Avodah Mailing List

Volume 14 : Number 016

Friday, October 22 2004

• Re: Shemini Atzeret (was: safeik bracha)
• Re: safeik bracha
• Re: Balancing Machshavah Amuqah and Emunah Peshutah
• Re: Words and their opposites
• The evolution of Hebrew
• Re: linguistic norm
• Re: Torah as Allegory
• Re: safeik bracha
• Re: safeik bracha
• RE: Pronounciation
• safeik bracha
• Re: Ikkarim (again??)
• Re: Ikkarim (again??)
• Re: The Moral Proof
• Re: Balancing Machshavah Amuqah and Emunah Peshutah

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> We eliminate the berakhah on sukkah because it is gorei'ah from Shemini
> Atzeres. Sitting in the Sukkah without a berakhah could be construed
> (with generous creativity, in some climates) as simply wanting to enjoy
> the outdoors. The 4 minim, for which there is no parallel argument,
> is eliminated despite the safeiq de'Oraisa for this reason.

The 4 minim on the 7th day of sukkot are not deoraita.

> And lem'aseh while we say shehechiyanu, we try to provide a new fruit
> so as to give a non-YTS kavanah.

On Shemini Atzeret?  I've never heard of this except on the 2nd day of
Rosh Hashana.

-- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
> And lem'aseh while we say shehechiyanu, we try to provide a new fruit
> so as to give a non-YTS kavanah.

A family tradition - or a personal innovation?

SBA

On Tue, Oct 19, 2004 at 12:54:22PM -0400, I forwarded an email from R'
Yitzchak Blau via YHE's list server:
: "The Rabbis taught: Once a Sadducee poured the water of the libation
: offering on his feet (instead of on the altar) and the people stoned him
: with their etrogim. That day, the corner of the altar was damaged and they
: sealed it up with a fistful of salt, not because this renders it fit for
: service but so that people will not see the altar damaged." (Sukka 48b)
...
: R. Yaakov ibn Habib, in his Ein Yaakov, suggests a clever answer. He
: points out that the Torah identifies the etrog with the somewhat
: ambiguous phrase "peri etz hadar." Our ability to identify the correct
: fruit comes from the help offered by the oral tradition....
:          Indeed, despite the fact that Anan, the founder of the Kaarites,
: preached that each follower should interpret the Torah for himself and
: not rely on Anan's opinion, traditional communal interpretations became
: the norm among Karaites as well. If so, the people pelted the Sadducee
: with a metaphorical etrog. Namely, they argued that the Sadducee rejection
: of Torah she-be-al peh does not work and is ultimately incompatible with
: the written Torah itself.

My two cents:

The mention of a fistful of salt, particularly at the corner of the
mizbei'ach, a location of zerikas hadam, brings to mind melikhah.
Withouyt a TSBP, the din of dam makes no sense. It's impossible to
remove all blood. And yet, the pasuq says that blood is assur, and
also requires the eating of meat of numerous qorbanos, as well as
speaking of shechitas chullin.

It requires the TSBP to tell us which blood is included, and which
not.

There is also another aspect: The mesorah is a tool for two things:
the new interpretation of din (peri eitz hadar), and the preservation
of din. A permanent covenant is a "beris melakh". Salt is thought of
for its preservation property.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Until he extends the circle of his compassion
micha@aishdas.org        to all living things,
http://www.aishdas.org   man will not himself find peace.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Albert Schweitzer

In all these examples, there is a common primary meaning from which the
others derive.

On Sun, Oct 17, 2004 at 05:21:43PM -0400, T613K@aol.com wrote:
: kadesh [kuf-daled-shin] which means holiness but also prostitute
: or prostitution. Of course a kedaisha may mean a particular type of
: prostitute--one who has been "sanctified" as part of the worship of a
: particular avodah zarah...

Asked and answered, no? There's three related terms, qedeishah, zonah
and chalalah. Qedeishah implies the license that comes with AZ.

: chessed--meaning kindness and incest. Interestingly, the word "kind"
: has a similar set of meanings in English, meaning "nice and helpful"
: and also meaning "kin, relatives."

According to R' Shimon Shkop, chessed in the first sense is about
dropping the barrier between "me" and "other" so that one's natural
self-interest leads one to give to others. The essence of incest is the
lack of appropiate boundries.

: akar [ayin-kuf-resh] meaning infertile and also the mainstay of the
: house...

Already addressed by others.

