Avodah Mailing List

Volume 16 : Number 120

Monday, February 6 2006

• Re: Kashrut reliable enough
• Re: Slavery
• Re: Slavery
• Re: Slavery
• Re: Slavery
• Re: Rape of Dinah
• Re: The Ethics of 360 Reviews
• Re: Killing kinim on shabbat
• Re: Rabban Gamliel's tube
• Re: Wife's kavod for husband
• Re: Wife's kavod for husband
• Rape- Sources?
• The Torah's eternal sensitivities (was Rape of Dina)
• Re: Enzymes in Honey & Cheese
• Re: Enzymes in Honey & Cheese
• RE: Creation & allegory

Reb Shinnar, Meir wrote:
> let me give a practical example of why we rely on hazaka.

> Let me start that I know of Rav Folger only through the internet - and

<SNIP>

Two points:
1: I don't advertise our hekhsher on list (actually, nor do I anywhere
else, I only certify establishments based on local needs and make no
money whatsoever on the hekhsherim, though there is plenty of work and
even when there are no problems, plenty of aggravation)

2: Since the differences between RMS' and my position are relatively
small, I think that we have sufficiently argued our positions. I also
agree that there is a 'hezqat kashrut, but at the same time substantiate
that *some* of the organization about which there is a rumor claiming
less-then-perfect reliability may deserve their reputation *in* *some*
*regard*. Since most people don't have a grasp of the issues because they
lack information, I recommend asking one's rav regarding those hekhsherim
that have a difficult reputation. Otherwise, I'd concur with RMS.

PS: RMS, BH, I am still alive, so no need for a eulogy. Next time I
am in the Tristate area or you in Switzerland, we should perhaps say
hello to each other. In cyberspeak, we might meat in flesh and blood,
instead of meet in pixels and dots. ;-)

Arie Folger

Joe Slater <jdslater@gmail.com>
> How about, because it's wrong and it corrupts the slave owner as well as 
> denying human rights to the slave?

What makor *in torah* should make us think that it's wrong? If we have
a feeling inside us that it's wrong, don't you think that's because
we grew up in a goyishe society that hammered this message into us,
and never allowed the contrary message near us? 300 years ago, did
any of our ancestors -- or anyone else in the world -- think there
was anything wrong with slavery? From a Torah POV, why should we not
consider the anti-slavery meme to be a purely goyishe one, and remove
it from our hearts?

> The Greeks praised slavery as a noble 
> and natural practice; I can't recall our sages doing the same.

Nor did they condemn it, though, or show any thought at all that it was
wrong. They discuss what reasons are sufficient to override the mitzvah
of "le'olam bahem ta'avodu"; they conclude that making up a minyan is
enough reason to free a slave. If they thought that there was something
morally wrong with slavery, surely that alone would be sufficient to
justify freeing all ones slaves, and one shouldn't need any other heter.

-- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

Joe Slater <jdslater@gmail.com> wrote:
>Zev Sero <zev@sero.name> wrote:
>>If some country where Jews live should one day legalise slavery, or 
>>if one of the countries which today unofficially allow slavery, 
>>e.g. Saudi Arabia, should one day become hospitable to Jews, I see 
>>no reason why a Jew living there should not buy slaves.

>How about, because it's wrong and it corrupts the slave owner as 
>well as denying human rights to the slave? The Greeks praised 
>slavery as a noble and natural practice; I can't recall our sages 
>doing the same.

There are kinds of slavery that corrupt the slave owner, certainly.
That doesn't mean it's inevitable. We have limitations on our treatment
of slaves. The very fact that avadim kenani'im are chayavim in mitzvot
makes an enormous difference right there.

The western penal system, with imprisonment replacing restitution, is
far more of a corruption, in my opinion, than anything that could come
out of halakhic slave holding.

