Avodah Mailing List

Volume 14 : Number 030

Saturday, November 20 2004

• Re: Torah and Science
• Re: Sanhedrin
• Re: Va'avorcho mevorchecho
• Re: Seeking Midrashic source that one should not favor one child over other c...
• Re: Requesting this List to List Machshava Classics
• Re: Asking questions
• Re: Torah and Science
• Re: Tiqun Olam
• Re: Torah and Science
• Orthodox rabbis, Conservative shuls
• Re: Orthodox rabbis, Conservative shuls
• Re: Torah and science
• Re: Torah and Science
• Re: Torah and Science
• Re: Torah and science
• Re: Choni HaMagel vs. Musar masters
• Re: Two observations in a beis olam

On Fri, Nov 19, 2004 at 06:13:19AM -0800, Harry Maryles wrote:
:> Objectivity does not imply verifiability. Rather, that the truth is not
:> a feature of a given perspective or less than all perspectives. Thus,
:> the opposite of subjectivity.

: What about elu V'Elu? Are you saying that there is only one objective
: reality and one of the perspectives is actually false? This is not my
: understanding of it.

First, eilu va'eilu is not a statement about fact or truth but about law.
One can be a pluralist and believe that Hashem gave us a system for
deriving two different ways of reaching our goal, and left it to us to
choose which we take. There is no contradiction in objective reality to
say G-d gave us both.

Second, as R' Tzadoq writes, in the world of thought there is no law of
excluded middle. IOW, A and B can contradict and yet both be objectively
true. It's not a difference in perspective, that within perspective X,
A is true, and from perspective Y, B is. Rather, there is an antinomy,
what RYBS would call an unresolvable dialectic -- two things that are
true with no limitation of perspective even though they contradict.

It is a matter for poseqim to choose sides, since in the world of action
there is a law of excluded middle.

: You don't think belief is subjective? Is belief less valid a truth
: than fact?

Belief means that someone considers an idea to be true. There is no
indication from the word "belief" that he is correct. Unlike fact, which
-- as I showed from a collection of on-line dictionaries, is supposed
to refer to ideas that are true, whether believed by anyone or not.

So yes, belief, because it says nothing about truth, is "less valid a
truth than fact", which is definitionally a truth.

A fact, i.e. a true idea, that is believed, and that the person has a
justification for believing, is called "knowledge". (With the caveats to
that definition provided before.) It relies on three lements: belief,
reason for the belief, and an external point -- that it happens to
correlate to reality.

You're defining fact to mean "a justified belief", regardless of truth,
where the justification could be shared by others. This is the product
of a critical change in western culture, related to relativism and PC,
in which words that refer to truth and falsehood are being warped into
saying things about provable to all. So that something under disagreement
has no objectively real solution.

It's not a tenable position for an O Jew. "Ani ma'amin", I take a
given idea as a reliable truth, even though I can't prove it to others
on demand.

:                           All facts are true. All truth is not fact.

The latter statement is false, or at least, was false until the
relativists started munging our thoughtspace. I'm campaigning that youi
resist that trend and stick to the definition still in the dictionaries. A
fact is an atom of truth.

The only people trying to say otherwise are those who want to make
scientifically provable truths more real than religious ones. Who want
to rob us the ability of saying that Judaism is right and Xianity wrong
with the same absoluteness as thermodynamics is right and phlogestron
is wrong. And from the inability to say it, leading the west down the
primrose path of believing such relativistic claptrap.

I therefore have a religious motivation to debate this issue of English
language. Which is why I bothered.

: Maybe I misused the the term "objectivity" but I do not misuse either
: the term "fact" or "truth". I think they mean different things.  Let
: me ask you point blank. What evidence is there of it? Do not facts
: have to verifiable in order to ...BE... facts....

No. I showed you in the dictionaries. Thus the idiom "a matter of fact"
does not mean "a matter of empirically provable truth".

: Do you think the Mabul was a fact? How so? Yet both you and I would
: agree that it happened.....

Yes, because we're arguing about words.

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Here is the test to find whether your mission
micha@aishdas.org        on Earth is finished:
http://www.aishdas.org   if you're alive, it isn't.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Richard Bach

In a message dated 11/18/2004 10:03:24am EST, turkel@post.tau.ac.il writes:
> There is a major problem with this position. We know quite well from
> Josephus and even the Talmud that many leaders of the nation including the
> high priest and the Hasmonean kings were Saducees. As such it is highly
> unlikely that they would have agreed to a 100% Pharisee high court. Hence,
> either the Sanhedrin of Hillel and Shamai and the others mentioned in
> Avot was not "the" Sanhedrin but a Pharisee version or else there were
> representatives of all the parties that existed at that time....

