Avodah Mailing List

Volume 23: Number 190

Mon, 10 Sep 2007

• 1. Re AAAH (david guttmann)
• 2. Re: AAAH (Mordechai Torczyner)
• 3. Re: Is it better for one person to do a vadai mitzva... (Chana Luntz)
• 4. Re: Is it better for one person to do a vadai mitzva... (saul mashbaum)
• 5. Re: AAAH (Richard Wolpoe)
• 6. Rabbinic system vs. ethical integrity (Daniel Eidensohn)
• 7. Selichos - Especially before Midnight (Richard Wolpoe)
• 8. Re: Teshuva - postive or negative? (Akiva Blum)
• 9. Re: lifnei iver/kanaus (Akiva Blum)
• 10. AAAH (Dov Kay)
• 11. Re: standing for chasan and kallah (Aryeh Stein)
• 12. Re: standing for chasan and kallah (Elazar M. Teitz)

>We should research whether the appropriate acronym wouldn't rather be AAEH
(AA 'eved haShem).

See R. Michael Brody article in Hakirah 

http://www.hakirah.org/Vol%203%20Broyde.pdf

Shana Tova to all
David Guttmann
 
If you agree that Believing is Knowing, join me in the search for Knowledge
at http://yediah.blogspot.com/ 
 
Ve'izen vechiker (Kohelet 12:9) subscribe to Hakirah at www.hakirah.org 

Arie Folger wrote:

>> AAAH (Avraham Avinu alav hashalom -- a new acronym for the list?)
>We should research whether the appropriate acronym wouldn't rather be AAEH
>(AA 'eved haShem). Didn't someone once post sometzhing about this on
Avodah?

I recall reading an article by Rabbi Michael Broyde on this topic (Alav
HaShalom vs. Eved HaShem), and a quick Google shows it was brought on
Avodah, by Jonathan Baker, back in May. Link is:
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol23/v23n114.shtml#09.

Ksivah vaChasimah tovah,
Mordechai
-- 

Congregation Sons of Israel, Allentown, PA  http://www.sonsofisrael.net
HaMakor! http://www.hamakor.org Mareh Mekomos Reference Library
Webshas! http://www.webshas.org Index to the Talmud
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RSM writes:

> I wrote
> >>
> Asei doche lo taaseh even if one could somehow both do a 
> mitzva and avoid the lo taaseh. Tzitzit is doche k'laim, and 
> wollen tzitzit can be put on a linen garment, even if linen 
> tzitzit (without t'chelet) could possibly be used, both 
> performing a mitzva (in perhaps a lesser way) and avoiding 
> the lav. Despite the wording of the principle, I think it's 
> fair to say that the lo taaseh is hutra, not merely d'chuya, 
> by the asei.
> >>
> I neglected to qualify the above, as I should have, with 
> "mikkar hadin, min haTorah". We do have the principle of 
> Reish Lakish, cited in connection with both yibum Yevamot 
> 20a) and tzitzit (Menachot 39b), that "efshar l'kayem et 
> sheneihem, m'kayem". Tosfot in Menachot 40a d"h kevan says 
> that this is m'dirabban, and the Rambam  Tzitzit 3:6 says 
> "din hu" that it is permissible to put wool tzitzit on a 
> linen garment, but then says we do not do so because of the 
> above cited principle. 

I may be wrong about this, but I understood that while this may be true
of tzitzit, it is not true of yibum.

As I understand it, the sugya which concludes on Yevamos 20a which you
cite is discussing a case where the brother of a cohen gadol dies
childless, so that his wife falls to the cohen gadol in yibum.  Of
course the cohen gadol is forbidden to a widow by means of a lav.  The
question is how can the cohen gadol perform yibum (or can he perform
yibum) given that there is an issur lav - and the conclusion appears to
be that he can, because aseh doche lo ta'aseh.  They say that this is OK
for those who disagree with Resh Lekish, but given that Reish Lekish
holds that efshar l'kayem et shneihem, mikayem, how can this be true
according to Reish Lekish, given that he can perform chalitza and still
keep the lav, and the answer that is given, and which seems to be the
conclusion (and certainly the Encyclopedia Talmudit understands it as
such in the paragraph I quoted) is that chalitza b'makom yibum aino
mitzvah.  That is, while the principle of Reish Lakish is applicable
elsewhere, eg with regard to tzitzit, it is not true of yibum because
chalitza cannot be considered an appropriate substitute for yibum,
allowing one to say that one is mekayim shneihem.  That means, as I
understand it, that while there may be a whole debate about Reish
Lakish's principle and whether it is d'orisa or d'rabbanan, elsewhere,
that debate does not start to apply to yibum/chalitza, because chalitza
is already discounted as a mitzvah when one is discussing yibum, so the
whole Resh Lakish principle does not apply if the option is chalitza as
opposed to yibum.  And it was from that statement that I was drawing the
inference that if we discount chalitza as a mitzvah to the extent that
we don't even get into the whole Resh Lakish discussion about being
mekayem shnehem, because in the face of yibum, chalitza is considered
not to be a mitzvah, then surely we would apply the same principle in
our case.

