Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 080

Tuesday, January 20 2004

• Re: 2 tfillin questions
• Middos of the Avos according to the Netziv
• mored bemalchut - Uraih Hachiti
• Wording in Avos
• Segulos
• Re: Rema Methodology
• shape of the menorah
• David and Batsheva
• ki la'asher yiten yohav
• 10 Tevet
• Re: nihye vs. nihyah
• Re: 2 tfillin questions
• Torah Attitude to Non-Jews
• prophetic innovations in Ezekiel
• Re: (Fwd) Middos of the Avos according to the Netziv
• Re: David and Batsheva
• Re: King David's dilemma - was Mrs. Cohen's dilemma
• Mored Bemalchus-Uriah Hachiti
• Mored Bemalchus-Uriah Hachiti
• psik reisha
• Re: Mrs. Kohen

R' Saul Z Newman wrote:
> 2- Someone said they heard Rav Moshe did like the mechaber on putting
> on tfillin-- made the knot shel yad , then the shel rosh, then wrapped
> down the arm. Fact or fiction?

I don't know if this is true, but if he felt that no rishonim argued
on the basic premise of the Rosh -- that the windings around the arm
are not part of the basic mitzvah -- and that the practice of the Ari
to wind down the arm before putting on the shel rosh was based on sod
(as the Taz says), then I wouldn't be surprised if a poseik rejected
the custom with a "nistar" basis in favor of the one based in "nigleh."

I have not yet had the opportunity to see the Mishkenot Yaakov inside,
but I saw in Nefesh haRav that RYBS held like the MY and was concerned
for the opinion of "some rishonim" that all of the windings are part
of the mitzvah, and thus he would put on the entire shel yad -- even
including around the hand and finger -- before the shel rosh, to ensure
that "kol zman sheheim bein einekha yihyu shnayim." Mishnah Berurah
also quotes the MY in support of the accepted custom (which does not
include the hand and finger -- I'd have to see the MY inside to figure
out why this discrepancy).

In any case, if it turns out that our custom is a matter of picking a
different shitah of rishonim than the one the mechaber picked (rather
than a matter of nistar vs. nigleh), then I would think it less likely
that one would advocate dropping the currently accepted practice in
favor of the one the mechaber picked.

My point here is not really to speculate on what R' Moshe did --
I'll leave that question to answered by those who might actually know.
It's more to stimulate discussion on what, if any, rishonim had positions
that would imply that the windings around the arm (and hand/finger?) are
an integral part of the mitzvah, and thus, must be done before shel rosh
(unlike the position of the Rosh/Tur/Mechaber).

I posted this elsewhere last year, but did not receive adequate response.
I hope that Avodah members will be able to help:

As a basic underpinning of his commentary to Sefer Breishis, and as a key
to his explanation of several broader concepts (running into Shmos), the
Netziv has a unique explanation of the individual strengths of the Avos.

He understands Avraham Avinu to exemplify Torah-learning, which creates
the z'chus for protection from the sword of our enemies; Yitzchok Avinu
to exemplify avodah, which creates the z'chus for material blessings and
sustenance; and Yaakov Avinu to exemplify the pursuit of chesed, which
creates the z'chus for peace. See Chumash Ha'mek Davar, Breishis 13:17.
(The Netziv applies these ideas in, e.g., Breishis 14:14; 15:1; 20:18;
21:3; 26:5; 28:13; 28:19; 30:29; 31:4; 31:46; 32:26; 34:1; 48:16; 49:24;
and Shmos 3:6.)

This approach varies significantly from the formulation that, in my
experience, is the most commonly quoted trifurcation of the middos of the
Av os: Avraham epitomizes chesed, Yitzchok epitomizes yirah or gevurah,
and Yaakov epitomizes emes or Torah. Other, kindred formulations have
Avraham, Yitzchok, and Yaakov corresponding to the middos of Gadol,
Gibbor, and Norah (or Tiferes), respectively. In particular, the Netziv
seems to understand Avraham and Yaakov as representing the opposite of
the middos they are usually cited to represent.

It is puzzling to me that, at least as far as I have seen, the Netziv
does not even acknowledge these other formulations, much less justify his
departure from them. (Contrast this with the many occasions in which he
does explain why he cannot accept the standard or classical approach to
a particular issue.) Can anyone tell me if there is literature commenting
on this?

