Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 029

Monday, October 27 2003

• RE: Basics for Philisophical discussions
• Re: Allegorization of Scripture
• RE: Basics for Philisophical discussions
• RE: Basics for Philosophical discussions
• RE: Hashqofoh and Authority
• RE: Basics for Philisophical discussions
• RE: Basics for Philosophical discussions
• Re: Hashkofa and Authority
• Re: Rambam and creation
• Re: Hashkofa and Authority
• RE: Basics for Philosophical discussions
• RE: Basics for Philisophical discussions
• RE: Basics for Philisophical discussions
• RE: Basics for Philosophical discussions
• Re: Basics for Philosophical discussions

>> Does someone who allegorizes the first chapter in Bereshis ALSO
>> qualify as "ketanei amanah"?

> Yes. Although with some little effort they may qualify as Apikorsim :-) .

So where does "intellectually honesty" (of which you are a proponent)
enter into the picture?

What does one do when *facts* (not theories) contradict (or rule out)
a literal reading of Chumash?

Akiva

In  Avodah V12 #27 dated 10/26/03  "Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" 
writes:
>>Do we present Torah as totally counter-factual? Or do we present it as
>>something which a modern reasoning person can accept and incorporate into
>>their psyche and behavior? Credo quia absurdum est is *not* a Jewish
>>sentiment. 

> We present Torah as Torah. We do not repackage it for modern
> sensibilities.

I don't know who wrote the snippet you quoted here, but your response
is excellent, perfect.

And to the R' Ploni you quoted: the opposite of finding a way to fit
the Torah into modern day intellectual assumptions is not "Credo quia
absurdum."

The Torah that we have, even taken literally in a way easily
understandable to women and children, is no more absurd than the belief
that the universe sprang into being all on its own, an unCaused Effect,
in a Big Bang. I don't see cosmologists running around all embarrassed,
trying to make their theories sound more plausible to intelligent people.

 -Toby Katz

"Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer": 
> Who is qualified to decide which derashos Chazal
> are pshat and which are "sermons?" I do not know. Rashi and other Rishonim
> clearly felt competent to do so, and that is probably part of what makes
> them Rishonim. This much I do know - there is no "modern" - by that I mean
> since the Gr"a - who can be considered qualified.

What is it about the Rishonim that makes them qualified, aside from the
concept of Niskatnu HaDoros? I am not asking this question rhetorically
but in all sincerety. Is it not possible that new information that comes
our way in our time that Rishonim were not aware of requires of us to
interperet the Torah thruough this new prism? If we may not do this do
we not paint ourselves into a corner?

What if a piece of information comes along that totally contradicts a
Torah narrative and proves that an incident could not have happened?
Are we stuck making the choice between rationality and traditional
belief? Must we deny conclusive proof? I do not think this is the case
yet in any of the narratives of the Torah, certainly not WRT to the
Mabul. But at least in theory what does one do if one finds this kind
of contradiction? Can we rely on a belief that such "proof" CANNOT exist?

RMS cite of RAL by REC:
> If I may cite Rav Lichtenstein :
>>At another level, one may alter the substance of whole areas by examining
>>them, legitimately, through a different prism. The great model here
>>is Maimonides, whose recourse to the concept of "Torah speaks in the
>>language of man [i.e. in human idiom] (Sifrei, Shelah 112)," on the one
>>hand, and to the mode of allegory on the other, enabled him to interpret
>>so much of Bible and midrash aggadah in a philosophic rather than purely
>>literal, popular vein.

RYGB:
> it is, indeed,
> deeply troubling to me that Rabbi Lichtenstein may have made such
> an assertion. If that is the case, then the RW's rejection of Rabbi
> Lichtenstein, something I have never fully understood, is eminently
> reasonable and entirely justified. Thank you, at the very least, for
> clarifying that point.

I would not be so quick to reject what R. Lichtenstein said. Are you
saying he is me'ketanei amanah? I have a hard time swallowing that.
The RW rejection probably has more to do with his association with RYBS,
and his strongly positive attitude about secular studies.

> Is not R Lichtenctein simply saying that

> Indeed, taking Rabbi Lichtenstein's model further, there is no reason
> to accept any part of Judaism as factual, and there is no reason why
> someone should take anything at face value, unless he wills himself to
> do so. On the contrary, the license to reinterpret and recast anything
> and everything ["alter the substance of whole areas by examining them,
> legitimately, through a different prism"] leads to only one absolute -
> individual relativism.

