Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 120

Wednesday, March 17 2004

• Re: Marc Shapiro's New Book
• why chabad is eruvless
• Re: Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Ikarim of Dwarves
• Re: Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Reading the Ketubah
• Re: Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: ikkarim of dwarves
• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Marc Shapiro's New Book
• RE: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Forward article re R M Shapiro's book
• Ikkarim of dwarves
• Re: Forward article re R M Shapiro's book
• Re: Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: omek pshoto shel mikra
• Re: Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Ikkarim
• Re: Marc Shapiro's New Book

On Tue, Mar 16, 2004 at 12:23:52PM -0500, Michael Frankel wrote:
: perhaps the moderator simply reports facts known to him by other means?

You seem to be unaware that the author stated his position on these
"pages". See v8n29 <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n029.shtml#03>
and onward.

So yes, I am basing my opinion not on hearsay about the book, but on
previous dialogue with the author on this subject and comments made
during our discussiions of mussar and of astrology.

(BTW, quite atypically, when discussing mussar he does adopt a halachic
process approach to wether mussar is hashkafically within the pale.)

-mi

<http://chabad.nu/images/Eruv.pdf>

[A 1 page fax. Teaser: "Someone who has made an Eruv and knows that
this will become public knowledge has created ... a grave stumbling
block. This is because it is impossible that the Eruv will not become
pasul one Shabbos." -mi]

From: "Gil Student" <gil@aishdas.org>
> On Areivim, I wrote:
>>Don't think of it as apikorsus. No one is claiming that a rishon
>>was an apikorus. The only claim is that the rishon had an
>>eccentric view on a particular issue that is no longer acceptable.
>>There were rishonim who had eccentric views on many different
>>topics that are no longer acceptable.
<snip>
> At the time, eccentric. "And on this, too, the halacha is not like
> him. One who says 'There is no mashiach' and holds like Rabbi Hillel is a
> kofer on the entire Torah that includes 'acharei rabim le-hatos'. Since
> the sages of Israel were more than he and disagreed with him, a person
> is not able to follow him. Similarly (al derech mashal), in the place
> of R' Eliezer they would chop wood [on Shabbos] to make logs in order
> to forge iron for the needs of a circumcision. After the halacha was
> determined by many of the sages of Israel against him, one who does so
> on Shabbos with witnesses and warning is to be stoned and cannot say
> "I hold like R' Eliezer.'" (Shu"t Chasam Sofer, Yoreh Deah 356).

I don't follow the analogy (unless the Hatham Sofer was a secret
Straussian). All apikorsus is false. Normally when we reject an opinion
based on aharei rabim l'hatos we think "eilu vaeilu divrei elokim hayyim,
v'halacha k'divrei X", i.e., we are explicitly not making a claim about
truth, we are making a claim about normative practice.

In this case you are claiming that the opinion the rishon held (and since
I don't subscribe to Areivim I don't know which opinion or which rishon)
would nowadays be considered apikorsus. Hence it is false. Hence (since
truth is not dependent on time) it was false when he held it.

Now in addition to the inherent problem of saying that a rishon was
wrong, the methodology stands out. The methodology of the Hatham Sofer
(aharei rabim) seems to permit you to deduce falsehood by majority vote.
In addition to being folly, that contradicts an explicit Hovoth HaLevavoth
about the limits of aharei rabim l'hatoth.

So I think you're playing with words here. You're not only claiming
<whoever> was eccentric, you're claiming he was wrong. And your proof
that he was wrong is not reasoned argument, but authority. And <whoever>
is also an authority.

David Riceman

> The issues of the decline of the generations and progressive revelation
> and progressive knowledge are not so easy to summarize . In particular
> was the decline in intellect, knowledge, spirituality, or clarity
> of Torah? Are we superior in knowledge because of the progessive
> clarification of previous generations and the revelations which result
> form being closer to Moshiach?

Thanks to RDE for marshalling all of these texts. EHS has an amazing set
of shiurim on halachic development , the nature of Chiddush, machlokes
and the relationship between Torah knowledge and technology that are very
applicable to this subject. I would also suggest that the Kidmas HaEmek
by the Netziv at the beginning of HaEmek Shealah also sheds much light
on the issue of halachic development. Query: We all know the Gemara
in Menachos where HaShem shows Moshe Rabbeinu the Beis Medrash of R
Akiva. Yet, we never learn either a have aminah or a halacha from that
Beis Medrash. Perhaps, as RHS pointed out, that's because we include even
those views which are never accepted as a Cheftza of Torah for purposes
of Mitzvas Talmud Torah.