I am also looking for the earliest sources of these other formulations,
in both kabbalistic and non-kabbalistic literature. (I have heard people
quote the pasuk at the end of Micha, "Titein emes l'Yaakov, chesed
l'Avraham..." in this vein. Based on the simple pshat of the pasuk,
it does not seem on its face to be particularly compelling.) Do any of
the early sources cite it? Is it possible that my assumption about the
commonly-accepted status of these forumlations is wrong?

Thanks for any help you can provide.
Kol tuv,
Yitzchok Brandriss

Concerning my post on King David's dilemma, Rav M. Levin has the
following comment:
> Yakov Meidan has a very ineresting small book on the chet of Dovid and
> Batsheva. He suggests a perspective which has a number of resonances in
> the phrasings of the story.

> Uriah was essentially a coarse Hittite warrior whose focus and life lay
> in fighting, army, and manly activites and action. He had no relationship
> with Batsheva and part of the mix of emotions that went into Dovid's
> reaction to this episode was his empathy and pity for her isolation and
> neglect. Uriah's refusal to go visit her even despite the King's command
> in moral terms earned him a death sentence for his insensitivity.

I recognize that Rav Meidan is a serious biblical scholar, but I don't
understand this citation. Is he assuming that a divorce was given or not?
If not, then how could some suddenly developed empathy justify taking
Bat-Sheva to his bed chamber . How could a feeling that one of his
lieutenants is coarse and unfeeling justify sending him to his arranged
death - a death that involved other totally innocent soldiers?

However, calling Uriah a Hittite warrior is a key observation that may
help account for king David's otherwise incomprehensible behavior. I
don't know if R' Meidan develops the implications of such an observation,
but it does lead to the question of whether Uriah's marriage to Bat-Sheva
was legitimate. It seems to be generally held that one could accept as a
convert someone from the historical seven nations of Canaan. There are
contrary opinions, and David may have held that position. If so, then
Uriah, in the king's eyes, was not a Jew and his marriage to Bat-Sheva
was consequently invalid. She was, thus, not a married woman, and the
king's actions were immoral but not a capital crime. Of course, others
- particularly Bat-Sheva' grandfather had a contrary opinion. Who was
Bat-Sheva's zaide? - none other than Achitofel, the chief counselor of
the king. Achitofel's revenge at this insult to his halachic opinion
and honor came later during the rebellion of David's son, Avshalom,
whom Achitofel advised to sleep with David's concubines in
 a rather public fashion.

Chazal, however, do not use this seemingly obvious way out and, instead,
postulate the existence of conditional (or actual) bills of divorce that
David's soldiers were required to give to their wives prior to setting
off to war.

As to David's guilt in conspiring to have Uriah killed by the Ammonites,
it seems that he genuinely feared that Uriah would seek to avenge the
treatment of Bat-Sheva and his dishonor by a man whom he served as a
member of the king's special forces (the 37 heroes). David may well
have felt that he had a duty to protect himself as the appointed king -
although his own misdeed had led to the situation.

Yitzchok Zlochower

In a message dated 01/15/2004 9:04:04 PM EST, Yzkd@aol.com writes:
>> I therefore assumed ... that "X hayah omeir" was an aphorism the tanna
>> used frequently, and is therefore more central to tanna X's worldview
>> than a simple "amar".

>  Yes, this is how the L. Rebbe Teitched it many times.

Is this synonomous with Margela bpumei?

Yes, as Batrnura in avos Mishna 2 says explicitly. See also Menachos 96a

M. Levin

Does anyone know of sources that discuss segulos - their suitable
priority in one's avodas Hashem and their relative significance in
Hashem's governance of a person's fate? (I think it's clear that both
are quite low, but I'd like to have some sources to show people.)

Thanks,
Nosson Slifkin

RGS wrote:
> What do we do when the Rema quotes a rishon as saying one thing but
> the rishon actually says something slightly differently? Do we assume
> that the Rema really meant to say whatever the rishon says or that he
> intended to give his own position based mainly but not entirely on the
> rishon? This is not an infrequent occurence.

Then we study Darkei Mosheh (the long one, if necessary). Usually clears
up many things.

