Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 121

Wednesday, March 17 2004

• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• rishonim - psak
• talking during davening - taanis analogies
• Sara's Infertility
• Re: megillah in Yerushalayim
• RE: mishloach manos and matanos l'evyonim
• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Ikarim of dwarves
• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves
• Re: Ikkarim of dwarves
• Re: 4 amot/tfachim
• Re: Rambam, Torah and philosophy
• Re: why chabad is eruvless

RGStudent:  <<Mechy Frankel wrote:
>As for RGS's remark that rishonic opinions might be>eccentric but not 
>heretical (which naturally I agree>with), this is description but still 
>not explanation. one>asks on what basis are they not heretical if you 
>>simultaneously hold to the inviolability of the iqqorim?

<<RGS: [FWIW, I've read the book.] ..Let me restate my view because
I was previously imprecise. I am claiming that the view is CURRENTLY
heretical but was not at the time of its writing and its author was not
a heretic. This is essentially what the Chasam Sofer wrote in his Shu"t,
YD 356 (which I quoted in a post earlier today) regarding R' Hillel
in the Gemara. The inviolability of the ikkarim presumes a consensus
on them. At the time of the rishonim there was not yet a consensus
on certain ikkarim and there is still not a consensus on all of the
details of every ikkar. But some ikkarim have achieved a consensus and
are inviolable. Because I consider the ikkarim to be an halachic issue,
I believe that the halachic process applies to them also. So, an ikkar
that has been uncontested for centuries is binding and inviolable. An
ikkar of which a perat has been contested, that perat is not inviolable.>>

The mind boggles. visualize me writing this with slack jawed amazement,
and not a little admiration for the sheer creativty of all this. no one
reading this should miss the fact that he/she is hearing great chiddushim
and if one could imagine the analog of that midrosh in m'nochos where
moshe sits with utter confusion listening to toras moshe as expounded
by r. akivoh, one can always fantasize what rambam would have thought of
RGS's exposition of the state of his iqqorim. But first lemme see if i've
truly read this as RGS wrote it and of course i invite his correction
if i've mis-stated the view articulated in the above quoted paragraph.

it would seem there are now two classes (which still add to 13?) of
iqqorim, those which are presently inviolable (and pray tell, just which
ones do you think those are?), and those which are not inviolable (and of
course which ones are those?). But membership in these sub classes has
also not been a constant, and some of the iqqorim which are presently
inviolable, in the past rather belonged to the violable set (and which
are those?). furthermore there is yet a further taxonomy, involving
sub categories of iqqorim - p'rotim - and it may be that a p'rot of
an iqqor may be violable, while the iqqor as a whole is still in the
class of the invilolable iqqorim, or possibly a new class of principles
which are overall inviolable but which may have a p'rot or two still
violable. Whew. i would enjoy being the fly on the wall as you explained
how the rambam's 13 iqqorim morphed into this version, though amazingly
without changing the rambam's halochoh either. remember - rambam says
that anyone who even entertains a doubt about any of these (i.e. his,
and all 13 of them. with the meanings he attached to them at that time)
has no cheleq l'olom habboh. has that been jettisoned or simply replaced
by new content, and if so, just who did it?...etc.

The inherent flexibility - indeed malleability - of RGS's take
on the fundamental principles, leads me to think of it as a kinda
make-it-up-as-we-go-along theory of iqqorim, where "fundamental" seems
to acquired overtones and shift practically while watching, and seems to
me so far from rambam's formulation that one questions why it is still
associated with the rambam at all. and perhaps that is not a bad thing
since i have little doubt that there is any spiritual thinker of any
stature these days (or past days for that matter) who actually accepted
rambam's theory behind the iqqorim - the "mechanical" theory of the role
of correct beliefs in producing olom habboh, if indeed people were truly
aware of them. but that is a different topic for another day.

Mechy Frankel				W: (703) 845-2357
michael.frankel@osd.mil			H: (301) 593-3949
mfrankel@empc.org
michaeljfrankel@hotmail.com

Mechy Frankel wrote:
>...one can always fantasize what rambam would
>have thought of RGS's exposition of the state of
>his iqqorim...

Yes, halacha has developed in the past 800 years beyond what the Rambam
himself held.

>...the "mechanical" theory of the role of correct
>beliefs in producing olom habboh, if indeed people
>were truly aware of them...