[Email #2. -mi]

> Of the other 10, 9 appear, but in a negative form - there is no hiyyuv to
> believe (or know) them, but rather there is a problem in denying them -
> and this has very different implications.

> One, schar vaonesh, does not explicitly appear in either positive or
> negative form, although the concept of schar vaonesh 
> clearly appears.

fascinating article Kdarko BKodesh of RSG ZTL. As to the 10 which are
stated in a negative form, what is the problem that is generated if one
does not deny them ? Where is scar vonesh less than clearly stated in
the MT?

Steve Brizel
Zeliglaw@aol.com

In a message dated 03/16/2004 1:58:58 PM EST, gil@aishdas.org writes:
> Joel Rich wrote in response:
>>I think the underlying question is: Can Dogma be created after
>>the fact or must it have been universally accepted from Har Sinai?

> It is not a matter of creating dogma but of trying to determine what
> the dogma is. My entire thesis is based on an understanding that halacha
> develops and evolves over time.

So did Moshe Rabeinu not have a position on corporeality or did he have
one but others in his generation disagreed or did later generations
forget what he believed?

KT
Joel Rich

Micha Berger wrote:
>(BTW, quite atypically, when discussing mussar he does adopt a halachic
>process approach to wether mussar is hashkafically within the pale.)

Of relevance in understanding Prof Shapiro's approach to data is Prof 
Woolf's review of his last book

<http://www.azure.org.il-12-woolf.htm> <Review>

Shalom!! I have been asked to read the ketubah at the upcoming wedding
of a student of mine. I have been so invited and have done so before,
but for some reason, this time around I have a strong desire to read
it "accurately"! I realize that the word "accurately" itself may not
be accurately employed when discussing the vocalization of ketubah
Aramaic, but, nevertheless - - - does anyone know how I might obtain
a standard Ashkenazic ketubah text with vocalization, preferably done
by or in consultation with a reliable authority in Aramaic grammar?
Thanks in advance.

Rav Berachot,
Yehoshua Kahan

> Of relevance in understanding Prof Shapiro's approach to data is Prof 
> Woolf's review of his last book 
> 
> <http://www.azure.org.il-12-woolf.htm> <Review>

Correction: That URL is http://www.azure.org.il/12-woolf.htm 

Avi Burstein 

See also the Shach, Yoreh Deah 246:8 who *paskens* based on the concept
that today we are on a lower level than in the times of the Talmud.

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

Meir Shinnar wrote:
>I have recently come across by an interesting article
>by rav shlomo goren zt"l in machanaim (tishre 5727)
>where he makes the following observation...

Yes, Shapiro quotes him. But see the Yad Peshutah who demonstrates via
diagrams how the 13 ikkarim are mapped out in Hilchos Teshuvah.

>One thing does seem clear - even if one agrees with
>the abarbanel that one can find them, they do not play
>the same central role in the mishne torah that they do
>in perush hamishnayot as defining a body of beliefs.

About which the Abarbanel (Rosh Amanah, ch. 19) explained:

"But in his Mishneh Torah, the great Yad, it was his intention to clarify
the commandments in the Book of God's Torah only, as he explained in his
introduction to his commentary. It is thus clear from his words that
his primary intention in these 'Laws' was to clarify the commandments
as opposed to clarifying the principles which were already explained in
the proper place, the Commentary on the Mishnah, as I said."

Mechy Frankel wrote:
>As for RGS's remark that rishonic opinions might be
>eccentric but not heretical (which naturally I agree
>with), this is description but still not explanation. one
>asks on what basis are they not heretical if you
>simultaneously hold to the inviolability of the iqqorim?

[FWIW, I've read the book.]

Let me restate my view because I was previously imprecise. I am claiming
that the view is CURRENTLY heretical but was not at the time of its
writing and its author was not a heretic. This is essentially what the
Chasam Sofer wrote in his Shu"t, YD 356 (which I quoted in a post earlier
today) regarding R' Hillel in the Gemara.

