Avodah Mailing List

Volume 21: Number 1

Wed, 01 Nov 2006

• 1. Re: . On Parashas Noach - from this week's MTA Parasha Publication (saul mashbaum)
• 2. Re: My Noah Problem (Zev Sero)
• 3. Re: establishing mamzerut (Micha Berger)
• 4. Re: Bnei Noach (Micha Berger)
• 5. Re: Lighting Neros on Yom Tov (Zev Sero)
• 6. Re: Lighting Neros on Yom Tov (Micha Berger)
• 7. Re: Hakafot on Shmini Atzeret (Micha Berger)
• 8. Re: Lighting Neros on Yom Tov (Daniel Israel)
• 9. Re: Fish and Meat (Jacob Farkas)
• 10. Re: My Noah Problem (T613K@aol.com)
• 11. Re: Bnei Noach (Zev Sero)
• 12. Re: honey (T613K@aol.com)
• 13. Re: Knowledge of Good and Bad (Micha Berger)

RYGBechhofer:
>>
The Sforno in Parashas Noach (8:22) suggests that prior to the Mabul there were no seasons. Rather, the Sun, relative to the Earth, constantly orbited at the Equator. The Earth was thus in a constant state of Springtime, the optimum condition for both vegetation and animal life to flourish, and for human beings to enjoy longevity...
>>
RYGB goes on to refute this Sforno from Avodah Zara 8a, and concludes "It is thus evident that the seasons existed already prior to the Mabul".

RGYB's refutation is indeed compelling, but RSRHirsch to Bereshit 8:22 cites R. Yitzchak in Bereshit Rabba 34:11 that before the flood, it was always spring "as between Pesach and Atzeret". Thus before the flood people were blessed with logevity and prosperity which did not continue after the flood. Apparently there were differernt traditions among chazal on this point.

The cited verse says that "...zera v'katzir, kor v'chom, kayitz v'choref, yom v'layla lo yishbotu".
RSRH makes the very interesting comment that each pair of the cited elements always exits simulteneously in the world: when it is day in one part of the world, it is night in another part;
when it is winter in one place, it is summer elsewhere, and the same with spring and autumn.

Saul Mashbaum

Jonathan Baker wrote:
> So, any of you religious minds have any thoughts on 
> my Noach problem?  http://thanbook.blogspot.com
> 
> How do I reconcile the God who keeps saying "oops"
> in the Flood story: "oops I shouldn't have created
> Man", "oops I went too far in destroying", with
> the common medieval God-images of the omnipotent,
> omniscient God?  It's the "etz pri -> etz oseh pri"
> problem writ large.


The root of your problem is in the word N-Ch-M (vayinachem,
ki nichamti), which you translate in the conventional manner
as regret, which implies that He realised He had made a mistake.
That's precisely why Rashi (6:6-7) takes care to translate the
word differently. He first cites Onkelos's translation, as
"to take comfort", and then gives his own, "to consider a future
course of action". In other words, He did not regret his past
actions, but took note of them and their result when considering
what to do next.

Think of someone planning out a game of strategy. "I'll do this,
and then he'll do this so I'll do that, and then when he does this
I'll do the other". All this is planned out before the first move
is made, and the early moves are not mistakes, even though the
later moves are caused by what the opponent does.

One may object that if this is so, then why does the decision to
bring the flood come after the world turns corrupt, and why does
the decision not to bring any more floods come after the effects
of the first one become apparent. But the premise of this
objection is the fallacy that He acts in time. We're biologically
incapable of comprehending a lack of time; in our minds everything
has to happen after one thing and before another. But when He is
described as making a decision "after" something happens, it can
only mean that the event played a part in the decision, so that
the decision comes logically after the event, not temporally.

The fact that humanity would become corrupt played no part in the
decision to make humanity in the first place, but it did play a
part in the decision to bring the flood; therefore the logical
place to tell us about it comes between the two decisions.
Similarly, He decided to bring only one global flood, but no more
than one, because the destruction of such a flood would be too
much to inflict twice; i.e. the fact of the destruction was not
a reason to keep the number of such floods down to zero, but it
was a reason to keep it down to one. Therefore the logical place
to describe the destruction comes between the decision to bring
one flood and the decision not to bring more than one.

Kach nir'eh li.