: Shin-chaf-ches means "to forget" but the word "shachiach" with the
: same shoresh means {Alkalay]: "ready to hand, common, frequent, usual"
: which is almost the opposite of "forgotten."

Forgetting is not the elimination of knowledge, it's the inability
to reach it consciously. Things done automatically, without causing
or being caused by conscious thought are chekhiach.

: "Achal" [aleph-chaf-lamed] means to eat and also to consume and to
: destroy. Well, in this case how one meaning comes from another is
: fairly obvious.

RSRH has a general rule that the /x-x-h/ to /a-x-x/ shift changes
the meaning to "that which exist for..." An even is material for

: Shin-nun-hei means to do something a second time, and can therefore
: mean either "repeat it exactly" OR "change it completely."

: A shoresh with two seemingly unrelated meanings is "lechem" which means
: bread and also fight. I've seen a suggestion that the meanings are
: related because of the necessity to fight for parnassah but this seems
: strained to me.

Marx would say they're related because no one is motivated to fight
if it doesn't boil down to lechem.

: Another shoresh with seemingly unrelated meanings is ayin-gimel-lamed,
: meaning both "round" and "a calf." If you have an idea how these may
: be related, let me know. I assume that an "agala [wagon]" is called
: that because of its wheels, which of course are round.

According to RSRH, animals whose names begin with an ayin (achbar,
akrav) are named for a related shoresh. The primary meaning is therefore
"eigel". Agalos are drawn by oxen. Which is why Apis, the Egyptian god
that was supposed to bring man's prayers up to the primary gods and
their blessings down to man was a bull.

Until harness technology improved, they didn't know how to use horses
to pull heavier weights without choking the horse. Even so, oxen were
used for things like plows.

Oxen were used to pull the vehicles that carried the kelei hamishkan,
no?

: Also, sometimes a word means one thing, and with a slight change in the
: shoresh, it means the opposite. For example, sin-chaf-lamed means wisdom
: while chaf-samech-lamed means foolishness. There are many examples
: of this, as well, in Hebrew and English.

But antonyms are related words. "Big" is similar to "small" -- both are
about size, If similar words meant totally unrelated, like "big" and
"edible", it would be far more strange.

On Mon, Oct 18, 2004 at 10:07:02AM -0400, Mlevinmd@aol.com wrote:
: The problem of words that have the same shoresh but different meanings
: is a broader one - it includes the many examples of words that sound
: the same but mean different things. An example would be Ram to raise and
: ram to throw, shv to sit and shv to capture. This is the bigest problem
: with three letter root theory...

First, why is it a problem with roots more than conjugated words? If the
problem with homonyms is that they cause ambiguity, the actual words are
what impact clarity, not their shorashimm.

Second, how can the elimination of one letter from the shoresh /decrease/
ambiguity? It can only make the word less distinct, not more. You
have only two points of distinction, both of which would exist in the
three-letter theory and they'd be joined with a third! With two letter
shorashim /sh-m-h/ and /sh-v-m/ both become /sh-m/.

What you would need is a theory like Rashi's that allows them in
*addition* to three letter roots.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Rabindranath Tagore

Returning again to RML's post of Oct 18, 2004 at 10:07:02AM -0400:
: Current academic theory treats Hebrew as any other language and claims
: that through a process of development it came to have meanings that got
: transfered from one word to another or took on double meanings. This
: is hard to defend from the traditional standpoint that it is a planned,
: Divinely given language.

However, the idea of evolution of Hebrew is still feasible.

In speaking of early Hebrew, we can speak of a number of things:
    - the primordial language with which the world was created.
    - the language of Adam
    - the language a moment before the hapelagah
    - the language at the time of matan Torah
and points in between.

I could see arguing that the ideal language for conveying the Torah's
truths was the language of beri'ah -- histakeil be'oraisa ubarei alma.
However, for the language of Adam to be the same as of matan Torah,
it would have had to been the only period of human history (and over
two millenia!) in which language did not evolve.

Even on an island with no contact with people who speak other languages,
a language evolves. How would it stay frozen for millenia?

What if the Ribbono shel olam set everything up so that the language of
creation would emerge by evolution at the right time to have the right
vehicle for relaying the Torah when we got to Sinai?

On Thu, Oct 21, 2004 at 08:05:50AM +0200, Ira L. Jacobson wrote:
: Arabic, for example, has two "het"s and three "ayin"s. Thus, two Hebrew
: words with seemingly identical roots may have two different "het"s and
: hence be unrelated. Similarly for "ayin"s.

