Avodah Mailing List

Volume 16 : Number 003

Tuesday, October 11 2005

• Shofar on Shabbos
• How Detached Are We?
• RE: Shofar on Shabbos
• Shofar on Shabbos
• Re: statistics
• RE: Torah & Evolution
• Re: Torah & Evolution
• Keeping Yorzeit - after 50 years
• Re: Shofar on Shabbos
• rough wooden box
• =?iso-8859-1?Q?Israel=B4s_Prof._Aumann_Wins_Nobel_Prize_in_Economics/Appl?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?ications_to_Talmud?=
• Re: shofar in the morning
• Gadol ... uveminyan
• Re: Keeping Yorzeit - after 50 years
• Re: Hashkofa learned from prayer?

Somebody wrote:
"What is the risk that someone is going to carry a shofar, on Shabbos
Rosh Hashana?"

Another reason given is what if the shofar breaks and then has to be
repaired? That was another reason why there is an issur for blowing
the shofar on Shabbos. Also, it should be pointed out that in the
Beis Hamikdash in Yerushalaym the shofar WAS sounded on Shabbos (but not
outside of the area). Perhaps carrying wasn't an issue then, but the risk
of repair would have been the same. So why didn't it bother them then?
This would indicate that the reason may be more complex.

The Talmud relates that very soon after the Temple was destroyed,
Rosh HaShanah fell on Shabbat. The Rabbis were at a loss as to what
to do, and wanted to sit down and debate the issue. But Rabban Yohanan
ben Zakkai recognized the crucial importance of establishing Rabbinic
authority to replace the centrality of the Temple that was lost. He said
to his colleagues, "you know what, it is Rosh HaShanah, the people are
gathered outside, they are expecting to hear the Shofar, let's sound the
Shofar now, and then later, when the pressure is off, we can discuss the
issue." So they sounded the Shofar. Then later, the Rabbis came to Rabban
Yohanan ben Zakkai and said: "Okay, now let us discuss whether or not to
sound the Shofar on Shabbat." And Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai responded:
"We already sounded it - what is left to discuss!?"

But that was not the end of the issue. Ultimately the prohibition of
sounding the Shofar on Shabbat had to do with the prohibition of carrying
anything in public space on Shabbat. But in the course of the discussion,
it was pointed out that the Torah itself contains two different verses
mandating Rosh HaShanah. B'midbar says: yom teruah yehiye lachem, you
are to have a day of Shofar sounding. Vayikra says: Shabbaton zichron
teruah, you are to have a day of rest, commemorated with the sounding of
the Shofar. Both verses mention Rosh HaShanah as a time of sounding the
Shofar; neither verse mentions Shabbat at all. But the Rabbis interpreted
the first text to refer to a regular weekday Rosh HaShanah, and the second
text to refer to Rosh HaShanah that falls on Shabbat, "a commemoration
of blowing the Shofar." Hence the prohibition is really mid'rabbanan.

I have always found it fascination that shofar does not require a minyan.
The mitzvah is fulfilled even if you blow shofar yourself in your house.
You would think that such a major mitzvah of R"H would require a
minyan. What this homiletically can teach is that when it comes to
fulfilling the ultimate meaning of the shofar, one must do it alone,
even without a minyan!

Verse 6 (ch.32) of Ha'azinu begins with a "hay" which is detached from
the word that follows. This "hay" is the end of Moses' signature. If
one takes the first letters of verses 1-6 (hay,yud,chof,hay,shin,hay),
they add up to 345 by way of gematria which represents the value of
the letters in Moses' name (mem,shin,hay). In this way Moses affixed
his name to the book, ending his "signature" with the detached "hay."
(Tanch. Ha'azinu 5.)

Here is my spin on this detached "hay." Firstly, this is the only
place in all of Tanach where this word (hay, lamed, etc.) occursג€”the
ONLY place. The hay introduces an interrogative: "Is it to HaShem that
you do this, oh vile and unwise people?!" So, in essence Moses asks
incredulously how Israel could have been so vile and unwise against God,
Who did everything for them. How could they be so ungrateful? They were
vile in their lack of gratitude and unwise in not considering the dire
consequences of their rebellion against God (Rashi).

So from that perspective, their behavior detached them from God,
symbolized by the detached hay.

On October 7, 2005 Cantor Wolberg wrote:
> Somebody wrote:
> "What is the risk that someone is going to carry a shofar, on Shabbos
> Rosh Hashana?" 

