Avodah Mailing List

Volume 23: Number 20

Thu, 15 Feb 2007

• 1. tznius (Ilana Sober)
• 2. Re: early bird specials and ribbis (David Riceman)
• 3. Re: early bird specials and ribbis (Zev Sero)
• 4. zov bezman hazeh (A & C Walters)
• 5. Slavery (dfinch847@aol.com)
• 6. Re: ona'ah and on-line discounters (Harry Weiss)
• 7. Re: Social responsibility, halacha and psak (kennethgmiller@juno.com)
• 8. Re: Social responsibility, halacha and psak (Meir Shinnar)
• 9. Re: Social responsibility, halacha and psak (Meir Shinnar)
• 10. Social responsibility, halacha and psak (Gershon Dubin)
• 11. Re: Slavery (Zev Sero)
• 12. Fwd: Copyright redux (Marty Bluke)
• 13. cosmetic surgery (Eli Turkel)
• 14. Re: Copyright and Dina deMalkhuta (Arie Folger)

To respond to the responses to my post connecting the proliferation of
mass-produced non-tzanua clothing with the ethical problems of mass-produced
clothing in general:

1) I admit - I just buy regular clothes and other products manufactured in
developing countries with no unions, labour standards, etc. I think this
dulls my sensitivity somewhat - I don't really like to think about the
tremendous disparity between my life and those of the people who manufacture
my innumerable material belongings. And a sensitivity dulled to tzedek, and
to the suffering of human beings created b'tzelem Elokim, is perhaps more
easily dulled in other respects as well (e.g., tznius).

2) I will not get into a discussion about whether, given all the givens, the
people who make our clothes are a lot better off than they would be if they
were unemployed, or worked in coal mines, or were sold into brothels, or
whatever. Indeed they are - but they are also quite a bit worse off than I
am, and that should matter to me. I am not under the illusion that I can
rectify the large-scale injustices of the global economy just by buying
union. I am not even so certain that we can, short of mashiach, eliminate
poverty and inequity. But just because there is no alternative to suffering
does not mean we should view it indifferently. Remember the story with Rebbi
(I think) who was punished for his insensitivity to the calf that was being
led to slaughter? I don't think that story is meant to teach us to be
vegetarians, but to develop the middah of sensitivity.

3) I am not positing a direct cause/effect. I am just pointing out that
mass-produced clothing creates real difficulties in our observance of tznius
and that perhaps it is not coincidental that mass-produced clothing also
creates difficulties in another area of avodat H' - sensitivity to the
suffering of others.

- Ilana
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From: "Zev Sero" <zev@sero.name>

> <me>
>>  an early payment is a loan which lasts until payment is due, and that's 
>> why giving a discount for an early payment is assur.

> <RZS>
> Except that that's clearly not true.  Giving a discounted wage advance
> to a future employee is only forbidden because it *looks* like a loan,
> not because it is one.

You've forgotten the gemara and Rasbam I cited in the previous post.  Wages 
are not fixed.  Hence a discount is meerely a reduction in wages.  Hence it 
merely "looks like" a discounted loan.

>  Giving such an advance to a current employee
> involves exactly the same transaction -- he's not legally entitled to
> the money, he hasn't performed the work for which it's paying, and he
> isn't legally obligated *ever* to perform that work -- and yet it's
> permitted because it doesn't *look* like a loan.

No!!!  "Lo nire'h k'agar natar": it doesn't look like a discounted loan. 
It's the discounting, not the loan, which is ribis.  Giving loans to people 
who need them is a kiyum mitzva.

David Riceman
 

David Riceman wrote:
> From: "Zev Sero" <zev@sero.name>
> 
>> <me>
>>>  an early payment is a loan which lasts until payment is due, and 
>>> that's why giving a discount for an early payment is assur.
> 
>> <RZS>
>> Except that that's clearly not true.  Giving a discounted wage advance
>> to a future employee is only forbidden because it *looks* like a loan,
>> not because it is one.
> 
> You've forgotten the gemara and Rashbam I cited in the previous post.  
> Wages are not fixed.  Hence a discount is merely a reduction in wages.  
> Hence it merely "looks like" a discounted loan.

Nor is rent; that's why it's OK to do this with rent.  And nor are
camp fees, or concert tickets.  Their price is whatever the vendor
says they are, and when the vendor publishes a schedule of fees and
discounts, it's clear what's going on.


>>  Giving such an advance to a current employee
>> involves exactly the same transaction -- he's not legally entitled to
>> the money, he hasn't performed the work for which it's paying, and he
>> isn't legally obligated *ever* to perform that work -- and yet it's
>> permitted because it doesn't *look* like a loan.

