Avodah Mailing List

Volume 25: Number 85

Thu, 28 Feb 2008

• 1. Re: The Kiddushin "raid" in Lakewood (Goldmeier)
• 2. Re: The Kiddushin "raid" in Lakewood (David Riceman)
• 3. Re: The Kiddushin "raid" in Lakewood (Elazar M. Teitz)
• 4. Does God Change His Mind? (Cantor Wolberg)
• 5. Zayin Adar (Cantor Wolberg)
• 6. Re: Hot Cheese for Shabbat Lunch (Yitzhak Grossman)
• 7. Re: Girl Scout cookies (kennethgmiller@juno.com)
• 8. Re: Hot Cheese for Shabbat Lunch (Zev Sero)
• 9. Re: learning Torah before Matan Torah (Moshe Y. Gluck)
• 10. Re: Girl Scout cookies (Daniel Israel)
• 11. Re: learning Torah before Matan Torah (Micha Berger)
• 12. Jewish Music (Micha Berger)
• 13. Torah limud: theoretical/academic versus lishma/yirat hashem/emunat chachamim (Michael Makovi)
• 14. Re: Does God Change His Mind? (Michael Makovi)
• 15. Re: Sefer HaChinuch on why 2 weeks Nidah for a girl andonly 1 for a boy (Richard Wolpoe)
• 16. Re: Girl Scout cookies (David Riceman)
• 17. Re: Girl Scout cookies (David Riceman)
• 18. Re: Girl Scout cookies (Micha Berger)
• 19. Re: Girl Scout cookies (David Riceman)
• 20. Re: Girl Scout cookies (Zev Sero)
• 21. inviting the grandparents Z"L to the wedding (Shoshana L. Boublil)
• 22. The Kiddushin "raid" (arnold.lustiger@exxonmobil.com)
• 23. Re: Girl Scout cookies (David Riceman)
• 24. Re: The Kiddushin "raid" in Lakewood (kennethgmiller@juno.com)
• 25. bitul (Eli Turkel)
• 26. Re: Girl Scout cookies (Akiva Blum)
• 27. history (Eli Turkel)

I would guess the reason for having the eirusin again privately, is to
resolve any possible safeik. Not to do it publicly so as not to be
"motzi la'az"

Kol tuv
Rafi

Zev Sero wrote:
> arnold.lustiger@exxonmobil.com wrote:

>> About a month ago, a Lakewood bochur got married. Before the wedding, he
>> had given the ring to his sister for safekeeping, who then returmed it to
>> him to perform the actual kiddushin. A few days later, in the middle of the
>> week of sheva brachos, the sister discovered that she had mistakenly given
>> her brother her own wedding ring, not the one that he had originally given
>> to her.

Zev Sero wrote:
> Why not say that since the two rings were obviously similar enough that
> they could be easily confused, and are probably of exactly the same
> value, when he accepted his sister's ring as a return of his pikadon
> he absolved her of any further duties as a shomeret, and effectively
> swapped his ring for hers? His ring became her property, the ring she
> gave him became his property and is now his wife's, and if the sister
> and wife each want their "own" rings that's entirely a matter between
> them. Any reason we couldn't say this?

Transferring property requires intention (AhS HM 189:2). If I
understand the original story correctly no one noticed the switch until
after kiddushin, hence there was no intention to transfer property.

David Riceman

R. Arnold Lustiger related:

<About a month ago, a Lakewood bochur got married. Before the wedding,
he had given the ring to his sister for safekeeping, who then returmed it
to him to perform the actual kiddushin. A few days later, in the middle of
the week of sheva brachos, the sister discovered that she had mistakenly
given her brother her own wedding ring, not the one that he had originally
given to her. This discovery was made during just prior to Shabbos Sheva
Brachos.
The question is: do the sheva brachos go on as scheduled?

(snip)

<1) Does the sister have ne'emanus? If not, is it not a case of shavya
anafshei?>

     What issur did she impose on herself?

<2) Kiddushin on Shabbos is an issur derabanan. Would this issur be
suspended in this case so a private reenactment of the Kiddushin would be allowed to take place on Shabbos itself, thus avoiding sheva brachos levatalah?

3) Can there be a chalos of nisuin without eirusin, allowing the sheva
brachos to continue even without this reenactment? The famous Mordechai
comes to mind that chuppah is really the badekin, which places the nisuin
before the eirusin.>

     If there can be no nisuin unless preceded by kiddushin, then
     re-enacting the kiddushin would not permit sheva b'rachos as part of
     birkas hamazon. Her status at that point would be that of an arusah,
     and the b'rachos would have to be said as part of chuppah -- under a
     chuppah, with Hagafen coming first. Also, that day would then be the
     first of the shivas y'mei hamishteh, although, according to what I
     recall is a Noda Bihudah, sheva b'rachos could only be said on the
     first three days. In fact, according to that shittah, this would apply
     even if the fourth day would have been one of the original seven.