> Another reason given is what if the shofar breaks and then has to be
> repaired? That was another reason why there is an issur for blowing
> the shofar on Shabbos. 

I haven't been following this thread but I don't see the problem. The
Gemara states openly that "everyone is mechuyav in Shofar but not everyone
is baki in Shofar" and thus we are afraid that a person who is not baki in
Shofar will take his shofar to a baki to blow for him and will transgress
the issur of hotzaah on Shabbos. What's wrong with that reason? Keep
in mind that unlike our urbanized lifestyles, our forefathers lived
primarily in small villages. That's why there are four days for kerias
megilla, due to the lack of bekeim in these far flung villages and thus,
"carrying' was a serious chashash in those days.

> Also, it should be pointed out that in the
> Beis Hamikdash in Yerushalaym the shofar WAS sounded on Shabbos (but not
> outside of the area).

Because Cohanim are zerizim (and bekeim) so there was no chashash in
the Beis HaMikdash.

As far as your repair reason, it's the same thing as what the Gemara says.
A non-baki might have a shofar nisdak and not know if it's kosher and
take it to a chacham thereby possibly transgressing haavars dalet amos
birshus harabim.

Simcha Coffer

Somebody wrote:
The point I'm getting to is that Chazal seem to have been very concerned
with even an extremely remote risk. Seriously, folks: What is the risk
that someone is going to carry a shofar, on Shabbos Rosh Hashana, through
a reshus harabim d'Oraisa, to bring it to a chacham, so that he can learn
how to blow it? Yet it is because of that possibility, that ALL of us
have been denied the benefits of hearing the shofar on that day in shul.

Actually Mateh Dan (R. David Nieto) spends a while in Part II on showing
that ignorance was widespread during that time and carrying a shofar on
Shabbos was a very real concern. TO elaborate, when Torah ShBaal Peh
could only be learned from a Rebbe and all that average people knew
was a smattering of some halachos, plus various sectarian groups that
existed, it is a very real chashash.

M. Levin

On Wed, 5 Oct 2005, micha@aishdas.org wrote:
>Still, a statistic that n% of people would die doesn't determine mi
>yichyeh... But it does constrain how many can merit it -- until the end
>of hesteir panim.

Let's consider the decline in mortality rates compared to 200 years
ago, due to the use of modern technology (antibiotics, medical imaging,
surgical procedures, and so on). How we can reconcile this decline with
our conception that the determination of who lives and who dies is made
based upon each individual's merit? The argument is as follows:

Assumption #1: The proportion of reshoim to non-reshoim has remained
almost the same throughout the past 100 years.
Assumption #2: If one is found to be a rasha on Rosh Hashanah, he is
decreed to die within the year.

The logical conclusion from these assumptions is that there should be
the same number of people dying now as there were one hundred years ago.
However, this is not the case. Therefore, one (or both) of the assumptions
must be wrong. Assumption #1 seems like it is more or less true - the
basic nature of humanity has not changed, political or other types of
progress notwithstanding. So assumption #2 must not hold. How can that
be? Perhaps even when one is deemed a rasha, but yet external factors make
it less likely for him to lose his life in a natural way, he does not in
fact die within the year. (The external factors could be, for instance
that he visited doctors throughout his life, took immunization shots,
avoids dangerous activities, will have access to modern medicine if he
gets sick, and so on. When combined together, a population that does
all these things will be found statistically to have a lower mortality
rate). A question remains however - if that individual does not die,
then how is his punishment effected?

Leonid Portnoy

On October 6, 2005 Micha Berger wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 06, 2005 at 01:23:55AM -0400, S & R Coffer wrote:
>:> Your argument must be flawed. After all, we can and do assert that Hashem
>:> exists, even though all we can comprehend about Him are the boundries
>:> of what is incomprehensible.

>: I'm sure you know that
>: the only thing we can understand about Hashem is how he is manifested
>: through his "actions" here on earth...

> I happened to be referring to R' Saadia Gaon's
> and the Rambam's notion of negative attributes.

Both R' Saadia Gaon and the Rambam hold exactly the same as the Maharal.
(See maamar sheini in Emunos v'deyos and Hilchos Yesodei haTorah perek
aleph halachos 11 and 12) As far as negative attributes go, they were
created precisely due to the need of characterizing God in a tangible
way and yet utilizing terminology that does not violate the true reality
of His existence which is entirely unknown. All negative attributes have
their source in positive physical attributes and thus, on a fundamental
level, are entirely within our frame of reference.