Lisa

In  Avodah V16 #116 dated 2/4/2006 R' Zev Sero writes:
>> I thought slavery was abolished because of the  secular laws around us.
>> [--Somebody]

> More than that, who says it's been abolished at all? If some country
> where Jews live should one day legalise slavery, or if one of the
> countries which today unofficially allow slavery, e.g. Saudi Arabia,
> should one day become hospitable to Jews, I see no reason why a Jew
> living there should not buy slaves. The Shulchan Aruch includes Hilchot
> Avadim...

The Hebrew language has only word -- eved -- to cover the concepts "slave,"  
"servant" and "indentured servant."   There seem to be many gradations  of 
servitude that are all encompassed by the word "avdus."  

Although it is true that you can purchase a slave (or capture a slave
in war), it seems that you are really purchasing his labor. There are
a lot of things you can't do with a slave, e.g., physically injure him
or kill him. Your "ownership" is not at all the same as your ownership
of your car or your washing machine. If he is a Jew you have a lot of
restrictions and can keep him for only a limited time, and if he is a
non-Jew it seems you have to convert him to Judaism and then give him the
time and the means to do all kinds of religious things, eg, keep Shabbos,
daven, keep kosher -- all the things your wife and daughters have to do.
Any Jew who acquires a slave (and who abides by the Shulchan Aruch)
is really acquiring a huge responsibility and headache.

 -Toby Katz
=============

T613K@aol.com wrote:
> The Hebrew language has only word -- eved -- to cover the concepts 
> "slave," "servant" and "indentured servant."   There seem to be many 
> gradations of servitude that are all encompassed by the word "avdus." 

However, Halachic language has two terms - "eved ivri" and "eved kenaani".
And stam "eved" is an eved kenaani.

> Although it is true that you can purchase a slave (or capture a slave in 
> war), it seems that you are really purchasing his labor.

An eino yehudi can only have a kinyan mamon on another. However when
a ben yisrael purchases one who is not so, he has a kinyan haguf, not
just a kinyan mamon.

> There are a lot of things you can't do with a slave, e.g., physically
> injure him or kill him.

You can't sever a rosh ever. But you are allowed to physically discipline
a slave; I'm not sure that you're not allowed to inflict permanent
injuries, so long as they don't affect a rosh ever. (Though it makes
sense to me that any injury or severe beating should be assur lechatchila,
if only through a kal vachomer from tzaar baalei chayim - if you can't
treat your horse like this, kol sheken you shouldn't be able to do so
to a human being.)

>  Your "ownership" is not at all the same as your ownership of 
> your car or your washing machine. 

It mostly is. Or rather, it's like your ownership of a horse or cow;
there are restrictions on what you're allowed to do to your animals,
though not as many as there are for your slave.

> If he is a Jew you have a lot of 
> restrictions and can keep him for only a limited time

Eved ivri is a different category, which has not existed since the 10
tribes were exiled. It's certainly not halacha lemaaseh today.

> and if he is a 
> non-Jew it seems you have to convert him to Judaism

Sort of.

> and then give him 
> the time and the means to do all kinds of religious things, eg, keep 
> Shabbos, daven, keep kosher -- all the things your wife and daughters 
> have to do.

Shabbos isn't relevant here, because you can't have your horse working
on shabbos either. What other religious obligation does an eved have,
that would have a significant impact on his work? Davening and benching?
A slave probably has to daven once a day, and perhaps only a short free-
form prayer, not shmone esrei.

-- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

Akiva Miller  asked:
> Why is the section of Devarim 25:11-12 needed at all? If it
> teaches us that the woman must pay for the embarrassment she
> caused, don't we already know that from the general halachos
> of nezikin?

Of course not. This is the source to pay for embarrasment. Bovo Kama 86a.

Akiva B.

On Wed, Feb 01, 2006 at 03:55:37PM -0500, Rich, Joel wrote:
: Expand the question to any performance appraisal system in any
: organization (including yeshivot)

There's LH leto'eles (unless you define LH as only referring to cases
where there is no to'eles), and then there's politicking at the office
leading to backstabbing under the guise of "review".