Without resorting to Brisker logic <smile> it is pashut that there wer
multiple Sanhedrins!

The term Sanhedrin {Greek Synedrion} is roughly equivalent to Senate .
Here in New Jersey the state has a Senate, the Federeal Gov't has a
Senate, nighbouring Canada has a Senate and iirc YU has a Senate etc.

Then there are all kinds of SYNODS in various churches. A synod is like
a council.

Now think of Supreme Court. In most states you think of the top court of
the USA, but in New York you are referring to the LOWEST state court. kind
of confusing? Is there any justice in this world?

THE Sanhedrin refers to Beis din Hagadol. The Rambam is usually pretty
sharp in using THAT term and it makes a very useful distinction. THE
Beis Din hagadol sat in the lishka, however there wer other Sanhedrins.

{My source is primarily the survey course in Anceint Jewish History
at BRGS}

AISI one thing is pretty clear. AFTER the Churban it is highly likely
that Rabban Yochana Ben Zakkai his chaverims and Talmiddim made sure
that the Sanhedrin in Yavneh {and later} had only prsuhim. Before the
Churban - I cannot say for sure what the composition was.

another guess: by the time of the later Zuggos it was probably mostly
prushim. But earlier on, guess what? We have a Nassi named Anitogonos ish
Socho who had Talmidim named Zadok and Baissus (source Avos Der. Nassan}
Im kein it is LIKELY that talmidim were pursaed to to to the "other"
side. There probably was a period of real tension in those days. I'm
guessing that that was pretty close to the era of Yochana Koheim
Gadol. Afer all Anitogonos is right after Shimon Hatzadikk and so was
Yochanan Kohein Gadol.

And also bear in mind that while Tzadukkim hve been construed as heretics
for their beliefssince who knows when, they were still "frum" in the
manner of their behavior. E.G. they also wore Tefillin albeit their shel
rosh was in a different position. IOW The demarcations in observance was
a LOT more subtle {at least IMHO} than the difference between Observant
Jews and non-Observant Jews.

Kol Tuv,
R. Rich Wolpoe
Richard_Wolpoe@alumnimail.yu.edu

In a message dated 10/24/2004 11:05:34am EST, sba@sba2.com writes:
> Someone asked me on Shabbos why it doesn't say 've'avoreich
> mevorachecho'?

im kein Why does it say Lecha Dodi and not Leich Dodi?

Kol Tuv,
R. Rich Wolpoe
Richard_Wolpoe@alumnimail.yu.edu

Moshe Feldman wrote:
>I recall a Midrash that we can learn from the story of Yaakov and Yosef
>that one should not favor one child over the others. Can anyone provide
>the citation or at least provide the exact language of the Midrash?

In a message dated 11/1/2004 12:00:14pm EST, yadmoshe@012.net.il writes:
> *Shabbos**(10b): *Rav said that a person should not show favoritism
> to one of his children. It was because of a minor present that Yaakov
> gave to Yosef -- more than his brothers -- that they became jealous of
> him. The consequence of this jealousy was that our forefathers went into
> exile in Egypt.
....

I also heard a dvar Torah like this

Yosef named his 2 sons sheim ho'echad ... v'sheim hasheini ... iow 1
was #1 and the wnd was #2

While Moshe Rabbeinu was careful to name HIS 2 sons

Sheim ho'echad ... v'sheim ho'echad!  IOW both were #1

Source for this is unkonwon...   but 

Kol Tuv,
R. Rich Wolpoe
Richard_Wolpoe@alumnimail.yu.edu

In a message dated 11/3/2004 8:35:26pm EST, micha@aishdas.org writes:
> I'm not sure how to make a canonical list of classic quotes. The
> assessment would be overwhelmingly subjective, and largely reflective of
> the editor's own mehalekh. Everyone sees a very different set of ideas as
> "classic".

Well let's say you wer teaching a course on classics of Jewish Machshava
and you needed to put some of the top quoes in the Bibliography

Or if you were writing a Telushkin style book on Literacy in "Classic
Machshava" - what would you selections would you include from popular
peirushim etc.?

As Far as Classic Titles go, I have a pretty good list already and BEH
I will share them...

