Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 016

Monday, October 20 2003

• Re: new birth control?
• R' Yosef Bechhofer and eruvin
• Re: Basics for Philisophical discussions
• RE: Basics for philosphical discussions
• Re: new birth control?
• Re: male birth control
• Re: Can women be domeh l'malachim?
• Re: Rabbi Yosef Bechhofer & Eruvin
• Re: Rabbi Yosef Bechhofer & Eruvin
• Re: vending machines on shabbos
• Hilonim and wine
• Korban Musaf: Uvayom vs. Bayom
• Structure of the Korbanos in Parshas Pinchas
• new manuscripts
• Re: Newly Found Manuscripts
• Re: Basics for Philisophical discussions
• RE:Basics for Philisophical discussions

Harry Maryles wrote:
> One cannot use a microscope to check for bugs in a matter that is
> Halachicly determined by the use of the naked eye. But in an
> Halachic situation ALREADY BASED on the microscopic, i.e. the
> presence or absence of sperm, then a microscope becomes a legitmate
> tool for determination.

However, you're arguing with RAF who is asserting the situation is
not "ALREADY BASED" on the microscopic. The issur could well be on
the macroscopic steps that make fertilization impossible, not on
the microscopic explanation for why it does. You're relying on the
exception to define the basis, not deriving from the basis that this is
an exception.

The question IMHO revolves around whether the ignoring of microscopic
effects is a general rule, and therefore RAF's assumption that it
applies here is justfied. The other tzad would wreck the assumption,
thus leaving RHM with an open question -- not an answer of definite
heter. (Which matches RHM's repeated use of the word "may".)

We already discusses this issue in the past. R' Dovid Lifshitz does
assert it as a general rule. RAYHKook, who is choleiq WRT eating maggots
found within a peice of meat, may do so because he holds that microscopic
beitzei qinim do have mamashus, or he may do so because the parent qinim
are sufficient goreim.

(FWIW, I too would be very shocked if an entirely infertile man was free
from the issur of SZL.)

:-)BBii
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember;
micha@aishdas.org        I do, then I understand." - Confucius
http://www.aishdas.org   "Hearing doesn't compare to seeing." - Mechilta
Fax: (413) 403-9905      "We will do and we will listen." - Israelites

RYGB:
> At 10:22 PM 10/15/03, JosephMosseri wrote:
>> Since it seems that Rabbi Bechhofer is Avodah's resident mumheh on Eruvin,
>> maybe he can help shed some light...
>> What is it about carrying on Shabbat within the confines of an eruv that
>> irks people?

> I have tried to develop an expertise on the halacha. For the most part,
> I have avoided the sociology and psychology. Rabbi Adam Mintz of Linclon
> Square Synagogue is writing his doctoral thesis on the history or eruvin,
> he may be able to provide more enlightenment.

If I may speculate, since much of this anti-Eruv sentiment is post-War...

Many rishonim and early acharonim were major baalei dikduk. Much
of Rashi's commentary is based on his resolutions to grammatical
difficulties. The Ralbag, the Ramchal, many others wrote on dikduk
and logic. However, once the Maskilim co-opted the study of grammar,
suddenly it became almost assur to study grammar. How many of us study
Aramaic grammar? I can't tell you how often a real knowledge of Aramaic
grammar would have helped me understand pshat in the gemara. Only RSRH
seems to have taken up grammar in the last century.

Similarly, in the postwar period, particularly post-1950s, maximization
of women's participation in religious life has become popular among the
more liberal elements of Jewry, partly driven by the external pressure
of the women's movement. Eruv is described in the gemara explicitly
as something we do in order to maximize women's enjoyment of Shabbos
and participation in visiting, walking, and going to shul. Perhaps, as
the liberal movements leaned towards feminism, suddenly anything that
smacked of feminism, even if it was put forth by Chazal, became less
than attractive to the policy-setters among poskim.

Most of the major cities in Europe, and probably the smaller towns
as well, had eruvs, since they were necessary for the *men* to enjoy
shabbos, what with communal cooking facilities, outhouses, etc. that
necessitated carrying outdoors. Now that we have modern indoor technology,
the only rationale left is the feminist one, even if it's from Chazal,
and contemporary poskim shrink from things that smack of feminism davka
because feminism is asso- ciated with the liberal movements.

