Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 104

Thursday, February 26 2004

• Re: Smoking and nishtanah hateva
• Re: Smoking
• Re: e-tzniut issues
• Re: Rambam and the Creation of the world
• Re: Yibum (was Re: kol isha al hayam?)
• Re: R' Aviner on women's group megilla readings
• e-tzniut issues
• RE: e-tzniut issues
• Re: e-tzniut issues
• Re: e-tzniut issues
• looking for Midrash
• Re: Yibum (was Re: kol isha al hayam?)
• Re: a fire on shabbos
• Re: Smoking
• Re: Re: Eye Surgery (d'Oraysa) on Shabbos
• Purim Source Sheet
• zemer yom shabbaton en lishkoach
• AIDS & brit mila
• AishDas Melaveh Malkah
• Re: e-tzniut issues
• Re: e-tzniut issues
• RE: e-tzniut issues
• what makes a posek
• RE: Eye Surgery (d'Oraysa) on Shabbos

On Tue, Feb 24, 2004 at 08:58:27AM +0200, Akiva Atwood wrote:
:>: I don't think so. I think they mean that, in the past, smoking wasn't
:>: harmful -- but WE have changed (or tobacco has) and now it IS harmful.

:> R' Avraham ben haRambam defines nishtanah hateva as being about theory
:> changing, not reality.

: I realize that -- I was refering to contemporary usage.

But I was referring to halakhah.

BTW, there is plenty of room for nishtanah hateva without contradicting
current science. For example, the last two millenia of chicken breeding
could change egg sizes. Similarly the effects of improvement (or
degradation) of diet.

In the case of blindness, I thought the issue was not literal sakanas
nefashos, but rather the comparison the gemara makes between blindness
to death. If so, social changes could, theoretically, make that less
true. Just as the deaf are no longer bedin cheireish.

On Tue, Feb 24, 2004 at 04:50:38PM -0800, Harry Maryles wrote:
: If it is then I take from that that RAS must hold that once Chazal Pakin'd
: that a Kinah does not reproduce sexually which is a requirement for the
: Issur, than it doesn't matter what we dicover subsequently about its
: nature. The Psak stands eventhough the stated reason for Chazal's Psak
: was that Kinim do not reproduce sexually.

Of course RAS holds that scientific data won't change pesaq. It's
Brisker derekh -- only halachic process changes halakhah. We've spoken
about RYBS's opinion on this subject WRT techeiles and other cases, and
it's identical. See my summary of Nefesh haRav on the topic (pp 52-54)
at <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol05/v05n073.shtml#12>.

In the past, we've spoken about R' Dovid Lifshitz vs RAYKook on the
subject. Rav Dovid found another reason why beitzei kinim would have
no halachic mamashus, leaving the meat to be the sole goreim for the
kinah that does have mamashus. RAYK, OTOH, invoked the Gra's notion
that for every published reason, a din could have numerous unpublished
ones. Therefore a change of scientific theory can eliminate a heter --
since eliminating one ground lehatir is sufficient. However, it can't
eliminate a chumrah -- that would require eliminating all grounds,
including the ones we don't know of.

In the case of eye surgery, being machmir in piku'ach nefesh trumps
being machmir in Shabbos, no?

 -mi

 -- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Rabindranath Tagore

On 25 Feb 2004 at 16:27, Zeliglaw@aol.com wrote:
> My LOR referred me to a Teshuvah of R Wosner ( ShuT Shevet HaLevi) in
> which R Wosner condemns smoking as an addictive and unheakty
> behavior-anyone seen this teshuvah?

I believe it's at the end of the last chelek of Shevet HaLevi. 
There's one in shul and I can try to check. But the tshuva is brought 
at the end of a sefer on smoking that my son has that was put out by 
one of Rav Shach's m'shamshim. 

 - Carl

In Avodah V12 #102, RbtznSKE replied:
> I'm asking if we can consider the realm of the virtual in practical,
> Torah terms...??

Since you put it that way, is there any part of olam hazeh that
we can-not- consider, define, couch, etc. in the language of Torah?
Precisely -how- we do so is a matter for debate (and may lead to machloqes
l'shaim Shomayim), but that we -can- do so seems to me axiomatic for
[at least] Torah-true Jews.

