Avodah Mailing List

Volume 13 : Number 040

Friday, June 25 2004

• re: immersing electrical appliances in the mikva
• Re: Water Heter 2 see attachment
• bugs
• Re: bugs
• 9 chanios and probability
• Jericho
• Disputing Previous Generations and "HaTania"
• Re: 9 chanios and probability
• Re: 9 chanios and probability
• Re: Habitat for Humanity
• Totally Safe Pesak
• segulas where tefilla/tzedaka aren't "working"
• Re: New Water Psak
• Re: Totally Safe Pesak
• Re: Totally Safe Psak
• Re: Disputing earlier generations--Malacha L'Moshe MiSinai
• Re: VIDC - murder, drowning
• Re: Habitat for Humanity
• Re: immersing electrical appliances n the mikva
• Re: VIDC #12

R' Noach Witty quoted an unnamed rav, and Rabbi Howard Jachter quoted
Rav Yaakov Briesch and Rav Yitzchak Isaac Lieb, who say that electic
utensils are exempt from Tevilas Keilim because they are "mechubar
lekarka", which diqualifies them from being "keilim".

This logic made me think of another halacha which I've had difficulty
understanding.

Chazon Ish is said to have held that when we use an electrical device on
Shabbos, this causes the melacha of boneh. This was always difficult for
me to understand. I never viewed flicking a switch as an act of building
a new object.

Could it be that the Chazon Ish was working with this same concept of
"mechubar lekarka"? Could it be that his shita that "electricity is boneh"
applies to plugging in a lamp (because it is a home-improvement project),
but not to turning on a flashlight (which might be "tikun keli" but not
full-fledged binyan).

Akiva Miller

In connection to the "Water Heter from Minhagei Marash" that I sent- see
Shulchan Harav 32.17 Nekev Sheino Nireh Ela Neged Hashemesh Aino Nekev
and Chikrei Halachos attached.

[See <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/waterChikreiHalachos.jpg> -mi]

Aryeh

R' Gershon wrote that copepods were permitted if " their spontaneous
generation took place in a bor rather than in a be'er or a stream." He
meant that if their birth took place in a bor; this din has nothing to
do with the question of spontaneous generation but with the definition
of sheretz hamayim.

Melech

M. Press, Ph.D.
Professor of Psychology and Chair, Touro College
mpress@ix.netcom.com or melechp@touro.edu

On Thu, Jun 24, 2004 at 12:11:40AM -0400, mpress wrote:
: R' Gershon wrote that copepods were permitted if " their spontaneous
: generation took place in a bor rather than in
: a be'er or a stream." He meant that if their birth took place in a bor; this
: din has nothing to do with the question of spontaneous generation but with
: the definition of sheretz hamayim.

Actually, it's not where the sheretz was born, but where it became of
visible size.

As I've written dozens of times in the past, Rav Dovid Lifshitz
halachically equated spontaneous generation with the maggot that became
visible size because of the combination of birth from a microscopic egg
that lacks halachic mamashus and the meat it ate since, which does have
mamashus. The only goreim relevent to halakhah is the meat.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "The most prevalent illness of our generation is
micha@aishdas.org        excessive anxiety....  Emunah decreases anxiety:
http://www.aishdas.org   'The Almighty is my source of salvation;  I will
Fax: (413) 403-9905      trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya

My father asked me last night:

Why is it that in the case of 9 chanios that sell kosher and one that
sells tarfus, we use the quantity of stores to determine the relevent
odds? What if one were a supermarket, and its sales exceeded the other
eight combined?

How does one construct rov? How do you determine
(1) the units to be measured;
(2) the population over which they're counted?

IOW, why stores, and why the stores in that city rather than looking
at the county (or, the ir and all kerachim that rely on its marketplace
[as implied in the opening of Mes Megillah])?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes
micha@aishdas.org        exactly the right measure of himself,  and
http://www.aishdas.org   holds a just balance between what he can
Fax: (413) 403-9905      acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham

On Fri, Jun 18, 2004 at 09:54:03AM -0400, Stein, Aryeh wrote:
: Q - since a Jew is forbidden to live in Yericho and any city by the name
: of Yericho, can a frum Jew live in Jericho, New York?