Earlier you wrote:

> As far as the probability of getting 5 yibumim goes, RCL has 
> gotten the math wrong. The possible combinations of the 
> yevamim and yevamot is,  5 factorial (5*4*3*2*1) = 120, not 
> five to the fifth power (=3125).Thus the chance that there 
> will be 5 yebumim is, as REReich correctly points out, 1/120, 
> an exponentially :) larger chance than RCL's  1/3125  This is 
> because the five yibumim are not independent of one another. 
> If , for example the first yibum is a "match", the chance 
> that the second one is also a match is 1/4, not 1/5, since 
> there are only 4 yevamot the second yavam may marry, one of 
> whom is "his" yevama. In the probability examples we are 
> probably familiar with, this illustrates the idea of "with 
> replacement" and "without replacement". If five people 
> blindly choose a ball from a box which contains one white 
> ball and 4 black balls, there is a fundamental difference 
> between if the ball chosen is replaced in the box after each 
> choice or not. In the former case the number of possible 
> choices is 5 to the fifth power, since each choice has no 
> influence on any other; in the latter 5 factorial, since they 
> do. In our case,obviously the yevamot are married "without 
> replacement"

While I would seem to have gotten the maths wrong, because as you say,
the yevamot choices to have an influence on the next choice, I am
struggling a bit to see how this case matches the white/black ball case
either.  If five people choose a ball from a box with one white ball and
five black balls, then in the end *somebody* gets the white ball.
However in our case, it is quite possible that nobody gets *his* yevama.
The reason for the difference is that the white ball is the same for
each of the five, but in our case, the yevama is a different one for
each.  In fact, if the first person chooses someone who is not his
yevama to marry (and hence does chalitza to his real yevama) then he has
made sure that somebody else of the five will also do chalitza, because
that person's yevama has been taken by him.  It is only if the first one
actually gets his yevama that he leaves everybody else with their yevama
still in the pool.  That would seem to still work with five factorial
for five yevamos, but that is not the figure I am really interested in.
What I really want to know is what is the likelihood of there being one
or more yevamos - ie how likely is it that you will beat the certain
result if you had one man marry all five women, and hence definitely did
one yibum.   

> Saul Mashbaum

Regards

Chana
> 

RCL:
>
While I would seem to have gotten the maths wrong, because as you say,
the yevamot choices to have an influence on the next choice, I am
struggling a bit to see how this case matches the white/black ball case
either.  If five people choose a ball from a box with one white ball and
five black balls, then in the end *somebody* gets the white ball.
However in our case, it is quite possible that nobody gets *his* yevama.
>>
My example of 4 black balls and one white one indeed did not completely correspond  to the case of yevamot, and was merely designed to illustrate the difference between selecting with replacement and without replacement, to show why the number of possible selections is five factorial and not five to the fifth power.   A complete match to the yevamot case is the follows: A box has 5 balls of the following colors: black, white, brown green and grey. 5 people, who happen to be named Mr. White, Mr. Black, Mr Brown, Mr. Green, and Mr Grey choose balls, one after another without replacenment, from the box. A "match" is when someone chooses a ball from the box whose color corresponds to his name (this is like a yavam marrying his yevama). A perfect match is all five doing so, which will happen on average in only 1/120 of the cases. Clearly it is possible that there will be no matches, or one or 2 or 3 (only four matches is impossible, since if the first 4  match, the fifth one must be a match as well). I have been unable to devise a general formula for calulating the likelyhood of a certain number of matches for any given number of brothers; empirically, greatly aided by REReich, I conclude that the mishna's method will on average produce fewer yibumim: for 5 yevamim the mishna's method is better (ie multiple yibumim) in 30 cases out of 120, against 44 non-yibumim out of 120. It seems that even taking into account the additional matches in the mutiple yibumim, the total number of yibumim out of the total number of marrisges by the mishna's procedure will be less that the 1/5 we get by the alternative procedure.
RCL
>>
That means, as I understand it, that while there may be a whole debate about Reish
Lakish's principle and whether it is d'orisa or d'rabbanan, elsewhere,
that debate does not start to apply to yibum/chalitza, because chalitza
is already discounted as a mitzvah when one is discussing yibum, so the
whole Resh Lakish principle does not apply if the option is chalitza as
opposed to yibum. 
>>
Reish Lakish makes his statement (or more accurately *could* make his statement - "amar l'cha Reish Lakish") that "chalitza b'makom yibum lav mitzva hi" in order to save his whole principle, which the gemara suggests is refuted (leima tehavei t'yuvta d'Riesh Lakish) by the case of chayvei lavim and yibum. To present this tentative suggestion that Reish Lakish could conceivably make to avoid being entirely refuted as a fundamental principle universally accepted and applicable to our case is IMO something of a stretch. I am happy with my statement that "lav mitzva" means "lav mitzva kol kach" even according to RL. 
My proof from the case where when appropriate the yavam is persuaded to do chalitza instead of yibum is still valid; the case of safek is merely another case where chalitza is a proper procedure, and one who does so is m'kayem a mitzva.
Saul Mashbaum
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On 9/8/07, Arie Folger <afolger@aishdas.org> wrote:
>
> RMB wrote:
> > AAAH (Avraham Avinu alav hashalom -- a new acronym for the list?)
>
> We should research whether the appropriate acronym wouldn't rather be AAEH
> (AA 'eved haShem). Didn't someone once post sometzhing about this on
> Avodah?
> R. Seth Mandel perhaps?
>