The inviolability of the ikkarim presumes a consensus on them. At the time
of the rishonim there was not yet a consensus on certain ikkarim and there
is still not a consensus on all of the details of every ikkar. But some
ikkarim have achieved a consensus and are inviolable. Because I consider
the ikkarim to be an halachic issue, I believe that the halachic process
applies to them also. So, an ikkar that has been uncontested for centuries
is binding and inviolable. An ikkar of which a perat has been contested,
that perat is not inviolable.

David Riceman wrote:
>All apikorsus is false.  Normally when we reject an
>opinion based on aharei rabim l'hatos we think "eilu
>vaeilu divrei elokim hayyim, v'halacha k'divrei X", i.e.,
>we are explicitly not making a claim about truth, we
>are making a claim about normative practice.

First, not everything that is false is apikorsus. That something was
once not-apikorsus but now is apikorsus does not mean that it was once
true and it is now false. It was always false.

However, I am speaking of halachic ikkarim. The statement that "all
apikorsus is false" is correct if one defines apikorsus as it is defined
kelapei shemaya. We don't know what Hashem is thinking. We can only
use the data points available to us to estimate Divine truth. Yes, "all
apikorsus is false". But we don't necessarily know what is apikorsus. All
we can know is what is apikorsus* (the * representing an estimator). We
can state that based on the valid tools available to us, belief X is
apikorsus*. But, aside from polemic purposes (which are very important
in the real world), we cannot state with absolute certainty that belief
X is apikorsus.

The question of what is or is not apikorsus* is not a matter of truth or
falsehood but of issur ve-heter. That is why the Chasam Sofer's analogy
works (more or less).

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
>Of relevance in understanding Prof Shapiro's approach to 
>data is Prof Woolf's review of his last book 

The Legacy of Yehiel Jacob Weinberg reviewed by Jeffrey R. Woolf
http://www.azure.org.il/12-woolf.htm

Joel Rich wrote:
>So did Moshe Rabeinu not have a position on corporeality or 
>did he have one but others in his generation disagreed or did 
>later generations forget what he believed?

If only we knew what Moshe Rabbeinu's positions were!

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

> Meir Shinnar wrote:
>>I have recently come across by an interesting article
>>by rav shlomo goren zt"l in machanaim (tishre 5727)
>>where he makes the following observation...
RGS
> Yes, Shapiro quotes him. But see the Yad Peshutah who 
> demonstrates via diagrams how the 13 ikkarim
> are mapped out in Hilchos Teshuvah.

I am familiar with the Yad Pshuta. However, your post presumed a consensus
on the issue - and that Marc Schapiro raising this issue (that the Rambam
himself did not codify the ikkarim) was somehow "bizarre" - and RSG
shows otherwise, and that this position is not "bizarre". One can read
many things into the Mishne Tora - but one expects that major halachic
statements,that anyone who violates them becomes a kofer, to be explicit.

Furthermore, while the Yad Pshuta does map the general structure of
the ikkarim (as does RSG - with the exception of schar veonesh) - the
formulation is quite different - and therefore, the issue remains that
the ikkarim as formulated in the perush hamishnayot do not have halachic
force. In previous go rounds, some have argued the (IMHO bizarre)
position that people agree that the ikkarim are binding, just not the
ikkarim as stated by the rambam, but some ill defined restatement of
them - and this seems to be another version of this position.

>>One thing does seem clear - even if one agrees with
>>the abarbanel that one can find them, they do not play
>>the same central role in the mishne torah that they do
>>in perush hamishnayot as defining a body of beliefs.

> About which the Abarbanel (Rosh Amanah, ch. 19) explained:
> "But in his Mishneh Torah, the great Yad, it was his 
> intention to clarify the commandments in the
> Book of God's Torah only, as he explained in his introduction 
> to his commentary. It is thus clear
> from his words that his primary intention in these 'Laws' was 
> to clarify the commandments as opposed
> to clarifying the principles which were already explained in 
> the proper place, the Commentary on the
> Mishnah, as I said."

 the abarbanel states that the ikarim have only philosophical rather
 than halachic force - which is why they are not in the mishne torah -
 which is precisely against the position that you argue.