All the best from
 - Michael Poppers via RIM pager

On Mon, Feb 23, 2004 at 08:34:48PM +0200, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
: The issue is what to do when human knowledge - either in terms of
: science, direct experience or philosophical proof - seems to contradict
: mesorah. The Ralbag (Introduction to Milchemes HaShem) and the Rambam
: (Morech Nevuchim 2:25) both indicate that theoretically they would have
: to reinterpret the Torah position....

Again, you presume more than I would.

Yes, they hold that no contradiction between Torah and science /
philosophy could be real. The question is when we do see a contradiction,
when do we assume the illusion is caused by having misunderstood the
Torah, and when do we assume it's our philosophical reasoning that
is faulty.

The Rambam does not say that one would reinterpret mesorah. He brings
one example of hypothetical reinterpretation, Ber' 1, and there are
mesorah sources for doing so in that case. Since he later speaks of
the incontravertibility of words of our nevi'im and zeqeinim, I do not
assume the Rambam speaks of assigning peshatim that contradict mesorah
outright. In fact, in the case in question he actually assigns the
fault to philosophy NOT our understanding of Torah.

What would the Rambam do if flawless reasoning contradicted the mesorah?
The Rambam doesn't worry about the impossible.

The Kuzari:
: "G-d forbid that there should be anything in the Torah which contradicts
: the reality that we experience or that can be clearly proven by logical
: proof....                         . This tradition has greater credibility
: than that of philosophical proofs. Nevertheless a person who believes in
: the Torah might be forced to admit by logic concerning the primordial
: hiyuli matter and the view that our present world was preceded by many
: other worlds. However this acceptance would not indicate a lack of faith,
: because he still believes that this world was created at a specific times
: and the beginning of mankind was from Adam and Noach." [Kuzari 1:67].

Of course! The Kuzari calls philosophical argument a poor second,
of value only to people like the Greeks who don't have a solid
mesorah. Since every philosophical position has a contradictory
position that some other philosopher feels is "proven", how can any
philosophical result be considered certain? See my machshavah vort
in <http://www.aishdas.org/mesukim/5764/yisro.pdf> on the Rihal's
epistomology.

 -mi

 -- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Rabindranath Tagore

On Tue, Feb 24, 2004 at 01:06:45PM +0200, Carl M. Sherer wrote:
: Even if Naomi were to have sons in the future, why would it matter? 
: Yibum can only be performed by a brother who was alive at the same 
: time as the niftar. Even if Naomi were to have further sons, for Rus 
: (or Orpa, who was still there at the time) to marry them would be 
: pogea b'erva. 

But I thought we're not talking about the din of yibum. After all,
neither Peloni Almoni nor Boaz were brothers. Rather, this is a
lifnim mishuras hadin extension of yibum. In which case, why wouldn't
an ach shelo hayah be'olamo be in the same class as a cousin?

 -mi

On Tue, Feb 24, 2004 at 04:29:17PM -0500, Jonathan Baker wrote:
:> 4. Generally, one should not change the customs regarding the forms of
:> prayers (Responsa Rashba, vol. 1 no. 323. Cf. Orach Mishpat, no. 35). The
:> forms of prayers that extend [back] hundreds or thousands of years are
:> very good.

: And so both forms of the bracha are old, no?  How is this relevant?

I didn't understand RSA to be speaking about the nusach of the berakhah.
Rather, the form of having women read megillah was that in question.

 -mi

Is this really such a new issue?

Are there any halachic sources regarding the propriety of regular mail
correspondence between men and women? Or phone conversations? Is email
different in kind, or only in degree? If it is different in kind, what
precisely is the difference?

 - Ilana

On 26 Feb 2004 at 1:04, Mishpachat Freedenberg wrote:
> Yes, I'd agree that it's a question the poster had the right to ask; I
> just think that she went way too far in her suppositions. Yichud is
> not virtual, it means actually being in the same physical/geographic
> location as the other person. 

Ain hachi nami. And I think that trying to impute the halachic 
concept of yichud into a virtual relationship is a stretch. But....