iirc R. Dr. Michael Broyde wrote the definitve article on AH = Eved Hashem
not Alav haShalom.
.
-- 
Kesiva vaChasima Tova
Best Wishes for 5768,
RabbiRichWolpoe@Gmail.com
Please Visit:
http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/
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There is a dispute in the fourth perek of Bava Metzia between R' 
Yochanon and Reish Lakish concerning aquisition of objects with money. 
R' Yochanon holds that money is  a doreissa technique but it was 
invalidated rabbinically to ensure that the merchandise being purchased 
would be protected until taken by the purchaser. On BM 47b the gemora 
tries to refute Reish Lakish who does not accept money as a doreissa 
technique. It argues that it only makes sense that beis din should curse 
someone  retracting from a deal involving money - which is good on a 
doreissa level - but is only invalid on a rabbinic level. The curse 
makes sense because it prevents people from taking advantage of the 
rabbinic invalidation of kinyan with money. On the other hand the gemora 
initially states that it doesn't make sense to curse someone just 
because he doesn't keep his word.

The conclusion of the gemora which is brought in Rambam and Shulchan 
Aruch is that the mi shepora curse only applies in cases where there was 
some transfer of money. Where there was only a verbal agreement then 
there is no mi shepora but only a statement that the chochomim are not 
happy with someone who breaks his word.

Question: Does that mean that -
1) Preventing people from taking advantage of a rabbinic ordinance is of 
greater importance than the mere ethical consideration of keeping one's 
word and that's why a curse is used to protect the rabbinic system but 
not to prevent breaking promises?

Or

2) Does it mean that keeping your word is so obviously important that it 
just needs the awareness of our Sages disapproval of breaking 
commitments. On the other hand preserving rabbinic improvments to the 
system is not so obvious a value so it requires a curse to arouse 
awareness of its importance?

Daniel Eidensohn

Most sources in poskim eschew reciting Selichos before Midnight.  The usual
reasons given are "al pi kabbalah"

Permit me the axiom that Selichos is ideally said during the last ashmores
at nigth just before "Boker"
[iirc the Sha'arei Teshuva  - or is it Ba'eir Heiteiv - mentions that Tiqqun
hatzos takes precedence!]

Let's say I were a poseik and someone asked me :  "May we say Selichos
before hatzos Halayla?"

I would say bichidus NO and then find out what is the motive betzibbur:

Follow up question: "WHY do you need to say it at night?"

If that ansewer is: I need to sleep late, I would mull it over.
If the answer is: I have  MUCH more qavana at nigth I would consider the
factors below:

Does saying it at night with qavana superior to saying in the morning w/o
qavanah?

Here are several reasons to be meikel to allow it at night:.


   1. There is a virtually  uncontested Minhag to say Selichos on Kol
   Nidre nght,  Thus we have a precedent!   BUT I have bee ntold that YK is an
   exception! Well then why no Avinu malekinu on Shabbos!
   2. Furthermore why not EXTEND the exception  for YK throughout the
   Selichos season  - given that our Selichos are structured on the YK model to
   begin with?  Furthermore:  I would posit the following:

We do not Daven Msusaf early bichidus on RH,  But betzibbur we are not
concerned. I would posit that a Tzibbur is allowed to say Selichos at night
for similar reasons, that the power of Tzibbur is traonger thatn the power
of Din.  And even Qabblists say the following: You are supposed to go thru 4
levels  before Amidah vi the structure of Birchos Hashachar, Korbanonos,
Psukei Dezimar and Shema etc.  BUT when you are late you daven with the
tzibbur and throw away the structure. As one Qabblist explained in class -
that is the power of the Tzibbur.