I cannot say what will and what will not produce olam ha-ba. All I
am discussing is what places someone in the halachic category of a
heretic. That, I believe, follows the complex rules of the halachic
process.

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

David Riceman wrote:
>According to the opinion that any truth of Torah is an
>ikkar am I an apikores? RGS says yes, since truth is
>no defence in a halachic process.

According to them: 1) You are wrong and 2) You are an epikores.

>Incidentally I think RGS is avoiding my point.  If he
>(RGS) believes that an assertion is true, can he also
>believe that it's apikorsus?

My turn for an example. If someone believes that the truth is that G-d
does not ch"v exist, does that mean that he is not a kofer be-ikkar? Since
the ikkarim must be true, and he does not believe that the existence of
G-d is true, than belief in G-d cannot be an ikkar.

Then you can say that ikkarim must be objectively true, which G-d's
existence is. Anyone who does not believe in it is wrong and is kofer
be-ikkar. Well, who decides what is objective truth? Plenty of intelligent
people will tell you that G-d's existence is not objectively true. Would
you accept the statement that Zionism is objectively kefirah in the
Nevi'im and is therefore epikorsus? Certainly not, because you do not
consider it to be objectively true. What about kefirah in a literal
techiyas ha-meisim? Or that every letter in the Torah we now have was
given to Moshe at Sinai? You are basically setting up a system whereby
anyone can hold any belief and, since he considers it to be true, can
claim that he is not a kofer. Something tells me that the rabbanim who
put Spinoza in cherem did not agree with that.

I am simply saying that different poskim can arrive at different
conclusions of what is an ikkar but they only pasken for their generation
and not for previous generations. I am speaking of determining normative
practice, not of defining absolute truth.

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

> According to them: 1) You are wrong and 2) You are an epikores.

Take it a step further. If I put someone who held this position on a
rocket to the moon and he landed there would he automatially become
an epikores?

> My turn for an example. If someone believes that the truth is that G-d
> does not ch"v exist, does that mean that he is not a kofer be-ikkar? Since
> the ikkarim must be true, and he does not believe that the existence of
> G-d is true, than belief in G-d cannot be an ikkar.

I tried (I thought successfully) to avoid the word "believe", since the
Rambam held that ikkarim require rational examination and approval and
not merely volitional assent. If someone has, by rational examination,
convinced himself that God does not exist he would not be a heretic.
That at least is the psak of the Hazon Ish. The Rambam could not conceive
such a possibility since he believed that any rational examination would
necessary conclude that God does exist (compare Ibn Tufayl's book Hayy
Ibn Yaktzan). Nowadays, however, philosophy is less self assured. That,
I suspect, is what lies behind the psaq of the Hazon Ish.

> You are basically setting up a system whereby anyone can hold any belief
> and, since he considers it to be true, can claim that he is not a kofer.

Yes, if he can demonstrate it rationally. You have a postmodern faith
in the impossibility of rational discourse which I do not share. As far
as I know none of the composers of Ikkarim shared it either (as RMF has
pointed out in great detail).

> Something tells me that the rabbanim who
> put Spinoza in cherem did not agree with that.

As far as I know he was put in herem for his behavior, not for his opinions.

> I am speaking of determining
> normative practice, not of defining absolute truth.

No you are speaking of determining normative belief. We seem to have
a fundamental disagreement about what belief is, and I suspect most of
our argument stems from that yesod.

David Riceman

David Riceman wrote:
>If someone has, by rational examination,
>convinced himself that God does not exist
>he would not be a heretic.  That at least is
>the psak of the Hazon Ish.

Are you suggesting that the Hazon Ish would eat from the shechitah of
an atheist (who wears tefillin, keeps Shabbos, etc.)?

>You have a postmodern faith in the
>impossibility of rational discourse
>which I do not share.

That is a bit of an overly sarcastic way of putting it. But, yes, you
could say that my approach is postmodern.

Re Spinoza:
>As far as I know he was put in herem for his behavior,
>not for his opinions.

Pashtus is that he was excommunicated for teaching heresy.

>> I am speaking of determining normative practice, not
>>of defining absolute truth.

>No you are speaking of determining normative belief.

No, not determining normative belief. Defining which beliefs are
normative. In other words, who is "in" and whose shechitah is kosher
and who is "out" and whose shechitah is not kosher.

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

> The other statements about the alleged post-talmudic inability to
> originate halacha, or the alleged inferiority of any later authority 
> to the Rishonim is contradicted by the facts. The inferiority of
> later generations has to do with the lack of true semicha and 
> universal  acceptance by all the scattered communities of Jews. It is 
> a question of authority more than scholarship....