: A - Jericho is not the same as Yericho - just because our bibles translate
: Yericho as Jericho, the isur only applies to cities with the name of
: "Yericho" - not "Jericho."

But what if there were a havarah in which a yud makes a /dj/ and a chaf
goes /k/ (the latter is no stretch)? Would it then make a difference?
Do we care if there exists such a havarah, or how the person in question
speaks?

For that matter, why is the issue phonetic rather than historical?
Jericho NY was named for Yerhicho, it's what the founders had in mind
when they chose the name. I would have thought that a city founded to
memorialize Yericho is a bigger problem than some imaginary Mayan city
"Ierixo".

Frankly, I would have thought the issur only included cities named Yericho
that the founders attempted to locate at Yericho, whether successfully
or off by a few miles.

I assume naming Mitzpei Yericho is not a problem because of the added
name. Even though it is also named for the biblical Yericho.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure.
micha@aishdas.org        It preserves health, promotes convalescence,
http://www.aishdas.org   and helps us cope with adversity.
Fax: (413) 403-9905         - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei"

From: "" <hlampel@thejnet.com>
> FWIW here are some factoids compliments of CD-ROM searches:
> HaT'nan or V'HaT'nan appears in the Bavli 203 times.
> HaTania or V'Hatania: 178 times.
> Total of above: 382 times.

> Of those 382, Rashi explains, as "b'nichusa,": tania--44 times, hat'nan--5
> times (Yuma 69b, Hullin 85b and 136b, and Temura 10b twice.)

What about "VeHaTania" and "VeHaTenan" in both full and contraction
forms: VHTNIA, VHA TNIA, VHTNN, VHA TNN?

They seem to be much more common than once every 10-15 blatt.

From: "Micha Berger" <micha@aishdas.org>
> Why is it that in the case of 9 chanios that sell kosher and one that
> sells tarfus, we use the quantity of stores to determine the relevent
> odds? What if one were a supermarket, and its sales exceeded the other
> eight combined?

When I learned the sugya many years ago we decided that it was
a psychological measure. Your chance of entering a particular store
(using Laplace's Law of Indifference) is inversely proportional to the
number of stores, not the number of pieces of meat.

If you generally use one store there is presumably a hazakah, and the
halacha of 9 chanuyos doesn't apply.

If you actually randomize another way (say by throwing dice before
deciding which store to use) with a known but non-uniforem probability
I don't know what we would say. But very few people do that.

David Riceman

In a message dated 6/24/2004 5:58:47 AM EDT, micha@aishdas.org writes:
> Why is it that in the case of 9 chanios that sell kosher and one that
> sells tarfus, we use the quantity of stores to determine the relevent
> odds? What if one were a supermarket, and its sales exceeded the other
> eight combined?

> How does one construct rov? How do you determine
> (1) the units to be measured;
> (2) the population over which they're counted?

BINGO! I've tentatively decided that this is the real issue concerning
the differentiation of Ruba dita kamman vs. rubba dleta. I'm in the
office now but you might start with the gemora in Baba Batra 23b (IIRC)
with the pigeons found between the dovecotes where the gemora discusses
rov and karov as well as positing the case where others don't come to
that city(bein harim). The commentaries have a field day on this (the
issue also moves into eglah arufa measuring-what cities do you look at ,
does karov override rov etc-see Rambam Hilchot rotzeach.)

Lmaaseh I'm still looking for a clear definition but my guess is it's
beinei hadayan.

KT
Joel Rich

WRT to Habitat for Humanity, HM asked: 
> Even if the work is so noble as to provide
>homes for the homeless, can one work for a Christian organiztion, one
>of whose primary goals is to sanctify the name of their god, even if
>they do not do so in their day to day activity?

How is that fundamentally different than working for a Christian hospital,
which is avowedly Christian, and whose purpose is to further Christianity
by works, or paying money to a Christian college (eg Loyola) whose purpose
is to spread Christianity, etc? Both of these are fairly widely accepted
(eg, Rav Dr Twersky).

Meir Shinnar

From: Kenneth G Miller <kennethgmiller@juno.com>
>Namely: Suppose the Sanhedrin paskens that a certain thing is allowed,
>and people act on that psak (which is most definitely a real psak,
>regardless of what one might say about our current "no real semicha"
>situation). If the Sanhedrin later finds their psak to be in error,
>they have to bring a korban for that.