But I do concede I do not know much Qabbalah so I cannot say that with
certainty.  And with all the years of trying to convince othre rabbis of
these arguments, they have by and large remained unpersuaded.


-- 
Kesiva vaChasima Tova
Best Wishes for 5768,
RabbiRichWolpoe@Gmail.com
Please Visit:
http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/
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"Richard Wolpoe" <rabbirichwolpoe@gmail.com> wrote:
>>EG Harat for a neder.  Had I known that my nephew would get engaged this
Thurdsay I would not have vowed to not eat Meat on Mondays and Thursdays.<<

Actually, this would not be a valid pesach. It's a nolad.

Akiva

>>> The case is as follows:
Reuven tried to steal the diamond. Shimon yelled at him, causing Reuven to
drop it. Reuven turns to run, Shimon chases after him with a knife
threatening to kill him. Levi, standing a few feet away, has only two
options - spray the blinding mace in Shimon's face, or pick up the diamond
that Shimon left for the moment because he was busy trying to kill Reuven
and yell out to Shimon that he has the diamond, with the plan being  to
cause Shimon to stop chasing Reuven out of concern for the loss of his
diamond.<<

Could I sujest a simpler case.
Reuven is attempting to kill Shimon. To prevent him, Levi must distract Reuven long enough for Shimon to escape. He yells and screams, but Reuven is too angry and cannot hear. Levi picks up a brick. He can either heave it through Reuven's car window, and THAT will get his attention, or he can throw it at Reuven's head. Which is preferable?

Akiva

<<We should research whether the appropriate acronym wouldn't rather be AAEH
(AA 'eved haShem). Didn't someone once post sometzhing about this on Avodah?
R. Seth Mandel perhaps?>>

It was an article by R. Michael Broyde, in which we proved fairly 
conclusively that the acronym AH originally stood for Eved HaShem, not Alav 
HaShalom, which probably derives from the Muslim "peace be upon him".

Kol tuv
Dov Kay

_________________________________________________________________
Got a favourite clothes shop, bar or restaurant? Share your local knowledge  
http://www.backofmyhand.com

>>>I don't recall _ever_ being at a Chasunah Minyan that said Tachanun, even
when the Chasan was _not_ Davening then.>>>

========================================

According to RSZA (in Halichos Shlomo), when davening mincha in a hall
during a seudas bar mitzvah or pidyon haben, tachanun is omitted.  R'
Shmuel Salant would omit tachanun on any day on which he was receiving
a chashuva guest.  While we are not noheg like R' SS, in the situation
of the bar mitzvah or pidyon haben, it is vadai a zman simcha.  (ad
kan divrei Halichos Shlomo)

Al achas kamah v'kamah, at a Chasunah Minyan - regardless of whether
the chasan is present or not.

KT and KvCT,
Aryeh

     R. Aryeh Stein, quoting R.Moshe Yehuda Gluck's remark

<<I don't recall _ever_ being at a Chasunah Minyan that said Tachanun, even when the Chasan was _not_ Davening then>>, comments

<According to RSZA (in Halichos Shlomo), when davening mincha in a hall during a seudas bar mitzvah or pidyon haben, tachanun is omitted.  R' Shmuel Salant would omit tachanun on any day on which he was receiving a chashuva guest.  While we are not noheg like R' SS, in the situation of the bar mitzvah or pidyon haben, it is vadai a zman simcha.  (ad kan divrei Halichos Shlomo)     Al achas kamah v'kamah, at a Chasunah Minyan - regardless of whether the chasan is present or not.>

     I don't believe there is any machlokes that at a chasuna itself, whether or not the chasan is in the room at the time, tachanun is omitted. It is, after all, part of the ma'amad of the chasuna. I  wonder, though, if it would be such a certainty if early-arriving guests would form a minyan before the chasan arrived -- if, say, the wedding was in a hotel and the chasan had not yet left his room.

     However, although afar ani tachas kappos raglav shel RSZA, but what is the makor for not saying tachanun for _any_ simcha?  The din mentions chasuna and bris milah, but no other simcha.  I doubt that anyone would omit tachanun at shacharis if the father of a b'chor or the kohein were davening there on the day the pidyon would  subsequently take place.  If they are not ba'aley simcha enough then to be equated with the bris principals, why does the occasion itself  suddenly rise to the level of equality?  

     And would the exemption hold at a siyum masechta as well?  After all, it should be no less than a bar-mitzva.  Also, since Av Harachamim is omitted when tachanun would have been skipped had it been a weekday, why is Av Harachamim universally said at a minyan in which a bar-mitzva is being celebrated?

EMT
   




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