This isn't helped by saying Hebrew evolved to its ideal state. Its
relatedness to less ambiguous outgrowths of the evoluationary tree is
a gorei'a to the claim that the Torah was given in the most appropriate
possible language.

However, if its impossible to evolve a language with no homonyms without
mitigating the bechirah of the speakers, then the language of the Torah
had to have such ambiguity, and in which case similar ambiguity would
be used in the language of creation so that the two would fit.



Along the same subject of evolution, but in a different domain....

On Wed, Oct 20, 2004 at 06:38:00PM -0400, T613K@aol.com wrote:
: But this happened centuries after Mattan Torah. It's not so surprising
: that the shevatim, after living quite a distance from each other for
: centuries, would begin to develop slightly different accents, possibly
: influenced by neighboring goyim. Look at Russian and Polish Yiddish.

It would be more surprising if 15 million people or so did not have
regional differences after two centuries. Why would you think differences
arose amongst the 20% who left Mitzrayim, and not while working amongst
Mitzriyim?

: It is also possible that among the people of Ephraim there was a common
: speech defect or lisp, not a different accent. They were closely related
: to each other, after all, and also usually married women from their
: own shevet, so a particular genetic problem arising in one shevet might
: become common in that shevet and not in others.

I don't think it's possible to have a physiology that can say /s/ and
/r/ but not /sh/. /sh/ differs from /s/ only in tongue curvature.

: I think it's a safe assumption that when the Torah was given to Moshe,
: there was indeed one correct pronunciation used by everyone. Without
: tape recorders, however, change over time was inevitable.

This just presumes the conclusion.

All you need is a single vocabulary and grammar. It needn't sound the
same for the same sentence to mean the same to all.

On Thu, Oct 21, 2004 at 11:10:43AM -0400, Mlevinmd@aol.com quoted
the Seifer haYetzirah which said (in part):
:     Seven doubles: Bet, Gimel, Dalet, Kaf, Peh, Resh, Tav which are to be
:     pronounced in two tongues: Bet, Vet, Gimel, Ghimel, Dalet, Dhalet,
:     Kaf, Khaf, Peh, Feh, Resh, Rhesh, Tav, Thav, a pattern of hard and
:     soft, strong and weak...

Notice that reish is listed as double in a way more fundamental than
shin / sin.

One might conclude two things: 1- the reish evolved, and 2- Seifer
haYetizrah is from a period in the evolution of Hebrew quite different
than all known pronounciations.

I'm not saying I believe this idea. I'm suggesting the feasibility
only.


-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Rabindranath Tagore

On Thu, Oct 21, 2004 at 04:46:39PM +0200, D&E-H Bannett wrote:
: One thing that always surprises me is the Teimani sof-pasuk tune which
: wiggles up and down a few times on the last syllable and makes every
: mileil last word in a sentence sound milra'. Surprises, but not annoys.

Particularly since earlier syllables gain stress at the last word
of a phrase -- the vowel is elongated: gefen -> gafen, lechem ->
lachem...

-mi

On Thu, Oct 14, 2004 at 08:36:17AM -0400, Mlevinmd@aol.com wrote:
: I don't if anyone has posted this link but it is a thoughtful, well
: considered article on this subject.
: <http://www.yutorah.org/showShiur.cfm?shiurID=703973>

I found R' Golding's article interesting, but I disagree on a fundamental
point.

He defines O by observance, and therefore the limits of O biblical
reinterpretation are those that would undermine observance. This is then
generalized to not only include halachic sections, but also the theological
grounding (i.e. the notion of Torah miSinai) and the textual grounding.

My point of contention: What about the mesoretic grounding? Doesn't
allowing a 2nd-guessing of mesoretic interpretation of the text weaken
the essential vehicle for the transmission and intepretation of halakhah?

Two more quibbling points:

First, he uses the allegorization of anthropomorphic terms to prove the
notion that despite "ein davar yotzei miydei peshuto" doesn't exclude
the possibility of pure metaphor. But is idiom outside of the notion of
"peshuto shel miqra" in the same way as extended metaphor is? I would
think they're very different. In English, we could speak of someone
"standing up" to someone else. Would it be non-peshat to assume the
speaker is speaking about asserting rights rather than being upright?
"Yad H'" is therefore peshat. Similarly to speak of "going down to take
a look".

Second, RJLG suggests that allegorizing the story of Amaleiq could be okay
within O, making the mitzvah about fighting evil. However, in that case
one is no longer actually remembering what the people of Amaleiq did,
the simple normative din. Even remembering the story qua myth doesn't
really qualify as a qiyum of remembering the event.