Arie Folger

Back in v12n74, R' Eli Linas <linaseli@netvision.net.il> wrote:
: When I showed your essay to a friend, he pointed out that in fact,
: there is a Kol Bo, quoted by the Darkei Moshe in tuff reish eyin gimmel,
: which says that "the mitzvah min hamuvchar is with olive oil, because
: the miracle occurred through it." Based on this Kol Bo, HaRav Elyahshiv,
: shlitta, says that one should try and use edible olive oil for the
: mitzvah, and not the stuff that's sold only for lighting.

There is an interesting Medrash Raba (in Ki Seitzei, of all places),
that says that one of Yaakov Avinu's pachim qetanim found its way to
Shemu'el who used it to annoint Sha'ul, and from there to the Shunamit
woman, and was the jug from which Elisha performed the neis.

This jug was then placed in a special place for pirsumei nisa in the
Beis haMiqdosh. Hashem saved it from churban bayis rishon, and the jug
was present in bayis sheini.

When the Yevanim were metam'im all the shemen, this pach shemen was
not stored with the ones set aside for the menorah (nor with those for
the minchah). The Chashmona'im were able to find this pach and continue
Elisha haNavavi's neis.

This medrash provides an answer to the Beis Yosef's question, as it
implies a neis occured even on the first day -- the just was still full!

As for the nimshal: Yaakov Avinu went back for the pach that was chaviv
lo because it was the product of masa umatan be'emunah. Conducting
business honestly is a source of berakhah in what one earns. (Berakhah
lashon ribui.)

Sha'ul ties into the war with Esav's mal'ach and with the MisYavnim,
as it was his job to fight Amaleiq. How Esav/Amaleiq/Misyavnim ties into
the above it beyond me.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember;
micha@aishdas.org        I do, then I understand." - Confucius
http://www.aishdas.org   "Hearing doesn't compare to seeing." - Mechilta
Fax: (413) 403-9905      "We will do and we will listen." - Israelites

> Rav Nebenzahl's basic argument is that it could not have been adultery
> because:

I have always found these arguments wanting. Basically they all prove
that in a formal legalistic sense there was no adultery. Lehavdil (a
million times) like saying that Clinton was not guilty because it was
technically not adultery.

If that happened to any modern day leader we would all be upset and the
explanations of R. Nebenzahl would not be very convincing.

I always think of the chassidic lad who panics when he sees a woman in
the yeshiva not to speak of naked women.

How many of us would consider Uriah's deed indeed deserving of death
even if it is mored bemalchut in some technical sense. David did not
kill Sheva Ben Bichri and others involved with Avshalom who committed
much more serious crimes.

Sorry the defense sounds like that of a lawyer (sorry Carl) rather than
of an ethicist.

Eli Turkel

Does anyone know the source of "ki la'asher yiten yohav"?

I did a search using Bar Ilan 10 with no success.  I found it in Michtav
Me'Eliyahu, Kuntres Hachessed, but am not sure that is a REED original.

Thanks!

Tzvi Harris
Halacha Yomit Educational Projects
www.halachayomit.com     tzvi@halachayomit.com

To supplement my wife's learned comments re: LXX: Much later, Chazal
commissioned a Greek targum, prepared by Aquilas, a Greek convert, widely
thouught to be identical with Onkelos the author of the Aramaic targum.
Unfortunately, it has been lost, except for fragments. Thus their
objections were to the content of LXX, not to its Greek language. The
situation is analagous to our own rather negative attitude to the
King James Bible, whose magnificence and influence are unsurpassed,
as compared with the more humble Koren Jerusalem Bible.

Moshe Sober

Re my << the correction started some two hundred years ago in siddurim
from likro et hallel to et hahallel.>>

R' Ira J asked: << The sefardim say, when they do at all, ligmor et
HAhallel. Do your objection and charge of rewriting apply to them too?>>

If I would read what I write before posting, I wouldn't be misunderstood.
I was not "charging with rewriting". Many Ashkenaz siddurim had an
error and, as I wrote, it was corrected.

It appears to me that the error originated from our calling that section
of Tehilim by the name Hallel. After a while, perhaps, people thought of
Hallel as a proper name. A proper name is preceded by et, so et Hallel
just like et Moshe.