While we're on the subject of RSG and the Rambam, both hold that time is
purely physical, is associated purely with our physical universe, and
has an end just like our physical universe unlike your idea that time
exists in a different form in the higher worlds. Not to mention every
other rishon and acharon (e.g. the Gra) that I can think of. (mareh
mekomos available upon request) Just an observation...

>: I have
>: taken the time to translate several paragraphs in Rav Dessler's maamar
>: that support my contention that he was never talking about the real
>: flow of time but was rather talking about how the real flow of time is
>: perceived by mankind....

> So? I told you what I believe REED is saying in those examples -- that
> the flow of time is a perception, not a thing-in-itself.

And it is this belief that I am questioning. Rav Dessler never says
that the flow of time is a perception. He states "hazman murgash l'adam
biyachas l'hischadshus harishmim shehu mikabel" Time is felt to man in
relation to the frequency of new impressions that he experiences. The
pashut peshat in this sentence is: Time - i.e. what we normally understand
time to be - is felt by man etc. According to you, we must insert a
whole new concept that we must suppose Rav Dessler held *in advance*
of this sentence as follows: Time - e.g. the essentially unknowable
entity that exists simultaneously in higher and lower worlds but in
the lower worlds is really only a perception - is felt by man etc. But
once again, I challenge you to come up with a sentence anywhere in this
maamar that would indicate that Rav Dessler is associating the essence of
physical time purely with our perception. You are begging the question
by introducing your own notions into Rav Dessler's words. After all,
take a look at the mashal of the boy...You write "Veharaayah, it (the
flow of time) runs at subjective speeds" and yet I'm sure even you would
be modeh that an individual boy's experiences, while slowing down the
perception of time for him, is a purely subjective impression and would
not affect the physical temporal flow as calculated by a time measuring
device such as a clock. Now, if Rav Dessler was indeed trying to express
the idea that the flow of time is contingent on our perception, the mashal
of the boy is entirely out of place. I have mentioned this argument to
you three times now.

> This dismissing of an objvective flow of time
> is the thread running through the maamar from the paragraphs you
> translated, to saying the Ramban held 6 literal days which are
> literally identical to (not representing or connected, but identical)
> to the subsequent 6 millenia

O.K. back to the drawing board.

Michtav MeEliyahu Chelek Beis pg. 152
After quoting the entire Ramban, Rav Dessler states as follows:
"And it is noteworthy that sometimes the Ramban writes there [in his
pirush] that this and this particular day [of creation] "alludes"
to this and this particular 1000 year period (of our six thousand year
world) or that it "corresponds" to it, and sometimes he writes utilizing
ontological terminology, that this and this particular day *is* this
and this particular thousand year period. That is, sometimes he writes
[using terminology that corresponds] with our [physical] perception, and
as we've mentioned before, that the Torah documents events as we perceive
them utilizing our terminology and thus, they (the days) of creation only
"allude" to the six thousand year period; and sometimes he (the Ramban)
writes according to their fundamental essence [in which case] the inner
essence of the six days of creation, and the spiritual revelations of
the six thousand years are really one and the same."

So now we see that the only time they are literally the same is at their
fundamentally spiritual level, *not* their physical level, unlike the
way you represented it above that all normal physical boundaries may be
crossed to explain the six and six phenomenon, that we may "dismiss' the
flow of time and say that the six days and six millennia are physically
one and the same (in some incomprehensible way).

>: Michtav MeEliyahu Chelek Beis pg. 154
...
> Yes! Man's bechinah of time is that of a flow. However, in reality,
> time "really does exist ... and does not go out of existence. And when
> the concealment of time is finally nullified, ... he will see all at
> once. ... All is really one entity which exists together at 'once'. This
> is the world of eternity which possesses no past or future."

I'm sorry but the above paragraph is a patently egregious
misrepresentation of my translation. You have inserted the sentence
"Yes! Man's bechinah of time is that of a flow. However, in reality,
time" in front of certain carefully selected passages from my translation
to make it look like Rav Dessler is referring to time but anyone who
reads the translation above can plainly see that he was not referring
to time but was rather referring to the spiritual components of man's
soul. You even quote the words "And when the concealment of time is
finally nullified," yet seem to ignore the fact that this passage is
in direct contradiction to your idea that time is never nullified and
continues to exist in its ethereal form.