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                       	                          - Clarence Thomas

On Sat, October 28, 2006 4:03 pm, R Arie Folger wrote:
: This issue was extensively discussed one day at the 24th Conference of
: European Rabbis, two years ago in Paris, and I recall hearing exactly the
: opposite from someone who was involved in this halakhah lema'asseh. Rav
: Wosner is rather inclined to accept DNA evidence against igun.

There are different standards of proof for igun and mamzeirus than for other
dinim. We could accept DNA evidence lehatir agunos or to prevent declaring
mamzeirus, and that wouldn't prove we could use it in general.

DNA testing WRT igun means finding proof that the body is the husband's.
Accepting the evidence is a matir. But WRT mamzeirus, the proof could be used
either lehaqeil or lechumrah. So it's not clear to me why one could generalize
even from igun to mamzeirus (nidon didan).

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha@aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

On Thu, October 26, 2006 3:05 pm, R Zev Sero wrote:
: Inventing a new religion, it seems to me, is assur to a BN for the
: same reason that it's assur to us; it is a denial of the Torah, and
: therefore against the things all humans are required to believe.
: This fits in with the fact that BN not only have to actually keep
: the 7M, but must do so because Hashem told Moshe Rabbenu that they
: must....

This requirement is specifically the Rambam's, though. AFAIK, it's a da'as
yachid.

: This means that they must believe in the truth of Mattan
: Torah and of the Torah itself, just as we must....

Which Notzrim and Moslems do, to varying extents.

I would think that since the punishment for violating any of the 7MBN is misah
(assuming all other criteria are met, of course), if members of these
religions aren't chayavei misah then they couldn't possibly be violating any
of them.

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha@aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

Jacob Farkas wrote:

> Lighting candles is Tzorekh Yomtov, as it is obligatory. Not lighting 
> them is problematic.
> [..]
> The "tzorich iyun" is actually understandable, even when considering 
> that Ner Shel Yom Tov is necessary in a room full of light. Borei 
> me'orei ha'eish does not 'need' 2 flames, having a second flame is not 
> even tzorekh ketzas, unlike the first flame, which RSZA would agree has 
> Tzorekh ketzas, so it is a good sha'aloh, whether the Hiddur of having 
> Avuqah is enough to satisfy Tzorekh ketzas. Bediqas Hametz is fine 
> without Ner as well, even though it is min hamuvhar to use a Ner, 
> specifically, so the question would also be, is that enough to 
> constitute Tzorekh Ketzas.


Not so.  The obligation is to have light in every room that one will
use, so that one won't hurt oneself stumbling around in the dark.
That obligation is adequately fulfilled with the electric lights,
and indeed the common practise is that we do *not* light candles in
most rooms of the house, relying on the electric lights to fulfill
the mitzvah.  Lighting candles in one location for the bracha, is a
hiddur mitzvah, surely no more important than having an avukah for
havdalah, or a ner for bedikat chametz.



> I don't have the sefer in front of me now, but I am unsure what the 
> Brakhah on Ner Yom Tov has to do with Hana'ah altogether.

The whole *point* of nerot shabbat veyomtov is to have hana'ah from
them.  If one will have no hana'ah at all from the nerot, it's a big
shayla whether one can make a bracha on them.  (My usual practise
when I'm not eating at home is to light a candle big enough that it
will still be burning when I come home, and I then make a point of
sitting near it and having a cup of tea, or stam resting and enjoying
the fact that I can see my surroundings; even though most of that
hana'ah comes from the electric light, at least some of it is from
the candle.)


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                       	                          - Clarence Thomas

On Sat, October 28, 2006 9:17 pm, kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:
: In Shmiras Shabbos K'Hilchasa, perek 62 note 31, Rav Shlomo Zalman
: Auerbach is quoted as questioning whether an avukah may be lit on for
: havdalah when Yom Tov falls on Motzaei Shabbos. He explains that this
: action is being done only for Hidur Mitzvah, not for Hanaah. He
: leaves it as a Tzarich Iyun.

: That same footnote points to Shaar Hatziyun 435:9, which tells of a
: case where a person did not do Bedikas Chometz, and did not do a
: Bitul Chometz either, and it is now Yom Tov. ... he asks whether a ner
: may be lit specifically for this purpose if it is during the daytime.
: .... He leaves this question as a Tzarich Iyun.