> This perspective is profoundly problematic, as the entire concept of
> "emes" no longer exists

I do not think so. To interpret the Torah through its many prisms is a
legitimate enterprise. In fact it was RAS who said at the Hespid Shloshim
of his brother (RYBS) that this was the primary purpose of his brother's
study and teaching of philosophy. According to RAS, RYBS felt it kind of
an Eis Laasos... in that particualar time and that particular situation
of which his world consisted, understanding the Torah demanded study
through those prisms... in the spirit of Shivim Panim LaTorah.

But the Amito and Umka Shel Torah was a constant which RYBS never
contradicted or doubted and spent a lifetime expounding upon. So it
isn't individual relativism but rather individual perspectives based on
newly discovered data and the questions raised therefrom, which need be
addressed perhaps through yet another prism.

I of course realize that by saying that one might come to confuse this
what the C movement believes. But I think there is a difference. C looks
at data and has the arrogance to deny Mesorah, saying in essence that
the Mesorah must have been wrong. O looks at the same data and tries to
synthesize Mesorah with those facts and come to a deeper understanding
of Mesorah. Are there concrete divisions to be made here? Are there
areas of overlap? I don't know. I am simply asking questions.

HM

At 12:50 PM 10/26/03, Harry Maryles wrote:
>What is it about the Rishonim that makes them qualified, aside from
>the concept of Niskatnu HaDoros? I am not asking this question
>rhetorically but in all sincerety. Is it not possible that new
>information that comes our way in our time that Rishonim were not
>aware of requires of us to interperet the Torah thruough this new
>prism? If we may not do this do we not paint ourselves into a corner?

The Baal Shem Tov put it that all the great mechabrim until the Maharasho
were blessed with ruach ha'kodesh. We can be more "rational" about it,
but the reality is that they were holier and greater than we are, by far,
and that is why they are called Rishonim. I know of no "corners" in which
one becomes painted by following Chazal, Rishonim and Gedolei HoAcharonim.

>What if a piece of information comes along that totally contradicts a
>Torah narrative and proves that an incident could not have happened?
>Are we stuck making the choice between rationality and traditional
>belief? Must we deny conclusive proof?  I do not think this is the
>case yet in any of the narratives of the Torah, certainly not WRT to
>the Mabul. But at least in theory what does one do if one finds this
>kind of contradiction?  Can we rely on a belief that such "proof"
>CANNOT exist?

This is a hypothetical. No such pieces of information exist, mei'heichei 
teisei that they will exist?

>RMS cite of RAL by REC:

>> If I may cite Rav Lichtenstein :
>>>At another level, one may alter the substance of whole areas by examining
>>>them, legitimately, through a different prism. The great model here
>>>is Maimonides, whose recourse to the concept of "Torah speaks in the
>>>language of man [i.e. in human idiom] (Sifrei, Shelah 112)," on the one
>>>hand, and to the mode of allegory on the other, enabled him to interpret
>>>so much of Bible and midrash aggadah in a philosophic rather than purely
>>>literal, popular vein.

>RYGB:
>> it is, indeed,
>> deeply troubling to me that Rabbi Lichtenstein may have made such
>> an assertion. If that is the case, then the RW's rejection of Rabbi
>> Lichtenstein, something I have never fully understood, is eminently
>> reasonable and entirely justified. Thank you, at the very least, for
>> clarifying that point.

>I would not be so quick to reject what R. Lichtenstein said. Are you
>saying he is me'ketanei amanah? I have a hard time swallowing that.
>The RW rejection probably has more to do with his association with
>RYBS, and his strongly positive attitude about secular studies.

Yes, if the quote is accurately interpreted by Dr. Shinnar, what more
can one say?

>I do not think so. To interpret the Torah through its many prisms is
>a legitimate enterprise. In fact it was RAS who said at the Hespid
>Shloshim of his brother (RYBS) that this was the primary purpose of
>his brother's study and teaching of philosophy. According to RAS,
>RYBS felt it kind of an Eis Laasos... in that particualar time and
>that particular situation of which his world consisted, understanding
>the Torah demanded study through those prisms... in the spirit of
>Shivim Panim LaTorah.