> This is the view of eternity -- the complete map of time -- held by Adam,
> a not-yet-born soul, 

A not-yet-born soul? What are you saying? That the Adam who ate from
the eitz hadaas was not yet physically created? So how did he eat from
the eitz hadaas??

Simcha Coffer

On Sun, Oct 09, 2005 at 02:57:13AM -0400, S & R Coffer wrote:
:> I happened to be referring to R' Saadia Gaon's
:> and the Rambam's notion of negative attributes.

: Both R' Saadia Gaon and the Rambam hold exactly the same as the Maharal.
: (See maamar sheini in Emunos v'deyos and Hilchos Yesodei haTorah perek
: aleph halachos 11 and 12)...

They don't even hold the same as each other.  Both believe in:
1- Negative attributes
2- Attributes that describe how Hashem's actions appear to us

However, R' Saadia also has a third category of middos not in the 
Moreh:
3- Attributes of our relationship to Him

The Maharal only discusses the second category.

...
: While we're on the subject of RSG and the Rambam, both hold that time is
: purely physical, is associated purely with our physical universe, and
: has an end just like our physical universe unlike your idea that time
: exists in a different form in the higher worlds. Not to mention every
: other rishon and acharon (e.g. the Gra) that I can think of. (mareh
: mekomos available upon request) Just an observation...

First, it is only relevent what REED says.

Second, I do not say it's different in other worlds. I understand the
MmE as saying that the "all there at once" view of things is what's
real in this world. As opposed to how we percieve this world.

...
: And it is this belief that I am questioning. Rav Dessler never says
: that the flow of time is a perception. He states "hazman murgash l'adam
: biyachas l'hischadshus harishmim shehu mikabel" Time is felt to man in
: relation to the frequency of new impressions that he experiences. The
: pashut peshat in this sentence is: Time - i.e. what we normally understand
: time to be - is felt by man etc. According to you, we must insert a
: whole new concept that we must suppose Rav Dessler held *in advance*
: of this sentence as follows: Time - e.g. the essentially unknowable
: entity that exists simultaneously in higher and lower worlds but in
: the lower worlds is really only a perception - is felt by man etc....

Huh? Where does this difficulty come from?

: once again, I challenge you to come up with a sentence anywhere in this
: maamar that would indicate that Rav Dessler is associating the essence of
: physical time purely with our perception...

He defines the flow of time as murgash in your very quote!

But why do you think that the flow of time is "the essence of physical
time"? That is neither in the MmE nor in Special Relativity (which
predates the maamar in question, BTW).

Again, it's clear from R' Dessler that time doesn't really flow, that
the flow of time can be experienced as two very different durations,
and that the same strip of time can be traversed multiple times and
experienced as different durations each traversal.

The part of the ma'amar you're focusing on is still in a ma'amar about
the zeman of bereishis and the zeman of history. If it were the maskanah,
rather than a simple proof that flow is perception, how would establishing
that different people experience time differently set the stage for his
peshat in the Ramban? And, why is it the beginning of the ma'amar rather
than the last section of it?

: Michtav MeEliyahu Chelek Beis pg. 152
...
: "And it is noteworthy that sometimes the Ramban writes there [in his
: pirush] that this and this particular day [of creation] "alludes"
: to this and this particular 1000 year period (of our six thousand year
: world) or that it "corresponds" to it, and sometimes he writes utilizing
: ontological terminology, that this and this particular day *is* this
: and this particular thousand year period. That is, sometimes he writes
: [using terminology that corresponds] with our [physical] perception, and
: as we've mentioned before, that the Torah documents events as we perceive
: them utilizing our terminology and thus, they (the days) of creation only
: "allude" to the six thousand year period; and sometimes he (the Ramban)
: writes according to their fundamental essence [in which case] the inner
: essence of the six days of creation, and the spiritual revelations of
: the six thousand years are really one and the same."

"Yeish letzayein" means "noteworthy" rather than denoting a problem
that needs further explanation?

You're making your point in your insertions:
The original has nothing about "[physical] perception". REED doesn't say
"bechinah" or "murgash", he says "hasagah".

Second, it has nothing about spiritual revelations. "Giluyei" refers to
what unfolds over the course of history. Not about spiritual revelations,
but about the experience of time. In the case of achar hacheit, how the
hole passes over the map.