> No!!!  "Lo nire'h k'agar natar": it doesn't look like a discounted loan. 
> It's the discounting, not the loan, which is ribis.  Giving loans to 
> people who need them is a kiyum mitzva.

Same thing.  It's not ribbis because it's not a loan; it doesn't look
like ribbis because it doesn't look like a loan.  In the case of the
future employee, it looks like a loan, and therefore the discount
looks like ribbis.

I think what you're missing is why it is that the case of the future
employee is forbidden.  If their deal were public knowledge, there
wouldn't be a problem.  The problem is that an observer won't see it
at all like it really is.  The observer will think that Reuven went
to Shimon for a simple loan, unrelated to any possibility of future
employment; later, when the time came for Reuven to pay, he offered
to work it off, accepting a lower rate than the prevailing wage at
that season.  If that were really the case, then the discount would
be clear ribbis.  The reason it's not actually ribbis is because
that isn't really what happened, but an outside observer is not to
know that.

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                       	                          - Clarence Thomas

bs"d

Is there a metzius of a zov bezman hazeh? Is there any nafka mina? If not, 
is the Mechaber in Or"Ch 301:13 just theoretical? Scientifically, what is 
Zova; Rashi expains the difference between this and zera, see also the first 
Bartenura in Ms. Zovim

Thanks Kol Tuv

AY Walters
Beis Shemesh 



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Shmuel Weidberg writes:

"The truth is, it is the same with slavery. Although the gemara 
determines that it is a zechus for a slave to be freed. The gemara
does not consider it a slam dunk. The main reason why slavery was 
condemned so strongly is because slaves were so severely mistreated
and had no rights whatsoever. But in a just society living by Torah 
rules slavery would be worse than being free, but would not be the
great injustice that it is made out to be."

Oy. I'd say that in a just society living by Torah rules there'd be no 
slavery, but I figure Abe Lincoln settled this question 140 years ago. 
It's a little late to be saying things like, "As I wouldn't be a slave, 
I wouldn't be a master," in earnest debate, as if there's another side 
to the question.

Here's the problem: Contemporary Torah Judaism can engage in the same 
Talmudic machlokes that sparked dispute eight centuries ago, and thus 
help preserve Talmud as a living dialectical instrument of law and 
reason. Torah Jews can even pine away for the reestablishment of the 
Temple and its customs of priests and animal sacrifice, as a means of 
distinguishing themselves from C's and R's, who think the project to be 
an anachronistic waste of time. But slavery, well, slavery is morally 
and intellectually unthinkable, even for the O-est of the O. It can't 
even be debated, not with a straight face.

David Finch
dfinch847@aol.com


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> From: "Michael Kopinsky" <mkopinsky@gmail.com>

>> Books, and many other commodities, now have a "label" price and a "street"
>> price which are different, due to the common presence of discounters.  What
>> does that due to the din of ona'ah? It would be perverse to say that every
>> bookseller who prints a price on his book is guilty of ona'ah.  On the other
>> hand, it seems invariably true that a person who looks hard can find a new
>> copy for less than the cover price.
>
> You seem to be taking for granted (and I agree with this, but would like
> to see it in print) that the price as far as ona'ah is concerned is the
> street price, and not the label price.  The question of whether it is
> muttar to write something on the book to make it appear to be worth more
> than it actually is, is lechorah the din in the mishna at the end of
> Hazahav (BM 60a at the bottom):

Would Onaah even be an issue here.  The list price is the real price.  If 
you call Artscroll or Felheim you will ususally pay list.  There are many 
other retailers that do charge that list.

They offer sales,and discounts (such as buying directly on line).  There 
are dealers who will offer much bigger discounts.    There is a standard 
markup in the book industry and the list price is based on that.

If some vendors elect to charge less than the list price, I don't think 
that makes the discounted price the base price for cacluclating Ona'ah.

At worst it is an item which has no set price and thus ona'ah is not 
applicable.  The various prices are readily available to most peeople, who 
may elect to pay a higher price for convenience to support a local 
business etc, but I don't think that is any form of Genevas Daas.


>

Harry J. Weiss
hjweiss@panix.com

I asked:
> Such as what? I cannot imagine any such branch. Any medical
> care at all always involves the possibility of complications
> afterward, and such complications could certainly be life-
> threatening. 

R' Moshe Yehuda Gluck suggested:
> Podiatry? Dermatology? Cosmetic surgery?