When your employer says that the bottom n% aren't getting bonuses,
or are being let go, the politicking become inevitable. And yes, the
first is common -- even in my industry where bonuses can be up to 50% of
your base salary -- and in 2001-2003 many employers were systematically
letting go of the bottom 5%.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The waste of time is the most extravagant
micha@aishdas.org        of all expense.
http://www.aishdas.org   			-Theophrastus
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

In  Avodah V16 #116 dated 2/4/2006  [R Joel Rich:]
> I just was listening to a shiur by R. Solomon Drillman -
> <http://www.yutorah.org/showShiur.cfm?shiurID=711692> where he mentions
> asking R'YBS about one of our favorite topics - the gemara's position
> that kinim do not procreate through pirya vrivya....

You bring up something I've been meaning to ask the learned chevra here
for a long time. Doesn't the Gemara mention "beitzei kinim" (I forget in
what context)? Didn't they know that lice hatch from nits? What is the
meaning then of "they do not procreate through pirya vrivya"? Does it
mean that they reproduce asexually, laying eggs that do not need to be
fertilized in order to produce young? There are some creatures that
sometimes reproduce asexually -- the babies resulting being all females,
and genetic clones of their mothers -- while also sometimes reproducing
sexually. (Some of you science-types might know more about this -- I am
thinking maybe some kinds of fish, maybe reptiles, snakes, frogs.....?)
Would the halacha be that if the creature reproduces asexually you are
allowed to kill it on Shabbos? If OTOH Chazal thought that kinim result
from spontaneous generation, then again, what did they think nits were?
Did they think the nits arose spontaneously from sweat rather than
being laid by mother lice? Just wondering.

 -Toby Katz
=============

Reb Shmuel

Look at Rashi there in Eruvin: the shfoferet was such that length of
the tube made a big difference (the shorter the better). It looks like
using ratios to determine height of a distant object.

I'm sure a professional surveyor could answer it better :-)

BTW Rabban Gamliel also used a telescope device to calculate the molad
(see gemara in Rosh Hashana 25a).

KT
Josh 

In  Avodah V16 #118 dated 2/6/2006 R' Joel Rich writes:
> The gemara in kiddushin 31a explains that if a child is asked by both
> his mother and father for something at the same time that he does the
> father's because both the mother and child are chayav in the father's
> kavod. I have not found the mother's chiyuv in kavod for the father
> brought down anyplace....

Well, as you just said, it is brought down in Kidushin 31a. I guess you
mean you haven't seen it brought down anywhere /else/.

BTW I seem to remember that the gemara somewhere says the husband has
to honor his wife more than himself. Nevertheless I think it's clear
from the fabric of the Torah taken as a whole that the relationship
between husband and wife is that he is primus inter pares in the family.

I am not absolutely certain whether that is prescriptive or merely
descriptive.

Like, what if in a certain family the mother is actually the more
dominating figure? Is she doing something wrong or is she a normal
variation -- like a woman who is unusually mathematical or unusually
strong?

Just remembered something else of possible relevance -- Rashi's comment
(re mitzva of kibud av ve'em) that children usually honor their mother
more but fear their father more. And for that reason they are told to
"honor father and mother" (father being mentioned first) but "fear
mother and father" (mother mentioned first).

However, though I have heard that mother should honor father (and vice
versa) I have not heard that father should fear mother (or vice versa).
I /have/ heard that a man should not make himself an object of fear in
his own home. (Source, anyone?) I guess there are differing definitions
of fear at play here -- a father should expect to be treated with
respect and reverence but should not be abusive and angry.