The authority of Taanaim vs Amoraim vs Rishonim vs Achronim and the
authority of SA is a very controversial topic. I doubt it has anything
to do with "true" semichah.
It seems that even R. Karo who received the renewed semicha from R.
Beirav did not use that fact to justify the SA and certainly not the
Ramah.

CI seems to equate authority in psak with greatness (as RDE quoted)
but this is not universally accepted. Other theories are offered by
others. Even CI seems to bring his theory for Amoraim vs Taanaim. It
is not clear he would give the same explanation as to why we don't
disagree with Rishonim. In fact some rishonim like Meiri seem to have
"less" authority and CI has a different theory for that not connectness
with greatness.

As indicated SA is clearly based on acceptance. In sefardi circles they
bring the 100 or more rabbis that upheld the SA. In ashkenazi circles
SA was accepted only with the addition of the nosei keilim. In there as
the example of shekia shows the acceptance was not absolute.

-- 
Prof. Eli Turkel,  turkel@post.tau.ac.il on 3/17/2004
Department of Mathematics, Tel Aviv University

Recently I was at a chassunoh and two people were talking. One was
telling the other about a new minyan he had recently visited in which
they were very much makpid about / nizhar against talking during
davening. He thought out loud that such may be not be advisable and
could be counterproductive to the desideratum of 'building a chevrah'.

I interjected and said that people can talk after davening - e.g. at
a kiddush (he later said that they had no kiddush, IIRC, but similar
talking can go on even without one). I continued on to say something
along the lines of that talking after davening is better, as the people
have had time to think about what they want to say - then something came
to me and I expressed the thought that talking ('shmoozing') after being
quiet through an extended davening is like eating after a taanis - it
is more geshmak (pleasurable) ! I am also reminded about the gemara re
Niddah - that a period of abstention can help prevent over indulgence
and familiarity, which can diminish pleasure and cause revulsion, and
keeps things enjoyable.

Additionally perhaps we can say that a 'taanis dibbur' of improper
talk during davening can be a zechus that helps us and our tefillos,
just like such a taanis at other times.

Comments ?

Mordechai

We had discussed Sara's infertility on Avodah (December 2001). I just
came back from our hospital's library where I came across the March 11th
issue of NATURE on the incredible finding of germline stem cells causing
growth of new eggs (even in the post-menopausal mouse, a well-accepted
animal model of human reproduction).

PEYRUSH RASHI: it's possible that the correct interpretation of Breishit
11:30 "akara, EIN LA VLAD" is not that she didn't have a uterus but that
she didn't have eggs. And "ne'ekar" doesn't mean prolapsed but but no
eggs. The "ness" would have been that somehow the germline stem cells
were stimulated, Sara's post-menopausal state was reversed and she could
give birth.

Josh

On Sun, Mar 14, 2004 at 04:08:58PM +0200, Eli Turkel wrote:
: I believe that different communities in Ramot still layn on different
: days and so this is controversial because of the gap. In Neve Yaakov
: until recently everyone layned on the 15th. I heard that this year some
: shuls insisted on also layning on the 14th.

Aren't there teshuvos from when Mei'ah She'arim was young?

-mi

Old Me: 
>>>(To tie two threads together) Although, since one shouldn't eat 
>>>before being mekayem the mitzva of matanos l'evyonim and mishloach 
>>>manos, one would probably want to do those mitzvos first thing after 
>>>getting home from shul.>>

RSG ask for the exact sources.

On page 334 of Halichos Shlomo volume 2, it says that "it is proper that
on Purim, one should not eat before one fulfills the mitzvos hayom."
In the D'var Halacha it adds "k'din kol hamitzvos she-ain le'echol
kodem kiyumin" (without quoting any sources). In the Orchos Halacha it
adds" RSZA used encourage the people of his house, immediately after
returning from shul on Purim morning, to send mishloach manos "l'kayim
mitzvos hayom." It brings from the sefer Mekor Chaim that it is a mitzva
"l'hashkim vl'hakdim mishloach manos v'matanos l'evyonim k'mo b'kol
mitzva d'zrizin makdimin."