  Jonathan Baker     |  Ksivechsimetoiveh!
  jjbaker@panix.com  |  (It's a contraction, like Shkoiech, or Brshmo)
               LZ"N Aharon Eli ben Yaakov Korpus, 1932-1999.

[Since this was CC-ed to I figure he must be the "you" in the
following. -mi]

Of course you are right... and yet you are also wrong. The problem is
that the argument from reductio ad absurdum does not work well in areas
that impinge on real life. Yes, there are borderline grey areas; however,
what is the essential distinction between O and C? Once that is defined,
we can talk about how specific borderline cases fit in.

Attitude is the best dividing line. Sometimes you can't define it
but, like obscenity, you know it when you see it. The main problem in
discussing these issues to me is that attitudes and feelings drive the
discussion which ostensibly is objective and philosophical but in fact
takes place under the surface.

I beleive that the Chazal would be sympathetic to locate the dividing line
more in the realm of attitude and soul than in philosophical positions
that one holds. Granted, some things are basic Torah facts but the factor
that separates C and O is not so much the content of their positions
but how they arrived at them

To illustrate, if a C holds an othodox position on issue 1 and a reform
position on issue 2, can you call him Othodox in one area and reform
in another? Clearly, one is a C or O Jew, not a holder of C orr O
positions. What makes one C or O Jew?

I am a mild fideist. I believe that feeling, faith and commitment
of belonging to a tradition make one an adherent. A Jew who knows and
keeps nothing but beleives in G-d and authority of the Sages is more in
the fold that an educated, and doubting sceptic who himself does not
understand why he continues to hold on to a worn-out frayed thread of
belief, despite himself. That is the paradigm of Conservatism to me.

RML
> There is also the concept of broken myth, expressed by Gilman. That is:
> the teachings of Judaism I love but just can't accept all of them as
> the only way to see the world....

> In contrast, O sees all truth as primarily residing in Chazal. Some may
> say that outside teachings may at times force us to delve deeper into
> Chazal; the right wing would even reject that. (Granted that there
> were opinons in Rishonim that aggadic pronouncements are not at all
> binding but we are dealing with the contemporary distinction between
> C and O.) However, both accept the Jewish tradition is the true and
> infallible source of religious insight, if properly understood.

If the concept behind this is one of general attitude - that O take
hazal more seriously than C, and don't blithely dismiss them - this is
in general true, although, as the C have al mi lismoch in this case
(Rav Hai Gaon), one would be loathe to base the difference purely on
this distinction. However, I sense RML making a stronger point - that
in Orthodoxy, all truth resides primarily in hazal. While this is true
about halachic issues, and there are times that we must submit our reason
in hashkafa, most MO accepts kisphuto the rambam's statements that if
reason required, we could reinterprete tanach and ma'amre hazal (many
might remember the battle in avodah (vol 10, many #, in 11/2002) over the
rambam's position on astrology - whether the rambam learned his position
from hazal, even though no one else before or after did (as RYGB argued),
or whether the rambam came to his position through philosophy (as I ,
RDE, the gra, and others) and understood hazal in light of philosophy ).

To cite the rambam (More Nevuchim 3:14, quoting from RDE's post in avodah
10:51)

Moreh Nevuchim (3:14) "Do not ask me to justify everything that [Chazal]
have said concerning astronomical matters conforms to the way things
really are. For at that time science was imperfect. They did not speak in
this way becaue they had a tradition from the prophets, but rather because
in they were experts in this knowledge of their days or because they had
heard this information from experts who lived in those times. However
despite this I will not say with regard to dicta of theirs, which, as we
find, corresponds to the truth, that they are incorrect or were accurate
merely by chance. For whenever it is possible to interpret the words of
an individual in such a manner that they conform to proven reality is
preferable and the correct thing for the superior person and tzadik."

and from an iggeret (taken from same post - easiest to cut and paste)

"I know of course that it is possible to search and find isolated opinions
of some sages in the Talmud and Midrashim whose views contradict [what
I have said.]... These statements should not trouble you because one
doesn't simply discard a clearly established halacha and revert back
to the initial analysis. Similarly it is not appropriate to discard a
well-validated principle and simply rely on a minority opinion of the
sages instead. That is because the sage [is not infallible and] might
have erred by overlooking some important facts or hints when he stated
his views. Alternatively he might have stated his view only concerning
a unique situation that had been presented to him and he had not meant
to state a general principle. This caution is illustrated by the fact
that many verses of the Torah are not meant to be taken literally - as
has been clearly established by impeccable proofs. Therefore they are
explained in a way that makes sense rather than literally. The general
rule is that a person should never easily toss aside his well-considered
views.. His eyes should look unflinchingly forward and not backwards.."

