Avodah Mailing List

Volume 13 : Number 049

Sunday, July 18 2004

• Pronounciation of word in parshas Balak
• Maariv at Mincha minyan
• Using Old Tests
• Re: progress - relationship between Jewish and worldly ideas
• Popular Animism
• Tfillin not worn
• Re: progress - relationship between Jewish and worldly ideas
• Re: R. Chaim Eisen article follow-up
• Re: Using Old Tests
• Re: Singing the Zemer 'Bar Yocha'i in Shul
• Re: Gestation of wolf,lion,bear,leapord,elephant,and monkey
• Re: Rov -Chazakah
• Re: Tanur shel achnai - how could a bat kol not be emes
• Re: Divine knowledge of future righteousness
• Re: Evolution
• Re: Evolution
• Re: Avodah Zara L'Maaseh
• Re: Divine knowledge of future righteousness

A few weeks ago we had an interesting debate in shul. When the bal koreh
got to Bamidbar 23:18, the baal Koreh read the sixth word of the pasuk
"ushama". One gabbai (using a Hertz chumash) corrected him as he saw the
word ushma. I was using an ARt Scroll Stone chumash and saw 'ushama' with
a chataf patach. Ultimately the bal koreh read it both ways. Afterwards
an unscientific survey of different chumashim found both girsa'ot.

I believe ushama is past and ushma is tzivuy (or future). One Hebrew
linguist pointed out that ushma makes more sense because two words before
we find 'kum' which is also tzivuy.

Anyone have any he'aros on the matter?

Elly Krimsky

Is anyone aware of any sh"ut or verbal advice on the following situation:

One has davened mincha before mincha ketana and knows they will not
be able to get a maariv minyan btibbur after plag. There is however a
mincha minyan davening btzibbur after plag before shkia.

Relative value to an individual of davening maariv at the same time that
the tzibbur is davening mincha so that their amidah's coincide (does the
individual get credit for tfilla btzibbur) versus davening in complete
ychidut after tzeit?

KT
Joel Rich

A long time ago (June 2003 in a thread titled "Yeshiva ( YU ) cheating"),
we discussed on Areivim whether it is permissible or moral for a student
to (legally) acquire a teacher's old tests. I argued that it is entirely
fine while others considered it cheating. R' Yisroel Belsky offers the
following pesak on the subject (I believe his contribution is oral and
a student writes it up):

"It is hard for me to say that it's ossur (prohibited) or that it's
immoral. It's a higher level of morality not to do it, and study. But
it's definitely not something that you could even taint by saying it's
ossur or by saying it's immoral, because it does lead to a good knowledge
of the material. It provides a pretty decent review... A baal nefesh
wouldn't want to look at that test.

"Q: Let's say you really did study, you know the material, and you just
want to use the test only as a review. Should a baal nefesh refuse doing
even that?

"A: No. That's mutar (permissible) even for a baal nefesh."

<http://www.torah.org/learning/honesty/question86.html>

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

R' David Riceman wrote:
> Unfortunately I couldn't find the (very explicit) source I thought I
> remembered.  Probably it's just a delusion.  But see the introduction to the
> fancy new edition of Igros HaRamChal UBnei Doro (called Magid MeReishith
> Aharith) section 2 (Giluy Hamagid) especially pp.15-19.

Thanks for the source. I contacted Prof. Tamar Ross who recommended a book
"Kol Godol" by Prof Silman published by Magnes Press - which is devoted to
this topic.

> RDE wrote:
> <<This is not the modern concept of progress. R' Avraham ben HaRambam
> was just indicating that the level of knowledge can fluctuate from
> one generation to the next. The concept of progress assumes that a
> general correlation of improvement with time.>>

> I think you're missing the important dietinction between practical and
> theoretical reason.  See Fox's essay "The Doctrine of the Mean in Maimonides
> and Aristotle" reprinted in Buijs "Maimonides: A Collection of Critical
> Essays".  Practical reason can be assumed to accumulate with experience.
> The number of the spheres is an example of theoretical reason.  If we can
> know even one fact about theory more than the ancients, it's fairly strong
> support for a concept of progress by accretion in knowledge.