I'd make a similar argument about the other zichronos. There are mitzvos
that our pesaq requires believing an event was historical, not mythical.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole
micha@aishdas.org        heart, your entire soul, and all you own."
http://www.aishdas.org   Love is not two who look at each other,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      It is two who look in the same direction.

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> stated the following on Thu, 21 Oct 2004 
15:19:24 -0400:
>We eliminate the berakhah on sukkah because it is gorei'ah from Shemini
>Atzeres. Sitting in the Sukkah without a berakhah could be construed
>(with generous creativity, in some climates) as simply wanting to enjoy
>the outdoors.

If that were the case, then we would be permitted to sit in the Sukka
in EY on Shemini Atzeret-Simhat Tora. But we are not!

~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~=
IRA L. JACOBSON
=~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~
mailto:laser@ieee.org
Fax: ++1-619-639-8172

On Fri, Oct 22, 2004 at 09:23:21AM +0200, Ira L. Jacobson wrote:
: If that were the case, then we would be permitted to sit in the Sukka
: in EY on Shemini Atzeret-Simhat Tora. But we are not!

True, without the safeiq Sukkos, it would be ba'al tosif.

The "ambiguous if you didn't make a berakhah" rationale is only usable
to preserve the kavod hayom. IIRC, it's the Mordechai's sevara. Perhaps
because kavod is very much about appearances.

:-)BBii!
-mi

RMS
>> as while there may be questions as to consonants/vowels, they don't
>> extend to mil'el milra. (as I phrased it to others, the only literature
>> meant to be read mil'el was bialik's poetry, which they weren't going to
>> teach.)

RLPM
> Whimsy Bialik invented this mei-ayin?
> (Not that the modern secularists developed the idea that everything has
> to be stressed as if it was a posuk from tenach, or even more millera,
> considering the numerous incidents of words that have variable stress
> depending on the words following and anteceding. No, they took this over
> from German Christians, who always knew better in things Jewish than the
> corrupted objects of their ethnological interest.)

While there is no question that the daily pronounciation of ivrit outside
of tanach (and ? leining) was ashkeNAzis rather than ashkenaZIS, there is
very little literature that I am aware, and for sure that is in common
use, that was written to be pronounced that way (and which loses much
of its ta'am when pronounced in sefardi hebrew - as bialik)before late
19th and 20 century - and therefore yes, the only literature that is
meant to be read that way is Bialik (and similar poets).

While the German Christians may have believed that all Hebrew should
be biblical, it is wrong (and quite polemical and requires a mecha'a -
just because they believed it, or even if one can show that some maskilim
took it over from them, doesn't mean that they are the sole origin) to
assume that the notion that all liturgical hebrew should be pronounced
as biblical hebrew comes from them - while there is an awareness of the
difference between leshon chachamim and leshon mikra in the rishonim,
there is clearly an awareness that the pronounciation rules should follow
tanach - as in most hebrew grammars and perushim, even those that address
piyutim, of the middle ages.

Meir Shinnar

Shaya Potter writes:

RMB and others has already dealt with the reason why we don't mention
Sukkos on Shmini Atzeres, because it deducts from the new Chag, which is
a Chag unto itself (look at the musaf davening for nusach Ashkenaz, note
that in general the musaf for both of the days of the sufeik are recited,
but on Shmini Atzeret we do not recite the musaf of last day Sukkos).

You then write: 
>Furthermore, the above question only deals w/ safeik to say 
>or not to say a bracha. What about if one has a safeik which 
>bracha to say (for instance shmini atzeret, shouldn't there 
> be a safeik if it's sukkot or shmini atzeret?)

The more interesting question to my mind is what happens if you say
Sukkos instead of Shmini Atzeres in Ya'alei V'Yavo do you have to go
back and repeat? (this question only arises according to those who
hold that Ya'alei V'Yavo is meakev. According to those, including the
Sephardi poskim, who hold that Ya'alei v'yavo is not me'akev except on
first night pesach and first night sukkos this question would not arise).

The Chai Adam holds that one should not repeat on a number of grounds
which include the fact that while we do not rely on the safek vis a vis
sukkos l'chatchila because of the contradiction with Shmini Atzeres, we
can b'dived (but also on the fact that we mention that it is a festival
further up in ya'alei v'yavo note he then tries to distinguish this case
from the tosfos which states that saying more that is mistaken is worse
than saying less, I confess however that I don't follow the logic of
his distinction here).