Most of MO take this position as simple pshat. Simple understanding of
RML would make this position of the Rambam a C one - something that the
C argue with passion, but I doubt that any one on this (including me,
and I am sure that that wasn't RML's intent)) would want to place the
O C divide in a place that makes the rambam C

Meir Shinnar

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> Harry Maryles wrote:
>> One cannot use a microscope to check for bugs in a matter that is
>> Halachicly determined by the use of the naked eye. But in an
>> Halachic situation ALREADY BASED on the microscopic, i.e. the
>> presence or absence of sperm, then a microscope becomes a legitmate
>> tool for determination.

> However, you're arguing with RAF who is asserting the situation is
> not "ALREADY BASED" on the microscopic. The issur could well be on
> the macroscopic steps that make fertilization impossible, not on
> the microscopic explanation for why it does.

Halachicly you may be right. I repeatedly do use the word "may",
as you pointed out because I am simply not any kind of authority on
this issue and know little about it. However, I based my statement
on a simple reading of the term Hashchasas Zera... the destruction of
seed. It seems to me that if there is no Zera whatsoever, then there
can be no destruction of it and therefore no Issur of Hashcasas Zera.
Simple logic. This is where a microscope would come in. If the issur is
the destruction of seed, then seed which is microscopic would require
some means of identifying its presence.

This is different than bugs on lettuce which is not defined
microscopicly. Bugs come in many sizeas and the Issur is only on those
bugs we can see with the naked eye. But sperm comes in only one size
which is microscopic. If we apply to Zera the requirement of visibilty
to the naked eye, then there would be no such thing Halachicly as Zera.

> (FWIW, I too would be very shocked if an entirely infertile man was
> free from the issur of SZL.)

I don't see why not. If sterility means no sperm production whatsoever,
how are you destroying it? There may be other Issurim involved but
you can't say that you are being Mashchis Zera if there is no Zera to
be Mashchis.

HM

R"n Toby Katz asked <<< Is a method of birth control that renders
the MALE sterile acceptable on the grounds of medical necessity? The
wife may have sound medical reasons for avoiding pregnancy, but does
that either obligate the husband or permit him to make himself sterile
(even temporarily)? Unless pregnancy is somehow harmful to the husband
(and how could that be?) I wonder... >>>

This is a fascinating question. I can't help but wonder if there are any
poskim who might consider the husband and wife as one and the same person
in this regard. If they are two halves of a whole, then the danger to
the wife is no different than the danger to himself, which would allow
him to practice "defensive medicine" in this manner.

Similarly, there are many details to the halachos of when a person
may/must endanger himself to save someone else, and those halachos
differ if it is the person's own self who is in danger. For example,
Reuven might be allowed to undergo a risky procedure to save his own life,
but not to save Shimon's. But what about saving his wife's life? Is that
considered his own or someone else's?

Akiva Miller

 From Shu"t Bnei Banim, vol. 3, no. 5. Translated in "Responsa on
Contemporary Jewish Women's Issues" (Ktav), chapter 10:

The third reason is in order to resemble the angels. According to the
Hagahot to Sefer haMinhagim of Mahari Tirna, minhagei Erev Yom Kippur,
no. 142, this applies only to men and not to women:

Women should not immerse themselves before Yom Kippur because they cannot
resemble angels; they are mistaken [if they immerse themselves], for it
is irrelevant to them.

This was cited by Mateh Mosheh, who was cited in turn by Eliyahu Rabah
in 606:9. Among the rishonim, Raviah in 628, Or Zaru'a, part 2, no.
276, and Mordechai in remez 723 also mentioned resembling the angels,
while Rosh and Tur wrote that the main reason for tevilah before Yom
Kippur was seminal emission and that resembling angels was a side issue.