The Orchos Halacha continues that RSZA would wash for a seudah, accept
guests and drink a little wine with them, and then go take a nap to be
mekayam "ad d'lo yada." Then, after chatzos, before washing for the main
seudah, RSZA would learn a little (like the Rama). (Once, as RSZA was
about to wash for the seudah he remembered that he hadn't learnt before
the seudah. He stopped what he was doing, said over the first mishna of
Bava Metzia, and then washed netilas yodayim.) During the seudah, RSZA
would begin learning hilchos Pesach with the guests and he would sing,
inter alia, "Shoshanos Yaakov" to the tune attributed to R' Yizchak Blazer
(anyone know which tune this is?)

KT
Aryeh

> Are you suggesting that the Hazon Ish would eat from the shechitah of
> an atheist (who wears tefillin, keeps Shabbos, etc.)?

Such a person would be a liar and a hypocrite ("asher kidshanu
b'mitzvosav"), and I find it hard to believe such a person exists.
The relevant din is moridin v'lo maalin. Do you believe that the Hazon
Ish practiced that on secular Jews?

> That is a bit of an overly sarcastic way of putting it. But, yes, you
> could say that my approach is postmodern.

No sarcasm intended, just description.

> Pashtus is that he was excommunicated for teaching heresy.

Source?

David Riceman

David Riceman wrote:
>I find it hard to believe such a person exists.

OK, maybe not an observant atheist. But how about an observant Jew
who does not believe in Moshiach? I cannot imagine that the Hazon Ish
would eat from such a person's shechitah and might not even allow him
to receive an aliyah to the Torah.

>The relevant din is moridin v'lo maalin.

I think the most relevant din is on the cheftza of the idea. Would the
Hazon Ish permit the teaching of the idea that there is no Moshiach from
a shul pulpit or a teacher's desk? I don't, because he considered it to
be kefirah, even if he felt that someone who held that idea nowadays is
anus and therefore patur from moridin velo ma'alin.

Re Spinoza:
>> Pashtus is that he was excommunicated for teaching
>> heresy.

>Source?

I don't know. This is such a davar yadu'a that I don't have a source,
although I am sure that some historian has come up with the idea that
there was really economic or sociological reasons behind the cherem. Do
you have any insight into the matter?

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

> 1. "But now, in the post-chazal era,
> we lack the ability or permission to come up with anything new

How do you understand the statements in BM that state "Rebi and Rav
Nasan-sof hamishna, Ravina and Rav Ashi-Sof Horaah"? RHS quoted RYBS
in the name of RMS to the effect that these are halachic statements
and limitations on the rights of post Talmudic authorities to argue on
statements contained within the Talmud, as opposed to the theoretical
right of an Amora to argue on a Tana ( See R Elchanan on Ksuvos in his
quote from R Chaim on "Rav Tana UPalig.")

Steve Brizel
Zeliglaw@aol.com

R' Gil Student wrote:
>I am simply saying that different poskim can arrive at different
>conclusions of what is an ikkar but they only pasken for their generation
>and not for previous generations. I am speaking of determining normative
>practice, not of defining absolute truth.

I think some support for R' Gil's position regarding the issue of
ikkarim and truth and the use of a halachic framework in defining the
parameters of the belief - comes from the extensive literature on this
point regarding the 8th principle. The issue is obvious very complex
and the other ikkarim might not fit into this framework.

[ R Z. Fendel's translation].

"The Eighth Principle - The Divine Origin of Torah... We shall believe
that the entire Torah which is found in our hands today, [is that] which
was given through Moshe Rabbeinu, [and that it] is entirely the word of
G-d.1 That is, that it came to Moshe entirely from the Almighty, be He
blessed, in a manner which we refer to, for lack of a better description,
as speech.2 Nor is it known [to us] precisely how this occurred, but
only that it was he, Moshe, ;'''31, who received it,3 and that he was
like a scribe, to whom it is dictated, while he transcribes all the
events that transpired the narratives and the commandments. Therefore
is he referred to as - the Scribe. 4 "

We know that this principle is not literally true because of the lack
of absolute identity of all scrolls. Yet the Rambam states clearly that
the Sefer Torah we have in our local shul is that which Moshe received.
There is an extensive discussion of this in connection to the last
mitzva in the Chinuch - writing a sefer Torah. There is also a very
well researched book "Fixing G-d's Torah by Prof Barry Levy. This is an
issue not only concerning belief but also if there is a missing letter
the Torah is posul and has no sanctity. Observe how the Ginas Veradim
deals with the issues.