That's exactly my point. In all of these, isn't there always a chance 
of post-operative infections, or sutures coming loose, or other sorts 
of emergencies which would require the doctor to examine and care for 
his patient? It might not be common, but my point is that there is no 
branch of medicine in which a physician can rest assured that he 
won't have to attend to a patient on Shabbos.

Surely we have an MD on the list who can offer some insight?

Akiva Miller

> RSB
>
> As far as the issue raised, one raise the following issue vis a vis  
> whether
> one should have a "Shomer Shabbos residency" or not or whether one  
> should
> enter  a profession if it will entail Chillul Shabbos on a regular  
> basis IIRC,
> this  issue has been discussed , etc among RIETS's RY with differing
> views-depending  on the quality of the residency, whether one  
> should lchatchilah enter a
> profession or branch of medicine  where Chullul Shabbos on a  
> regular basis
> will be part of one's family life.. Why is insisting upon on's  
> civil  liberties
> and rights which are constitutionally guaranteed, at least in the  
> US,  "a
> quite radical position" ?
The question, as I phrased it, wasn't on the final lema'ase  
conclusion - but that, given that there was no major  halachic issue  
(and if one grants hutra, there is no halachic issue and requirement  
to find someone else) - and indeed the notion that there is an  
obligation - the issue of personal comfort rises to such a level.
The issue of being legally allowed to do this in a secular sense  
never even arose - but not everything that is legal, or even  
halachically permitted, is moral (yesh naval birshut hatora).  I  
would add that especially for those who hold hutra, one shouldn't be  
talking about hillul shabbat - it actualy is the kiyum of shabbat
Meir Shinnar

>
> FWIW, one can certainly find many discussions and teshuvos as to  
> what a
> prospective medical student , intern, resident or attending  
> physician can or
> should do, ranging from going for the best residency without any  
> concern about
> Shabbos to considering only Shomer Shabbos residencies among Poskim.
>
> Yet, one wonders why one cannot simply go for the branches of  
> medicine that
> offer the best of both worlds, namly a superb medical training  
> without having
> to  be Mchallel Shabbos or entering into the huge safek of Hutra/ 
> Dchuyah.
One can, of course, also be a lawyer or accountant.  There are  
medical specialties with little chance of being called on shabbat.   
The issue is whether saving lives has any halachic merit - and  
whether we think there should be Orthodox doctors.

WRT to shomer shabbat residencies - it should be understood that in  
general, with the possible exception of Einstein, most programs do  
not offer shomer shabbat programs because they want to enable Jews to  
keep shabbat - they offer them because they realize they can get a  
far higher caliber of resident than they would otherwise get - and  
conversely, the residents end up getting a far lower level of medical  
education than they could otherwise have gotten (residency is where  
one really learns the medicine - and there is a great difference  
depending on the program..)
Meir Shinnar

From: "kennethgmiller@juno.com" <kennethgmiller@juno.com>

<<Such as what?>>

Depending on the setting of the practice,

Radiology
Dermatology
Pathology
Emergency Medicine

etc.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

dfinch847@aol.com wrote:

> Oy. I'd say that in a just society living by Torah rules there'd be no 
> slavery, but I figure Abe Lincoln settled this question 140 years ago.

Huh?  Lincoln was some sort of posek?  A rishon, an achron, a Rosh
Sanhedrin?  Why would the halacha change just because Lincoln won
a war?  And if he'd lost the war, would the halacha be different?

 
> It's a little late to be saying things like, "As I wouldn't be a slave, 
> I wouldn't be a master," in earnest debate, as if there's another side 
> to the question.

Why would one say anything like that?  Where is there even a hint
in the Torah at such a sentiment?  Did any of the Tana'im, Amora'im,
Rishonim or Achronim cavil at owning slaves, or utter even the
faintest word of criticism at it?


> Here's the problem: Contemporary Torah Judaism can engage in the same 
> Talmudic machlokes that sparked dispute eight centuries ago, and thus 
> help preserve Talmud as a living dialectical instrument of law and 
> reason. Torah Jews can even pine away for the reestablishment of the 
> Temple and its customs of priests and animal sacrifice, as a means of 
> distinguishing themselves from C's and R's

WHAT?  You think this is why we want the restoration of korbanos,
just to be different from Cs and Rs?  If the Cs and Rs were to
disappear, would we stop wanting it?  And before there were Cs and Rs,
why did we want it then?  I can't believe I'm reading this.