My translation:
"That is, something he (the Rambam) writes according to our perception,
like we saw above that the Torah is written according to our comprehension
and language, and according to this they are a hint to their essence. And
there are times when he writes as they are in themselves actually,
that the substance of the days and the substance of what is revealed
over millenia are one subject."

According to comprehension, we can only understand them as signs or
allusions. Ontologically, they are identical.

And he then writes:
"AQnd this is the language of the Gra ..., "Three times: reishis, acharis
vehoveh' -- (meaning that they are three bechinos of time) -- "by ma'aseh
bereishis it says bereieshis, that the six first days included all six
thousand years.'"

First, note that REED uses the word "bechinah" in his interruption of
the quote from the Gra.

But to the point, REED identifies the Ramban's position with the Gra's
and accepts it as his own. We perceive time as past present and future,
but the first six days literally included all of history.

At the end of this portion of the ma'amar, he continues quoting the Gra
(leaving jargon intact):
"'And acharis haymim, which is le'asifd lavo, when everything will return
to their source (Source?). As it says thart HQBH will be metaheir the
whole world in acharis hayamim, which is why it's called "teshuvah" for
they return to their sources. THE PRESENT IS THE CURRENT TIME WHICH IS
THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL.' (emphasis REED's) Until here his [the
Gra's] language. And it is as we saw above, the 6 days of bereishis are
themselves the 6 thousand years mamash. That their tochen and giluyim
are one. However, how we understand them is different in the way that
bechirah is different after the sin of Adam haRishon. Now the musag
hagilui is in a differentiated manner, and spread out over 6 thousand
years for it is the time of bechirah -- of da'as tov vara. The geder
of acharis hayamim is that then everything will return to the bechinah
of re'iyas gan eiden, which is gilui in a manner of full deveiqus
like before the sin, and there can not be in this any change or chiluf
zeman, for it is all one gilui...."

Can I pause here for a moment and ask you to reread that line? Achareis
hayamim, like qodem hacheit, is a state without shinui or chiluf zeman.

My thesis, stated outright. Not "could only mean", not "all he says"
without quoting the entire ma'amar. Not words inserted in brackets.

To continue the paragraph:
"The geder of acharis hayamim is that then everything will return to
the bechinah of re'iyas gan eiden, which is gilui in a manner of full
deveiqus like before the sin, and there can not be in this any change
or chiluf zeman, for it is all one gilui. And in truth, those
giluyim are mamash of six millenia, but they are understood in another
manner of understanding. What the astonished ask about the shortness
of the 6 yemei bereishis, there does not apply there any shortness or
length at all. KN"L."

And in the last sentence is the point with which you took objection.

:       You even quote the words "And when the concealment of time is
: finally nullified," yet seem to ignore the fact that this passage is
: in direct contradiction to your idea that time is never nullified and
: continues to exist in its ethereal form.

Concealment of time is nullified -- acharis hayamim.

Time, sans human perception, does exist in its true form -- as the map.

:> This is the view of eternity -- the complete map of time -- held by Adam,
:> a not-yet-born soul, 

: A not-yet-born soul? What are you saying? That the Adam who ate from
: the eitz hadaas was not yet physically created? So how did he eat from
: the eitz hadaas??

I was referring to REED's quote of Chazal (Niddah 30b) discussing "adam
qodem leidaso", the not yet born soul. Not Adam, but the usual [ben] adam.
time. See pg 153, 6th line from bottom. "That a person, before his birth,
looks out and sees from one end of the world to another. Meaning, that he
sees in the mabat ha'acharis and experiences that all is one, and all
emerges only from His Kavod Yisbarakh." Aside from the sentence itself
explaining that the fetus's soul sees all of time at once, we saw above
from his eplanation of the Gra what acharis means.

I get the impression that you still don't "chap" my understanding of the
MmE's shitah. Please don't put strawmen in my mouth.

GCT!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Man is a drop of intellect drowning in a sea
micha@aishdas.org        of instincts.
http://www.aishdas.org                         - Rav Yisrael Salanter
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

Some time ago someone asked if there is any validity to what some claim
that Kaddish etc is only said for 50 years after the petireh.
IIRC, at the time, no one commented.

Tonight I saw that this is discussed by the Munkatcher rav zt'l in Shu'T
Minchas Elazar [vol 5:33].