You missed a key word in the quote from RAL - "substance." I was at
that Hesped (transcribed it for MJ, where you can find it). There is a
difference between refraction of the light and altering itsd substance.

YGB 

RYGB: <<..logic, we often refer to the two broad methods of reasoning
as the deductive and inductive approaches. Deductive reasoning works
from the more general to..>>

Much as I greatly appreciate RYGB's/Prof T's little lecture on deductive
and inductive reasoning which explains his own perspective on those
topics, I'm actually tolerably (OK, intimately) familiar with some of
these matters from a rather more quantitative perspective than those
of a social scientist. It is in any event entirely irrelevant to the
subject matter at hand so let's not go there.

But lo'inyon, RYGB proceeds to remark: << Someone who had not the
pre-conceived notion that the IE believed in kadmus, or one who was
not desperately seeking Rishonim who may believe in kadmus, would not,
by inductive reasoning, have reached the conclusion that you reached
in IE Bereishis 1:1. This, rather, is a fine example of deductive
interpretation.
 >>
Absolutely extraordinary. It is quite amazing how RYGB can read my mind
to realize I had a pre-conceived notion that IE believed in qadmus (of
matter) and that I sought, indeed desperately (sic) sought, like minded
rishonim. Now, I've previously had occasion to remark the mind reading
skills of some posters to this forum (more usually demonstrated on topics
such as WTG's and such like where the inner spiritual states of complete
strangers are invariably described with unfailing confidence by our cadre
of avodah psi-adepts), but it is nevertheless a fantastic experience
to be the object of such a personal demonstration. I say fantastic with
some precision, because alas it is a fantasy. In fact I have no dawg in
this hunt, do not care one way or the other what IE's conception of this
matter was, and certainly held no preconception of same.

Let us instead turn the question around. Pre-conceived notion of qadmus?
Whatever for? Why on earth should I approach IE with the thought he held
such beliefs? After all the majority of his contemporaries (I think)
did not believe in qadmus, so why should I pre-conceive the notion that
he did? It is rather the confrontation with the actual writings of IE
which lead me to form such a conclusion -- oh, and don't worry your head
too much trying to decide whether this conclusion followed a deductive or
inductive template, it really doesn't matter how you want to taxonomize
the process.

Let me go further, though I know this is throwing raw meat before
such a proponent of necessity of pre-existing "authority" for
hashqofic/intellectual enterprises. Had no other person in the world
ever reached the conclusion I did, it would (as a cautious fellow)
give me pause and perhaps motivate me to consider my reasoning yet one
more time, but that would not deter me. In some instances it is in fact
true that everybody else can be wrong and you can be right. Happily, in
this instance, that is not necessary, since many other others, including
rishonim, acharonim, and (feh!) academics have similarly understood IE
(thus e.g., r. yosef tov-elem, r. sh'muel motot, abarbanel, berenfeld,
rosen, neumark). There are also no dearth of sources in rishonim and even
chazal which would seem to conform to a qadmus interpretation. These
are summarized by A. Lifshitz:: Pir'kei 'yun b'mishnas R.IE. mossad
ha-rav, 1982.

Concerning "authority" to make intellectual decisions. RYGB writes:
<<Reputation? What has reputation to do with it? If RDE would assert that
he has been through Bavli, Yerushalmi, the Midrashim (let's say Tanchuma,
Rabba and the Yalkut) and Sifrei Kabbalah (let's say Zohar and Kisvei
Arizal) several times or that he has had a Gillui Eliyahu or a Maggid,
I would believe him and accept his authority. YGB>>

Let us set aside for the moment whether RDE has been through RYGB's
necessary curriculum (and who says he has not?). let us be clear that
RYGB is rather articulating a different epistemology than my own. I in
fact do not much care about the authority of the disputant in matters --
particularly hashqofic matters, though i certainly find their perceptions
of interest. (in fact there are close professional analogies in which
I'm presently engaged). I'm more of a sh'ma ho'emes mi'mi she'om'ro type
of guy, and sometimes that guy can even be me. Otherwise I'd probably
still believe in the four basic elements and astrology, all of which were
propounded by the great majority of authorities of much greater weight
than exist today -- even according to RYGB's criteria. In fact however,
RYGB's bar, if he truly believed in it himself, which I doubt (see, now
I 'm a mind reader too, avodah abilities much be catching, kindalike an
internet virus) since he has not been bashful about propounding various
original ideas (i.e. those with out discernible support in the classic
sources), is much too high. To those who have doggedly pursued that
last sentence to its nested end, I merely meant to say that one doesn't
necessarily have to know everything in the universe before expressing
an opinion. One merely has to know enough and make sense.