WRT to the chatam sofer - WADR, this position is not universally accepted,
precisely because the issue of apikorsus requires a judgement that the
statement is false, rather than that in a practical matter, one has
to pasken according to an opinion - and the blithe acceptance of major
amoraim, rishonim and acharonim as people who held beliefs that are so
wrong that today would be kfira is something that most people do not
accept. It is hard to find an earlier source than the chatam sofer,
or major poskim afterwards who agree, and that this is a da'at yachid
(a da'at yachid of the chatam sofer, but a da'at yachid, nevertheless.

I would argue that the chatam sofer's tshuva is polemical in intent,
as the early Reform tried to cite sources behind some of its hiddushim -
rather than representing a serious statement - and if not, it is such a
radical extension that requires far more proof.After all, it is quite easy
to say that elu veelu divre elokim hayim, but we pasken like bet hillel,
and therefore anyone today who holds of bet shammai is over a d'oraita.
It is quite another to say elu veelu, but the opinion of bet shammai is
so wrong that anyone who holds of it is a kofer... This position requires
a rejection of the entire notion of elu ve'elu. After all, even though
we don't pasken like bet shammai, studying the opinions of bet shammai is
considered talmud torah. If we reject the position of some amora or rishon
as now being kfira, as we shouldn't study kfira, we now can't study it.

You have never addressed the tshuvat haradbaz I cited - that would put
positions based on intellectual conclusions as inherently not covered
by kfira.

Meir Shinnar

R' Zev Sero wrote <<< But because the unanimous opinion of the amoraim
was that the halacha was like BH except in the 19 cases listed in gemara
Shabbat, the BS option has been closed off forever.>>> [where BH =
Beis Hillel, BS = Beis Shammai]

I think the logic is a little off. It was not neccessary for the Amoraim
to have had that opinion *unanimously*. It would have sufficed for a
majority of them to have held that way and to have so voted in the
Sanhedrin. (But they didn't atcually sit and vote, so perhaps that
makes the unanimity critical.) The *really* critical factor is that
those amoraim had semicha, and *that's* where they got the ability to
establish what the halacha would be.

RZS: <<< Similarly, because the rishonim unanimously rejected Rav
Hillel's opinion that 'ein lahem mashiach leyisrael', one who today
denies that an actual person will one day arise and take us out of galut
is an apikores.>>>

But the rishonim did *not* have semicha, and therefore did *not* have the
ability to establish the halacha in the manner that an earlier generation
did. Therefore, if someone today holds by this shita of Rav Hillel, I
believe that one cannot say that he categorically *is* an apikores. The
worst one might say about him is that *according* *to* the great majority
of rishonim he is an apikores. Not quite the same thing. He has on whom
to rely, even if you and I would never dream of relying on that shita.

The above paragraph goes directly against the Shu"t Chasam Sofer, Yoreh
Deah 356, quoted and translated by R' Gil Student. (I wrote it before I
saw RGS's post.) To be honest, I am not familiar with this "Rav Hillel".
Is his opposition from the post-semicha era (as RZS's post clearly states)
or might he have been out-voted by a real-semicha court (which is the
only way this Chasam Sofer makes sense to me)?

Akiva Miller

To clarify some points in my comments on this topic.

I objected to two statements: 1. "But now, in the post-chazal era,
we lack the ability or permission to come up with anything new." 2.
"Rabbi Akivah may have had a fuller and deeper understanding of Torah
than Moshe Rabbenu". These two statements are incorrect, in my opinion,
and somewhat inconsistent. I did not say that Moshe Rabbenu was taught
or knew all the possible applications of the principles that he learned
directly from Hashem. I question whether such an enormous achievement is
theoretically possible given a finite time to absorb such an immense mass
of material, and the intrinsic limitations of a human mind. Nor would
such an achievement be of any practical consequence. Moshe did not have
to know how to deal with electrical appliances on shabbat since there
were no such items in his time. I don't know if he was taught about
electricity as an academic subject, but I do assume that he would be
able to judge questions of electricity on shabbat once the physics of
the matter were fully explained to him. All that I am saying is that
his torah was not lacking - even if he did not know of all the possible
applications of his torah. Therefore, I find it rather astonishing to
see that some would claim a deeper knowledge of torah for Rebbe Akiva
(or the Ari). I am not saying that the derashot of R' Akiva that were not
taught by Moshe are, therefore, not torah. To the extent that any derashot
lead the student to a better understanding or reminder of Moshe's torah,
then that mnemonic or pedagogic device can also be termed torah. As
to the development of halacha through the ages, I do not believe that
Moshe knew whatever would become accepted and codified as halacha in
the future. The aggadic statement that Moshe was given all that future
students would later innovate, I take to mean that the principles which
formed the basis of any true innovation had already been given to Moshe.