He totally debunks it adding that this 'minhag' has its background from
some European non-Jewish sources - where they used to clear out graves
after 50 years.
[AFAIK this is still practiced in Belgium [maybe 25 years] - which is
why the local Kehilos have their Botei Chaim in neigbouring Hollan.]

SBA

I don't see why people think that it is so unlikely that somebody would
carry a shofar on Shabbos. Granted we wouldn't do it because we went to
Cheder etc., but somebody who is an am haaretz might think that learning
ho= w to blow a shofar is docheh Shabbos. Especially when there was a
shitah that kol tzorchei milah were docheh Shabbos.

 -Ezra

I got drafted to give a Yom Kippur drasha in shul this year. Here's a
rough draft -- I hope it's in time for useful comments/supplements.

1. The Ramban (Aharei Moth 16:8) says that the s'ir la'azazel was a
bribe to Samael, and it's not idolatrous becuse we give it only because
God told us to. Yet the Rambam (H. AZ 1:1) says that the delusion that
God wants us to give things to his assistants is "ikkaro shel AZ".
What can the Ramban mean?

2. Rabbi Kook (Oroth HaTshuva 5:6*) cites the midrash "tshuva kadmah
l'olam" and explains it to mean that tshuva is an essential part of
human nature. He then points out that this is paradoxical: tshuva means
abandoning one's sins and returning to an uncorrupted nature, so what
need has uncorrupted nature for tshuva?
He responds that part of being human is not to be static but to strive
for ever greater holiness, and that is the essence of tshuva.

3. The Rambam (H. Tshuva 5:3) identifies tshuva with free will. I think
Rabbi Kook is best understood as explaining the Rambam (cf. H. Tshuva 7:3)
as applying not only to aveiroth, but to all parts of one's life.

4. The gemara (Yoma 39a) mentions that the box (kalfi) which housed the
lots the kohen gadol used to select the seirim was made of wood, not gold,
becuase "has hkbh al mamonan shel yisrael". Yet if it had been made of
gold the gemara would have said because "ein aniyuth bimakom ashiruth".
What does the answer mean?
I suggest that "ein aniyuth bimakom ashiruth" represents the beith
hamikdash as an awful (archaic usage) place, where one's free will is
lost to fear of God, and "has hkbh al mamonan shel yisrael" represents
God wanting people to retain their free will (for a different answer
see Yismah Lev ad. loc.).

5. The two s'irim were supposed to be identical, and the kohen gadol
cast lots to determine which was which to represent that there was no
attempt at predetermination. The identical s'irim represent what we can
do to last last year's us. We have the free choice (represented by the
wooden box) of remaining as we were (la'azazel) or of improving ourselves
(lashem).

6. Last years us was good enough for last year's Yom Kippur. The bribe
the Ramban speaks about is a metaphoric version of Rabbi Kook's constant
striving for more. We take last years us, which was good enough for God,
and appraise it as appropriate for Samael, because this year we intend
to have an even better us for God.

David Riceman 

Prof. Robert J. Aumann is a co-winner of this year's Nobel Prize in
Economics, for "enhancing our understanding of conflict and cooperation
through game-theory analysis." Aumann, a religious Jew who grew up in New
York City and currently resides in Jerusalem, won the prestigious prize
together with Prof. Thomas C. Schelling of the University of Maryland. The
two established game theory as the dominant approach towards understanding
conflict and cooperation between countries, individuals and organizations.
They will share the $1.3 million prize. Prof. Aharoni said that a famous
article by Prof. Aumann, in which he applies his theories to explain a
difficult Mishna in Tractate Ketubot and another Mishna in Tractate Baba
Metzia "caused economists and mathematicians around the world to take
an interest in Talmudic texts and see how they deal with economic/legal
issues." Aumann has shown that the Talmud and Rishonim were well aware of
sophisticated concepts of modern risk taking and that the 2000 year old
Talmud prescribes bankruptcy solutions that equal precisely the nucleoli
of the corresponding Coalitional games. Between 1901 and 2004, more than
740 Nobel Prizes were handed out of which at least 156 were Jews. Thus
Jews have been awarded over 21% of Nobel Prizes while being about 0.25%
of the world population.

For links to the papers on the Talmud see the October 10, 2005 item at
www.toriah.org

The papers are also available at Prof. Aumann's website.