There is a throwaway phrase at the end of RYGB's post which merits an
entirely new intellectual discussion, but I have to run just now. And that
is the apparent credence RYGB would give to "maggidim" or "gilui elyohu".
I myself would counter with a loa bashshomayim he, but the role of such,
lets call it astral, phenomena along with its cousin sh'eilas chalom,
is surely worthy of a new thread.

Mechy Frankel H: (301) 593-3949
michael.frankel@osd.mil W: (703) 845-2357
mfrankel@empc.org
michaeljfrankel@hotmail.com

At 10:32 AM 10/26/03, Akiva Atwood wrote:
>What does one do when *facts* (not theories) contradict (or rule out)
>a literal reading of Chumash?

I guess one must then become not-Jewish.

BTW, it is worthwhile to see the Lubavitcher Rebbitzen's book (written
under the pseudonym of H. Moose) on Bereishis before one decides one is
really reading the pesukim literally...

YGB 

> I have made this statement in the past and I make it again.

That doesn't make it correct.

> Science is in flux, constantly reassessing and reinterpreting.

Not true. Science is the act of *refining* our understanding of the
world around us.

> Torah is an eternal verity.

I thought the whole point of Gemara was the "reassessing and
reinterpreting" of Torah?

> To believe otherwise is to be me'ketanei amanah.

You are quick to throw that phrase qround. Care to DEFINE exactly what
you mean? And give SOURCES backing up your accusation?

Akiva

It seems to me that Micha is 100% correct that the issue here is one of
pedagogy rather than license.

RDE is certainly permitted to publish his "Litvak's Guide to the
Universe", omittting any and all material that he does not consider to
be consistent with the messorah of his Rabbayim. Given RDE's erudition,
I think it will be a great book and am ready to sign up in advance for
a copy (With an Avodah discount, I hope!).

However, the question is not whether RDE is permitted to omit the views
of non-Litvaks, but whether his book would be even better were he to
include them -- and provide some respectful contrast (without voting,
just by stating that his Rabbayim hold differently).

True, it's not the path that others have taken (outside the academic
world), but that does not mean that their seforim might not have been
the richer for it.

[Email #2. -mi]

In fact, how could one even begin to understand the hashkafic position
of anyone from the time of Rishonim onwards (including Rambam, Ramban,
GRA) without knowing the context eg what belief systems they were
responding to?

Taking, RDE's example of Michtav M'Eliyahu as an example, could
one properly appreciate his passion against the letter writer who
had questioned whether or not Gedolim had erred in not forseeing the
destruction of European Jewry were one to be ignorant of the fact that
this was the topic of intense debate at that time -- even amongst other
Gedolim?

Dovid Hojda

> (and the rambam's own statement that he would be willing to
> allegorize all of ma'ase breshit is not related by him to any mesora or
> license - nor does he ever suggest that he requires license for any of
> his allegorizations)

I apologize for not following this discussion from it's start, but
could someone give me the source where the Rambam states that he would
be willing to allegorize all of ma'ase breshit?

Thank you.
Shoshana L. Boublil

[R Daniel Eidensohn:]
> I have not seen a single authority
> being quoted by R' Bechhofer who agrees with his psak. Which recognized
> gadol - chassidic, litvak, sefardic, modern orthodox etc declares that
> when teaching hashkofa that it is wrong to omit views that are not an
> accepted part of the mesora of that group?

Actually, the general practice that my husband has found is to definitely
omit views that are not accepted as part of the mesora of that group.

Time after time, when teaching a topic in Machshevet Yisrael, he comes
up against total ignorance of other views. Typically, a litvak will
waive his hand in dismissal when facing a quote from the Zohar and a
Yeminite Ik'shee will comment on the ignorance and apikorsut of anyone
who doesn't accept the Zohar.

Actually, we keep seeing it here on Avodah/Areivim <g>. [at least here,
we get a chance to hear the other opinions].