I'll look into Fox's essay. However a simple accretion of knowledge -
theoretical or practical - is not a concept of progress in the modern
sense just as the loss of knowledge about making violins or harmony
with nature - does not constitute a perception of decline of the
generations. Progress is a perception of optimism and of anticipation
regarding the future. The world will be better. We are better off,
more moral, more profound, more knowledgeable, more in control than
previous generations. This attitude clearly existed in the world from
the late 1700's. It was one of the major factors for the abandonment
of the yeshivos for socialism and communism. The desire to counter the
attraction of wordly progess was one of the major factors why the mussar
movement was started by R' Yisroel Salanter.

Daniel Eidensohn

[does this belong on avodah?] [yes -mi]

I did not see what you did  in the R' Doniel Neustadt column.

Jonathan Baker wrote [to Areivim]:
> But the seforim are *not* designed by God.  They are several removes
> from the Divine will: human composed, mass-produced, etc.

> I looked over the R' Doniel Neustadt column that someone recommended,
> and the way I see it, a) much of the regulation is practical, to
> preserve books that (before printing) cost hundreds or thousands
> of dollars to produce (in current money); b) or else really late,
> 20th century, Mishna brura and later.

> You don't want to get feces on the book that you can't just toss
> in the geniza and buy another copy of.  You don't want to damage
> the binding or the paper in various ways.

The column was a practical halacha column, and as a rule references
texts that are very widely accepted sources of halacha. And while the
article was about seforim, you can look up the halachos of tefillin and
mezuzos both of which have a level of kedusha that is d'oraysa. There
are definitely halachos that pertain to saving seforim from destruction
(being metamei yadayim was instituted so food would not be kept with
sifrei tanach, resulting in damage from rats). But these halachos seem
complete based on the concept of desecration of something holy.

The way I understand it is that
1) there are objects that have a Torah defined holiness (tefillin,
mezuzos) and there are other objects to which chazal extended a treatment
as if they were holy.

2) there is a concept of bizayon of a davar kadosh, and chazal have
described what constitutes a bizayon, with later poskim filling in where
situations are different today than 2000 years ago. These guidelines
apply to something that is kadosh mid'rabanan as well. How can an
inanimate object have a concept of bizayon? Well, if it can be holy,
why should there not be a concept of desecration of that holiness?

3) These objects and the halachos about their bizayon are in no way
related to covering challos, or hiding a tv for shabbos!

Maybe someone can provide a stronger explanation of kedusha and bizayon.

k't
elly

--
Elly Bachrach
Engineering Intent http://www.EngineeringIntent.com
mailto:EBachrach@EngineeringIntent.com

The gemora in Shabbat(130a) mentions mitzvot that B"Y kept during gzerat
malchut and those that they weren't moser themselves on. Tfillin is the
example of the latter and therefoe it is "adayin mrafeh byadam". Tosfot
49a seems to say this was still the case in his day(unless I'm
misreading).

Any thoughts on why Tfillin was in this category especially since it is
an ot? Could this possibly partially explain why R" Tam and Rashi could
have different tfillin?

KT
Joel Rich

I wrote:
> It's also a commonplace among mekubbalim. I'll try to find sources
> later.

Unfortunately I couldn't find the (very explicit) source I thought I
remembered. Probably it's just a delusion. But see the introduction
to the fancy new edition of Igros HaRamChal UBnei Doro (called Magid
MeReishith Aharith) section 2 (Giluy Hamagid) especially pp.15-19.

RDE wrote:
<<This is not the modern concept of progress. R' Avraham ben HaRambam
was just indicating that the level of knowledge can fluctuate from one
generation to the next. The concept of progress assumes that a general
correlation of improvement with time.>>

I think you're missing the important dietinction between practical
and theoretical reason. See Fox's essay "The Doctrine of the Mean in
Maimonides and Aristotle" reprinted in Buijs "Maimonides: A Collection
of Critical Essays". Practical reason can be assumed to accumulate
with experience. The number of the spheres is an example of theoretical
reason. If we can know even one fact about theory more than the ancients,
it's fairly strong support for a concept of progress by accretion in
knowledge.