R. Zev Sero commented on the incident:

<Why not say that since the two rings were obviously similar enough that
they could be easily confused, and are probably of exactly the same value,
when he accepted his sister's ring as a return of his pikadon he absolved
her of any further duties as a shomeret, and effectively swapped his ring
for hers? His ring became her property, the ring she gave him became his
property and is now his wife's, and if the sister and wife each want their
"own" rings that's entirely a matter between them. Any reason we couldn't
say this?>

     Because kinyanim don't happen automatically. They require da'as of the
     parties, or at least of the makneh. In this case, where there was no
     awareness of the need for a kinyan, there was no da'as for one.

<In a case of mekach ta'ut, we say "pachut mishtut eino chozer"; this
is certainly less than a shtut. True, there was no intention to
transact any sort of mekach at all. But can we compare the cases?>

     Pachos mishtus applies only if the mistake was one of mistaken price,
     not mistaken objects. "Eino chozer" refers to the overpayment: it need
     not be returned. (Or, in the case of underpayment, it need not be
     paid.)

<What if, between the mistake and its discovery, the sister's house
had been burglarised and the ring in her possession had been stolen?
Could she claim that the ring in her sister-in-law's possession was
really hers and must be returned, while the stolen ring was not hers,
and as a shomeret chinam she is not responsible for geneva? Or
would her brother be able to say "you got a ring and you gave a ring,
our deal is concluded, and the ring that was stolen was yours"?>

     She might be considered a posha'as, for failing to exercise care and
     return his ring when asked to. Even if not, since she kept the ring
     with the intent of using it, she is either a sholachas yad or a
     sho'eles shelo mida'as. In either event, she is liable even for oness.

EMT

Regarding:
"How about this: if Levi honestly believes that if he speaks lashon
hara, he will die. Instantly. Don't you agree Levi will be the best
hilchot lashon hara observer ever? I wager he'll be better than the
Chofetz Chaim! But the fact remains that his idea that he will die
instantly, is wrong. 100% wrong. But it still strengthened his
observance, didn't it?"

If Levi is suicidal, then he would be very inclined to speak lashon
hara. It would put him out
of his misery. So no, it isn't necessarily true that Levi will be the
best hilchat lashon hara
observer ever. And certainly not better than the Chofetz Chaim. And if
he was a normal person,
and his erroneous thinking strengthened his observance, the maxim "he
did the right thing for the
wrong reason" would be applicable. I would rather do the wrong thing
for the right reason because
ultimately we are going to be judged by intent.

Regarding Immanuel Kant, who was brought up in discussion, he was
baptized Emanuel but interestingly,
changed his name to Immanuel after he learned some Hebrew. Kant felt
that because of man's limitations of reason,
no one could really know if there is a God and an afterlife, and
conversely that no one could really know that there was not a God and
an afterlife.
Therefore, he contended for the sake of society and morality, people
are reasonably justified in believing in them (God and olam haba),
even though there
was no way to know for sure. In some sense he was reflecting free will
and suggested hedging one's bets.
ri

T.K. wrote:
Rashi says the sun and the moon and everything else were created on
the first
day and only put in place on their respective days of creation.

Rashi is reflecting the Gemara which says the luminaries, which had
been created on the first day, were set
in place on the fourth (Chagigah 12a). Also, according to the Midrash,
the original light was of an intense
spiritual quality (which would not be the sun) and God saw that the
r'shoim were unworthy of enjoying it.
Therefore, He separated it from the rest of the universe and set it
aside for the use of the tzadikim in olam haba. (Rashi).

ri
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On Fri, 15 Feb 2008 14:57:46 -0500
Zev Sero <zev@sero.name> wrote:

> T613K@aol.com wrote:

> > The meat at lunch can be cold chicken (thanks to Chazal who were
> > kind enough to make chicken fleishig, for this very purpose).

> Huh? I hope this is tongue in cheek (both of which are fleishig
> mid'oraisa)!

Actually, Maran [0] and Shach [1] rule that fowl isn't m'd'oraisa,
Rema doesn't disagree, and although Shach cites a dissenting view of
some Aharonim, he states that "harbeh poskim m'od" rule that it isn't.

I wrote the above under what I now believe is a misinterpretation of
your word 'both'; I originally assumed you meant 'cold and uncold
chicken', but I now understand you to mean '[human] tongue and
cheek'. Is human flesh b'halav d'o'raisa, considerations of ein issur
hal al issur aside [2]?

[0] SA YD 87:3
[1] ibid. 4
[2] see ibid. Pis'he T'shuvah 6

> Zev Sero Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's

Yitzhak
--
Bein Din Ledin - bdl.freehostia.com
An advanced discussion of Hoshen Mishpat

R' David Riceman asked:
> They're labeled OU Dairy, but when you read the list of
> ingredients the only dairy ingredient (whey) is third on
> the list headed by "contains less than 2% of:". Is one
> permitted to eat these cookies after eating meat? If not,
> why not?

Do the halachos of bitul apply to mixtures of milk and pareve?

When a drop of milk falls into a pot of chicken soup, the milk is batel.
I've always wondered if part of the mechanics is that we declare the
mixture to be mutar because the alternative would be a bal tashchis
problem. But if a drop of milk falls into a pot of water, perhaps we simply
consider the whole thing to be dairy, because there is no threat of bal
tashchis. Or maybe we do use the principles of bitul to consider it pareve.

