Avodah Mailing List

Volume 20: Number 2

Wed, 04 Oct 2006

• 1. Re: Rambam on corporality (David Riceman)
• 2. Kiddush Levanah on Motzoei Yom Kippur (Daniel Wells)
• 3. break on yom kippur (Eli Turkel)
• 4. Havdalah Motzei Kippur (Yisrael Medad)
• 5. Rambam on corporeality (Silverman, Philip B)
• 6. Re: Kiddush Levanah on Motzoei Yom Kippur (Zev Sero)
• 7. Re: Rav Keller's JO article on evolution (T613K@aol.com)
• 8. Re: R' Keller's JO article on evolution (Meir Shinnar)
• 9. R' Keller's JO article on evolution (Jonathan Baker)
• 10. Re: Avodah Digest, Vol 3, Issue 1 (Prof. Levine)

I forgot to suggest chapter 2 ("How can we speak about God?") of Oliver 
Leaman's book on Maimonides.

David Riceman 

>
> Many have the custom of making Kiddush Levanah on Motzoei Yom Kippur
> right after Maariv.


We make KL on Motzoei Shabbos Shuva. It's mentioned I think in the MB that
the reason is to get an extra mitzva in before YK

Along the same lines, I have noted that some women stay in shul after
> Neilah and daven Maariv. This means a delay in preparing the meal
> after the end of Yom Kippur. Again, is it really proper to perform
> this mitzvah at the "expense" of others who may well be feeling weak
> from fasting?


Is that a subtle hint to your marital partner <grin>?

Daniel
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I found a hint to making a break during the Yom Kippur tefillah

The Mishnah says that after the lottery the goat to Azazal was sent
to the desert 12 mil (about 12 kilometers) away.
The Cohen Gadol would not begin the next activity of reading from
the Torah until he heard that the goat was in the desert and according
to most opinions this was until the goat was thrown off the cliff.

Walking one mil takes 18-24 minutes. Given the conditions of the desert
and having the goat I assume I assume at least 20 minutes for 1 mil.
So 12 mil takes 4 hours and possibly longer (the ish itti could have a
bite to eat or rest at succot along the way)

Hence, in the middle of the avodah on yom kippur there was a break of
at least 4 hours. I assume the Cohen Gadol rested I have not seen
any discussion what the other priests and the general population did
during the break

(maybe thats when they danced with the young ladies? -)

-- 
Eli Turkel

-- 
Eli Turkel
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I think our minyan at Ramat Shmuel in Shiloh figured it all out this year:
we had a light from erev YK and right after a bit of "L'shana Haba'ah"
dancing, a quick Ma'ariv was davened, Havdalah was made outside, cakes &
drinks were made available, the men started Kiddush Levana and the women who
were still there then went home to warm up some food.

-- 
Yisrael Medad
Shiloh
Mobile Post Efraim 44830
Israel
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I enjoyed Rabbi Eidensohn's post the other day at Avodah.

I was wondering where Rabbi Akiva Tatz's position (as described in
his book WorldMask) fits into all this.

If I understand R' Tatz correctly, he takes the expressions "God's
hand" and "God's eyes" literally. If there's any metaphor going on,
it is we humans who have the metaphoric hand and eyes. (Extending
this thought, I suppose the whole universe would be, in a sense, a
metaphor.) At the same time, he believes firmly that God is
completely incorporeal, and that He is absolutely One. I believe he
holds that the seeming contradiction is above humans to comprehend.
I don't fully understand this position (and don't know how 'kosher'
it is), but I was wondering something. Perhaps the "sages (the
Raavad refers to) who are greater and better than the Rambam who
hold this ... view" believed not that God was corporeal in any way,
but rather, believed in the way R' Tatz writes about.

Maybe what I'm doing is trying to defend the honor of these unknown
sages against the charge of believing in a corporeal God, but my
main goal is to figure out whether R' Tatz's position is the one the
Raavad was actually referring to as being mistaken.