David Riceman

Parts 2 and 3 of the article have not yet been published, although I
have been after R. Eisen for some time now to finish it. At one point,
he felt a Hebrew version would find a better audience but I dont know
how far that plan went.

At least now I can tell R. Eisen that it is not just me who awaits the
conclusion :)

Be-tsipiyah li-teshu'ah me-et Mena.hem Tsiyon u-Voneh Yerushalayim
le-.homot va-.hel shel `ir she-.hubrah lah ya.hdav le-kol bet Yisrael,
Yisrael

In a message dated 7/16/2004 1:14:44 PM EDT, gil@aishdas.org writes:
> "It is hard for me to say that it's ossur (prohibited) or that it's
> immoral. It's a higher level of morality not to do it, and study. But
> it's definitely not something that you could even taint by saying it's
> ossur or by saying it's immoral, because it does lead to a good knowledge
> of the material. It provides a pretty decent review... A baal nefesh
> wouldn't want to look at that test.

Is this talking about limudei kodesh or chol?

If the latter, and the teacher has not asked the students to refrain from
getting old tests, I don't see the higher level of morality. What about
using review tests from the textbook or one of the many review series
available? Is there some kiyum in studying less effectively or is R'
Belsky espousing a TUM philosophy that one must study limudei chol lshma?

KT
Joel Rich

"SBA" <sba@iprimus.com.au> wrote:
> Zev Sero <zev@sero.name> wrote:
>> "SBA" <sba@iprimus.com.au> wrote:

>>> Are there any others cases where a man is praised mid-tefilah?
>> [...]
>>> How would it look, if someone during an audience with the King of Sweden
>>> in his royal palace - gave a speech praising the king of the Zulus?
>>> Al achas kamoh vekamoh, in a shul, beis Hashem, is it right to sing the
>>> praises of a bosor vodom?

>> IIRC, there is not a single word in kabbalat shabbat that addresses
>> Hashem directly. It's all *about* Hashem, not *to* Him.

> Same thing.

First of all, RSBA, please watch your attributions. The way you posted
this, it seemed like I wrote 'How would it look....', and you wrote both
'IIRC...' and 'Same thing'. I've fixed the attributions here, so everyone
can see who said what.

No, it is not at all the same thing. In kabbalat shabbat we are *not*
speaking to Hashem; hence there is not a single word addressing Him
directly. We are not 'during an audience with the King of Sweden',
so to speak, we are in the waiting room, about to have the audience.
In the meantime, we sing His praises, we sing a song about His queen,
sometimes someone comes in at that point, and we greet him and wish him
well (we wouldn't do *that* in front of the King), we read a bit from
one of the law books on the coffee table, and then sing a song about
one of His prominent subjects, whose yartzeit happens to be coming up.
*Then* we go in to the audience chamber, and the atmosphere and language
is completely different.

BTW, about translating the haftara, this is still done in Yemeni shuls.

-- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

Ohrchama@aol.com wrote:
>: "that this Gemara is an example where it would be very difficult to say
>: that the science of the Gemara is always right, as some in the  Yeshiva
>: World including the Chazon Ish, seem to hold....
...
> I was however, referring to a different statement of the Chazon Ish. In
> a letter (Kovetz Igros-Volume One-Letter 15) he basically wrrites that
> the expression of any doubts in the words of Chazal,whether in Halacha
> or Agada, is Heresy which would make such a person a Kofer in the words
> of Chazal, whose Shechitah would be a Nevelah, who would be Posul for
> testimony,etc.

However, that's doubting Chazal on issues of halakhah or agadah. Science mina
lan?

BTW, this would seem to say that those who declare the mabul or at least its
size to be written biderekh mashal are well outside the CI's derekh.

:-)BBii!
-mi

R Eli Turkel wrote:
> Can someone please explain the difference between ruba de-lesa mikaman
> and chazakah.

I already gave my understanding of RMK's answer.

IMHO, I'm now toying with the idea that rov, even RDLK, is about comparing
quantities, with no interest in which quantity is actually more likely.

A chazaqah disevara is something where the rules of nature or human nature
(as defined in some culture) make one outcome far more probable than
another. Half of the possibilities for how a coin lands is "heads". Even
in a weighted coin, that's half of the options -- even if not half of
the results of tossing that coin (as the number of tosses approaches
infinity).