>Someone brought a source from Maseches Horios which pointed out that
>this korban is m'chaper not only for the Sanhedrin's error, but it is
>also m'chaper for the people's action.

>To me, this indicated that despite everything one might say, NO psak
>an EVER offer one a "totally safe position".   ...
>.. My only point is that even in such cases,[of a pesak] there *is* an
>element of risk, despite the fact that halacha does not require us to
>worry about that risk.

I assume that the "risk" referred to is that of inadvertently committing a
"transgression" or not performing a mitzvah.

This touches upon an area of interest to me: whether on an absolute level
there is a perfect "Platonic" Halacha that we may attempt to approximate,
or conversely whether there is on such absolute level a continuum of
possible halachic choices that are all equally valid.

Let share some thoughts about the above, although I have not yet done
the necessary review of sources including of Horayot but only looked
into the Rambam Sefer Korbanot, Hilchot Seggagot, beginning at chapter
13 and considered the lecture by Prof. Halabertal. So the following is
really my tentative beginning at looking into the issues in the hope of
getting some guidance from the any subsequent discussion.

As I mentioned in a previous posting, there is an excellent
(although I have some reservations) lecture by Prof. Moshe
Halbertal and a written version of this is found at:
<http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/Gruss/halbert.html>.

IIUC, Prof. Halbertal categorizes the major views of the Rishonim as
to the origin of machloket as being
(1) That of the Geonim and of the Rabad Baal Sefer Haquabala -- that
all halachot were given in detail at Sinai and many were forgotten over
time. We attempt to reconstruct them by using halachik methodology.
(2) That of the Rambam: Only the klallim of the various areas halachot
were given at Sinai. By definition there are no disputes regarding the
contents of such klallim. We use logic to extrapolate from those klallim.
The klallim are absolute and logic is absolute; so if we follow correct
logic (and if we have correct knowledge of the particular facts involved)
then we should always reach a correct solution. An incorrect solution
(again assuming we correctly know the facts) derives from faulty
logic.
(3) The view of the Ramban and his talmidim (especially the Ritvah):
There is a range of possible halachic answers to a problem; they are all
"correct" on an absolute basis, however poskim when rendering decisions
select the correct halacha through the "constitutive" powers that they
are given in the halachic system.

As to the last view cited by Moshe Halbertal how can a Sanhedrin ever be
"wrong"?
Perhaps the facts were not correctly known (all opinions); or perhaps
a flaw was found in the reasoning of the decision (first two opinions)
or perhaps a tradition was found that contradicted the decision (first
opinion). Perhaps the Sanhedrin for various reasons including more
pragmatic reasons decided to change its choice within their halachic
options (and maybe such change must be retroactive and hence the need
for a korban).

The first two views would have as an underlying assumption that there was
an absolute halacha, notwithstanding that we are permitted and usually
required to rely upon pesak.

So according to those two views, I would reach a (unsettling for me)
conclusion that pesak would be reliable on a practical basis and perhaps
even obligatory (if within normal halachic conventions) but still not
"correct" on an absolute basis. I would appreciate any comments.

KT
Eliyahu

Good afternoon,
Recently a citywide program was announced here in Chicago, to organize
40 women (people?) who are mafrishos challa, to do so for the refuah
shleima of someone here who is r'l ill. This segula was described as
"baduk u'menuseh", and suggested in the name of a Dayan Fisher z'l.
As I understand it, by performing this segula with for the sake of a
particular objective, that objective will be attained.

We have been davening for a refuah shleima; whole tehillim sessions
by the community together have been for it. We have been learning for
a refuah shleima; shiurim, days of learning at kollelim and yeshivos
have been dedicated to it. And we (the family mostly) have been giving;
much tzedaka has been given l'shem this refuha shleima. As far as I know,
the physical situation has r'l remained unchanged.

Don't misunderstand me; if something can help this sick person, I am all
for it. But I am confused by this use of a segula. Is a segula supposed
to work where the learning, davening, tzedaka, etc. do not appear to be?
Is this  a "what could it hurt" kind of thing?