The fact that Sefaradim say "ligmor et hahallel" has always interested
me but I have never investigated. Ashkenazim (with some exceptions) who
make a b'rakha on chatzi-hallel have a reason to differentiate between
the half and the whole. Logically, they should do that by saying likro for
the half and ligmor for the whole. The Sefaradim do not make a b'rakha on
chatzi-hallel and, therefore, have no need to differentiate between the
two forms. Yet, they chose to emphasize the difference by saying ligmor.

I'll probably never get around to looking into it. Perhaps somebody on
list can save me the effort.

Re: Netz and hanetz hachama: This error is not at all similar to the
hei before hallel. Netz hachama is a bird. Hanetz hachama is Hebrew
for sunrise.

k"t,
David

RAM: While we're on the topic, consider where a hat must be positioned
on a head which has tefillin on it. The hat is often so far back on the
head that it looks like it's about to fall off. Anyone other than me
who thinks it might be a good idea to forego the hat in such cases?

Me: R' Chaim (Ben R' Ahron) Soloveichik once told me that his father
was concerned that wearing a regularly-sized hat with tefillin shel rosh
could push the bayis too far forward.

Meyer

A few days ago, I mentioned on Areivim that I'd like to start an off-list
discussion about some of the issues raised by the Grama book and the
article in Beit Yitzchak. It will focus purely on various halachos and
sources for them, and keep sociology to a minimum. I just realized that
some of the interested people might read only Avodah, and therefore
might have missed my post.

So, if this sounds like it might be interesting, I hope the moderator
will let this one post onto Avodah, and interested parties can respond
to me offlist. (I'll be writing directly to the four people who have
already signed up, to confirm.)

Akiva Miller

I wonder how our more erudite chaverim deal with the apparent discrepancy
between the well known aphorism of Chazal that a prophet is not permitted
to innovate halacha and the many innovations in sefer Yechezkel 40 - 48.
The innovations in Ez 40 - 43 deal with the dimensions and structure
of the new temple, and appear to be within the perogative of prophesy.
The biblical stricture in Ex. 25:9, "In accord with everything that
I show you of the form of the Mishkan and of all its vessels, and so
shall it be done." appears to allow for later prophetic changes (Rashi as
interpreted by the Chasam Sofer). Starting with Ez. 44, however, we find
halachic innovations that ought not, according to Chazal, be within the
province of prophesy. I am aware of the various answers given in Chazal
and commentators to this problem, but I have not been convinced. For
example, take the seemingly new halacha for Kohanim of the Zadok line
44:22, "They may not take a widow or divorcee for wives, only a virgin of
Jewish ancestry or a widow of a kohen may they take". It takes a rather
radical interpretation of this verse to make the first part refer only
to the Kohen Gadol, while the end refers to ordinary kohanim. Instead,
commentators tend to see this verse as foretelling a chumrah that kohanim
of the Zadok line will take upon themselves. However, the entire context
of this chapter is halachic in nature. Mostly, it agrees with the Torah,
but there are seeming exceptions such as the verse above and Ez. 44:26,
"After his (the kohen's) purification (from contact with the listed dead
relatives) he shall count 7 days". This appears to set out a 2 week period
before a bereaved kohen can return to temple service; one week for the
purification process (sprinkling of the Parah Adumah mixture on the 3rd
and 7th day) and an additional week of waiting. In Ez. 45:18-25 we find
new korbonot and new amounts of flour and oil for Pesach and Succot. In
Ez. 48, the new tribal division of the land is set out with 13 stripes
of land of equal width (75 mil or kilometers); 12 for the tribes and 1
for the Nasi (government). The assignment of tribal position is quite
different than the original apportioning of Canaan among the tribes. One
such change is the position of Judah on the north side of the Nasi's
portion, which includes the temple and the new Jerusalem, while Benamin
is on the south side - in reverse of the original disposition. Another
innovation is giving converts a portion of the land assigned to the
tribe amongst whom the convert resides.(Ez 47:22-23).

Yitzchok Zlochower

On 18 Jan 2004 at 21:11, IBrandriss@aol.com wrote:
>     ... the Netziv has a unique explanation of the individual
> strengths of the Avos.

> He understands Avraham Avinu to exemplify Torah-learning, which
> creates the z'chus for protection from the sword of our enemies;
> Yitzchok Avinu to exemplify avodah, which creates the z'chus for
> material blessings and sustenance; and Yaakov Avinu to exemplify the
> pursuit of chesed, which creates the z'chus for peace...