Concerning later luminaries. It would be most presumptuous for me to
attempt to rank them according to abilities or knowledge of torah - and
that is certainly not my intention. I only disagreed with the blanket
statement that the generations post-Sinai or post-talmud were necessarily
regressive. I gave a few examples of luminaries whose knowledge (Vilna
Gaon -late18th century) or innovative skills (R' Chaim Soloveitchik-
late 19th, early 20th century) is generally judged not to be inferior to
all the luminaries who lived in the Middle Ages (Rishonim). I was not
making a direct comparison of Rabbenu Tam, universally acknowledged as
one of the very greatest of the Rishonim, and the Vilna Gaon. I was,
however, attempting to illustrate the degree of innovation that has
been introduced into halacha over the ages. I was also attempting
to distinguish between authority and scholarship. As an example of
how scholarship can occasionally trump authority, I cited the current
acceptance of the views of the Vilna Gaon and R' Shneur Zalman on when
bein ha'shemoshot starts, in opposition to the view of the mechaber of
the Shulchan Aruch which is based on the shita of Rabbenu Tam. I do not
see where in hilchot Mila (e.g. Y.D. 262 or 266) the Mechaber deviates
from what he paskened in O.H., hilchot hachnasat shabbat. If there is
a subtle difference, that would not still indicate a withdrawal of his
earlier view. Such an important halachic matter would require a very
clear renunciation of a prior Pesak if that earlier ruling were felt to
be in error.

Yitzchok Zlochower

Joelirich@aol.com wrote:
>I think the underlying question is: Can Dogma be created after the fact or
>must it have been universally accepted from Har Sinai?

Would appreciate any souces that state that principles of faith are
from Sinai. The only views I have found assert only that they are 1)
Interpretations of Torah verses 2) Interpretations of verses of Nach 3)
sevora 4) Kabbalistic sources which do not assert that the views are
from Sinai

Daniel Eidensohn

David Riceman wrote:
>I don't follow the analogy (unless the Hatham Sofer was a secret
>Straussian). All apikorsus is false. Normally when we reject an opinion
>based on aharei rabim l'hatos we think "eilu vaeilu divrei elokim hayyim,
>v'halacha k'divrei X", i.e., we are explicitly not making a claim about
>truth, we are making a claim about normative practice.

I think we have recycled this a few times. There are two major views of
eilu v'eilu. One states clearly that all views are true e.g., Introduction
of Yam Shel Shlomo to Baa Kamma. The alternative view of the Ran and
Chinuch and introduction to Igros Moshe indicate that it is a Divine
principle to minimize dispute but the view is not necessarily true.

>In this case you are claiming that the opinion the rishon held (and since
>I don't subscribe to Areivim I don't know which opinion or which rishon)
>would nowadays be considered apikorsus. Hence it is false. Hence (since
>truth is not dependent on time) it was false when he held it.

According to the kabbalistic view cited by the yam shel shlomo and
also found in medrash - it is possible that a view is not true for a
particular generation but it is for another. Truth here being understood
as Ratzon HaShem or that which is most appropriate for that generation's
spiritual development

>Now in addition to the inherent problem of saying that a rishon was
>wrong, the methodology stands out. The methodology of the Hatham Sofer
>(aharei rabim) seems to permit you to deduce falsehood by majority vote.
>In addition to being folly, that contradicts an explicit Hovoth HaLevavoth
>about the limits of aharei rabim l'hatoth.

The Ramban and others indicate that majority view determines truth and
falsehood - at least when dealing with Sanhedrin and possibly the gedolim
of any generation

Will be glad to provide citation for all the above but it should be in
the archives.

Daniel Eidensohn

>Now in addition to the inherent problem of saying that a rishon was
>wrong, the methodology stands out. The methodology of the Hatham Sofer
>(aharei rabim) seems to permit you to deduce falsehood by majority vote.
>In addition to being folly, that contradicts an explicit Hovoth HaLevavoth
>about the limits of aharei rabim l'hatoth.

