS For those interested, a nice piece from the Klei Yokor here

From: kennethgmiller@juno.com
> If the children are brought because of chinuch, why would the pasuk have
> to tell me to do it in this particular case?

Binyan av mikasuv echad; binyan av mishnei kesuvim (here and shevisas
shabbos).

-mi

In the Drushot Haran (Nissim ben Reuvain), Drush No. Six near the
start there is an elaboration about the the trait of Hatzna Lechet,
acting modestly. Can anyone explain what the Ran means by the following
sentences, which I translate literally roughly.

".....Also matters which are commonly not done otherwise than in public,
for instance matters which are customarily done at wedding celebrations,
it is fitting that there should not be too much publicity; but one
should lessen the publicity according to ones ability. According to this
since the custom has spread to sermonise at the occasions of weddings,
the sermon should be preached at the house of the wedding. (Heb: Achar
sheposhat haminhag lidrosh bo'ais hachatunah, shetaoseh hadroshoh bebays
hachatunoh) Since even matters which are not commonly done privately
(Heb: Betzinah) the Torah says Vehatzna Lechet"

There is a footnote in my (Aryeh Feldman) edition, but it is not very
helpful.

ER

RAMiller:
> Perhaps this will give us a deeper understanding of those who define
> *complete* teshuva as where one's resolve is so complete and sure, that
> HaShem can testify that he will not commit this sin again.

This make work for Everett's theory, but would R' Love agree? After all,
he's arguing that *anything* imaginable by the Borei has real existance.

I personally don't buy into either. But your last paragraph at least
makes this version tempting:
> If the person was *not* successful in raising his bechirah point that high,
> then he does have a choice to make. There will indeed be some universes
> where he fails and others where he succeeds, and in each case, each of the
> alternate "him"s will reap the consequences of that bechirah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 It isn't what you have, or who you are, or where
micha@aishdas.org            you are,  or what you are doing,  that makes you
http://www.aishdas.org       happy or unhappy. It's what you think about.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                            - Dale Carnegie

Do those individuals that wear tefillin all/most of the day take them
off for Musaf on Rosh Chodesh?

Eli Turkel

> - if someone came to a posek and said -I'm going to give the same $ to
> this charity in any event- should I put my name on the building or give it
> anonymously? What would be the response all other things being equal?

In response to a similar question, I was told that, if by having one's
name on the building it may motivate/inspire others to do likewise,
then one should have his name on the building. IOW, while anonymity
is certainly a good thing, there is sometimes/often a toeles to having
one's name publicized, and the anonymity should be sacrificed for the
sake of the toeles.

Just this morning I was listening to a R' Reisman tape where he mentioned
that, when asked the shailah, he encourages people to be honorees at
shul/school/yeshiva dinners, since it helps the institution.

KT
Aryeh

Regarding the discussion of bechira, see the Ramban in Parshas Lech
Lecha, 15:14. There the Ramban states that, if Reuven kills Shimon,
Reuven may say "Why should I be punished for Shimon's death; it was
meant to happen anyway!" No, says the Ramban, Reuven is, of course,
chayiv (for reasons previously stated on Avodah).

This past shabbos, someone told over an anecdote that happened to him
in Israel. He was at the Kosel and he wanted to go to Har Nof. He got
into a taxi being driven by a frum sefardi Israeli. When he told the
taxi driver that he wanted to go to Har Nof, the taxi driver was very
happy, as that was exactly where he (the taxi driver) had to go anyway.
The taxi driver exclaimed something to the effect of "Todah Lakail!" and
"Hashgacha pratit!"

The passenger then half-jokingly asked the taxi driver if he could get a
discount on the fare, since the taxi driver was going that way anyway.
The driver replied "Mah l'cha etzel hashgacha sheli?!" (or something
like that). IOW, it was hashgacha that the driver would get a passenger
who wanted to go to Har Nof; the fact that this person was the passenger
has absolutely nothing to do with the driver's hashgacha.

KT,
Aryeh

In a message dated 9/3/2003 2:32:46 PM EDT, AStein@wtplaw.com writes:
> In response to a similar question, I was told that, if by having one's
> name on the building it may motivate/inspire others to do likewise,
> then one should have his name on the building.....

> Just this morning I was listening to a R' Reisman tape where he mentioned
> that, when asked the shailah, he encourages people to be honorees at
> shul/school/yeshiva dinners, since it helps the institution.

I've heard that tape. I wonder whether anyone has actually tested the
hypothesis-eg announcing the $ gift to name the building but not who
gave it. One Shul I know of tested a silent appeal versus their previous
"regular" appeal. The tnai was that if the silent appeal brought in less
they would go back to the old method. B"H (as their mora datra said)
they found no reduction in contributions!

The reason for my question is a theory I have been developing re:
lchatchila bdeieved's- these are actions that we do (and should do)
because of conditions that cause us not to do optimal actions and whether
we are aware of them and understand that we're not in an optimal situation
and should try to educate away from them where possible (or at least yearn
not to need them and should they change as conditions change (possible
examples-not reading haftara from the klaf, taking money for learning)

Comments welcome.

KT 
Joel Rich

[RMS:]
> Let me turn it around. What is the halachic basis for requiring
> such broadspread agreement about issues of nusach hatefilla and private
> functions? There are certain issues that affect the entire community,
> and therefore one can argue that a halachic consensus is required. Issues
> affecting personal status may be one, although even there it is not
> always followed. However, issues of minhage tefilla are clearly within
> the purview of the mara d'atra.

While your point is well taken, I disagree that a woman saying kaddish
is only an issue of minhagei tefilah and a private matter. If a woman
wants to say kaddish quietly while another man says it aloud, I don't
think anyone would really care, as it really doesn't effect anyone else.
However, I think an argument can be made that when she says it aloud,
it becomes an "issue that affects the entire community," and a halachic
consensus is required. IOW, matters of private tefilah are private,
but matters of public tefilah are public.

By way of illustration, whenever R' Pam had yarhtzeit on Shabbos, he
would not daven from the amud, since he didn't think he knew the shabbos
nusach well enough. While there is an inyan for a person be the chazzan
when he is observing a yahtzeit, this should not come at the expense
of the tzibbur's tefilah. So too, with a woman's desire to say kaddish.
When this desire comes at the expense of the tzibbur), we should require
a halachic consensus before allowing it. As mentioned by others, there
are many other ways that a daughter can do something to give her parent's
neshamah an aliya (tzedaka, chesed, etc.)

KT
Aryeh

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