: So we have two cases about lighting a fire on Yom Tov specifically
: for a mitzvah, not for actual use...

Actually, specifically for hiddur mitzvah. RSZA explicitly calls the first
case a hiddur mitzvah, and bediqas chameitz doesn't /require.

OTOH, yom tov lights are a taqanah, an actual din derabannan, not "only"
hiddur. Now that would only work for the first light. After that, we are left
with comparing minhag yisrael to hiddur, for which I would think minhag
Yisrael kedin spells that it's a greater need, and therefore makes sense that
we lemaaseh call it "letzorekh".

...
: Is this melacha mutar? To me, this case seems similar to the other
: two cases, a Tzarich Iyun.
: It is undeniable that the whole world *does* light under these
: conditions, and has been doing so for decades. But what is the heter?

AISI, RSZA's tzarich iyun is a question of shiur. At what level of halachic
desiratum need something reach for it to be considered letzorekh yom tov.Also,
I an not sure RSZA is questioning the normal pesaq as much as wondering about
the basis -- halakhah velo lema'aseh. Just how does one specify a shiur of
need?

But I wonder what RSZA would have said about the norm of using candles on
Simchas Torah -- a hiddur minhag. Aside from shuls that use two candles to
light the way, or to keep the aaron from being empty, before people worried
about the fire hazard, many decorated the tops of flags, etc...

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha@aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

On Sat, October 28, 2006 10:20 pm, R Jonathan Baker wrote:
: Other well-known halachot based on "mistakes": the kashrut of bee-honey
: (when the text meant date-honey) and turkey (based on a mistake about
: Asian Indians vs. American Indians).  When asked about turkey, isn't it
: based on a mistaken identity, the late Bobover Rebbe replied, "It's a good
: thing our ancestors weren't as frum as we are".  So now we have a mesorah
: that turkey is kosher....

Neither of these are examples of minhagim based on mistakes, as neither is a
minhag. Turkey is altogether different for a second reason, as eating it today
is only indirectly related to the mistake, and permitted on the grounds of
those who made the error. (Besides, it has the simanim anyway.) IOW, the
concept of "having a [mimetic] mesorah" is part of the textual formulation.

But to add to what others said about the gemara and honey. I understood the
gemara to be aware that it was using a homonym, and saying that the pasuq
wouldn't speak of eating devash without a qualifier if the other kind of
devash were okay. Besides, they didn't matir honey, they found a maqor for the
common knowledge that honey was okay.

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha@aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

On Tue, 31 Oct 2006 11:14:25 -0700 Jacob Farkas 
<jfarkas@compufar.com> wrote:
>R' Akiva Miller wrote:
>> Are there any other poskim who deal with this question? In light 
of 
>> Shaar Hatziyun 435:9, how do we light Neros Yom Tov when the 
room is 
>> already full of electric light? Perhaps we must arrange things 
so 
>> that they are lit only in a dark room?
>
>I have yet to see any posqim deal with a hypothetical case of 
frying an 
>egg on Yomtov when there is a fridge full of prepared food, either.

Actually, although I've never seen the case specifically discussed, 
it would seem to me that the heter is only because one presumably 
wants a freshly fried egg, which one would not have already in the 
fridge.  If, OTOH, one wanted a hard boiled egg, and there was 
already one in the fridge, and assuming that normal people can't 
tell the difference between just cooked and one day old, and 
further that there is no significant possibility that a second egg 
will be needed that day of Yom Tov- I would assume that it such a 
case it would be assur.

Given that RAM explicitly assumed that Neros don't add hanah in a 
room that is already fully lit electrically his question still 
stands.  (Although I am not sure I agree with that assumption.)

--
Daniel M. Israel
dmi1@cornell.edu

R' Zev Sero wrote:
> Meanwhile, it's possible that the fish/meat danger *is* the result of
> an "error" in transmission.  The gemara says not to eat "binta" with
> meat, and everyone translates "binta" as "fish", but there's good
> reason to suppose that in fact it's not "fish" in general, but a
> specific species of fish which was known in Bavel.  When Jews moved out
> of Bavel, and their children learning the gemara asked them what
> "binta" was, they told them it was a fish they had back in Bavel;
> the children told the grandchildren "it's a fish", and the grandchildren
> told the great-grandchildren "it means fish".