Kol Tuv,
R. Rich Wolpoe
Richard_Wolpoe@alumnimail.yu.edu

R Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
> R' Chaim is placing limits on questions and that is also how R' Zevin
> understands R' Chaim Brisker.

> A copy of R' Zevin's account is available
> <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/questionsRChaim.pdf>

R' Zevin's description is quite clearly restricting qushyos, not she'eilos
and curiousity (the subject we started with).

I think this is more relevent to the conversation than the original quote,
translation mine:
    The boundry is explained in the "Beraisa of R' Yishmael": "Two
    texts that contradict one the other, UNTIL [emph his] a third text
    comes and resolves between them." As long as we didn't find a third
    distinguishing verse, we do not have permission lehaqshos on the two
    texts that contradict one another. It is not our job. Here the Torah
    says this, and there the Torah says that. Gezeiras hakasuv. This is
    the statute of the Torah.
    But where we do find a third text, the Torah itself commands us
    to explore and lidrosh on the two texts and resolve. A "qushya"
    like this is the substance of Torah -- one of the middos by which
    one darshen's the Torah.

His constraint on questioning is very limited. (IOW, the range of
questioning he allows is quite broad.) R' Chaim speaks of trying to
resolve and apparant contradiction without recourse within Torah --
presumably relying on thought and external knowledge alone. A single
very particular kind of question.

My earlier conclusion from a different quote, particularly based on
the related story, was that R' Chaim was distinguishing between honest
qushyos and attempts to upshlug. Now my understanding is very different.

It would seem to me that R' Chaim's point is that of the parable of the
blind men and the elephant. The blind men can't reason their way out of
the paradox of this one feeling an elephant (its ear) and concluding an
elephant is like a fan, the one near the back concludes it's rope-like,
one near the front a snake, this one insists it's a wall, and another a
tree. Without more information from the elephant itself, their conclusions
will be false.

However, one is enjoined to be curious. To explore the ear or trunk. And
even to ask qushyos other than this one particular kind.

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Here is the test to find whether your mission
micha@aishdas.org        on Earth is finished:
http://www.aishdas.org   if you're alive, it isn't.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Richard Bach

Two last (b"n) things:

For a number of dictionary entries in my list, RHM asked (eg):
>> Cambridge American English: something known to have happened or to
>> exist.

> This definition comes closer to what I have been saying. Something known to
> have happened. But where do you see "facts" mentioned in this definition?

The entry name. This is the CAE's definition of fact. (You also ignore
"or to exist".) The other usage I called "NewSpeak" because it's not
yet in the dictionary (thus, "new") and makes it easier to discuss a
particular worldview rather than our own.

Second, RHM writes:
> Isn't that really the same argument we are having about the age of the
> universe, though? Can't we apply the same phrase there? For the literalists,
> the universe is 5765 years old. That... is "true for them". To those of us
> who factor in the available data, the age of the universe is much older than
> that. That... is "true for us". Two truths. Elu V'Elu. This does not take
> away the "fact" that only the empiricably provable are fact.

RHM notices that he uses the word "fact" in what I consider the
proper sense in formulating his final sentence; to diambiguate he uses
quotes. Thus, by adopting the PC definition, you ARE falling into the
trap of using the same word for both "a true idea" and an "empiricably
provable idea".

As I wrote, "eilu va'eilu" is about halakhah, not history. Only one thing
occured. There is only one historical truth about creation. We may be able
to make statements about it that seem to our minds to contradict. For that
matter, they may have actually contradicted -- perhaps the law of excluded
middle wasn't imposed on the universe until Adam needed it! There is no
"true for them". You can speak of what people think is true, or what
part of the truth they embrace. But truth is a singular thing. Again,
dangerous adoption of relativistic language to be avoided.

Your last statement is simply a restatement of your terminology. Not
some deep epistomoligcal truth, but an opinion about English definitions.

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Here is the test to find whether your mission
micha@aishdas.org        on Earth is finished:
http://www.aishdas.org   if you're alive, it isn't.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Richard Bach

From: Micha Berger  <micha@aishdas.org>
> On Mon, Nov 15, 2004  at 04:00:28PM -0500, T613K@aol.com wrote:
>: If you are alluding to  environmental concerns, then yes, mankind has a
>: duty to keep our water  and air clean, as part of our duty to build and
>: maintain civilization  [=tikun olam]...

> Is that tiqun olam? I've only heard tiqun olam defined  that way in non-O
> circles. I thought it was about ha'alas hanitzotzos or  tiqun hakochos...