> who think the project to be 
> an anachronistic waste of time. But slavery, well, slavery is morally 
> and intellectually unthinkable, even for the O-est of the O. It can't 
> even be debated, not with a straight face.

Sure it can.  It's theoretical today, because there aren't any slaves
available, anywhere that Jews live.  The only countries where one can
still buy slaves aren't places we would want to live.  But that doesn't
change the way authentic Torah Jews think -- by which I mean Jews who
didn't grow up absorbing USAn culture and values and learning to
idolise people like Washington and Lincoln.  Believe it or not, such
people still exist.  The fact that we regard slavery as unthinkable
doesn't mean we're morally superior, it means that we have been so
infected with goyishe values that they have become part of us; that's
nothing to be proud of.

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                       	                          - Clarence Thomas

I sent this mistakenly to Areivim, it should go to Avoda.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Marty Bluke <marty.bluke@gmail.com>
Date: Feb 15, 2007 9:51 AM
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Copyright redux
To: mkopinsky@gmail.com
Cc: The General Discussion Area for Avodah <areivim@lists.aishdas.org>

RHS has said many times that we don't pasken like the Ran with regards to
dina d'malchusa. In addition he says that in modern society the chiyuv to
pay taxes etc. is based on the idea of shutfus.
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*Such as what? I cannot imagine any such branch. Any medical care at
*all always involves the possibility of complications afterward, and
*such complications could certainly be life-threatening.

Podiatry? Dermatology? Cosmetic surgery?>>

While occasionally cosmetic surgery serves a serious medical need most
of cosmetic surgery is just that - cosmetic.
Does the doctor in this case have any of the zechut of saving people that most
doctors have?

-- 
Eli Turkel

Shalom y'all,

Numerous posters have recently discussed the applicability of DDD (Dina 
deMalkhuta) to copyright legislation, specifically as it applies to 
downloading copyrighted multimedia material. Others suggested that perhaps 
downloading is allowed based on a number of arguments.

DDD means different things to different people. Halakhically, what people mean 
nowadays under DDD is the conflation of two concepts:
* the power of taxation by the sovereign, a.k.a. the classical notion of DDD. 
This minimally applies to real estate transactinos and poll taxes. Maximally 
it can apply to a lot more.
* the power of a governing body to institute new rules and decrees necessary 
for society to function.

Actually, there is a third category: laws that derive their power from minhag 
hasokharim. If the government enforces model contracts, we can generally 
assume these to be minhag hasokharim and automatically binding.

The power of taxation by the sovereign power derives from the notion that the 
sovereign (or, perhaps, in modern democracies, the citizens as a whole) lets 
the inhabitants live in the country by his grace. Hence we owe him a debt.  
This justification for DDD requires us to fulfil laws that are to benefit the 
sovereign. Taxes, and possibly law and order fall under this.

The power of the governing body to set rules necessary or beneficial to 
society most likely DOES NOT derive from DDD, but from the power of the 
shiv'ah tovei ha'ir (7THI). Now there are lots of arguments as to who the 
7THI are, how they are appointed/elected, etc.

Some assume that the 7THI must be reuyin ladun, which is ipso facto impossible 
with a non Jewish body. Others allow lesser mortals to be among the 7THI, 
especially if they are elected, but don't allow them to enact laws that make 
property pass from one entity to another, only from individuals to the 
generality of the city. There are more views in the matter, and they are 
nicely explained in Encyclopedia Talmudit under 7THI (7= zayin).

The net result of the above is that, most likely, the Ran's position on 
whether DDD applies in EY is irrelevant to copyright. However, copyright 
legislation most likely involves the creation of a new, artificial right, as 
copying an intellectual work doesn't involve depriving someone of his 
property (the legal literature, especially on the US constitution, talks a 
lot about this aspect of intellectual property legislation). Copyright 
legislation says that what would be permitted under a doctrine of natural 
rights or whatever, now requires the consumer to pay the rights holder. In my 
opinion, this is resembles "taking from one to give the other" quite a lot, 
although the matter may not be clear cut.

Thus, the question of in what measure copyright legislation is halakhically 
binding is a good one, not easily resolved, and dependent perhaps on the 
power of the 7THI. If so, it might also involve a kind of goodness test, to 
determine whether the law really does bring the optimal benefit to the public 
or not.

IOW, life is complex and halakhah doesn't blindly accept whatever a government 
wants it to swallow. BH. This way halakhah remains a moral compass.

PS: RMB posted my source sheet on gender identity at 
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/gender_identity.pdf>.


Kol tuv,
-- 
Arie Folger
http://www.ariefolger.googlepages.com


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