When studying the hashkofa of the giants -- RS"G, Rambam, Ramchal, Rabbi
Yehuda HaLevy, Mei'ir, Rav Kook etc., we find that they don't always
agree with each other, but this is something WE find when we compare
their writings. They themselves don't always present the counter opinions
[especially, as they lived in different historical times].

Now, if the book is about Litvische hashkafa (Mitnagdim) during a
specific era and as presented by a specific group of rabbis, then it
could note other opinions in it's notes, but I wouldn't expect it to
present the opinions of other hashkafot as this would be the topic of a
different book, unless the other opinions were relevant to the hashkafic
conclusions relevant to the topic of the book.

In general, a book should be well defined and on-topic. Each author
defines what he/she want to present and then they should proceed to do
so. The title and description in the Hakdama should make it clear to
the reader what they should expect to find between the covers of the
specific book.

Good Luck!
Shoshana L. Boublil

At 02:33 PM 10/26/03, Akiva Atwood wrote:
>> Science is in flux, constantly reassessing and reinterpreting.

>Not true. Science is the act of *refining* our understanding of the
>world around us.

Calling it "refining" does not change anything. If refining suits you more 
than reassessing and reinterpreting, fine.

>> Torah is an eternal verity.

>I thought the whole point of Gemara was the "reassessing and
>reinterpreting" of Torah?

Not to the best of my knowledge.

>> To believe otherwise is to be me'ketanei amanah.

>You are quick to throw that phrase qround. Care to DEFINE exactly what
>you mean? And give SOURCES backing up your accusation?

It is in Rashi in this week's parashah.

YGB 

> At 10:32 AM 10/26/03, Akiva Atwood wrote:
>>What does one do when *facts* (not theories) contradict (or rule out)
>>a literal reading of Chumash?

> I guess one must then become not-Jewish.

That's a simplistic answer.

Why not just admit that that section must be taken allegorically, not
literally?

Especially the "pre-Avraham" section -- which *doesn't* impact on the
history of Klal Yisroel.

> BTW, it is worthwhile to see the Lubavitcher Rebbitzen's book (written
> under the pseudonym of H. Moose) on Bereishis before one decides one is
> really reading the pesukim literally...

I've been told that the authorship is "questionable".

Akiva

At 05:16 PM 10/26/03, Akiva Atwood wrote:
>>>What does one do when *facts* (not theories) contradict (or rule out)
>>>a literal reading of Chumash?

>> I guess one must then become not-Jewish.

>That's a simplistic answer.

>Why not just admit that that section must be taken allegorically, not
>literally?

We have gone through this before. If Noach was an allegory, who is to
say that the Avos are not? And if the Avos are an allegory, who is to
say that the makkos are not? And if the makkos are an allegory, who
is to say that kerias yam suf is not. Please not that I am not arguing
"slippery slope." I am arguing that the moment we allegorize something
that Chazal did not we are already deep inside the pit.

>Especially the "pre-Avraham" section -- which *doesn't* impact on the
>history of Klal Yisroel.

>> BTW, it is worthwhile to see the Lubavitcher Rebbitzen's book (written
>> under the pseudonym of H. Moose) on Bereishis before one decides one is
>> really reading the pesukim literally...

>I've been told that the authorship is "questionable".

Could be, but I believe most Lubavitchers accept that attribution.

YGB

> We have gone through this before. If Noach was an allegory, who is to
> say that the Avos are not? And if the Avos are an allegory, who is to
> say that the makkos are not? And if the makkos are an allegory, who
> is to say that kerias yam suf is not. Please not that I am not arguing
> "slippery slope." I am arguing that the moment we allegorize something
> that Chazal did not we are already deep inside the pit.

IOW we turn our backs on "intellectual honesty"?

> Could be, but I believe most Lubavitchers accept that attribution.

They do -- but that doesn't make it accurate.

[Email #2. -mi]

>>You are quick to throw that phrase qround. Care to DEFINE exactly what
>>you mean? And give SOURCES backing up your accusation?

> It is in Rashi in this week's parashah.

And only has connection to this discussion in the most "creative" way.

How you can bring that as your source and justification?

Akiva

RYGB wrote:
> At 03:38 AM 10/26/03, Arie Folger wrote:
>>When the Gaon criticizes Rambam for interpreting magic away, he is not
>>criticizing the general approach, since the Gra himself also uses it,
>>rather, he is criticizing Rambam's reason for reinterpreting those
>>particular verses.