I am using the pshat definition of "tikun olam" (which long predates
non-O mis-use of the term to refer to liberal politics). Pshat is that
it refers to maintaining the world, civilization. See RSRH. You are
using a kabbalistic definition of the term.

 -Toby  Katz
=============

In a message dated 11/19/2004  RHM writes:
> Isn't  that really the same argument we are having about the age of
> the universe,  though? Can't we apply the same phrase there? For the
> literalists, the  universe is 5765 years old. That... is "true for
> them". To those of us who  factor in the available data, the age of
> the universe is much older than  that. That... is "true for us". Two
> truths. Elu V'Elu.

"True for us" and "true for them" is classic relativism. "There is no
real, actual, objective truth, but whatever floats your boat, dear,
go for it."

Neither the Torah nor true science can operate that way. This is a
misrepresentation of the concept of "Elu v'Elu."

 -Toby  Katz
=============

1) I think the term, "Orthodox Conservative rabbi," which someone used
in a previous post, is a misnomer. A rabbi is either an Orthodox rabbi
or a Conservative rabbi, depending on where he received his smicha.
I think what we are talking about is Orthodox rabbis who are employed
at Conservative shuls, and whether their employment at such a shul
automatically negates the Orthodox smicha that they have received.
This is the real question. There are many Conservative rabbis who are
shomrei mitzvot, but I would not consider them an "Orthodox rabbi" because
they are personally Orthodox and also a rabbi. The term "Orthodox rabbi,"
in my opinion, means someone who has received an Orthodox smicha.

2) Fifty years ago (even 35-40 years ago) it was not that uncommon for
Orthodox rabbis to work at Conservative synagogues. In fact, legitimate
heteirim were given to these rabbis by respected poskim to work at these
shuls, for parnassa reasons and/or if there was going to be an attempt
to change the shul to a more normative Orthodox synagogue (putting
in a mechitza, etc.). Times have changed, and today I don't think you
will find any Orthodox rabbi who could get such a heter to work in a
Conservative synagogue. So let's assume there's a 75-year-old YU graduate
who, back in the 50s, receieved a heter to work in a Conservative shul.
He still is the rabbi there. He is Orthodox in practice in his personal
life. Would the fact that times have changed negate the original psak
that he received allowing him to work at such a synagogue?

Michael Feldstein
Stamford, CT

On Fri, Nov 19, 2004 at 01:18:15PM -0500, MIKE38CT@aol.com wrote:
: 1) I think the term, "Orthodox Conservative rabbi," which someone used
: in a previous post, is a misnomer. A rabbi is either an Orthodox rabbi
: or a Conservative rabbi, depending on where he received his smicha.....

I took the original title of this thread to refer to an O [man] who we're
identifying as a C Rabbi. IOW, he is C in ordination and affiliation
who personally is O. Can such a person exist, or does his position as C
"rabbi" contradict his being O?

The C notion of who is a "good Jew" includes our definition of the concept.
Therefore, unless there is something inherently non-O with the affiliation
or believing in an unrealistic "red line" it's possible for someone to be C
as well as O.

But that's a big "unless".

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                    ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

Isaac A Zlochower <zlochoia@bellatlantic.net> wrote:
> I have greater difficulties, however, with the idea proclaimed by Zvi
> and others that Hashem created an old appearing world replete with
> fossils of creatures and plants that never lived, and whose rocks
> contained artificial compositions of radioisotopes and their nuclear
> decay products. Are we to believe that there is divine delight taken in
> fooling us or in some odd sense of divine aesthetics? I don't know if I
> would place my trust in such a being. We appear to have a scenario which
> serves to demean the Creator in order to make the text of His torah be
> literally true. I would rather take some liberty in reinterpreting the
> verses than to accept such a theological stance.

At the risk of boring everyone, let me repeat myself. As I see it, the
key insight here is "ve'ein tzayar keilokeinu". G-d is an artist, and
this world is a work of art. What's more, I posit that He is a realist,
and thus made a plausible world, a world that not only runs by certain
physical laws, but appears in every way consistent with those laws.
The Supreme Artist bothered to make everything look real, not just on the
surface but everywhere, and put in convincing details to add to the sense
of realism. And then He told us what He did, and signed His Name to His
work, 3314.5 years ago at Mt Sinai (and before that, in visions He granted
to Adam, Noach, the Avot, etc.), so it is unfair to call Him a liar, any
more than an actor is a liar for not breaking character while on stage.

-- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> : What about elu V'Elu? Are you saying that there is only one objective
> : reality and one of the perspectives is actually false? This is not my
> : understanding of it.

> One can be a pluralist and believe that Hashem gave us a system for
> deriving two different ways of reaching our goal, and left it to us to
> choose which we take. There is no contradiction in objective reality to
> say G-d gave us both.

You're saying that the valid age of the universe is equally 5765 years
old and 15 billion years old. Two truths, yes. But... two facts?

> Second, as R' Tzadoq writes, in the world of thought there is no law of
> excluded middle. IOW, A and B can contradict and yet both be objectively
> true. It's not a difference in perspective, that within perspective X,
> A is true, and from perspective Y, B is. Rather, there is an antinomy,
> what RYBS would call an unresolvable dialectic -- two things that are
> true with no limitation of perspective even though they contradict.

This is a good illustration of truth. But it is no illustration of
fact.

> : You don't think belief is subjective? Is belief less valid a truth
> : than fact?

> Belief means that someone considers an idea to be true. There is no
> indication from the word "belief" that he is correct. Unlike fact, which
> -- as I showed from a collection of on-line dictionaries, is supposed
> to refer to ideas that are true, whether believed by anyone or not.

> So yes, belief, because it says nothing about truth, is "less valid a
> truth than fact", which is definitionally a truth.

Belief says everything about truth. Belief equals Emunah. Does Emunah
require facts? We beleive B'Emunah Shelaima in the existence of God.
That is a truth. It is the highest of truths. But it is not a fact.
It is a belief.

I must ask whether your belief in God is fact based. What facts do you
have to support it? This may sound like Apikursus but I am simply
trying to point out that belief in God does not depend on facts in
evidence. Belief is NOT less valid than fact, despite an assertion by
some that it is. How do you define Emunah P'Shutah? Is that not pure
belief devoid of facts?

> A fact, i.e. a true idea, that is believed, and that the person has a
> justification for believing, is called "knowledge".

Facts can and should be believed. No argument here. Let's leave
knowledge out of it.

> You're defining fact to mean "a justified belief", regardless of
> truth,

No I'm not. Facts equal verifiable data. That's all. Facts are true.

> This is the product
> of a critical change in western culture, related to relativism and PC,
> in which words that refer to truth and falsehood are being warped into
> saying things about provable to all. So that something under disagreement
> has no objectively real solution.

> It's not a tenable position for an O Jew. "Ani ma'amin", I take a
> given idea as a reliable truth, even though I can't prove it to others
> on demand.

True it is. Fact it is not.

> The only people trying to say otherwise are those who want to make
> scientifically provable truths more real than religious ones. 

They may be the ones who got me to thinking about it, but that doesn't
make them automatically wrong. I disagree with their hierarchy. They
may have come up with this to disparage truth as having a lesser value
than fact but that is their problem and I do not agree with them. There
is more to truth than facts. Facts can be one aspect of truth. but they
do not equal truth.

> : Maybe I misused the the term "objectivity" but I do not misuse either
> : the term "fact" or "truth". I think they mean different things. Let
> : me ask you point blank. What evidence is there of it? Do not facts
> : have to verifiable in order to ...BE... facts....

> No. I showed you in the dictionaries. Thus the idiom "a matter of fact"
> does not mean "a matter of empirically provable truth".

The expression "As a matter of fact" means the same to you as the
expression "As a matter of truth"?

> : Do you think the Mabul was a fact? How so? Yet both you and I would
> : agree that it happened.....

> Yes, because we're arguing about words.

In truth, I believe that's a fact.

HM

From: Harry Maryles <hmaryles@yahoo.com>
> This definition comes closer to what I have been saying. Something
> known to have happened. But where do you see "facts" mentioned in this
> definition? It isn't. One can "know" something happened without empirical
> facts. The Mabul comes to mind. Perhaps someday we will be able to prove
> through the discovery of facts that it happened but presently the facts
> seem to point in the opposite direction. Yet we still know it is true.

That's not "knowing" -- that's "believing".

The two are not the same.

akiva

On Fri, Nov 19, 2004  Isaac A Zlochower wrote:
>I have greater difficulties, however, with the idea proclaimed by Zvi
>and others that Hashem created an old appearing world replete with
>fossils of creatures and plants that never lived, and whose rocks
>contained artificial compositions of radioisotopes and their nuclear
>decay products. Are we to believe that there is divine delight taken in
>fooling us or in some odd sense of divine aesthetics? I don't know if I
>would place my trust in such a being. We appear to have a scenario which
>serves to demean the Creator in order to make the text of His torah be
>literally true. I would rather take some liberty in reinterpreting the
>verses than to accept such a theological stance.