> This approach varies significantly from the formulation that, in my
> experience, is the most commonly quoted trifurcation of the middos of
> the Av os: Avraham epitomizes chesed, Yitzchok epitomizes yirah or
> gevurah, and Yaakov epitomizes emes or Torah. Other, kindred
> formulations have Avraham, Yitzchok, and Yaakov corresponding to the
> middos of Gadol, Gibbor, and Norah (or Tiferes), respectively. In
> particular, the Netziv seems to understand Avraham and Yaakov as
> representing the opposite of the middos they are usually cited to
> represent.

We sent this question to my brother-in-law, Zvi Weiss, and asked him to
comment. Here's what he said:

It is not at all clear that "Chesed" is the opposite of "Torah" as the
writer asserts. In particular, if you look at the approach taken by
the Netziv in discussing the pesukim relating to Matan Torah, there is
a clear distinction between "regular" Chesed which Jews are ASSUMED
"automatically" to do (and which even the Non-Jew is expected to
perform -- as per the statement of "Olam Chesed Yibaneh") as opposed
to the "elevated" Chesed that is done solely to fulfil the Will Of
Hashem. Such a Chesed can only be performed by those (as I understand
it) who are the "Gedolai Yisrael" and -- presumably -- are steeped
in Torah. If you follow this approach, then the convergence of Torah
and Chesed in Avraham fits very well. Note that the Netziv quotes from
Chazal that Avraham was the "Learner of Torah" until his "klayot" were
"fountains" of Torah. Similarly, the Chesed that Avraham "performed"
was NOT the "regular" Chesed but was the "exalted" form of Chesed --
which can only be accomplished by truly learning and understanding Torah.
[In particular, see Netziv on Shemot 19:5 where the Netziv writes:
".... But for the Heads of Yisrael there is a second explanation namely
that 'And you will be for me a Segulah" is not the result but rather is
also a condition that is to say that the ACts of Chesed that you perform
will not be based upon human nature and one's [human] intellectual
knowledge but rather all is done purely for the Shem Shamayim...."

I similarly do not see the contradiction between "Shalom" and "Emet"
when we look at Yaakov. While Yaakov sought to make peace, there was no
deception involved. Yaakov did not try to hide anything. On the contrary,
he was quite straightforward with Lavan in detailing how Lavan mistreated
him -- yet at the same time, he was ready to "make peace" and [sort of]
start afresh. See the commentary of the Netziv on that section there
where it states that Yaakov summoned his "brothers" to gather stones --
when in fact these were his SONS...

So, I do not see any real contradiction here... rather it seems to me 
simply a different emphasis.  

 -Zvi

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son, 
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much. 

On 19 Jan 2004 at 20:16, eli turkel wrote:
> If that happened to any modern day leader we would all be upset and
> the explanations of R. Nebenzahl would not be very convincing.

Ain hachi nami. But that's why the aveira was only to Hashem and not to
people - people were upset but had no halachic basis for being upset. But
David sinned to Hashem because there was a chilul Hashem that resulted
from his actions.

> How many of us would consider Uriah's deed indeed deserving of death
> even if it is mored bemalchut in some technical sense. 

Same thing. It was not an aveira in a legalistic sense; it was a chilul
Hashem and for that David was punished.

 - Carl

Carl Sherer wrote:
>Rav Nebenzahl's basic argument is that it could not have
>been adultery because:
>1. The Gemara says that David didn't sin.

It is certainly mashma from Avodah Zarah 4b-5a that David sinned (he
committed "oso ma'aseh") in order to teach about teshuvah. There are
ways to be meyashev this, but one way is certainly to say that there
are two opinions over whether David sinned.

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

I recognize that Rav Meidan is a serious biblical scholar, but I don't
understand this citation. Is he assuming that a divorce was given or not?
If not, then how could some suddenly developed empathy justify taking
Bat-Sheva to his bed chamber . How could a feeling that one of his
lieutenants is coarse and unfeeling justify sending him to his arranged
death - a death that involved other totally innocent soldiers?