My logic on the fly (when this happened last Shmini Atzeres night, and
then just as my husband and I were discussing what to do the lights went
out, putting sfarim out of reach as well), was that it was a safek safeka.
First safek was it Sukkos or Shmini Atzeres and second safek was maybe
ya'alei v'yavo is not meakev in any event (third safek, even if in
general it is meakev for a man, maybe not for a woman).

Later (ie next day) I was referred to this Chai Adam.

Further question, could we only rely on this Chai Adam in Chul, and
should one repeat if one said sukkos during shimni atzeres in ya'alei
v'yavo in Eretz Yisroel? (My safek sefaka would disappear, and it is
not clear to me that the Chai Adam's second point would stand on its own).

Shabbat Shalom
Chana

At this point I'm totally confused. It all started when I pointed out
that according to the Rambam someone who denies an ikkar can acquire the
status of moridin v'lo maalin without violating an issur. I had hoped that
someone would explain why that was true; instead RMB chose to deny it.

I asked what issur someone who denied the possibility of prophecy
committed. RMB suggested (A) eilav tishmaun and (B) no one who denied
the possibility of prophecy would do mitzvos anyway.

I responded (A) that eilav tishmaun is the mitzva to obey a horaath shaah
from a certified navi, it doesn't apply in the absence of a navi and
(I now add) doesn't require belief in nevua.

RMB responded by telling me that anshei knesseth hagdolah included everal
neviim. So what?

I responded (B') that the philosopher of the Kuzari endorsed (RMB corrects
to tolerates) following religious law for the practical benefits they
entail, and (B'') that the Rambam envisions Hachmei umoth haolam doing
the same thing.

RMB responded to (B') by saying that the Kuzari's philosopher is not
portrayed as Jewish. So what?

RMB responded to (B'') by saying that hachmei umot haolam are disqualified
from being geirei toshav. So what?

I don't understand how any of RMB's arguments demonstrate the existence
of an issur.

David Riceman

On Fri, Oct 22, 2004 at 09:53:05AM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
: I asked what issur someone who denied the possibility of prophecy
: committed. RMB suggested (A) eilav tishmaun and (B) no one who denied
: the possibility of prophecy would do mitzvos anyway.

: I responded (A) that eilav tishmaun is the mitzva to obey a horaath shaah
: from a certified navi, it doesn't apply in the absence of a navi and
: (I now add) doesn't require belief in nevua.

: RMB responded by telling me that anshei knesseth hagdolah included everal
: neviim. So what?

And moreso: Their pesaqim are considered beyond just derabanan because
of the fact (at least, according to the Rambam). This would indicate
that despite the phrasing in seifer hamitzvos, he did not believe that
requiring belief in nevu'ah was only a chiyuv WRT hora'as sha'ah.

: I responded (B') that the philosopher of the Kuzari endorsed (RMB corrects
: to tolerates) following religious law for the practical benefits they
: entail, and (B'') that the Rambam envisions Hachmei umoth haolam doing
: the same thing.

: RMB responded to (B') by saying that the Kuzari's philosopher is not
: portrayed as Jewish. So what?

So you can't cite him as proof that it's possible to be a shomer torah
umitzvos without emunah even if emunah weren't a chiyuv. For that matter,
even without being one of the 613, a parallel to the Ramban on the first
first dibrah would apply.

The Rambam doesn't list "Anochi H'" as one of the 613, since one can't
have any mitzavos without presupposing a metzaveh. One also can't have
any mitzvos without belief in the act of tzivui.

: RMB responded to (B'') by saying that hachmei umot haolam are disqualified
: from being geirei toshav. So what?

This was no in response to A or B, but the original claim: How can
something be prohibited for geirei toshav and not for Jews?

Also, I wondered how the 11th ikkar, which is about sechar va'onesh and
Hashem as Dayan, could appear in a list of non-violations that cause
the withholding of sechar.

Another point of mine that you didn't address when you were infected
by my confusion was addressing the metaquestion. Regardless of whether
some or all the ikkarim are amongst the 613, otherwise mandatory or not
mandated at all, the underlying problem holds.

The Rambam defined din as being primarily olam baba, and olam haba as a
function of one's yedi'ah. This allows a rift between observance and olam
baba -- someone can get the yedi'ah without doing mitzvos, and someone
(like RSDR's hypothetical) might be the most observant fellow in history,
but if he never gets that epiphany he still wouldn't get olam haba.