I have seen another explanation based on a similar concept. Not that
Binita itself is necessarily a "type of fish" per se, but that the fish
indigenous to Bavel when cooked together with meat presented a health
problem.

This reasoning is used to explain, why the Rambam and the Rif don't
pasqen like Mar bar Rav Ashi, [Pesahim 76b] who forbids eating "Binita"
with salt, when roasted in the same oven as meat, because of "davar
aheir" (Rashi: Tza'ra'as).

The Tur (seeing Ma'aseh Rav by his father, the Rosh) does pasqen that it
is forbidden to eat fish and meat for reasons of Saqanah. As does the
Shulhan Arukh and the Rema. Perhaps they understood the Gemara to mean
all fish, or did not see any reason to discriminate against fish from
other regions, not just those in Bavel.

Jacob Farkas

 
 

>>How do I reconcile the God who keeps saying "oops"
in the  Flood story: "oops I shouldn't have created
Man", "oops I went too far in  destroying", with
the common medieval God-images of the  omnipotent,
omniscient God?  It's the "etz pri -> etz oseh  pri"
problem writ large.<<


.
>>>>>





There are a gazillion more examples you could have brought -- e.g., "He was  
/going/ to have the sun and the moon the same size, BUT....."
 
Every story has two sides, as seen from G-d's perspective and as seen from  
ours.  The whole Torah is written from our perspective.  From His  perspective, 
He knew ahead of time that human history would play out in a world  with sin 
and mortality in it; that Pharaoh wouldn't let the Jews go; that the  Jews 
would be in the desert for forty years; that Moshe wouldn't enter  E'Y and so on. 
 The story /has/ to be told from a human perspective,  in which WE don't know 
the outcome of each story at the beginning, and  therefore it looks to us 
like G-d is "changing His mind."
 
Pirkei Avos deals with an aspect of the paradox when it says "Hakol tzafui  
vehareshus nesunah."  Thus, G-d knew that the Dor Hamabul would sin but  
nevertheless THEY didn't know they were going to sin and they DID have free  will.  
And therefore could be punished.  G-d's knowledge does not  /force/ our 
actions.  And then after we have acted, He in turn  /reacts/.  He is not a puppeteer 
pulling our strings, IOW.
 
But the very fact that P'A talks about it shows there /is/ a logical  
paradox.  However this paradox has no practical consequences for us humans  groping 
in the dark.  We still have to choose.  We can't just sit on  our duffs each 
day saying, "Thy will be done, L-rd.  If You want me to  daven today, just drop 
my siddur in my lap, if You want me to go to work, send a  limo, Thanks."

--Toby  Katz
=============
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avodah-aishdas.org/attachments/20061031/f8ffcb14/attachment-0001.html

Micha Berger wrote:
> On Thu, October 26, 2006 3:05 pm, R Zev Sero wrote:
> : Inventing a new religion, it seems to me, is assur to a BN for the
> : same reason that it's assur to us; it is a denial of the Torah, and
> : therefore against the things all humans are required to believe.
> : This fits in with the fact that BN not only have to actually keep
> : the 7M, but must do so because Hashem told Moshe Rabbenu that they
> : must....
> 
> This requirement is specifically the Rambam's, though. AFAIK, it's a da'as
> yachid.

Is it?  Who disputes it?  If the Rambam is the only one to express
an opinion on the subject, then it doesn't qualify as a daat yachid.



> : This means that they must believe in the truth of Mattan
> : Torah and of the Torah itself, just as we must....
 
> Which Notzrim and Moslems do, to varying extents.

The problem is the extent to which they don't.  Both of their
religions require denying at least some of the Torah.  The Moslems
openly say that the Torah that is in our hands is a forgery, that
we and the Xians cobbled together after the rise of Islam.  The
Xians are more subtle, not denying the truth of any part of the
Torah as such, but ignoring "vezot hatorah", and its implication
that no part of it will be overridden by future prophetic revelation.


> I would think that since the punishment for violating any of the
> 7MBN is misah (assuming all other criteria are met, of course),
> if members of these religions aren't chayavei misah then they
> couldn't possibly be violating any of them.