I think the Nodeh beYehudah must hold this way, because even if one
follows rov chaniyos rather than rov chatichos in my father's original
case, the rov chaniyos isn't the more likely.

The question is whether the BA is saying that yes, it does go
statistically. Or does he agree that it goes quantitatively, but defines
what it is we take the quantity of differently.

This 2nd shitah would suggest that the difference is whether the fact
that the store is kavu'ah makes it the countable unit of the beraisa
(NbY), or if the beraisa was just loosely giving a means of saying 9/10
vs 1/10 (BA).

> Thus, for example, the gemara says there is a chazakah that a borrower
> will not completely deny a loan (kofer ha-kol). Is this based on
> statistics? It cannot just be the "nature" of people because the gemara
> says that in later generations we no longer rely on this chazakah but
> require a kofer hakol to take a shvuat heset.

I am suggesting a middle ground. It's statistics derived from nature
and norms, as opposed to comparing quantities.

> Chazakah is tricky because there are many different types of chazakah.
> However, one type of chazakah seems to me to be very close to rov and
> statistics.

The Sh"Sh identifies two: chazaqah demei'iqara and (nidon didan)
chazaqah disvarah.


As for RJR's question:
> ... is karov the same as rov, just redefining the sample space to exclude
> anything not close by?

IIUC, he's asking: Is "karov" a rule in sample space, after which the
usual din rov applies?

Perhaps. There is much discussion in the various issues of Higayon about
how to define sample space.

I have a unique opinion on the subject of birur, described in the URLs
RSM graciously posted as well as our earlier "taam and taste" discussion
(see "T" in the archive index).

RAE, in teshuvah 136, writes of two kinds of birur:
1- resolving doubt in metzi'us;
2- resolving doubt in pesaq.
Furthermore, he identifies parish as a doubt in metzi'us, for which rov
applies, and kavu'ah as one in pesaq. The pesaq was once established
(kavu'ah), and now we don't know what it was.

I believe that the primary reason for halakhah is to promote sheleimus
and deveiqus. Therefore, what is relevent is not the unknowable metzi'us
but how the person relates to the unknwn. If it is totally unknowable,
then it has no mamashus -- such as betzei kinim. If it is knowable but
unknown, how concerned should I be with the possibility.

Parish is therefore not a question of determining reality, but determining
how people perceive and react to that reality.

Unless you believe chazal modeled uncertainty using some precursor of
Bayes' statistical model, it's not relevent. If how an axct involving
an unkown is diproportionate in effect to the chance that the unknown
is a problem, then the impact (nif'al lefi pe'ulaso) on the po'eil is
disproportionate.

Which leaves me ambivalent as to whether karov is a rule in how people
lump their unknowns together, or is a rule in how to determine rov,
and if the latter, does that mean my opinion is wrong, or that hainu hach.

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                    ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (270) 514-1507

Gil Student wrote:
> The Shenaton Mishpat HaIvri, no. 1 (or 2?) has a long article going
> through the various different explanations of this passage.

I doubt I have access to a copy.

So far we've seen the ET's list of shitos, and more recently the
Maharal's notion that Torah be'olam hazeh is only an approximation of
an ineffible emes.

Could you summarize any shitos we didn't already discuss?

:-)BBii!
-mi

R Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
> I think I am getting a clearer view of your point - what does it mean that
> "ein zeh biydei Shamayim". I am saying that it means according to Rashi
> that G-d doesn't know and you are saying that it means that man must
> have free will in the matter....

As I said, look at Rashi on hakol tzafui vehareshus nesunah. He doesn't
limit omniscience to resolve the paradox. Therefore, once must understand
Rashi's statement literally: "biydei Shamayim" -- under heavenly control
(yad as in "gito veyado ba'im ke'achas") not that it is known by Shamayim.

> You are saying that the announcement of
> the Bas Kol some how would interfere with his free-will if it the zivug
> were based on spiritual status. I simply don't understand what the Bas
> Kol has to do with man's free will. Therefore I don't see why the person

Every resolution of R' Aqiva's paradox in Avos seems to rely on the
transcendence of HQBH. (Except, of course, for the Ralbag's limitation of
Divine Foreknowledge.) The second Divine Knowledge becomes associated with
an event and a point in time, the problem become far more accute. Such
as via a bas qol going out before birth.