What does the Chovas HaLevavos say? Where is it?

Daniel Eidensohn

> On Mon, Mar 08, 2004 at 07:23:52PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote:
>: How do you explain that if there is *no* Jewish notion of an objective
>: reading of a text (although we may disagree what that objective notion
>: is)?

RMB replied:
> I think RML was not so much denying the notion of an objective truth
> as much as denying the notion that objectivity necessitates uniqueness.

Call it what you want. My argument was that major commentaries do not accept 
the lack of uniqueness of interpretation.

Arie

> I think we have recycled this a few times. There are  two major views of
> eilu v'eilu. One states clearly that all views are true e.g.,
> Introduction of Yam Shel Shlomo to Baa  Kamma. The alternative view of
> the Ran and Chinuch and introduction to Igros Moshe indicate that it is
> a Divine principle to minimize dispute but the view is not necessarily
> true.
<snip>
> According to the kabbalistic view cited by the yam shel shlomo and also
> found in medrash - it is possible that a view is not true for a
> particular generation but it is for another.  Truth here being
> understood as Ratzon HaShem or that which is most appropriate for that
> generation's spiritual development

Are any of the sources you're citing dealing specifically with apikorsus?
This sounds to me more like an attempt to define eilu vaeilu in normal
halachic context.

David Riceman

From: "Gil Student" <gil@aishdas.org>
> However, I am speaking of halachic ikkarim. The statement that "all
> apikorsus is false" is correct if one defines apikorsus as it is
> defined kelapei shemaya. We don't know what Hashem is thinking. We
> can only use the data points available to us to estimate Divine truth.
> Yes, "all apikorsus is false". But we don't necessarily know what is
> apikorsus. All we can know is what is apikorsus* (the * representing an
> estimator). We can state that based on the valid tools available to us,
> belief X is apikorsus*. But, aside from polemic purposes (which are very
> important in the real world), we cannot state with absolute certainty
> that belief X is apikorsus.

> The question of what is or is not apikorsus* is not a matter of truth or
> falsehood but of issur ve-heter. That is why the Chasam Sofer's analogy
> works (more or less).

One thing lacking in this discussion is a discussion of how one decides
which falsehoods are so egregious that a belief in them constitutes
apikorsus. Some people, however, rejected the Rambam's position and
concluded that any truth of Torah is an ikkar. So let's now consider
an example.

All rishonim, as far as I know, agree that the moon is made of a substance
different from any sublunar material. The Rambam paskened this halacha
l'maaseh in Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah. I believe that this is false,
since I have hearsay evidence that astronauts brought rocks back from
the moon which were no different from sublunar rocks.

According to the opinion that any truth of Torah is an ikkar am I an
apikores? RGS says yes, since truth is no defence in a halachic process.
I say no, since I believe that truth is a defence in this context
(see Hovoth HaLevavoth, Introduction, citing "ki yipalei mimcha davar
lamishpat" [pp. 30-32 of the Feldheim edition]).

Incidentally I think RGS is avoiding my point. If he (RGS) believes that
an assertion is true, can he also believe that it's apikorsus? That
should be enough to drive him away from Judaism. So he himself must
believe that <whoever> is wrong. In that case he is abandoning his usual
deference to rishonim.

His (RGS's) response seems to be that he is incapable of determining
whether anything is true. First of all, that also should drive him away
from Judaism. Second, if he can't determine whether something is true,
and <whoever>, whose opinions he usually treats with great deference,
believes it, how can he even imagine that it's false? His post reads
more like a dichuy b'alma than a serious response.

David Riceman

May I suggest that the appropriate principle with which to measure and
size up social policy aspects of innovations in Hashakafa are not who
said it and where it was written for there is no end of weariying and
unproductive discussion on these topics. May I suggest that they should,
instead, be judged by their results. If lectures by authors who advocate
these ideas result in people abandanoning or diluting their observance, as
I has heard happened in several cases, they are suspect. Good things lead
to good results, increase in Yiras SHemaim and stronger observance. If
that is not what we see happen as a result of public discussion of
these issues, they may, in fact, not be good positions to take, ot at
the very least, they should remain as topics for scholarly discussion
and not public debate.