... The admonition in the Hagahot to Mahari Tirna that women should
not immerse themselves because they cannot resemble the angels, should
be taken to mean that they should not immerse themselves with such an
intention in mind, and that if they do so they are mistaken. But if they
immerse themselves for the purpose of teshuvah, what mistake is there?

Besides, the assumption of the Hagahot to Mahari Tirna that women cannot
resemble the angels on Yom Kippur is problematic. The achronim cite as
his source Yalkut Shimoni on Proverbs 21 which is based on Vayikra Rabah
31:5, "the angels are all males, there is no female among them." I think
that is no proof, however, for we are not trying to copy the angels'
masculine qualities, but only what pertains to Yom Kippur. This is clear
in Pirkei d'Rabi Eiezer 46, as cited by Or Zaru'a and Rosh:

As the ministering angles are barefoot, so [the people of] Israel are
barefoot on Yom Kippur; as the ministering angels do not bend, so [the
people of] Israel stand on their feet on Yom Kippur; as the ministering
angels do not eat or drink, so [the people of] Israel do not eat and
drink on Yom Kippur; ...as the ministering angels are cleansed from all
sin on Yom Kippur, so [the people of] Israel are that way on Yom Kippur.

In not eating or drinking, going barefoot, or being cleansed from sin
on Yom Kippur there is no difference between men and women, and all
can resemble the angels. Indication of this can also be seen from the
custom that both men and women say baruch shem kevod malchuto l'olam
va'ed out loud on Yom Kippur; the source for this is in Devarim Rabah
2:36 : "on Yom Kippur, when they are cleansed like ministering angels,
they pronounce it publicly."

R' Joseph Mosseri asked <<< What is it about carrying on Shabbat within
the confines of an eruv that irks people? >>>

R' Harry Mayles suggested <<< Because it is the nature of citywide Eruvin
to be flawed and often great Kulos are utilized, that many people aren't
ever aware of. Yet many Baalei Nefesh use these Kulos when in other areas
of their religious lives they would never rely on Kulos like these. >>>

R' Harry, I do think that I understand what you are saying, but I still
wonder if you would consider Eruvin to be much different than Kashrus
in this regard.

When I read publications such as Kashrus Magazine, I am often left with
the clear impression that many hechsherim - even many famous and highly
regarded ones - also engage in "great kulos", the sort of which that
many people aren't ever aware of, and would not want to rely on if they
did know. I am left in a quandary, wondering whether to be choshesh for
the attacks made against unnamed hechsherim.

Well, I figure that a chazaka usually beats a safek, so the hechsherim
that I've been told to trust win out over such articles every time.
(Especially since there's really no way for an outsider like me to find
out the details of the published innuendo.) So too, when I hear that
an Eruv has been okayed by a responsible Rav, I don't pretend to know
Hilchos Eruvin -- or the technical facts about how this particular eruv
was constructed -- so well that I feel obligated to stop carrying there.

OTOH, I can understand the point of view of those who find it impossible
to stop relying on the kashrus of [insert your favorite hechsher here],
but who are capable of managing to avoid carrying on Shabbos, and perhaps
that is another answer to RJM.

Akiva Miller

R Harry Maryles wrote:
>> What is it about carrying on Shabbat within the confines of an
>> eruv that irks people?

> Because it is the nature of citywide Eruvin to be flawed and often
> great Kulos are utilized, that many peole aren't ever aware of. Yet
> many Ballei Nefesh use these Kulos when in other areas of their
> religios lives they would never rely on Kulos like these.

The idea that eiruvin are an appropriate forum for qulos in a way that
other dinim are not dates back to chazal.

Other examples where Chazal actively hunted for qulos: agunos,
mamzeirus, hefseid merubah (which in a way includes the previous two),
and aveilus. If anyone can help create a complete list, I'd appreciate
it. I started collecting these to prove to a C email friend that these
are the exception, and that in general the halakhic process is not about
hunting for qulos qua qulos nor chumros for their own sake.