>                 Why should a tzadik have to marry a second time in
> order to have the correct spiritual mate?

Not "the correct", but the one he deserves.

You're thinking of "mazal" meaning luck, that the first zivug is a matter
of chance. However, "mazal" is more like destiny. Thus the whole point
of astrology, to those who thought/think there is a point.

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                    ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (270) 514-1507

> Dinosaur bones don't
> bother me at all, but if the above is true, and Hashem really created
> an evolved world nearly 5763 years ago (on 25-Elul-1), and put Adam and
> Chava in it to breed and produce all of us, then how can we explain the
> diversity of human genetics? Modern genetic analysis seems iron-clad
> proof of how many generations ago two lines diverged, so how can mutations
> that seem to have happened more than 6000 years ago exist?

Firstly I see no reason to assume that Hashem created the world 'Omphalos
(bellybutton)' style with a 'fake' prehistory. As Rambam says, if Plato's
view of the eternity of the world were provable we would accept it and
re-interpret Torah. At the moment the weight of scientific evidence
suggests that classical physics came into operation with the Big
Bang. This is very easily reconcilable with the Bereshit narrative
in a Schroederian sense, or by simply realising that ma'ase bereshit
is not kifshuto, and is 'satum' ie we don't really understand it.
Furthermore there is no ironclad reason to believe that the Bereshit
account is intended as a physical statement, it could be merely there to
teach mussar (a gnat preceded us etc). At any rate the Big Bang theory
may very easily change, and Membrane Theory is already suggesting
a role for a greater multiverse which existed before the Big Bang,
where a collision between two 'membranes' created the Big Bang, which
would explain the development of a non-uniform mass distribution in the
universe. So we may soon be back to an eternal universe - and so what?
Remember sticking to the pshat is what the Rambam describes as the correct
stance in the face of logical or scientific uncertainty. With regards
to the 'Omphalos' theory. It is not science - it's just an easy out.
It is not testable and doesn't advance us one bit to understanding
the text or the world. Frankly it seems rather childish, and avoids a
real resolution. One of the areas of Torah is Pardes, which includes
investigation into Ma'ase Bereshit, and Omphalos doesn't really qualify.
In any case, it is not material whether Hashem created the world the
'science' way, or another way but made it look like the 'science' way.
With regards to the origin of the human race, the concept of similarity
between people and apes is well grounded in the midrash. You can theorise
that Enosh was the product of a pre-adam woman and Shet. So was that
woman human? Perhaps sentience could be acriteria? Well dolphins are
quite possibly sentient, as could be any number of alien civilisations.
So in that case perhaps free will? But how do we know who has free will?
Well we don't. Our only reason to belive in free will as anything other
than the illusion of consciousness, is revelation. Hashem confronts the
newly 'created' human race, represented by Adam and Chava, and breathes
into them a divine spirit. This divine spirit comes with free will
(a divine trait), and came as a package deal with mitzvot. Free will
only exists in terms of humanity's encounter with the divine imperative.
ie aliens could be sentient, but they don't have mitzvot, so they don't
have free will, same with dolphins. So my attitude to paleolithic man
would be that they were chayot - just as much as say sentient dolphins.
Perhaps the mishna on adnei hasade would have bearing on this?

Jonathan Cohen
jcoh003@ec.auckland.ac.nz

Every event has an effect. Had the RSO created a universe with no
derekh hateva explanation of how we got here, the consequences of that
discontinuity would be felt in contemporary events.

IOW, those tree rings and life-in-progress have to be there in order
for teva today to exist. It's all interconnected, even across time.

Which would justify providing such continuity, even if artificially by
seeding the universe with tree rings, light already on the route between
a distant star and here, etc...


Now to argue the other direction...

Was Adam the first homosapien, or the first homosapien to house a soul?
Hashem evolved a body from mud and then breathed into a selected
homosapien a soul.

This would explain the genetic diversity RZS wonders about (aside from
explaining who our early ancestors married).