 -Toby Katz
=============

"Rich, Joel"  asks: 
> The gemara in kiddushin 31a explains  that if a child is asked by both
> his mother and father for something  at the same time that he does the
> father's because both the mother  and child are chayav in the father's
> kavod. I have not found the  mother's chiyuv in kavod for the father
> brought down anyplace - she does have to do certain services (see  even
> haezer 80) but as far as I can tell these are limited and perhaps  to
> keep her from being indolent? I assume this is taught in  chatan/kallah
> classes? Any help would be  appreciated.

Your gemara must be the source for Rambam, Hil. Ishut 15:19-20:
    Our Sages commanded a man to honor his wife more than [he honors]
    himself and to love her as much as [he loves] himself. If he has
    financial resources, he should spend generously for her according
    to his means. He should not instill excessive fear upon her
    and should speak pleasantly to her. He should not be depressive
    or angry.
    Likewise, our Sages commanded a woman to honor her husband
    excessively; his fear should be upon her. She should conduct herself
    according to his direction and she should view him as a prince or a
    king. She should follow the desires of his heart and shun anything
    that he despises. This is the way of the holy daughters and sons
    of Israel who are pure in their relationships. In these ways will
    their cohabitation be pleasant and praiseworthy.

The following is from an article I wrote an Shalom
Bayit that provides some perspective (mine at least):
<http://ocweb.org/webdata/uploads/1001000359_FileName_shalombayitdratchrevisedcopyright.rtf>
These descriptions of the domestic duties required and the subordinate
nature of the relationship between husbands and wives grate on many
modern ears.

    Our time is one in which has offered greater equity and autonomy in
    marital roles and has, in many ways, significantly changed the role
    of women. Let us analyze these statements in their philosophical,
    social and halakhic contexts in an attempt to understand the positions
    and the sensitivities of our tradition. We must be careful when
    evaluating the sources that no one statement is cited in isolation;
    doing so would give a skewed and false impression of Jewish tradition
    and law. There might have been room for significant criticism had
    all of the obligations and duties been one-sided, i.e., from wife
    to husband. However, this is clearly not the case. Jewish marriage
    is an institution of mutual obligations in which the partners are
    required to work for the common good, to provide what they are
    able and to sacrifice what they must in an exchange of reciprocated
    responsibilities.[i] One partner is not subordinate to the other.[ii]
    Haim b. Betzalel, brother of Maharal of Prague, wrote, "A husband
    should not treat his wife as a servant.... Each of them is a master
    and each of them is subjugated to the other so that it is impossible
    to distinguish between them. He acquires her as a servant through the
    betrothal money and she acquires him as a servant through the dowry
    that she brings into the marriage."[iii] Their mutual obligations of
    respect creat e a proper balance and prevent abuse and inappropriate
    control of one over the other. While contemporaries may not express
    these ideas in these terms, nevertheless, the underlying message is
    important: marriage is not only about self-fulfillment, it is about
    reciprocity and being in a mutually beneficial relationship. In the
    Jewish tradition, the sharing of responsibilities and the balancing
    of interests in an equitable manner defines the traditional view of
    this relationship.

____________________________________

[i] She'eilot u-Teshuvot Hatam Sofer, Even ha-Ezer, II, no. 74; Hatam
Sofer, Novella to Baba Batra 41a. These and other sources are cited in
Yosef David Epstein, Sefer Mitzvot ha-Bayit (New York, 1981), pp. 119-120.

[ii] She'eilot u-Teshuvot Maharshdam, Even ha-Ezer, no. 198.

[iii] Sefer ha-Haim, II, ch. 4. 

Mark  Dratch

Apropos our discussion about rape... For a project I am working on,
I am looking for sources that actually say that rape is forbidden.

Rambam, Hilkhot Na'arah Betulah and Shulhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 177 only
discuss the issue of fines and forced marriage/no divorce. Nowhere does
it say that the act itself is forbidden. And nowhere does it speak of
consequences for the rape of a married woman (except whether or not she
is subsequently forbidden to her husband).

I'd appreciate anyone's help.