> There are some people who raise similar
> chashashes about allowing unmarried young people to have a cell phone
> -- I always tell these people that I grew up way before cell phones
> and I can assure them that boys and girls were able to meet behind
> their parents backs in those days and, even today, it is quite
> possible to arrange to be at a certain pay phone at a certain time and
> get calls from a member of the opposite gender if you so wish.

Ain hachi nami. But....

> I think that it just boils down to whether you feel the tool causes
> sin or the yetzer hara causes sin -- 

No. The tool makes it easier to act upon the yetzer hara that was always
there (and will likely always be there, since the Anshei Knesses HaGdola
concluded that removing the yetzer hara for non- arayos relations out
of marriage had too many other unintended consequences). And when it's
easier to act upon the yetzer hara, you're more likely to do so. I think
that's what we all need to recognize.

-- Carl

R' Harry Maryles wrote <<< As to the level of Tznius in "being friendly"
or "engaging wits" on e-mail, I think it should be less of a problem in
cyber-space since we are not interacting in any way except with words.
There is no sensory contact at all and as such I do not see a problem.

I agree that there's no *physical* contact, but I think that a "heart-to-heart"
conversation does count as *sensory* contact. (Again, I must stress that I'm
not out to forbid anything, only to point out that some danger does exist,
however small it might be.)

and <<< But I do not think fora like Areivim are conducive to it anymore
than a conversation amongst couples, families, or friends around a shabbos
table for example, and probably a lot less. >>>

Agreed. Being in the public arena has a certain "safety net" simply by
virtue of being public, and that's part of the whole idea of why yichud is
more dangerous than the shabbos table or the marketplace.

But when that conversation moves from a public email list to a private email,
it allows dangers comparable to those incurred when a conversation moves from
the Shabbos table to a side vestibule. However open that vestibule might be,
the nature of the conversation becomes more personal, and has the potential to
advance from "personal" to "intimate". Again, I admit that in the absence of
any real yichud or physical contact there is no technical issur, but tznius
demands a much higher level of attention to these dangers.

Akiva Miller

R"n Rena Freedenberg wrote <<< I think that it just boils down to whether
you feel the tool causes sin or the yetzer hara causes sin -- I think
that people who want to do something illicit will find a way to do it
with our without a computer and those who have no intention of any such
thing won't do it no matter what. It seems that the yetzer hara has been
around a lot longer than either cell phones or computers and nobody ever
needed either one of them if they were intent on getting into mischief.

I would like to focus on several specific phrases in the above quote.
Namely:
<<< people who want to do something >>>
<<< those who have no intention >>>
<<< won't do it no matter what >>>
<<< if they were intent >>>

While I must admit that RRF is correct in these statements, I feel that
the focus is improperly placed on people who are at the far ends of the
spectrum. Her analysis ignores the great numbers of people in the middle.

Most people, I believe, are neither so innocent that they'll stay pure
"no matter what", nor so "intent on getting into mischief" that they'll
work overtime figuring out how to do it.

Rather, I believe, most people have a yetzer hara such that if an
opportunity presents itself to get into mischief with a neglible amount
of risk and effort, they'll have a difficult fight against it. Of course,
the "shiur" of "negligible risk and effort" will be determined by the
perceived rewards promised by the situation, and will vary from person
to person and occasion to occasion.

My point, obviously, is that computers and cell phones should not be
dismissed so lightly. Of course it's not the tool which *causes* the sin,
rather the yetzer hara is what causes the sin. But we must never forget
that the nature of the tool can make the sin more difficult or more easy,
and that will be a factor in whether it is the yetzer tov or hara which
wins the fight.

Akiva Miller

Does anyone know the source of this mashal? I cannot find it and actually 
saw it cited by the Chida in Kise David for Zachor (Online this is all I 
found)

[From www.booksunderreview.com, I shrunk the URL to fit. -mi]
<http://tinyurl.com/2nowb>

Take the Midrash about the Leviathan and the Fox, a tale about a small
creature who dared to defy an enormous beast. The Leviathan, knowing the
fox is clever, assumes that if he eats the latter he will be not only
the strongest creature alive but also the most clever. Thus he sends
the Swordfish and Sea Bass to find and bring the fox to him. They lure
the fox to come with the false promise of a feast.