Perhaps one of you has some thoughts on how to understand this.
thanks
elly

--
Elly Bachrach
Engineering Intent http://www.EngineeringIntent.com
mailto:EBachrach@EngineeringIntent.com

So assuming that one accepts this psak and, on examination, sees (or
thinks he sees) copepods zipping around in his tap water, I'm curious
about what exactly might be assur. Anything where you might swallow the
beriah, clearly. But what about these:

 - If you boil an egg (in its shell) in this water, is the egg kosher? Is
the pan still kosher?

 - Can you use the water to wash your dishes?

 - Can you use the water for netilat yadim?

Daniel

From: "Allen Gerstl" <acgerstl@hotmail.com>
> This touches upon an area of interest to me: whether on an absolute level
> there is a perfect "Platonic" Halacha that we may attempt to approximate,
> or conversely whether there is on such absolute level a continuum of
> possible halachic choices that are all equally valid.

See Drashoth HaRan #7 (esp. pp. 212-214 in Professor Feldman's edition).

David Riceman

On Wed, 23 Jun 2004, Akiva Miller wrote: <kennethgmiller@juno.com>
> Someone brought a source from Maseches Horios which pointed out that
> this korban is m'chaper not only for the Sanhedrin's error, but it is
> also m'chaper for the people's action.

> To me, this indicated that despite everything one might say, NO psak
> can EVER offer one a "totally safe position".

This brings to mind the Brisker Rov's vort on why Ploni Almoni did
not want to marry Ruth, despite the Sanhedrin's p'sak of "Moabi v'lo
Moabiss." I.e., he feared that a later Bes Din may change the halacha,
and subject his offspring to the status of mamzerus. Another scholar
adds that even though he may have accepted Boaz's reply that this was
irreversible--since it was not derived through drash, but was a Halachah
L'Moshe MiSinai--he still feared that later generations may forget this
fact, think it was drash-generated, and reverse it. Indeed, generations
later, Dovid HaMelech's status was contested for this very reason.

Zvi Lampel

On Sun, Jun 20, 2004 at 12:41:18AM -0400, hlampel@thejnet.com wrote:
:>: ...Rambam's ... definition of Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai ... is
:>: simply a halachah whose sole source is Hashem via Moshe Rabbeynu, and for
:>: which no real indication for itself has been planted into the p'sukim to
:>: be seen through drash. (Actually, I don't know of any other definition,
:> ...
: The Rambam's definition is solidly based on the Gemora. When the Gemora
: (Sukkah 5b-6a) refers to the halachic units of meaurements (such as
: k'zayis, etc.) as Halacha L'MOsheh MiSinai, the Gemora objects, "How
: can you say they are HLMS, when the measurements are said to be alluded
: to in a posuk?" The answer is, they are indeed HLMS, [and they actually
: have no bona fide indication in the Torah,] and that posuk is merely an
: device."

If HLM means that the maqor exists in principle, but it known to be lost
(as per my understanding of the Malbim), the gemara's question still
makes sense. How can you say they are HLM when we measurements' allusion
in the pasuq is known?

Me:
: > In his introduction to Vayikra, the Malbim says there are 613 rules of
: > derashah and sevarah by which any part of TSBP could be reconstructed
: > if lost. He doesn't write what to do if the rules themselves -- which
: > are part of TSBP afterall -- are lost.

RZL cont.:
: 1. The Malbim considers his rules to be part and parcel of the grammatical
: and syntaxical nature of Lashon HaKadosh, not hermenutical rules handed
: down MiSinai....

I don't see the relevence to our point. Regardless of the type of rule,
there is a set of rules by which ALL of Torah can be reconstructed
from the text. Then how could he understand HLM as postulates which had
to be given directly at Sinai alongside -- and with no attachment to --
the text?

In any case, the Malbim calls them rules of derashah and sevarah. I do not
know something that would be called a rule of "derashah", particularly
alongside the word "sevarah" other than in the R' Yishma'el's 13 middos
sense.

: created in the generation of Rabbi Akiva by Shimon HaAmsuni, based upon
: his own analysis, trying to discover sources in the Written Torah for
: extant oral explanatory details of mitzvos, and then using that rule
: to generate new information...

ShM was darshening the word "es". That's not a new rule, it's an
application of the concept of ribui. Given the assumption that biblical
Hebrew would allow the inclusion of an grammatical object in a sentence
without the word "es". Then, even if the use of the word is the norm,
each use would be an "es".