The question of whether there is an issur involved is one of whether
one turns this metaquestion into asking about
a) the lack of difference between the fate of the non-observant and the
one who keeps all the chovos ha'eivarim, or 
b) between the fate of the non-observant and one who keeps all the
chiyuvim.

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "The most prevalent illness of our generation is
micha@aishdas.org        excessive anxiety....  Emunah decreases anxiety:
http://www.aishdas.org   'The Almighty is my source of salvation;  I will
Fax: (270) 514-1507      trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya

We were discussing on Areivim which books one would lend a non-O friend
or acquaintance who was asking about Orthodoxy. That discussion started
to drift into the validity of the contents of some of those books,
so I wish to continue it on Avodah.

On Thu, Oct 14, 2004 at 10:50:40AM -0400, Gil Student wrote to Areivim:
: R. Yitzchak Blau has an article in the most recent issue of the Torah
: U-Madda Journal (<http://www.yutorah.org/showShiur.cfm?shiurID=705187>)
: that points out a significant flaw in one of Kelemen's main arguments in
: Permission to Believe. I tried to defend Kelemen in a letter to the editor
: that will be in the next issue, but R. Blau ably trounced my arguments.

The article is titled "Ivan Karamazov Revisited: The Moral Argument
for Religious Belief".

Much of his argument is phrased pragmatically, IOW, RYB is more likely
to speak of the problems the Moral Argument (MA) leads to more than
whether it's inherently valid. The moral argument is most often used in
educating youth and kiruv projects, and RYB assesses them in that light.

RYB initally argues that MA is likely to lead to one of two opposite errors:

1- It makes religion a handmaiden to ethics, as religion then become about
being the Divinely given morality. Or
2- By identifying religion with ethics, one makes the ethical merely
an expression of religion, which WRT yahadus means saying there is no
ethic beyond the G-d-given din. Do we want to teach a yahadus that has
no barrier to geneivas aqu"m and the like?

After proving that ge'onim and rishonim assert the existance of a
natural ethic (citing R' Nissim Gaon, Ramban, Chizquni and Rav Saadia)
he ends up revamping MA to be about supplementing natural ethics with
the more refined Divine ethic. For example, one can argue the need for
a Divine ethic not on the grounds of "Thou shalt not murder" but on
the impossibility of natural ethic dealing with abortion, euthenasia,
and the other borderline cases in any deterministic way.

I think the paper is fundamentally flawed by a lack of a basic chaqira.
There are two distinct issues:
- The source of morality. Can all human beings agree that there is a
concept of morality (even if we disagree about much of what morality
includes) if G-d didn't create humans with the concept of morality?
- The source of information about what morality consists of.

I would assert that MA is about the first, not the latter. Therefore,
we could rely on the Torah to know what morality consists of, while
still using the existance of morality as a concept to imply the
existance of a religious world.


I find it interesting that RYB has a discussion of why we should obey G-d
in the context of "If all ethic is from G-d, isn't ethic arbitrary?"and
using John Stuart Mill, Hobbes, Geach (the latter two saying "follow G-d
or he'll beat you up!" -- far from moral imperative!), but not Plato's
Euthyphro which is this very dilemma! My opinion on this question was
posted here.

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             When we long for life without difficulties,
micha@aishdas.org        remind us that oaks grow strong in contrary
http://www.aishdas.org   winds, and diamonds are made under pressure.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Peter Marshall

micha@aishdas.org posted [quoting a DT from R' Yitzchak Blau]:
>: "The Rabbis taught: Once a Sadducee poured the water of the libation
>: offering on his feet (instead of on the altar) and the people stoned him
>: with their etrogim.

>: R. Yaakov ibn Habib, in his Ein Yaakov, suggests ... the people
>: pelted the Sadducee with a metaphorical etrog. Namely, they argued
>: that the Sadducee rejection of Torah she-be-al peh does not work and is
>: ultimately incompatible with the written Torah itself.

FWIW, I thought I'd mention that Josephus (Antiquities 13.13.5) writes,
"As to Alexander, his own people were seditious against him; for at a
festival [I suspect the orginal rendition came from the term "Chag,"
the specific reference to Succos--ZL], which was then celebrated, when
he stood upon the alter, and was going to sacrifice, the nation rose
upon him and pelted him with citrons--the laws of the Jews required
that at the feast [? maybe festival?] of tabernacles everyone should
have branches of the palm tree and citron tree...."

Shall we say this was a case of "the medium is the message"?

Y'yashser ko'cha'cha on your intepretations re: TSBP and
salt. Fascinating!

Zvi Lampel 

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