KCT
JSO

From: Elly Bachrach <ebachrach@engineeringintent.com>
>I have a rosh hashanna question: there are very strong ties between the
>musaf and the blowing of the shofar. But the gemara relates how originally
>the shofar was blown in the morning, not at musaf. Does that mean that
>historically malchuyos, zichronos, and shofaros were originally sections
>of shacharis? ...

The Baal HaMaor RH Ch 4 dibur hamatchil VaAni Omer proposes that the
tfilot on RH all should have 9 brachot - including malchuyot, zichronot,
and shofarot "ha le'inyan brachot ze ve'ze (Shacharit and Musaf) shavin"

Dov A Bloom
dovb@netvision.net.il

In an Areivim discussion, someone lauded his source's pedagogic and
public speaking. To which another asked, "how do the facts that someone
is a powerful orator and has a large following make them more of a
gadol? Were there no better qualities ... to invoke to explain why the
author was wrong?"

To which R' Moshe Y. Gluck <mslatfatf@access4less.net> replied:
> "Gadol b'chochma u'v'minyan" is explained by some (the minyan part) as
> having more students. IOW, one who has more students is greater than one
> who doesn't.

What it says is that he has more authority in establishing halakhah.
Interestingly, that does not imply an assumption of superiority.

For example, acharei rabim lahatos. And what if the rabim are known to
be less wise than the mu'atim? We still follow the rabim (which, as I
just mentioned in the "lo bashamayim hi" thread, is one reason given for
why we follow Beis Hillel). Beis Shammai were the greater gedolim, though.

GCT!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Despair is the worst of ailments. No worries
micha@aishdas.org        are justified except: "Why am I so worried?"
http://www.aishdas.org                         - Rav Yisrael Salanter
Fax: (270) 514-1507

SBA wrote:
> Some time ago someone asked if there is any validity to what some claim
> that Kaddish etc is only said for 50 years after the petireh.
> IIRC, at the time, no one commented.

> Tonight I saw that this is discussed by the Munkatcher rav zt'l in Shu'T
> Minchas Elazar [vol 5:33].

> He totally debunks it adding that this 'minhag' has its background from
> some European non-Jewish sources - where they used to clear out graves
> after 50 years.

Igros Moshe(Y.D. IV. #61.14 page 297). Question: This that the children
made an agreement with a yeshiva or charitable organization to say
kaddish on the yahrtzeit forever (l'olam). - How many years are they
in fact obligated?

Answer: When it is not specified then they are obligated as long as the
organization exists - even if they change locations or administrations.
It is also reasonable to say that it is not more than 50 years since
this time period is called l'olam [Yoveil]- because it is impossible
that the obligation to these organizations should actually be for all
eternity. If in fact eternity was meant than there is absolutely no
obligation at all. ... If more than fifty years was specified - the
organizations should not accept the obligation...

Daniel Eidensohn

R Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
> My question concerns the Unesana Tokef prayer which clearly states that
> the judgment concerns specifics details of one's fate - not just life or
> death. This is inconsistent with the sources I cited....

(I assume you mean both life and income.)

I frankly think you're being overly pedantic about these sources. I know
of no one who pasqened, for example, that one shouldn't daven for a
shechiv mairah because his judgement already was set. And doesn't the
mishnah require holding a fast when there is a draught, even though
parnasah and life are judged on Rosh haShanah?

Someone is judged and sentenced in a human court. There are still appeals.
Thus, there is no machloqes as to whether someone is judged annually or
daily -- why not both?

Hashem doesn't hold court -- it's an oversimplified metaphor for us puny
human beings. The entire subject doesn't work the way we can picture.

> This also opens the larger question of whether the specific wording of
> prayers indicates "psak" in hashkofa or that the prayers need only to be
> uplifting or motivating. If it is the former then the prayer itself is
> in fact the source of the hashkofa. However if we are in fact learning
> hashkofa from this prayer there is an additional problem in that the
> prayer was taught in a dream - which gets into the issue of not learning
> halacha from ruach hakodesh and dreams.

You lost me. How do you get from "'psak' in hashkofa" (with "psak"
in quotes") to "learning halacha from ruach hakodesh"? The topic is
hashkafah, not halakhah, and (therefore) the pesaq isn't really a pesaq,
either.

GCT!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Despair is the worst of ailments. No worries
micha@aishdas.org        are justified except: "Why am I so worried?"
http://www.aishdas.org                         - Rav Yisrael Salanter
Fax: (270) 514-1507

********************


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