However, calling Uriah a Hittite warrior is a key observation that may
help account for king David's otherwise incomprehensible behavior. I
don't know if R' Meidan develops the implications of such an observation,
but it does lead to the question of whether Uriah's marriage to Bat-Sheva
was legitimate. It seems to be generally held that one could accept as a
convert someone from the historical seven nations of Canaan. There are
contrary opinions, and David may have held that position. If so, then
Uriah, in the king's eyes, was not a Jew and his marriage to Bat-Sheva
was consequently invalid. She was, thus, not a married woman, and the
king's actions were immoral but not a capital crime. Of course, others
- particularly Bat-Sheva' grandfather had a contrary opinion. Who was
Bat-Sheva's zaide? - none other than Achitofel, the chief counselor of the
king. Achitofel's revenge at this insult to his halachic opinion and honor
came later during the rebellion of David's son, Avshalom, whom Achitofel
advised to sleep with David's concubines in a rather public fashion.

Chazal, however, do not use this seemingly obvious way out and, instead,
postulate the existence of conditional (or actual) bills of divorce that
David's soldiers were required to give to their wives prior to setting
off to war.

As to David's guilt in conspiring to have Uriah killed by the Ammonites,
it seems that he genuinely feared that Uriah would seek to avenge the
treatment of Bat-Sheva and his dishonor by a man whom he served as a
member of the king's special forces (the 37 heroes). David may well
have felt that he had a duty to protect himself as the appointed king -
although his own misdeed had led to the situation.

ML: I understand the difficulty that you express based on a very partial
presentation of a very complex and multi-level interpretation. I probably
cannot do justice to it in a short citation but here are a few points:

R. Meidan is interested in exploring the emotional and moral dynamics;
he dealt with the issue of sin or no sin at another part of the book.
He assumes that generally in Navi, moral failing takes precedence for
criticism over a purely halachic transgression. Here it is taking the
kivsa away form a poor man, not technical violation of even a grave
prohibition. He explores the undercurrent of confrontation between Dovid
and Uriah based on their incompatible moral and spiritual outlooks and
how this ends up being formulated as mored bmalchus.

M. Levin

I recognize that Rav Meidan is a serious biblical scholar, but I don't
understand this citation. Is he assuming that a divorce was given or not?
If not, then how could some suddenly developed empathy justify taking
Bat-Sheva to his bed chamber . How could a feeling that one of his
lieutenants is coarse and unfeeling justify sending him to his arranged
death - a death that involved other totally innocent soldiers?

However, calling Uriah a Hittite warrior is a key observation that may
help account for king David's otherwise incomprehensible behavior. I
don't know if R' Meidan develops the implications of such an observation,
but it does lead to the question of whether Uriah's marriage to Bat-Sheva
was legitimate. It seems to be generally held that one could accept as a
convert someone from the historical seven nations of Canaan. There are
contrary opinions, and David may have held that position. If so, then
Uriah, in the king's eyes, was not a Jew and his marriage to Bat-Sheva
was consequently invalid. She was, thus, not a married woman, and the
king's actions were immoral but not a capital crime. Of course, others
- particularly Bat-Sheva' grandfather had a contrary opinion. Who was
Bat-Sheva's zaide? - none other than Achitofel, the chief counselor of the
king. Achitofel's revenge at this insult to his halachic opinion and honor
came later during the rebellion of David's son, Avshalom, whom Achitofel
advised to sleep with David's concubines in a rather public fashion.

Chazal, however, do not use this seemingly obvious way out and, instead,
postulate the existence of conditional (or actual) bills of divorce that
David's soldiers were required to give to their wives prior to setting
off to war.

As to David's guilt in conspiring to have Uriah killed by the Ammonites,
it seems that he genuinely feared that Uriah would seek to avenge the
treatment of Bat-Sheva and his dishonor by a man whom he served as a
member of the king's special forces (the 37 heroes). David may well
have felt that he had a duty to protect himself as the appointed king -
although his own misdeed had led to the situation.

ML: I understand the difficulty that you express based on a very partial
presentation of a very complex and multi-level interpretation. I probably
cannot do justice to it in a short citation but here are a few points:

R. Meidan is interested in exploring the emotional and moral dynamics;
he dealt with the issue of sin or no sin at another part of the book.
He assumes that generally in Navi, moral failing takes precedence for
criticism over a purely halachic transgression. Here it is taking the
kivsa away form a poor man, not technical violation of even a grave
prohibition. He explores the undercurrent of confrontation between Dovid
and Uriah based on their incompatible moral and spiritual outlooks and
how this ends up being formulated as mored bmalchus.