Ginas Veradim (O.H. 2:6): According to the Torah one needs to follow
the majority in all matters - even though for a particular issue it is
possible and even likely that the result is not true. One follow the
majority even in such serious matters as marital issues which can cause
mamzerim....The Rambam's words concerning the valdity of a Sefer Torah
fit in well with this. Since we are trying to ascertain the correct text,
it is necessary to thoroughly examine all possible scrolls - and then
follow the majority. A Torah which has been corrected to follow this
majority view is considered as if it were the Torah which was given
on Sinai. Any deviation from this "majority" text is considered to be
completely invalid according to Torah law and it lacks the sanctity of
a Sefer Torah... The scribes from the previous generations worked hard
to determine an accurate text based on the principle of "majority"...
Therefore a Torah which has been corrected according to this established
text should not be modified. It should be viewed as the text that was
received from Sinai. Therefore any deviation from this standard accepted
text - even a small single letter - should not be used l'chatchila for
public reading. It should be viewed as an ordinary chumash as the Rambam
himself writes. However if it were used for public reading then one can
rely on those who are lenient and not require that the reading be done
over from the beginning...

Daniel Eidensohn

>Concerning later luminaries. It would be most presumptuous for me to
>attempt to rank them according to abilities or knowledge of torah - and
>that is certainly not my intention. I only disagreed with the blanket
>statement that the generations post-Sinai or post-talmud were necessarily
>regressive. I gave a few examples of luminaries whose knowledge (Vilna
>Gaon -late18th century) or innovative skills (R' Chaim Soloveitchik-
>late 19th, early 20th century) is generally judged not to be inferior to
>all the luminaries who lived in the Middle Ages (Rishonim). I was not

I know of no one (perhaps there are some eccentric Briskers out there,
but I have not met them) who regards RCS as on a par with the Rishonim
(ka'yadu'ah min ha'hasagah ha'rishonah shel HaCI al Chiddushei R' ChL).
Indeed, in the olam hayeshivos Reb Chaim is not even regarded as the
greatest of his generation - I have heard that accolade reserved for R'
Dovid Karliner.

YGB 

RJR:
> The gm in sotah 44. has a machloket Bet Hille and Bet Shanai concerning
> tumat hamet. It involves an antechamber/walkway . Rashi explains 4 amot is
> "chashiva makom latzma" and the 4 tefachim "havi makom chashuv bchol
> duchta". Wecan all think of examples of each measure being used but has
> anyone heard of a universal theory that explains why each would be
> appropriate in certain cases?

I never heard of one, but here's what I had thought when learning Mes Sukkah.

When dealing with area, 4 amos define a quantum of maqom. IOW, if two things
are within four amos, we consider them the as being in the same place. Thus
for carrying in a reshus harabim on Shabbos, within 4 amos doesn't count.
Similarly, for hefseq in tefillah, for maqom qavu'ah, and for the minimum
Sukkah.

However, when defining whether two things touch, the shi'ur is 4 tefachim.
Which came up WRT sechach.

Vertical height/depth comes in a minimum of 10 tefachim, though.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             A person must be very patient
micha@aishdas.org        even with himself.
http://www.aishdas.org         - attributed to R' Nachman of Breslov
Fax: (413) 403-9905

Shinnar, Meir wrote:
>> I would have said: If there seems to be a conflict.... we have to find the
>> flaw in our understanding which, once cleared up, shows the two are
>> identical. The flaw could be in our understanding of the relevent Torah or
>> in our understanding of philosophy.

> Yes. However, the Moreh is proceeding from the assumption that philosophy
> has proven certan things - and therefore the onus is to understand how torah
> can be reconciled....

I see this as putting the cart before the horse.

We are trying to describe how the Rambam decides whether it's the philosophy
or the Torah which is being misunderstood. That includes his means for
deciding whether philosophy has solidly concluded the point in question. He
therefore can't take the solidity of the proof as a given -- it's the thing
being decided!

>                         If the philosophy is in doubt (as in the issue of
> aristotelian eternity)...

I, OTOH, would say that the reason why the Rambam knew that the eternity of
matter was in doubt was because it contradicted mesorah. That's the point of
his second clause.

...
>> You're using the word "Torah" without being as specific as I would like to
>> be. Reinterpreting ma'aseh bereishis does not require reinterpreting the
>> TSBP on the subject as well.