 -mi

 -- 
Micha Berger             When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org        you don't chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org   You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905        - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

R' Avi Burstein wrote <<< In our recent discussion of keeping web sites
open on shabbos, there seemed to be consensus that making money from a
site on shabbos is prohibited. It got me thinking about another similar
situation which is even more difficult to manage: vending machines. >>>

I will not venture an opinion about whether web sites or vending machines
may be open on Shabbos, but I will offer this point for others to
consider: Older vending machines are purely mechanical devices, and their
use would generally violate only rabbinic laws, like handling muktzeh
(like the money, and perhaps the items purchased) and doing business. In
contrast, modern vending machines and websites involve electricity,
which (depending on various factors) may easily involve Torah violations.

Akiva Miller

As a continuation of several past threads, as well as relevant to
the issue of why we care about hashkafa, I ran across the following:
In Vealehu lo yibol by Rav Stephansky (vol 2 pp 65-66), he cites the
following:

Rav Yehuda Brandes once asked RSZ Auerbach whether a hiloni (secular
Jew) touching the wine was a problem. RSZA's answer was first to send
him to his own rav, then, when told that that rav had sent him to ask
the question, he answered. and if that hiloni was drowning in the sea
you wouldn't save him?

Rav Brandes understood that to mean that current secular Jews have a
different status than heretics and public sabbath violators did in the
past - and just as we would save them, their touch doesn't make the
wine forbidden.

Very similar to the binyan ziyon...

Meir Shinnar

When I was saying Musaf both yesterday and today, I caught myself as I
was about to say "Uvayom hashmini", when I noticed my siddur give the
text as simply "Bayom hashmini".

I later looked in Parshas Pinchas, and found that every single other Musaf
is introduced with a vav: "Uv'yom haShabbos", "Uv'rashei Chadsheichem",
"Uvachodesh haRishon", "Uv'yom haBikurim", "Uvachodesh haSh'vii",
"Uve'asor laChodesh", "Uvachamisha Asar", and the same for all of Chol
Hamoed Sukkos too. (Please ignore any transliteration that you disagree
with.)

My question: Why is that vav missing by Shmini Atzeres?

RSR Hirsch sees my question and immediately tries to answer it by pointing
out that (unlike the other days of Sukkos) the eight day is separate and
unconnected. But I feel unsatisfied by that answer, because Shavuos and
Rosh Chodesh and all the other Yom Tovim are also unconnected, yet they
all have the vav except for Shmini Atzeres.

Has anyone heard another answer to this?

Akiva Miller

I noticed something interesting by the maftir on Shmini Atzeres: the
last two psukim (which are also the last two psukim in Parshas Pinchs,
for those who want to look it up) seem a bit off-topic. They are not
specifically about the korban of the day, but refer to the whole Parshas
HaMusafim as a whole. I understand that the laining had to included them
because of the rule about not stopping when there are only two puskim
left until the break, but that led me to take a look at the structure
of the whole section.

(For the rest of this post, the word "parsha" refers not to a weekly
sedra nor a long section of the Torah, but specifically to a "paragraph".)

It turns out that (except for these two psukim) every musaf is in
own parsha, but it is very interesting to see which is a parsha stuma
("closed" parsha, where the next one begins on the same line; this is
considered a minor break) and which is a parsha psucha ("open" parsha,
where the rest of the line is blank; this is consider a major break).

Shabbos is on its own as a parsha psucha, separate from the others. Rosh
Chodesh, Pesach, and Shavuos are together in the next parsha psucha
(separate from each other with a minor break). Rosh HaShana, Yom Kippur,
the seven days of Sukkos, and Shmini Atzeres comprise the third parsha
psucha (again, each day separate from the others by a minor break).

Does anyone know if anyone comments on this interesting structure? I can
easily see why Shabbos would stand apart from all the others, but then
why are the others broken into two sections instead of being one longer
section? For example, if there's going to be a break between Shavuos
and Rosh Hashana, then why not have one between Yom Kippur and Sukkos too?

Akiva Miller

I am personally still very unhappy with the thinking some have brought
about finding old manuscipts and in fact I think that most poskim don't
hold that there is any real problem

1. Before discussing manuscripts how about girsaot?
We know that many rishonim and acharonim worked hard to find the correct
girsa in the gemara sometimes using nonstandard texts. I don't recall
any of them saying that HaShem wanted that incorrect "standard" girsah.
Yet somehow some people feel that way towards the printed "Vilna
Shas". Same applied to Rambam and every sometimes to SA and Tur where
recent research has discovered mistakes in the standard texts. Are we
to assume that Hashem wanted these mistakes?