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure.
micha@aishdas.org        It preserves health, promotes convalescence,
http://www.aishdas.org   and helps us cope with adversity.
Fax: (270) 514-1507         - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei"

On Wed, Jul 14, 2004 at 08:23:48PM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
:> Can this be? Would we be better off not knowing who Jesus or Buddha were?

: I used to think this was a machloketh in Hazal. See Shabbos 75a ("i ata
: lomeid laasoth ...") vs. the Sifra cited in SHM Lav #10. I changed my
: mind a few months ago and found a way to harmonize the two, but I can't
: remember what it was.

Chazal themselves obviously spent enough time learning AZ to know the
metzi'us they discuss in Mes AZ. If knowing about AZ were assur, how
could they have studied anything but (perhaps) the barest lema'aseh only
for the particular situations actually encountered?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org        And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                   - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

On Sun, Jul 18, 2004 at 01:25:28AM +0200, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
: There is a problem trying to refute my understanding of the Rashi in
: Sotah by citing the absence of such an explanation in Rashi on Avos on a
: related topic. Rashi could have simply been explaining each according to
: what he felt was the view of the particular text - and was not voicing
: his own opinion.

There were two parts to my argument:

1- You bear the burden of proof to show that "yedei" refers to knowledge,
as the word usually refers to ownership and control.
2- In the one place where the mishnah could be taken as discussing the
relationship between foreknowledge and control, Rashi does not connect
the two.

Therefore, why do you?

...
: Referring back to my original post - there are a number of sources other
: than the Ralbag [Ohr Hachaim, Malbim, Rav Tzadok, Kabbala] that clearly
: state that G-d's knowledge of the future can be limited.

I'm confused aa to relevance. You ask if Rashi limits divine
foreknowledge, but we have no statement from Rashi to that effect. That
others connect the two really has little to do with Rashi.

As an aside, I question that these other sources say what you think
they do. You projected your own problem dividing foreknowledge from
predetermination onto Rashi -- how do you know you didn't in these other
cases as well?

: >>                Why should a tzadik have to marry a second time in
: >>order to have the correct spiritual mate?

: >Not "the correct", but the one he deserves.

: mazel has nothing to do with what he deserves. In fact it is just the
: opposite.

You've left me confused again. "Mazal" is used to describe the first
marriage, not the second. Rashi calls the first the product of mazal,
of fate, of predestination; part of the hand the person is dealt, just
like the parents and life situation he is born into. The second marriage
is the one he deserves.

However, both are "correct". just as a person gets the parents that are
"correct" for him.

: >You're thinking of "mazal" meaning luck, that the first zivug is a matter
: >of chance. However, "mazal" is more like destiny. Thus the whole point
: >of astrology, to those who thought/think there is a point.

: Mazel is not the same as chance or deserving. Chance is inherently
: a random fate....

Mazal is predetermination. Fate, as I put it. Thus it is associated with
the astrological configuration at birth. It's not randomness nor luck.
I explicitely denied that misconception. I therefore am confused as to why
you reply to my post also arguing against it.

:                                         Mazel in the sense of destiny
: or deserving is a relatively recent understanding.

Not derserving, destiny. Nor is it recent, it's clearly original usage --
it's the only meaning that involves both constellations and life events.

: stated by R' Aryeh Kaplan Jewish Handbook Vol II page 296-297. But it
: is not the way the term is used in the gemora and rishonim and many
: achronim Shlimazel is someone who has bad luck....

Or fated to get a less-than-ideal life. Where is the presumption of luck?

:                                                     ... A person whose
: mazel is to spill blood can have high merit if he becomes a doctor or low
: merit if he becomes a murderer. The mazel is fixed and is not related to
: deserving. Mazel is related to the issue of chance in that it seems that
: the time of birth is from chance as we see in the following quote of R'
: Yonason Eibschuetz when he equates chance and mazel.

Chance? If it were chance it wouldn't be "fixed". It's bedavka destiny.
Someone destined to spill blood can spill blood in a positive way.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             You will never "find" time for anything.
micha@aishdas.org        If you want time, you must make it.
http://www.aishdas.org                     - Charles Buxton
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

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