M. Levin

On Wed, Mar 17, 2004 at 09:31:27AM -0500, David Riceman wrote:
: Are any of the sources you're citing dealing specifically with apikorsus?
: This sounds to me more like an attempt to define eilu vaeilu in normal
: halachic context.

AFAIK, the word "apiqoreis" has two uses: name calling (which I won't
bother discussing) and halachic chalos.

Eilu va'eilu therefore should apply. This one could hold that such
a belief should both be presumed to be false and render someone in
a class where I can't drink his wine or wouldn't accept his geirus.
(not to mention issues of moridin ve'ein ma'alin.) While another
could not only pasqen that the belief does not render someone a formal
apiqoreis/min/kofeir and also believe it's true.

On Sun, Mar 14, 2004 at 12:16:34PM -0500, Jonathan Baker wrote:
: Even if he's holding of a more minimal set of ikarim, the whole idea
: of ikarei emunah is itself the minimal set that can support praxis, no?
: Rather than just a set of random beliefs that one *has* to hold.

Making a set of beliefs ikkar because they're necessary to justify
given behaviors is a necessary component of orthopraxy. For that matter,
there is nothing that I saw that would justify rejecting a totally
disjoint set of postulates that for some odd coincidence would
recommend the same praxis.

RJB:
:                          And even when they say that the 13 Principles
: were accepted by klal Yisrael, which version? Rambam in PhM, Rambam in
: MT, Ani Maamin, or Yigdal?

Depends on the poseiq and beis din involved. Like many halakhos, the
pesaq gets blurry at the edges.

As I've written here many times, for all the theorizing, you'd be hard
pressed to find me a beis din legiyur that doesn't require some belief
in the Rambam's ikkarim or a later version thereof before performing
geirus. That's the pesaq we hold by -- even if it's the pesaq of
acharonim, it's as binding as any other consensus of acharonim (and
as malleable).

The halachic process is not about the truth of the proposition, but
about the halachic status of someone who has such a belief.

As raised yesterday, one implies the other. So, looking at Hillel's or
a rishon's beliefs requires not only the usual issues of halachic pesaq,
but also wondering how we could be so sure of something people who were
closer to Sinai were not. I don't think the issue of the chalos sheim
of apiqoreis being more broadly applied than it once was is really the
center of this debate.

Thus the 2nd thread in this discussion, nisqatnu hadoros.

Abayei's answer to R' Papa (Berakhos 20a) fits that. With the generations
has been a decline in mesiras nefesh, while there has been an increase
in Torah known. In R Dr Haym Soloveitchik's framework, we could say that
textual knowledge has been on the rise, while mimetic knowledge has been
on the decline. And with the decline, so has the intimacy with HQBH that
one gets through cultural feel rather than intellectual knowledge. In
fact, R' Papa's speculation was looking across a "rupture" event at the
mimetics of the previous Torah culture. Also to be noted is that Abayei
praises the quality of R' Adda bar Ahavah's mistake as a proof; not a
claim that they were more right, but that even their mistakes reflected
a more passionate relationship with the Borei.

Have we increased in textual knowledge since Ravina veRav Ashi? I think
so. Look at the tools of lomdus now at our disposal that didn't exist
a couple of centuries ago. Today we have general theories about gavra
vs cheftzah, pe'ulah vs chalos, etc... that we don't find explicitly
amongst the rishonim. Someone who knows the rules of grammar knows things
that someone who uses the rules implicitely because "that sounds right"
does not. Greater formal knowledge, less of a feel for what is right. (To
shift to R' Moshe Koppel's model.)

I also doubt Moshe Rabbeinu knew the halachos of thermostats on Shabbos.
He knew everything possible for him to pasqen on such a metzi'us -- if
MRAH would ever have learned the details of such a metzi'us. For that
matter, future history played a major role in the evolution of pesaq
since Moshe. Did he know that we would some day hold like Beis Hillel
over Beis Shammai because of the middos of that future school? Or even
that two such different perspective of the same basic truth that Moshe
brought us would emerge because they failed to perform proper shimush?
Does not our knowing that from a Hillelian perspective one would hold X
whereas a Shamuti would hold Y constitute our knowing Torah that Moshe
Rabbeinu did not?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             A person must be very patient
micha@aishdas.org        even with himself.
http://www.aishdas.org         - attributed to R' Nachman of Breslov
Fax: (413) 403-9905      

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