2. In discussing finding manuscripts R. Sperber brings the Ramah that if a
psak disagrees with an older psak that was not known then we assume that
if the recent poskim had known the older psak they would have paskened
differently. Doesn't this contradict the CI?

3. There are many rishonim that have been "discovered" over the
years. Even the chiddushin of Ramban and other rishonim were not known
by many achronim and certainly Rabbenu Chananel and Ri Migash and Tosafot
HaRosh. Do we still ignore all these seforim?

One more famous case is the problem of women reading the megillah.
Some understood tosafot that women cannot read for women. From tosafot
harosh it is clear they meant that women can't read for men. Do we still
use the old mistaken approach because we don't use tosafot ha-Rosh? (Some
poskim object on other grounds but that is not the present discussion).

There is an old joke of some gadol who comes to Heaven and asks to speak
to Rambam and says he has several "Rambams" he was not able to answer
after years of study. The Rambam hears the questions and answers that
the gadol has the wrong girsa. The gadol gets very upset - Is that the
way to answer a shver Rambam?

kol tuv,
Eli Turkel

RJR:
>> SBA writes "<<< IIRC the reason being that HKBH would not have
>> allowed Klall Yisroel to be nichshol all these years - and had it
>> been relevant or indeed the halocho so - it would have been in our
>> hands centuries ago.>>>>>

> To tie in another thread- are you saying the person who had the last
> "public" copy of the meiri had no bchirah to be able to give it to
> someone who might have kept it public?

Bechirah is the ability to make a choice, not necessarily the ability
to carry it out. Perhaps the last person wanted to give it to a library,
but the wind blew the pages of another sefer over the place on the table
where he put it down, and therefore it was omitted when he collecting
things for the donation to the beis medrash. Or perhaps it was ruined
in a flood or some other "act of G-d" -- before or after that delivery to
a beis medrash.

> What is the halachik basis for saying that we ignore a Rishon's
> opinion because it was unavailable? ...

I thought we were saying we don't unwind halachah as it evolved since
the rishon's opinion became lost. As I first saw this notion besheim
RYBS, I would point out it fits his concept of Halachic Man's role as
covenental partner in the creation of halakhah.

 -mi

 -- 
Micha Berger             When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org        you don't chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org   You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905        - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

Mlevinmd@aol.com wrote:
> Of course you are right... and yet you are also  wrong. The problem
> is that the argument from reductio ad absurdum does not work well
> in areas that impinge on real life. Yes, there are borderline grery
> areas; however, what is the essential distinction between O and C?
> Once that is defined, we can talk about how specific borderline
> cases fit in.

As I said there is much overlap but IMHO the dividing line has to be
belief in Torah MiSinai as far as C and O are concerned.

> Attitude is the best dividing line. Sometimes you can't define it
> but, like obscenity, you know it when you see it.

I disagree. Attitude is too amourphous to be a dividing line.

> I beleive that the Chazal would be sympathetic to locate the
> dividing line more in the realm of attitude and soul than in
> philosophical positions that one holds. Granted, some things are
> basic Torah facts but the factor that separates C and O is not so
> much the content of their positions but how they arrived at them
> To illustrate, if  a C holds an othodox position on issue 1 and a
> reform position on issue 2, can you call him Othodox in one area
> and reform in another? Clearly, one is a C or O Jew, not a holder
> of C orr O positions. What makes one C or O Jew?

It's like being a little bit pregnant. You can't be a little bit
pregnant. You either are or you are not. Once you step across the
clearly drawn line of apsotacy and believe that the Torah was written
in Bavel by Man (Divinely inspired though he may have been) during the
Mishnaic or Amaraic period, than you are no longer O. It doesn't matter
then if you are Machmir on Chadash and drink only Chalav Israel. In fact
Reconstructionism is a good example of that. They are very big on Mitzvah
observance and encourage their flock to follow Halacha. The only problem
with Reconstructionism is that it doewsn't accept the existence of God.

> I am a mild fideist. I believe that feeling, faith and commitment
> of belonging to a tradition make one an adherent. A Jew who knows
> and keeps nothing but beleives in G-d and authority of the Sages 

One who accepts the authority of God but chooses not to observe any of
the Mitzvos is a Mumar L'Kol HaTorah Kula unless if he is simply a total
Am HaAretz in which case not observing anything is not his fault.