Thanks,
Mark Dratch

<<<As for a developing ethic that exceeds what the Torah commanded
at Sinai based upon developing moral sensitivities, see, for example,
the words of Rav Kook that follow. He argues that the Torah, at times,
"speaks against the evil inclination" and allows things that ultimately
will be forbidden. Mark Dratch

"A Vision of Vegetarianism and Peace" By HaRav Avraham
Yitzchak Kuk <http://www.orot.com/issues.html> citing
<http://jewishveg.com/DSvision.html> >>>

When it comes to vegetarianism, I have no issues with that. The Torah
itself originally had only allowed Man to be vegetarians. Only after the
Mabul did that change. So obviously, the ideal was what was originally
in place. (Similar to how Hashem wanted to crate this world on Din but
felt the need to have Rachamim. There too, the ideal was Din, as our
Avos tried to live up to.)

My point of contention was what sounds like your assertion, that we can
assume this developing and changing sensitivity in areas where there is
no indication that the Torah was offering varying values.

I want to repeat again, when it comes to Rabbinic legislation, that is
exactly where we do see this. Where totally on the same page there. But
that is the function of Rabbinic legislation - to assess the ongoing,
changing currents in society, and using the fixed principles of the Torah,
make takkanos and gezairos accordingly.

Rav Nota Schiller often uses the great Moshol of a baseball field to
illustrate this point. The fixed part of our Torah is the infield (Torah
Shebichsav). No matter which baseball field you visit, regulations mandate
that they have the same measurements. But when it comes to the outfield
(Torah Sheb'al Peh), every park has their own distances.

On Sat, 2006-02-04 at 21:02 -0500, Micha Berger wrote:
> I'm not sure milk is further from grass than honey is from nectar. For
> example, you could taste the difference in the milk if the cow ate only
> grass, only hay, or only corn.

and one can taste what type of flowers were used to make the honey.
<http://homecooking.about.com/library/weekly/bl060997a.htm>

On Mon, Feb 06, 2006 at 05:40:44PM -0500, Shaya Potter wrote:
:> I'm not sure milk is further from grass than honey is from nectar. For
:> example, you could taste the difference in the milk if the cow ate only
:> grass, only hay, or only corn.

: and one can taste what type of flowers were used to make the honey.

I was assuming that people who saw bottles of clover honey vs those of
orange blossom honey (vs kinds less common in these parts) knew that. I
therefore was pointing out that the same could be done with milk.

-mi

On February 5, 2006, Lisa Liel wrote:
> The Rambam wrote the Moreh for Nevuchim. He says things in the Moreh that
> contradict things in the Yad. It's important to consider the audience.
> I wouldn't have any problem telling someone who was having a hard time
> accepting the Torah that the sequence of the days of creation aren't
> necessarily reflective of the historical order of events. You teach
> people on a level they can handle.

The above seems, at least to me, to be pashut and represents sechel
hayashar. Unfortunately, there are many in the academic world who attempt
to misrepresent the Rambam's true hashkafos by pointing to apologetic type
statements in the Moreh and claiming that they are his true views. Rav
Dessler claims, on several occasions, that the Moreh was merely offering a
possible explanation for "nevucchim" but was not necessarily eliminating
the possibility of other, deeper explanations (such as the necessity
for korbanos) and was not even eliminating the possibility that his
explanation was wrong as he himself mentions in the hakdama to the Morreh.

At the same time, I personally feel that it is necessary to address
certain issues head on and not "skirt the issue" by claiming that the
Rambam didn't mean it. I feel this can be done because I don't think the
Ramabam would have put something in the Moreh which he felt is entirely
incongruous with our messorah although he may have personally related to
the issue differently. This is why I strove to show that RDE was possibly
confusing the first half of chapter 30 with the second thus keeping the
Rambam's shita intact and perfectly in concert with our messorah.

Simcha Coffer 

**********************


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