Which is why it was bedavka in R' Aqiva's beis medrash, not R' Yishma'el's.

Which brings me to the next point.

: 2. True, the Malbim doesn't deal with the iisue of what to do if the rules
: provided at Sinai themselves are lost. However, we do know that--just
: as with some details of halachos l'maaseh--details of the mechanics of
: the 13 hermenutical laws did come under dispute...

Much more than details. The difference between R' Yishma'el's rules
related to kelal uperat and R' Aqiva's ribui umi'ut are pretty
significant. Kelal uperat has to do with the meaning of phrases, ribui
umi'ut has to do with the inclusion of particular words (eg: akh, raq)
in how the phrase is written. Semantics vs syntax.

See <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol12/v12n047.shtml#24> for earlier
ramblings on the subject.

Perhaps this is why pisqei halakhah were no longer being founded on new
derashos by their day.

:> ... But the Malbim doesn't seem to exclude HLM.

: Sorry, but I don't understand what you mean by this.

When he speaks of reproducing all of Torah from the text of chumash,
he doesn't say "all of halakhah except HLM". It would seem that even
HLM he believes can be reproduced from the text.

: Despite my earlier post, RSRH does speak more on the matter. In Collective
: Writings, Volume V (Origin of The Oral Law), p. 40, he writes:

: "These midos ... were placed by the Lawgiver Himself in the written
: expression of His Law in order to refer the student to the oral complement
: of the Law. At the same time they wewre intended as a tool to use in
: the correction, examination and restoration of any tradition that might
: become vague, dubious or incomplete due its having fallen into oblivion."

Again, if any tradition can be examined or restored, the Rambam's
notion of HLM as traditions divorced entirely from any hint in the text
doesn't hold.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             A person must be very patient
micha@aishdas.org        even with himself.
http://www.aishdas.org         - attributed to R' Nachman of Breslov
Fax: (413) 403-9905      

RYGB:
: We know that murder is one of the things that are not overriden by
: Pikuach Nefesh, because of the sevara of Mai Chazis: What did you see to
: lead you to conclude that your blood is redder than your friend's blood
: (Sanhedrin 74a et al)? On the other hand, when two people are drowning the
: Gemara in Horios (13a) suggests a hierarchy of who to save first. Thus,
: we see that in the Gemara in Horios we do reckon whose blood is redder;
: why, then, in the case of murder do we reject that assessment?

A number of the chevrah suggested variants of the idea that one is an
assessment of who to kill, the other of who to save.

I'm not sure why this is relevent. Assessing the relative values of lives
is involved in either case. If mai chazis implies that such assessment
is impossible, then how can it be employed to decide who to save?

Perhaps it's not an issue of saving lives, but of kavod. Perhaps the
values of the lives are equal, and therefore one is only exploring who
the kavod of getting your attention goes to.

I'm reminded of something in quantum mechanics called renormalization.
Some QM formulas involve infinities. Rather than worry about them,
physicists simply cancel the infinity from either side of the equation
(even though that's basically dividing both sides by 0 and therefore
mathemeticians would laugh at the idea) and proceed with what's left. For
some reason, it works.

Human life is of infinite value. Therefore, from a straight mathematical
point of view, there can't be more worth to this infinity over that
infinity. Which is why a few seconds of life of someone who will never
regain consciousness is no less valuable than the lives of the people
who could otherwise recieve his organs.

However, once we cancel the infinities, the far more finite issue of
kavod comes to play.

To answer the original VIDC:

I didn't think mai chazis was an actual kelal in pesaq. The three issurim
yeihareig ve'al ya'avor are YVY for their own reasons. The Maharal
(Derech Hachaim 1:2) associates them with the amudei olam. There is no
point to choosing life over the very foundations of life. But whatever
the sevarah...

Mai chazis is employed when a person is asked to choose between himself
and another, not between two others. It's not being treated as a rule
of triage at all.