> is
> more in the fold that an educated, and doubting sceptic who himself
> does not understand why he continues to hold on to a worn-out
> frayed thread of belief, despite himself. That is the paradigm of
> Conservatism to me.

If someone observes the Mitzvos but is skeptical then he may be more
of a Jew than someone who believes in God, know that he should follow
Halacha but refuses to do it. The observant skeptic at least conce=des
the possiblity that his skeptisism may ultimately be incorrect. So he
is observant.. just in case. I do not fault such an individual. He is
simply unable to overcome his own intellectual doubts.

This is different from someone who is an atheist but clings to Mitzvah
observance for social reasons. I believe such a person has no Schar for
doing Mitzvos.

HM

Shinnar, Meir wrote:
> Just to complicate life, the rambam did not make hashem being a
> creator (as commonly understood) part of the 13 ikkarim, and his
> actual position on this issue is a matter of dispute (as RM Frankel
> has posted in the past) - making it problematic to make this one of
> the basic axioms - showing how difficult it is to reach consensus.

????

The first ikkar is belief in the existance of a Borei. He doesn't
merely require belief/knowledge that Hashem is a Creator; the Rambam
defines belief in terms of there being a Creator, and then requires
other theological points that draw the image of that Creator that we
associate with HQBH.

I find this line of reasoning beyond wrong, and beyond even suggesting
the Rambam was a kofeir by his own defintion in the Yad. It's downright
absurd -- in both the common and philosophical senses of the word!

RML writes:
> May I suggest that what differentiates Conservatism and Orthodoxy is
> attitude and not specific points of doctrine. Let us return to
> dynamic models residing in the Chazal and get away from the
> philosophical models of principles of faith.

I agree with part of what RML suggests; it's something I've noticed
emailing in fora with large C and R populations. The underlying difference
is one of epistomology, not theology.

It made me understand a nequdah (perhaps the central one) in RYBS's
"Lonely Man of Faith". They see the world through a techonologist's
eyes. Most non-O Jews I've discussed these things with can't keep distinct
the concepts of truth, provable, and provable to others on demand. They so
bought into the scientific method that many of them consider that which
is experimentally provable to be more real than that which isn't. They
therefore reject the traditional history and its invocation of miracle
and prophecy because their worldview rejects the means to possibly
believe them.

Contrast this to the Kuzari's approach to emunah, or emunah based on the
experience of shemiras hamitzvos built by those who become O in response
to Shabbos.

However, there are two points I can't assert.

1- I'm not sure if the cause of the separation is the actual point
of separation.

2- I'm also not clear on why RML considers this an issue of dynamics
rather than principles of faith. What you consider a valid means of
finding truths is itself a principle and a philosophical point.

RMS wrote in response to RML's post:
...
> To cite the rambam (More Nevuchim 3:14, quoting from RDE's post in
> avodah 10:51)

> Moreh Nevuchim (3:14) "Do not ask me to justify everything that
> [Chazal] have said concerning astronomical matters conforms to the
> way things really are. For at that time science was imperfect. They
> did not speak in this way becaue they had a tradition from the
> prophets, but rather because in they were experts in this knowledge
> of their days or because they had heard this information from
> experts who lived in those times. However despite this I will not
> say with regard to dicta of theirs, which, as we find, corresponds
> to the truth, that they are incorrect or were accurate merely by
> chance. For whenever it is possible to interpret the words of an
> individual in such a manner that they conform to proven reality is
> preferable and the correct thing for the superior person and
> tzadik."

The Rambam's position fits the "may at times force us to delve deeper
into Chazal" clause in RML's description of O. Liberal movements would
not insist "dicta of theirs ... corrensponds to the truth". Liberal
Judaism teaches r"l, that Chazal could be "incorrect or were accurate
merely by chance:.

Reminder: We're not here to define C belief. We're trying to define the
limits of O's. I don't need a course in C beliefs. (Besides, Jay Lapidus
can do that for me far more accurately than any O outsider.)


 -mi

 -- 
Micha Berger             When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org        you don't chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org   You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905        - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

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