A gmar chasima tova,

Phil Silverman



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Prof. Levine wrote:
> At 03:38 PM 10/03/2006, you wrote:

>> Why can't they make their own havdalah?  Whether women are obligated
>> in havdalah or not, mimah nafshach they are yotze.  Or are you
>> concerned about bracha levatalah, if it should turn out that they
>> are not obligated?

> Yes, this is a factor, the question of a woman making the brocha.

But does a bracha count as levatalah in such a circumstance?
Even when it is clear lechol hadeot that women are exempt from a
mitzvah, the practise of almost all Ashkenazim is that if they do
keep the mitzvah they say the bracha, and it's not levatalah.
How much more so in the case of havdalah, where perhaps they're
actually obligated min hadin, and therefore *all* women keep it.
Even if galuy klapei shmaya that the halacha is that women are
exempt from havdalah, let their universal custom of keeping it
be no worse than their common but not universal custom of shaking
the lulav, or counting the omer, or saying shema in the course of
davening shacharit, in all of which cases they say the appropriate
brachot (according to almost all Ashkenazim).


>> At whose expense?  If the wife is at shul, and so is the husband,
>> then they will go home together, at a time and pace that is mutually
>> convenient.  And surely whoever is at home with the kids can feed them.
> 
> At the husband's expense. If the wife stays in shul to daven Maariv, 
> then they will have to wait longer when he gets home until the food is 
> heated up. On the other hand, if the wife goes home right after shofar 
> blowing, then she can get a head start on getting the meal ready to be 
> served.

Surely she is just as hungry as he is, and her staying for maariv or
going home is a matter for mutual agreement.  And why must he have
warm food to break his fast?  Can't he (actually they) first have cold
drinks while the food is warming up?  In any case, why is his having
to wait a few minutes longer for hot food (though no longer than she
waits) more important than whatever hanaah she gets from staying for
maariv (and walking home with him instead of alone)?  What is she,
his maid?

I assume that real-life couples actually discuss things like this,
and arrive at mutually acceptable arrangements, which won't be the
same for each; all we can discuss here is an abstract couple, with
preferences common to most people.  If I see a woman in shul after
neilah, either davening maariv or just waiting for her husband,
I don't assume that he really wants her to go home, and she's being
inconsiderate by staying; I assume that this is what they've both
decided to do, for reasons that seem good to them.  (Though actually
in my specific case I don't have to assume anything, because the
whole issue doesn't arise, as I mentioned.)



> As far as feeding the kids, if there is a non-Jewish baby sitter at 
> home, then feeding the kids can involve all sorts of problems.

Surely the babysitter has access to some food she can give the kids,
otherwise what is she meant to do if they're hungry.  Not that the
whole issue is particularly relevant here - any kid old enough to
be fasting the whole day is probably in shul with the parents,
unless s/he's at home babysitting, in which case s/he can make
havdalah and eat.



>> PS: My shul always has a "havdalah" after maariv, so everyone can
>> stay for maariv, nobody has to go home hungry, and kiddush levana
>> can be said besimcha, *after* breaking the fast.

> There was a time when all shuls made Havdalah after all Shabbosim
> and Yomim Tovim. This is no longer the case in many places.  One
> person wrote to me that his shul made Havdalah for everybody and
> then served some snacks and drinks to all. This to me avoids all
> concerns.

Yes, that's what I meant by a "havdalah".  It would be silly to call
it a kiddush.


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                       	                          - Clarence Thomas

 
 
From: "Zvi Lampel" _hlampel@thejnet.com_ (mailto:hlampel@thejnet.com) 

R' Zvi Lampel  wrote:
>>Now, the quote from the Sefer HaIkarrim.... 
...."The Torah  is called a "testimony" (aidus --Ex. 25:21 and Ps. 132:12). 
This is to signify  that the Torah must be understood by pashtus (the normal 
meaning of its words),  just as the testimony of witnesses:...<<


.
Nevertheless we do not translate "Etzba Elokim" or "Yad Hashem"  literally.  
So it's not always so pashut what pashtus  is.