The requirement to believe in the truth of the Torah is not one of
the 7 mitzvot, it's a prerequisite to them.  They can't keep the
7 mitzvot without first believing that they were commanded by Hashem
to Moshe; any accidental adherence to the mitzvot for any other reason
doesn't count as keeping them.  In the case of BY, the Rambam lists
belief in Hashem as one of the 613 mitzvot, but the classification
scheme for the 613 isn't the same as for the 7 (e.g. the issur of
arayot for BN includes six arayot, each of which is a separate item
in the 613).  The Ramban's objection to including emunah in the 613
is well known, and the defenses of the Rambam that I've seen begin
by acknowledging the Ramban's point, and explaining that the Rambam
meant something deeper.  I haven't yet seen anyone claim that yes,
we are indeed commanded to believe that there is a Commander, i.e.
that the reason to believe that He exists is because He told us to.


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                       	                          - Clarence Thomas

 
 
>>Probably the "yaarot".  A thicket of sugar canes could be  called a
"forest", but it's hard to see the connection between a  honeycomb
and a forest.  <<
 
.
>>>>>
Actually when you think about it there is a likely connection.  What  is a 
ya'ar?  It is a forest, not one tree but a lot of trees  together.  Similarly a 
honeycomb is not one cell, but a lot of cells  together.  Referring to a 
honeycomb as a "honey forest" would be using the  word "forest" in a poetic, 
metaphorical way.
 
Reminds me of a monkey trained in sign language who referred to ketchup by  
the signs for "tomato" and "toothpaste."  It would not be so rare at all to  
find words in Tanach used metaphorically for more than one purpose (if it's not  
a stretch to call a honeycomb a forest). One example is in this past week's  
parsha, Noach, where an animal and its mate are called "ish ve'ishto" -- "a 
man  and his wife" -- the words "man and wife" being used metaphorically to  
refer to a bonded pair.
 



--Toby  Katz
=============
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avodah-aishdas.org/attachments/20061031/0a922423/attachment.htm

On Sat, October 21, 2006 10:23pm, R' Akiva Miller
<kennethgmiller@juno.com> wrote:
: I never meant to reject the idea (based, I believe, on Rambam in
: Moreh Nevuchim 1:2) that prior to eating from the tree, Adam and
: Chava based their decisions on emes/sheker, and that after eating,
: based on right/wrong.

: But there is a great middle area between those extremes. Perhaps I am
: misunderstanding what people mean by "emes/sheker", but I understand
: it to refer to objective fact, leaving no room for opinions or
: emotions.

Except that if Adam and Chavah had to choose, their minds contained
opinions about which was true. There is no indication that they were
omniscient, so their choice was trying to determine the truth.

Similarly emotions. Adam started out lonely, so we know they had emotions.

But in the Rambam's thought, the concept of da'as is at a nexus between
thought and emotion that is central to Aristotilian psychology, but not
in current psychological models. Now we tend to think there is minimal
connection between what we think and how we feel. But the Rambam found a
similarity in the Torah's use of "da'as" for both knowledge and intimacy.

This is actually pretty central to his hashkafah. His whole concept of
personal redeption is based on the inevitability of da'as Hashem leading
to the proper middos. As reflected in how the Rambam named Hilkhos Dei'os.

And so, the Rambam would naturally assume that deciding the truth
determines emotional stance, whereas nowadays we stress the opposite flow:
how emotions color our perception of the truth.

: For example, Chava observed that the fruit of the tree was "tov
: l'maachal". I will concede that this might refer to the objective
: fact of it being edible. But it seems to me more likely that she was
: making a value judgment, that it was not only an edible food, but
: that it was a *good* food, i.e., better than some other foods...

I agree that "good" has non-moral meanings. But what scale is intended
here? Functional -- it was a healthier fruit than others? Aesthetic?

And here's where I am in the dark on the emotion thing. Did the fruit
taste good? If so, did she have a ta'avah for the food, or would a ta'avah
for anything but being a tzelem E-lokim not come until /after/ she ate
the fruit?  Because if she could have a ta'avah for the good taste, it
would introduce negi'os that would color her assessment of the nachash's
version of the story.  But isn't that by definition a yeitzer hara?

And yet I agree with RAM that it:
: is clearly how the Torah uses the word "tov" in reference to the gold
: of Chavilah (2:13), to describe it as above-average in quality.