Of course, the fox cannot swim, and so the fish agree to carry him. Once
he is on their backs at sea, they tell him the truth--that the Leviathan
plans to make a meal of him. Now the story breaks, and the child is
asked, if he were in the fox' place, what would he do? This is a tough
one, and most children will not know (although there are other tales
where they can easily guess the riddle). Alas, says the fox, I left my
heart at home. "We foxes never travel with our hearts unless it is for
a very important reason." He would hate to disappoint the Leviathan,
and so the fishes take the fox back to shore. Whereupon the fox dances
with joy and runs off. He has even escaped the Angel of Death, he tells
them. "Do you think I could be fooled by a couple of silly fish?"

On 26 Feb 2004 at 4:33, Micha Berger wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2004 at 01:06:45PM +0200, Carl M. Sherer wrote:
>: Even if Naomi were to have sons in the future, why would it matter?
>: Yibum can only be performed by a brother who was alive at the same
>: time as the niftar. Even if Naomi were to have further sons, for Rus
>: (or Orpa, who was still there at the time) to marry them would be
>: pogea b'erva. 

> But I thought we're not talking about the din of yibum. After all,
> neither Peloni Almoni nor Boaz were brothers. Rather, this is a lifnim
> mishuras hadin extension of yibum. In which case, why wouldn't an ach
> shelo hayah be'olamo be in the same class as a cousin?

I just thought of another reason why not - because even if Naomi had
children they would be achim min ha'eim and not min ha'av. Yibum only
applies to achim min ha'av.

You can't expand yibum to achim min ha'eim or to ach she'lo haya b'olamo
because either would be pogea b'erva. Remember, we're talking post-Matan
Torah here, so this isn't like the case of Yehuda and Tamar. The general
rule is that you cannot marry eishes ach - the exception is if it's
mandated by the halachos of yibum.

We're not talking about Ploni Almoni or Boaz here. We're talking about
Naomi's statement to Rus and Orpa that they should return to Moav because
she will not have any more sons to perform yibum with them. See Rus
1:11-13. Those are the psukim under discussion.

 - Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son, 
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much. 

R' Josh Backon wrote <<< However if the fire could spread to a neighbor's
home, he does permit kibui. >>>

On the one hand, it's hard for me to imagine a case where we'd be
confident that the fire is unable to spread to the next house, unless
the entire block has no other house on it, and also has no trees which
would help the fire spread.

On the other hand... Do we have anyone on-list who is a volunteer or
professional fire fighter? I've got to wonder what the rules are when a
house is on fire. Do they force evacuation of the neighboring buildings
or not? I would imagine that their standard practices are very relevant
to this shaalah, in exactly the same way that standard medical practice
is important to those shaalos.

Akiva Miller

R' Steve Brizel wrote <<< I recently discussed the issue of smoking with
my LOR ... He also mentioned that the Chasam Sofer does speak about a
distinctive Jewish physiology that is present when we all observe the
mitzvos, a condition that is obviously not present today. >>>

Sounds fascinating. It seems to me that if it is *obvious* that this
condition is not present today, the Chasam Sofer must have been pretty
specific in describing that condition. Any idea what the condition was,
or where we can find this Chasam Sofer?

Akiva Miller

RDE wrote in part:
>Shemiras HaGuf v'HaNefesh page 54): The sefer Nishmas Avraham (14:4)
>quotes R' Sherira Gaon and R' Avraham ben HaRambam that the medicinal
>cures mentioned in the Talmud are only reflections of the medical
>knowledge of those times and thus are outdated. The author cites this
>view as one of the reasons why these cures should not be utilized today.
>However R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach commented that this view should not
>be classified as a primary reason but only as a minority view...
>          He wrote to me the following: "At the present time I don't
>remember if there was anyone who actually rejected this view or even
>whether there is anyone who is authoritative enough to disagree with them.
>But since many write that the reason is because nature has changed and no
>one mentions the reason that modern medical knowledge is an improvement -
>therefore I commented that it is best to classify their view as a minority
>opinion....