--Toby  Katz
=============
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I don't have direct access to R Keller's article.  However, the article, as
described by the posters, and some of the posters, are asking (IMHO) the
wrong question in regard to the whole controversy.

After all, the ultimate question is not merely being right or wrong
understanding of hazal -but the statement that some things are so wrong that
it is forbidden to teach them (or even minut)

There are several different questions one could ask about the length and
duration of creation.
1.  What is pshuto shel mikra? That does depend on defining the notion of
pshat - but assuming that one is talking about the plain meaning of the
words (this is not necessarily the standard Jewish approach - and those who
have used it in the past have made statements that are not generally
accepted as representing ture"pshat" in the meaning of the actual meaning of
the text - even if it is pshuto shel mikra - eg, the rashbam's pshat
understanding that the day begins in the morning) , yes, days mean days (but
perhaps starting in the morning...)(sphuto shel mikra as being the literal
meaning is a very Christian argument - who lack torah shebealpe and drash -
, and as others have pointed out, many of the proliteralists are
recapitualing and regurgitating Christian arguments)

2.  How do hazal and rishonim understand the text?
Here again, one can come to different conclusions - as there are different
sources.  Yes, sources can clearly be mustered that there are rishonim who
view breshit quasi literally - and a day being 24 hours.  There are also
other sources.
Now, one can come to a conclusion, based on one's way of learning and
inclination, about what one thinks is the mainstream position .  My
understanding is that R Keller, in his article - tries to show that a
literalist position is the mainstream position - and that nonliteralists
have a high hurdle to climb.  All the citations brought seem to bring
specific textual issues that the nonliteralists may have to deal with.
Others have argued about the specifics of the texts and issues  However,
even if one is willing to concede that R Keller proves this point - (not
that I concede it)  - within the context of the argument, there are several
further steps to prove..

3.  Assuming, for the sake of argument, that  there is mainstream hazal and
rishonim support for the literalist position, and that nonliteralists have a
high hurdle - does this prove that the literalist position accurately
reflects reality -  that is a direct reflection on the position we take
about aggadot hazal and their statements on history/science - not so pashut
(which is why some of the controversy has swirled specifically about this
position - and here mainstream hazal and rishonim is by no means clear -
(here also the rambam's famous statement about how breshit can be
reinterpreted - if the sole issue was the age of the world...) as even the
opponents agree- even if current mainstream haredi position is clear - which
is why R Feldman's article basically had to argue that the rambam's position
on science and hazal is now explicitly rejected and is even now  minut -
quite difficult for most to swallow...


4.  Is the understanding that one has of what is the mainstream position
normative - that is, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that one has
proven that the mainstream hazal and rishonim position is for a literalist
interpretation, and that this implies that it reflects a correct
understanding of reality and truth - does denying it put one out of the
fold?

Here, the problem is twofold;
1) that there are many rishonim and acharonim  whose credentials as members
in good standing has never been doubted who specifically reject the
literalist interpretation - (one only thinks of the tiferet yisrael,and
multiple others that others have cited).
Now, there are always disagreements about understandings of any text - and
one can argue that all these gdolim are wrong.  However, it is (at least it
had been) quite difficult to argue that, given their stature,  not only are
they all wrong - but that the texts are so clear and unequivocal that any
rational, knowledgable person with respect for hazal and the mesora would
have to agree that they are wrong -  essentially the position of those who
would ban.   Supporting the ban implies being mevaze baale mesora.

2)  there is a strong tradition (even amongst literalists like the kuzari)
that, even if one does not argue for the rationality of torah, torah does
not contradict reason - eg, the kuzari argues that there is no good, solid
evidence for a world older than 5000 years (his time) - but admits that if
there was such evidence, the position and argument would have to be
rethought - because nothing in the torah can contradict reason.
For most of us, the current scientific evidence is sufficiently strong and
irrefutable (let's not argue whether it is actually irrefutable - not very
fruitful - nor for the various reconciliations - just accept that there is a
large community of dati people who find the reconciliations proposed fatuous
at best - even if one thinks that they are wrong) - that accepting the
literalist position requires a position of credo quia absurdum est - which
we think (along with the pshat being understood as literal) as a very
Christian rather than Jewish position.