I don't think 'fooling us' is the proper or only way of describing such a
scenario. Perhaps it is simply a very rigorous test of our unconditional
devotion and trust in G-d. The test essentially involves presenting
us with a wealth of scientific data using which we could extrapolate
(backwards in time) a model of the universe that is inconsistent with
the literal interpretation of Torah. Whether our trust in G-d and the
authenticity of His Torah is diminished by this and if so to what degree,
determines how well we do on this test. Yes, we could appeal to our
intellect and say that we can employ it to reconcile Torah and science
(usually by reinterpreting Torah non-literally)... but possibly this is
the wrong approach and is considered as placing our trust in ourselves
(our science, our minds, our interpretations of the world around us,
even our logic) instead of trusting G-d.

I'm not saying that's the case, I'm just showing that we need not
necessarily think that in the literalist approach G-d is fooling us
somehow. In fact, you might as well argue that the evil inclination
and the temptations it causes are also attempts to deceive us. During
moments when we are tempted to sin, we do not see the true nature of
reality and it is our task to uncover the falsehood of reality's nature
that the evil inclination suggests to us. Sometimes a certain choice
seems intellectually and logically correct, and the test is to put our
intellects aside and choose according to the Torah - not our logic.

Leonid Portnoy

> See "My Uncle the Netziv" where the Torah Temimah quotes the Netziv as
> saying that the reason for many of the Rambam's mistakes in halacha was
> because he learned by himself while putting together the Yad Hachazakah.
> (I don't know if it is in the censored version.)

It's in the english version. There is no censored version.

(The english version IS an adaptation of the hebrew, so things were
left out.)

Akiva
-- 
there are no dilemmas without confusion, there's no free will without
dilemmas, and there's no humanity without free will.

Harry Weiss <hjweiss@panix.com> wrote:
>  From: "Zev Sero" <zev@sero.name>
>> I assume the same arrangement would also allow someone to carry in the
>> street on shabbat. At least, I know the human mechitzah works on shabbat,

> How would it work on Shabbos. The problem is not moving within the box,
> but moving the box itself. The box works by carrying.

Inside the box is a reshut hayachid, so a person standing there is
allowed to carry. I haven't seen anything directly on point, but it
seems a chidush to me to say that a person standing in reshut hayachid,
with no part of him sticking into reshut harabim, is restricted in what
he can do inside that reshut hayachid.

> I have seen our local Chabad Shaliach (who is a Kohen) use it to attend
> and conduct Levayas. It just feels very strange to me. Until recently
> I have never seen such a thing. I just find it hard to understand that
> for thousand of years no one devloped such a box. it does not require
> high technology. Thinking of Hilchot Sukkah, if wall move/flap there
> is a problem. When the Kohen lifts up the box and walks with it arent't
> the walls moving?

Not true. A succah can be built on a wagon or a ship (or a truck), and
is perfectly kosher even when the vehicle is moving. Perhaps you're
thinking of a succah that is so flimsy that it will fall over in an
ordinary wind, and is therefore not fit for use even as a temporary
dwelling; I've heard some people worry on this ground about walls that
flap, and insist that the walls have to be 100% rigid, but I've never
seen any support for such an idea, and I think they're mistaken, because
a flapping wall doesn't prevent a person from taking his ease inside -
think of a tent, which is a perfect dirat arai (though of course not a
kosher succah, because it's made of sechach pasul).

But in any case, this is not relevant here, for two reasons: 1) the walls
themselves are rigid and don't flap in the wind, so the box (if big enough
and covered with schach) would be a kosher succah even while it is being
carried around, and the occupant would be allowed to eat bread inside it,
just as he may in a succah that is on the back of a moving truck.

2 vehu ha'ikar) Even if the box were flimsy and easy to blow over there
would be no problem, because the only reason a flimsy succah is pasul
is because it's not a dirah, and a succah must be a dirah, albeit a
dirat arai. With mechitzot shabbat, or mechitzat hakever, fitness for
dwelling isn't a criterion at all. There is no doubt whatsoever that one
is allowed to carry inside a moving wagon on shabbat, nor is there any
doubt that a kohen inside a moving car may drive within 4 amot of kevarim.
How is the box different than a car?

-- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

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