                                         Bs"d
In a later madura, Rav Lerner (author of Shimras HaGuf v'haNefesh) notes 
that the authorities rejecting the vies of R' Sherira Gaon and R' Avraham 
ben HaRambam are the Rivash and the Rashba

kol tuv,
Eli  

Dear Friends,

Micha was kind enough to convert my Purim flyer to PDF format and
post it to the Aishdas website.  Please feel free to use them in any
way you like (I'll be happy to hear if and how you do use them).

<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/stateOfPurim.doc>
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/stateOfPurim.pdf>

[Email #2. -mi]

A listmember wrote to me about my Purim source sheet:
> You might want to add that the Mishna Brura quotes this Rambam
> l'halacha in 694:3.

I'd like to raise the question of how one understands this directive
of the Rambam, and afterwards, to consider the Mishnah Berurah's
quotation of it.

> Hilkhot Megillah 2:17
> It is preferable to spend more on gifts to the poor than on the
> Purim meal or on presents to friends, for no joy is greater or more
> glorious than the joy of gladdening the hearts of the poor, the
> orphans, the widows, and the strangers.  Indeed, he who causes the
> hearts of these unfortunates to rejoice emulates the Divine
> Presence, of whom Scripture says, To revive the spirit of the
> humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones
> (Isaiah 57:15).

I tend to see this statement as something designed to move the heart
towards giving more to aniyim, rather than as din.  It puts the
mitzvot in proper perspective: once you've fulfilled your basic
obligations of seudah, mishloach manot, and matanot la-evyonim, then
you should go beyond that with the following in mind:
    1) Whoever increases his sending of gifts to friends is praiseworthy.
    2) It is preferable to spend more on gifts to the poor than on
       the Purim meal or on presents to friends...

If it were a simple law, I don't feel like Rambam's poetic
exhoration would be necessary.

The MB mentioned earlier says (on the requirement to give two gifts to two poor
people):
> This is the legal requirement (zehu mi-dina), but in truth, It is
> preferable to spend more on gifts to the poor...

So what is the relevance of the MB quoting the Rambam?

Is it simply that the MB wants us to know and be influenced by this
beautiful halakhah of the Rambam (this would be enough for me to put
it in)?

Or, assuming that I already know what the Rambam says:
  1) Does it move the heart more knowing that the MB brings it?
  2) Is it more binding as halakhah because the MB brings it?
  3) If the answer to either question is yes, is it because the
     Chafetz Chaim was such a great tzaddik or because he
     has become so accepted as a halakhic authority or for some
     other reason?

When I raised this question with a rabbi last Shabbat, he was very
much in line with the statement as psak.  The MB's statement is
important, because hilkheta ke-vatraei, and therefore as halakhah
the MB's quotation of the Rambam is more authoritative than the
Rambam would be on its own.  I find myself closer to my first
suggestion (the MB brings it because we should know this Rambam, as
a statement of the Rambam), but I'm curious about other approaches.

I'm most interested to read your responses.

Kol Tuv,
David Roth

I was reading in my edition of R Yehuda Halevi's diwan, and came across
the shabbat zemer yom shabbaton en lishkoach. In the diwan, stanzas 3 and
4 were completely different from the routinely published one. (although
still adhered to the acrostic). Any one with access to Davidson or other
source about the origin of the one widely used?

Meir Shinnar

[I wrote the following to Areivim. It was in reply to a comment about
beris's possible protection from AIDS being an example of mitzvos
provifing protection in general. -mi]

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> Sechar mitzvos behai alma leiqa.
> Tzadiq vera lo.

I find it ironic yet, I suppose, necessary in order to give us Bechira
Chafshis, that the above two statements effectively relegate exitence
to what appears to be randomness. Atheists or agnostics might just say
that this is how religion explains the random nature of existence. How,
they will ask, can there be a just God when we see events like the
Churban Beis HaMikdash, the Assarah Harugei Malchus, or the holocaust
where Tzadikim were indiscriminately killed along with Reshhaim and
Benonim? The Atheist would say doesn't the Holocaust at least lead you
to question the existence of a God who cares?