Meir Shinnar
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From: Zev Sero <zev@sero.name>
> Jonathan Baker wrote:
 
> > R' Alan Brill notes that until the mid-19th century, nobody took the
> > Creation narrative literally.  On his first tape from the Revelation
> > course he gave at YU last year (available on www.yutorah.org), he gives
> > a catalogue of rishonim & acharonim and how they each viewed the Creation
> > narrative as a metaphor: for spiritual realm, for morality, etc.
 
> On the contrary, until the mid-19th century nobody questioned the
> literal meaning of the narrative.  They looked for deeper meanings,
> beyond the obvious, but not for a moment did they accept or even
> consider that the physical events didn't happen exactly as described.

I think we're getting into something analogous to "lo rainu eino raayah".
Also tying back into lots of old Avodah arguments.

What was it that our ancestors accepted: a literal reading of Genesis 1-2,
or the best understandings of current science, which, in the absence of
stratigraphy and radioisotope dating, was based on a literal reading of
Genesis?  I submit it's the latter, supported such lines as "whoever says
there is wisdom among non-Jews, believe them" (as contrasted with Torah);
who is wise, one who learns from all persons (adam, not yehudi or achicha);
and "the theory of the non-Jews (relative motion of sun & earth) seems
better".

Then there's Guide II:25, about which RYGB and RMShinnar have argued
ad infinitum: that if there is clear proof that an idea is wrong, it is
wrong, and even if we have always treated pesukim literally to support
that idea, we have to now find allegorical meanings for those pesukim.
(and, in the context of that chapter, thank God we don't have to do this
since there is no proof of the Aristotelian eternity of the universe).

Since there was no raayah against a literal reading, there was no need
to consider the question.  Once the raayah came up, then it became 
necessary to either continue in the old way (follow current scientific
knowledge) or to create a new forced literalism (become an obscurantist).

What's particularly strange is that only today is this becoming such 
an issue, after 150 years of modern biology, and 250 years of modern
geology made it a challenge.

In other words, did they take the literal meaning literally because 
taking it literally was commanded by God, or did they take it literally
because there was nothing better?  Esp. since, as I noted, even Rashi
takes it not completely literally.

Look in the archives for arguments about the limits of allegorization.
I keep coming back to the Meiri on Avos, on "derashot shel dofi", who
tells us that it's OK to treat as allegorical, narrative passages that
are clearly unbelievable on a literal level.

Next year, new verse: Vechol maaminim, shehu bara haolam, besheshet yamim 
b'diyukam.

Beniyyah ukeniyyah tovah.

--
        name: jon baker              web: http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker
     address: jjbaker@panix.com     blog: http://thanbook.blogspot.com

At 03:38 PM 10/03/2006, you wrote:
>Why can't they make their own havdalah?  Whether women are obligated
>in havdalah or not, mimah nafshach they are yotze.  Or are you
>concerned about bracha levatalah, if it should turn out that they
>are not obligated?

Yes, this is a factor, the question of a woman making the brocha.

>At whose expense?  If the wife is at shul, and so is the husband,
>then they will go home together, at a time and pace that is mutually
>convenient.  And surely whoever is at home with the kids can feed them.

At the husband's expense. If the wife stays in shul to daven Maariv, 
then they will have to wait longer when he gets home until the food 
is heated up. On the other hand, if the wife goes home right after 
shofar blowing, then she can get a head start on getting the meal 
ready to be served.

As far as feeding the kids, if there is a non-Jewish baby sitter at 
home, then feeding the kids can involve all sorts of problems.


>PS: My shul always has a "havdalah" after maariv, so everyone can
>stay for maariv, nobody has to go home hungry, and kiddush levana
>can be said besimcha, *after* breaking the fast.

There was a time when all shuls made Havdalah after all Shabbosim and 
Yomim Tovim. This is no longer the case in many places. One person 
wrote to me that his shul made Havdalah for everybody and then served 
some snacks and drinks to all. This to me avoids all concerns.


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