: What was life like, for people who did have bechirah chafshis, but
: did not yet understand right and wrong? I imagine that they might
: choose, for example, between two equally healthy fruits, but which
: had different tastes. Or perhaps they'd choose between fruit with
: different nutritional strengths. They had emotions, and desires, and
: the ability to choose from among them.

Given what I wrote above, they would choose between competing claims
for which is right. Even if it's always "right" to choose the healthier
fruit (given what you need at the moment), how would Chavah know which
one that is?

Which is why I think that REED's model is consistent with the Rambam's.
REED writes about the fruit internalizing the yeitzer hara. What was once
the snake's job we now carry within ourselves. Leshitas haRambam, as I
have been explaining it, the snake's job was to present an evil as though
it were good, and thus requiring Chava to determine which story was true,
and thereby follow the right choice.

BTW, I wrote another blog entry relating to my stance that functional
good (eg a good pen is one that is easy to write with) is the basis of
moral good.  Someone is behaving morally when they act in accordance
with the function for which Hashem made them.

And on Mon, October 23, 2006 6:54am, RAM wrote:
: The nachash explained, "Eat this, and you'll be like G-d!!!" To
: someone who does not understand right and wrong, but does understand
: benefit and loss, I'd think this would sound like a great idea...
: It is only we, who do understand the idea that disobeying G-d is
: *wrong*, who feel that the nachash's idea was stupid. But that was
: beyond Adam and Chava's comprehension. I think it would have sounded
: pretty reasonable to them.

How? Why would Adam and Chava possibly believe that disobeying the Source
of everything would bring benefit?

: Yes, they were certainly aware that HaShem told them not to eat it,
: but they couldn't fathom the idea that His command makes the act
: inherently *wrong*...

I would suggest the reverse, again placing sechar va'onesh as the cause,
not the effect, of the mitzvah. (Been doing that a lot lately.)

Hashem, in His knowledge of man's function, knows what would make us the
most effective. Onesh is merely the equivalent of what happens to a glass
when you use it to hammer nails rather than hold fine wine. Thus, Hashem
tells us which acts support that function, and which hinder. Functional
good plus Hashem's intended function for man being the basis of moral
good.

But even without such complicated sevaros, I still wonder why Chava would
possibly lack the knowledge that doing G-d's will must in the long run lead
to more benefit than would defying it.

On the linguistic front, we had three suggestions.

Rav YH Henken 1, based on the TT's Tosefes Berakhah:
:> According to Hebrew grammar (semichut), the verse should properly read:
:> "etz da'at tov vera" without a "heh" (and not: "etz hadaat..."). A parallel
:> can be found in Bamidbar (34:2) "baim el haaretz -- (eretz) Canaan," and
:> elsewhere.

So, it's probably not a semichut (good and bad knowledge), as this would
be a rare grammatical construct.

The same could be said of "yeitzer hara".

RYHH 2:
:> Another possibility is to vocalize it differently: "etz hoda'at tov vera."
:> In fact, even without changing the vowels, "lada'at", to know, often is
:> transitive and means "lehodi'a," to make known or promulgate... This is the
:> meaning of the Serpent's statement "You shall be like elohim (judges)
:> yode'ei tov vera."

IOW, the tree which informs people about good and bad.

RLPMinden <phminden@arcor.de> on Fri, October 27, 2006 10:15am:
: I understood it similarly... by understanding "touv vera" as an object...
: Compare the English equivalents - "tree of knowledge good and bad" doesn't
: work, but for a verbal form that doubles as a noun it works: "tree of the
: knowing of good and bad" = "tree of knowing good and bad".

Wouldn't it be "the tree that knows good and bad"?

Before you ask how a tree could know ra, think of "eitz peri" vs
"eitz oseh peri". If the eitz hada'as was the esrog, which is ta'am
eitzo upiryo shaveh, then the tree is truly one that understands the
difference between good and bad.

But in looking at any way of understanding the grammar, we can't ignore
the problem of not really knowing what da'as is: intellectual knowledge,
internalization of facts, emotional dei'os, etc...

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha@aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter



------------------------------


Avodah mailing list
Avodah@lists.aishdas.org
http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org


End of Avodah Digest, Vol 4, Issue 1
************************************

Send Avodah mailing list submissions to
	avodah@lists.aishdas.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
	http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
	avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
	avodah-owner@lists.aishdas.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Avodah digest..."