>>Why would you disagree with both of them? (and just about anybody else
>>who wrote on the matter)

> Huh? Run that by me again, I do not understand.

I am anticipating your reaction. It is beyond reasonable doubt that
the Rambam felt free to reinterpret maamarei 'Hazal and even verses,
when he felt that the simple understanding contradicts reason. He is
explicit about that and states it several times. There are others who
reinterpreted passages against what is suggested by 'Hazal, in a way that
is mutually exclusive, so that it seems reasonable that they intended
their pshat to supercede what had been presented as the accepted view.

Now, I expected you to cite Gra as a critique of Rambam, and so I
stated that even Gra does the same kind of reinterpretations. The
only difference between Gra and Rambam, and by extension, between any
two authorities differing in this area, is not whether any verses are
interpreted non-literally, but what the threshold of difficulty is,
after which one feels compelled to prefer a non-literal interpretation.

Thus, the speculation about whether a passage can be interpreted in a
non-literal way is not revolutionary. It isn't any different from any
other kind of useful pilpul.

> Let me paraphrase a great American political quote: "I know the Rambam and
> the Gra. You [and I] are no Rambam and no Gra."

And therefore? Should I refrain from trying to understand how
different shitot harishonim translate into different psaqim in matters
of kashrut, and should I subsequently refrain from analysing when it
may be appropriate to be lenient and rely on only some of the opinions
(i.e. standard halakhic analysis)? Should I refrain from understanding
the historical context in which our gedolim lived, from the Tannaim,
Amoraim and Geonim through the Rishonim etc. until those included in the
Mking of a Godol (to cite I work I believe you appreciated)? Why should
this kind of analysis be different?

>>Note: sod is also a form of reinterpretation. Dibra Torah belashon bnei
>>adam is also a form of reinterpretation.

> Both are from Chazal. Not from katlei kanya b'agma. shu'alim ketanim
> mechablim keramim.

Sorry. Much of Sôd is not from 'Hazal, but from much later
authorities. This doesn't make the sôd deficient, it merely indicates
that not all sôd is from 'Hazal.

>>Actually, I argue for a kind of Autorial intent analysy, where we look
>>at how the Torah quoted itself, and how it presented itself. Thus, when
>>the Torah quotes the Exodus repeatedly as a reason for keeping certain
>>and for keeping all mitzvot, it is clear that the Torah needs YM to have
>>been real. I would then say that the Torah is also literal in many (I
>>leave the possibility open of some exceptions) of the details of YM. The
>>Torah is not an unreliable account, G'd forbid. It is simply an account
>>that is not always so easy to understand.

> And your precedent in sources al taharas ha'kodesh is...?

It isn't significantly different from the modes of arguments presented
in many sources that precisely present non-literal interpretations.

>>Lastly, I suggest that we draw a line between issues of Talmudic science
>>and Messorah.

> I have made this statement in the past and I make it again. Science is in
> flux, constantly reassessing and reinterpreting. Torah is an eternal
> verity. To believe otherwise is to be me'ketanei amanah.

When I argue that perhaps Mabul was somewhat or very localized, I am not
saying that that definitely was the case. I don't know. I wasn't there.
Neither were you. What I am saying is that the text is compatible with
such a conception, and thus, one who feels convinced (just as Rambam
was convinced that witchcraft is hog wash) that something did or did not
happen in a particular way, will not need to be classified as miqtanei
anything, since his belief is compatible with the text. You disagree, with
pleasure. You are also welcome to say other things that don't quite make
sense, and to classify other people as qtanei emunah, etc. Your arguments
wil not, however, become more cogent by calling fine people names.

Arie Folger
 - 
If an important person, out of humility, does not want to rely on [the Law, as 
applicable to his case], let him behave as an ascetic. However, permission 
was not granted to record this in a book, to rule this way for the future 
generations, and to be stringent of one's own accord, unless he shall bring 
clear proofs from the Talmud [to support his argument].
	paraphrase of Rabbi Asher ben Ye'hiel, as quoted by Rabbi Yoel
	Sirkis, Ba'h, Yoreh De'ah 187:9, s.v. Umah shekatav.

*********************


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