Rather, it explains why retzichah is worse than misah, even though the
beri'ah loses one life either way. It's a split between doer and victim,
oneself, and choosing among others.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Here is the test to find whether your mission
micha@aishdas.org        on Earth is finished:
http://www.aishdas.org   if you're alive, it isn't.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Richard Bach

"Shinnar, Meir" <Meir.Shinnar@rwjuh.edu> wrote:
> WRT to Habitat for Humanity, HM asked: 
>> Even if the work is so noble as to provide
>>homes for the homeless, can one work for a Christian organization, one
> >of whose primary goals is to sanctify the name of their god, even if
> >they do not do so in their day to day activity?

> How is that fundamentally different than working for a Christian hospital,
> which is avowedly Christian, and whose purpose is to further Christianity
> by works, or paying money to a Christian college (eg Loyola) whose purpose
> is to spread Christianity, etc? Both of these are fairly widely accepted
> (eg, Rav Dr Twersky).

True. That is a good question. I can't think of any answer that would
make one scenario permissible and the other not. Perhaps if we knew
the basis for permitting one to work in and/or receive treatment in a
hospital we could determine if Habitat is permissible or not.

For example if the reason Christ Hospital here in Chicago is permitted
is because of Pikuach Nefesh considerations, then perhaps Habitat
would not qualify for dispensation WRT working there. Hospitals are
places we all need to be able to access. Perhaps they are treated
differently then a project that provides housing for non-Jews. Perhaps
Parnassa considerations such as availability of a position for a
Jewish doctor looking for a job in such a Hospital overrides the
accompanying aggrandizement of their god that comes with a successful
such hospitals. That would not be the case at Habitat, which is an all
volunteer organization, IIUC.

Does anyone know of any Teshuvos WRT working at Christian sponsored
hospitals? It would be interesting to see the particulars.

HM

On Mon, Jun 21, 2004 at 03:17:00PM +1200, jcoh003@ec.auckland.ac.nz wrote:
: Interesting... according to my ecollection, my LOR said that according
: to those who hold that it is required, the keli should be taken apart
: past the point that the average consumer would take it apart, and then
: put back together again by a Jew, ie it loses the status of keli, and
: regains it in the custody of a Jew...

A crockpot or urn that is dismantled still has a beis qibul. How does
it cease being a keli?

On Mon, Jun 21, 2004 at 11:02:18PM -0500, Elly Bachrach wrote:
: by the way, this tube creates some questions regarding preparing this
: pot for shabbos, as if it fills (even partially) with water when you fill
: the pot, that water will not have been heated for shabbos, and could be
: a problem if mixed with the heated water.

Why isn't it all one keli? I would have though the problem of mixing
the water in the spout with that in the rest of the vessel is identical
to worrying about water from the top, further from the element, being
heated by that from the bottom.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             You will never "find" time for anything.
micha@aishdas.org        If you want time, you must make it.
http://www.aishdas.org                     - Charles Buxton
Fax: (413) 403-9905      

At 12:05 AM 6/20/2004, [RGS] wrote:
>1. Reb Elchanan in the beginning of Pesachim suggests that the hierarchy
>in Horiyos is on mi-safek. Therefore, we only follow it passively (shev
>ve-al ta'aseh) and not actively.

What does passively mean? Aren't we talking about doing a ma'aseh
hatzalah b'yadayim?

>2. Alternately, you can say that the hierarchy is only a list of
>priorities in order to avoid chaos. If there is no list of priorities
>then there would be no way of determining how to act and everyone would
>have to make it up on their own. This list gives us a way to deal with
>that absence of guidelines.

Could be, but isn't the ultimate yesod of the list a hierarchy of
"sumak tfei?"

>3. Or, you can say that "mai chazis" is not meant literally but is an
>explanation of why we do not say "ve-chai bahem" regarding retzichah.
>Since there is pikuach nefesh either way, "ve-chai bahem" does not
>apply. But there is no attempt to determine who is more worthy of living.

Like that, but then what is the deeper yesod of which mai chazis is a
superficial formulation?

[Email #2. -mi]

At 03:06 AM 6/21/2004, [RnTK] wrote:
>If B--There is always a rule about which bracha to make first, which shoe
>to put on first, and so on--so of course there has to be a "which person
>to save first" rule. The alternative would be a distasteful randomness,
>which seems quite antithetical to Torah. This of course is a meta-halachic
>rather than a halachic observation.

What's so bad about randomness? Since the list in Horios is very lo 
l'ma'aseh, mah ho'ilu Chachomim anyway?

YGB 

*********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]