An another clear illustration of the problem can be seen in Tay-Sachs
disease. The occurance of a Tay-Sachs baby for both the child and the
parents is completely divorced from whether the parents or child are
deserving of the "punishment" of such physical and emotional pain.
How can one reconcile the genetics of Tay-Sachs with Divine Justice?
Tay-Sachs does not look at "who" it afflicts. It only looks at biology. I
find it hard to reconcile this issue with my own concepts of Justice in
the world. Is it indeed in order to give us Bechira Chafshis? I know that
"it all comes out in the wash..." meaning that Olam HaBah will straighten
it out for us and only there will true justice be meted out by God. But
it is hard to understand how one can teach about justice in this world
when justice SEEMS to be so random.

HM

[My own post continued:
> There are many things other than the meting out of sechar or onesh that
> go into what one experiences. There is so little correlation between
> zechus and one's fate in olam hazeh, I don't see how this statement is
> of singnificant import.
-mi]

Just a reminder that the 5764 AishDas melaveh malkah is scheduled
for this motza'ei Shabbos in Kehal Sha'arei Shalom, Brooklyn
NY(http://shaareishalom.tripod.com/id4.html) starting at 8 pm. Be
advised that there will be another event, sponsored by the Chofetz
Chaim Heritage Foundation, in the same building. Walk past that event
(inside the building) to get to the melaveh malkah.

Gil Student
gil_student@hotmail.com
www.aishdas.org/student

Kenneth G Miller <kennethgmiller@juno.com> wrote:
> when that conversation moves from a public email list to a private email,
> it allows dangers comparable to those incurred when a conversation moves
> from the Shabbos table to a side vestibule. However open that vestibule
> might be, the nature of the conversation becomes more personal, and has
> the potential to advance from "personal" to "intimate". Again, I admit
> that in the absence of any real yichud or physical contact there is no
> technical issur, but tznius demands a much higher level of attention to
> these dangers.

Anyone can continue a friendly chat at a Shabbos table in a lter private
venue. There is always this danger in the course of human interaction
and the danger exists when "moves from a public email list to a private
email". But that does not Assur a Shabbos table of Mixed couples,
etc. Freindly e-mail discussions between the sexes on a religious forum
like Areivim should not be subject to any greater restrictions than that.

HM

In a message dated 2/26/2004 1:49:57 PM EST, hmaryles@yahoo.com writes:
> Anyone can continue a friendly chat at a Shabbos table in a lter private
> venue. There is always this danger in the course of human interaction
> and the danger exists when "moves from a public email list to a private
> email". But that does not Assur a Shabbos table of Mixed couples,

Does it assur a shabbos table including mixed singles?

KT
Joel

> Rather, I believe, most people have a yetzer hara such that 
> if an opportunity presents itself to get into mischief with 
> a neglible amount of risk and effort, they'll have a 
> difficult fight against it. Of course, the "shiur" of 
> "negligible risk and effort" will be determined by the 
> perceived rewards promised by the situation, and will vary 
> from person to person and occasion to occasion.

But I think that this is the real point. You are talking about something
which, no matter how little effort it would take to get into trouble
with, carries such a huge risk that very few [frum people] would attempt
it. Just remember, you are talking about an aveira that carries very
dire penalties for a frum Jew. Actually, since email is such a distant
form of communication, it adds at least another step or two into the
process that would serve to further separate between people instead of
bringing them together.

 --Rena 

In the collected works of Rav T.H. Chajes, he has a monograph entitled,
"Darchei HaHoraah." I give a shiur on it before mincha on Shabbos. It's
quite fascinating and perhaps will help in your search for finding how
the system functions.

Elly Krimsky

Harry Maryles wrote:
>IIRC, R. Aaron Soloveichik held that anyone
>who Paskin's that killing Kinah on Shabbos is
>Chaiv should be put into Cherem.

I'll just point out that among those who pasken that it is assur to
kill a kinah on Shabbos (not that you are necessarily chayav chatas but
that it is assur) are the Pachad Yitzchak encyclopedia by R' Yitzchak
Lampronti, Shu"t Shevet HaKehasi vol. 3 no. 126, Piskei Teshuvos 314:6,
and R' Yosef Qafih on Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos ch. 11 n. 4.

Additionally, there were Geonim who held it was assur: Halachos Pesukos
136 and Shu"t Geonim Sha'arei Teshuvah 225.

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

**********************


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