> Let me define better reinterprete. The rambam would probably have argued
> that he was explicating the true meaning of the TSBP (and TSBK) - which has
> been misunderstood by the vast majority of his rabbinic colleagues - and
> rather than a reinterpretation, he was going back to original intent.

Which only works when there's room to do so. To insist it's always possible
goes beyond the Rambam's position.

...
>>> Secondly, our belief in the Incorporeality of God is not contrary to any
>>> of the fundamental principles of our religion: it is not contrary to the
>>> words of any prophet.

>> Reinterpretation works for TSBK, but not to actual tenets of religion.
>
> THis is actually the point of what I quoted from the ma'amar tchiyat
> hametim. It actually proves more of my point.

> First, note that this point is second - the issue of it being fundamental is
> raised only after the issue of it not being proven. If it was proven, it
> would be a different issue.

The Rambam says there is no call to search for a better understanding of the
Torah for two reasons. That means that either reason alone is sufficient. IOW,
he won't conduct such a search when the philosophical point isn't proven, nor
will he do so when it runs counter to TSBP.

This connection between questioning mesorah and fundamentals of the faith is
made at length in the haqdamah to PhM.

> There is, however, a different point. The question arises what the
> "fundamental principles of our religion". There is a fundamental belief that
> there is a concordance between those fundamental principles and
> philosophical truths. What those fundamental principles are is a
> different issue...

No, they are THE issue. As the Rambam writes, these include belief in the
statements made by the nevi'im and chachmei mesorah.



...
> Note that in the presence of a conflict between something viewed as actually
> proven and a "tenet of our religion" - rather than merely advocating
> therefore accepting the "tenet of our religion" as RMB would - would
> fundamentally change the nature of our religion - and that possibility is
> therefore not even raised in the MN, whose fundamental tenet is that such
> conflicts inherently cannot occur.

No, it means that philosophy, not just one's understanding of Torah, is open
to re-examination when there is an apparant conflict. (As above.)

It's your placement of other knowledge on more certain terms than Torah
knowledge, as though apparant conflict must always mean clarifying TSBP in new
ways, that gets me sufficiently motivated to repeatedly chase this thread.

Is there nothing you believe about the Torah so certainly that you simply just
await scientific theory to correct itself? Didn't you write many many digests
ago (back in the days of the flood, or at least the 1st flood debate) that
yetzi'as Mitzrayim is one such inviolate belief? If you could decide that
archeologist consensus is wrong because yetzi'as Mitzrayim had to occur, why
can't you believe the Rambam would say the same about Aristotilian philosophy?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             A person must be very patient
micha@aishdas.org        even with himself.
http://www.aishdas.org         - attributed to R' Nachman of Breslov
Fax: (413) 403-9905

R' Saul Newman sent us a link to http://chabad.nu/images/Eruv.pdf

Someone (other than RSN) [Twas me -mi] posted a "teaser" about the
argument made in that link, that <<< This is because it is impossible
that the Eruv will not become pasul one Shabbos.">>>

When I read that teaser, my immediate reaction was "That's ridiculous!
For a chashash that once in a while people will be ovayr on a Melacha
D'Rabanan b'Shogeg, they want to deny us the benefits of an eruv
entirely???"

But then I went to that link, and I believe the teaser was a
misrepresentation of the author's views. After the above quote, the
author wrote:

<<< It is the nature of people that once they become accustomed to
carrying on Shabbos, announcements and/or notifications that the Eruv
is pasul will not be heeded and hence stop them from carrying. On the
second Shabbos Chanukah 5764, the Eruv was down and we saw openly what
the Rebbe was talking about.>>>

Now that is a far more convincing argument, in my view. Accidents are
one thing, but if people will refuse to accept the reality of the Eruv
being pasul, that's a more serious problem.

In the past, I've noted that in my city, Elizabeth NJ, the Rav is careful
to have one Shabbos each year when the Eruv is down. (This year's was
this past Shabbos, in fact.) This is done so that people will grow up
knowing and beign aware of this melacha, and so that people will be
prepared for the occasional accidental p'sul, by having a Shabbos Key
of some sort or other.

But, sad to say, my experiences are slightly similar to those which
appear in that letter. Though I am not aware of anyone who actually
carry on the designated Shabbos, I *am* aware of many people who treat
the situation more cavalierly than I think they ought, by suggesting that
"the eruv's not *really* pasul, the Rav is just *saying* that it is." R'
Akiva Atwood's new sig line (see yesterday's Avodah) seems quite apt.

Akiva Miller

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