M. Levin

[R Carl Sherer:]
> On 13 Jan 2004 at 8:30, Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. wrote 
> regarding walking past a light with a motion sensor on Shabbos:
>> It is most definitely a pesik reisha d'lo nicha lei. As the Aruch
>> holds prdln"l is muttar lechatchila, and R' Chaim paskened azoi
>> l'ma'aseh (because he held it was also shittas ho'Rambam), there is 
>> makom l'hakel b'makom ha'tzorech.

> Why "d'lo nicha lei"? I would think that at most it would be "d'lo
> ichpas lei" and maybe even "d'nicha lei" because it would show you 
> where  you  are going?
> Also, what's considered b'makom ha'tzorech? ...

R. Broyde has an article in 1992 in Journal of Halacha and Contemporary
Society that discusses Psik Reisha in detail. He claims that most poskim
do not differentiate between lo nichei lei and lo ichpat lei.

Our LOR said he spoke with R. Zilberstein who said that if necessary
it is muttar because it is even lower than lo nichei lei because that
is the ordinary way of walking. i.e. if one can easily avoid the motion
sensor than that is preferable however, if that is difficult one is not
required to stop going home or not leave one's home or even go over a
fence etc. to avoid the motion detector
(i.e. consider a future where a satellite notes everyone's location -
would it be prohibited to leave home?. A bigger problem is motion sensors
in hotel rooms or lobbies).

R. Broyde in his article claims that all this is a problem only if some
incadescent bulb is lit by the motion (I don't know what the status is
of flickering control lights).

However, if there is only a video of the movement than it should be
okay as a video is only prohibited miderraban and so the issue reduces
to a psik reisha de lo nicha lei on a rabbinic level which many poskim
allow. He also brings further reasons to permit.

Let me point out that it is common in many European communities for the
shul to have a video surveillance system (operated by a goy) on shabbat
for security reasons. The question is then whether this is considered
nicha lei or not.

kol tuv,
Eli Turkel,  turkel@post.tau.ac.il on 1/20/2004
Department of Mathematics, Tel Aviv University

See the sugya (Menachot 43b) regarding the "shelo asani" brachot
(especially according to Rashi's first explanation), where the wife is
deemed to have the halakhic (but not the social) standing vis a vis her
husband of a slave to a master. This is obviously only one facet of the
immensely complex institution of marriage, but it does have certain
implications. (1) Since the gemara is referring to a standard, even
idealized marriage, there must be a ketubah. Thus the wife has the status
of a slave regardless of the obligations of the husband towards her. (2)
There are problems with a master serving his slave even voluntarily,
and certainly with a slave requesting such assistance, however gently,
but there are kulot, and certainly in the context of marriage, a husband
is allowed, nay encouraged, to help out his wife, and I imagine there
would be no problem either with the wife requesting such assistance. (3)
OTOH, a slave certainly cannot demand favors from a master, and it would
seem the same should apply to the wife. All the more so where the husband
refuses and the wife insists.

Because of the complexity of marriage, the above is merely an ideal with
little normative implications. The gemara is in effect saying that a
demanding or insisting wife is a flaw in the marriage, which obviously
cannot be addressed in isolation. But where the husband is halakhically
entitled to kavod from people other than his wife (viz. a kohen, a Torah
scholar, or a very old man), there certainly is no heter for the wife,
who is in any case supposed to behave like a slave towards her husband,
to treat her husband the kohen with any less deference. Thus if Mrs. Kohen
demands, let alone insists, that her husband do some task, she not only
departs from the marriage ideal, she also violates Vekidashto. Moreover,
given that marital problems are never the fault of one party alone, it
would seem that Mr. Kohen violates Lifnei Iver, and probably Vekidashto
as well, since he too is obligated to keep the kehunah in high repute,
and he may well be virtually compelling his wife to be disrespectful.

The bottom line: The Kohen family has a special obligation to make their
marriage a model of the Jewish ideal. While the Torah was not given to
the angels, failure is judged with greater severity than in a regular
family. OTOH, in a really good marriage, the fact that a husband is a
kohen or a talmid chacham only enhances the mutual respect that is the
hallmark of a model Jewish marriage.

Moshe Sober

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