I'm pretty sure I once saw this discussed somewhere but I cannot find it. Anyone else?

(Of course, I presume that all the above would apply equally to mixtures of meat and pareve.)

Akiva Miller

Yitzhak Grossman wrote:
> Zev Sero <zev@sero.name> wrote:
>> T613K@aol.com wrote:

>>> The meat at lunch can be cold chicken (thanks to Chazal who were
>>> kind enough to make chicken fleishig, for this very purpose).
>> Huh? I hope this is tongue in cheek (both of which are fleishig
>> mid'oraisa)!

> I wrote the above under what I now believe is a misinterpretation of
> your word 'both'; I originally assumed you meant 'cold and uncold
> chicken', but I now understand you to mean '[human] tongue and
> cheek'. Is human flesh b'halav d'o'raisa, considerations of ein issur
> hal al issur aside [2]?

No, it isn't, not even midrabanan. But stam "tongue" and "cheek" are
not human.

(And since human flesh is only an asei, had it been fleishig I don't
think ein issur chal al issur would have applied.)

--
Zev Sero Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

R' Eli Turkel:
> This whole attitude is so a-historical as to be disturbing (I would
> use a stronger word but then risk
> being rejected).

And Tosfos about Pinchas, Eliyahu, and Beis Hakvaros? (Mareh Mekomos escape
me, sorry.)

KT,
MYG

David Riceman wrote:
> My wife recently brought home a few boxes of Girl Scout cookies.
> They're labeled OU Dairy, but when you read the list of ingredients the
> only dairy ingredient (whey) is third on the list headed by "contains
> less than 2% of:". Is one permitted to eat these cookies after eating
> meat? If not, why not?

First of all, AFAIK (as someone else mentioned), bitul only occurs when
there is a davar issur involved. Second, we don't do bitul
intentionally. For both of these reasons the cookie is dairy, and can't
be eaten after meat.

(I _think_ if this cookie fell into chicken soup it would count as less
than 2% dairy, rather than all dairy, so it would be batel in about 1.2
cookie volumes of soup, assuming that it instantly disintegrated and
became an non-distinct part of the mixture.)

It is worth noting, however, that the OU (as well as several other
kashrus agencies) does not employ a "dairy equipment" designation. So
when no dairy ingredients are listed on a product which is OU-D, it is
often worth checking with the OU whether the product is actually dairy,
or merely produced on dairy equipment. In the latter case the product
could be eaten after meat. In your case, I would assume "less than 2%
whey" is still an actual ingredient in the product, and actually dairy.

--
Daniel M. Israel
dmi1@cornell.edu

On Tue, Feb 26, 2008 at 10:52:17AM +0100, Eli Turkel wrote:
: This whole attitude is so a-historical as to be disturbing (I would
: use a stronger word but then risk being rejected).

Except that the question isn't about the history, but about Chazal's
willingness to tell the story. Presumably, Chazal wouldn't place sinful
actions in the biography of Avraham avinu, not even bederekh mashal.

So, regardless of whether one can accept that Avraham avinu ate matzah
shemurah with the three mal'akhim because it was 15 Nissan, Chazal
taught us a lesson with the narrative that he did. Which means that all
details of that narrative, such as his learning Torah, would not be at
the expense of AAAH's memory.

I stand by my dictum that wondering about the historicity of
aggadic/midrashic stories is to miss the point. (One might even say that
it's of value, but a different discipline, to tie two thread together.)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

--
Micha Berger You cannot propel yourself forward
micha@aishdas.org by patting yourself on the back.
http://www.aishdas.org -Anonymous
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On Wed, February 27, 2008 7:12 am, R Michael Makovi wrote to Areivim:
: Nu? What's the problem with using gentile music? I'd wager a guess
: that almost every single Jewish tune is gentile in inspiration if not
: origin. Why else would Ashkenazi music sound very European and
: Sefaradi music sound Arabic? ...

Worse, even our chants for trop are in our host culture's modes (mode
in the technical musical sense; something like a scale).

A central element of Dr Birnbaum's notion of tif'eres (see AishDas's
motto, which is plagiarized off his motto for haOlim) is the notion of
a Jewish aesthetic. The idea that the individual and community are so
one with their Torah that even their choice of furniture (to take an
example) can not be separated from their Torah. It's all one piece.

I think he meant it in terms of the ennoblement aspired to by TIDE,
the refined and cultured Torah Jew combined with the gadlus haadam of
Slabodka.

Dr Nathan Birnbaum was a product of the same trend as RAEK's and the
Seridei Eish's leadership of Hildesheimer. There was a start to a
fusion of these two influences. And a large area of commonality; look
at the implications on sartorial choices in Slabodka and in TIDE
communities.

(Using TIDE loosely, as RSRH was vehemently and vociferously against
Hildesheimer Seminary's use of Chokhmas Yisrael (O Wissenschaft), and
Hildesheimer's preached vehemently against Austritt.)

SheTir'u baTov!
-micha

--
Micha Berger "Man wants to achieve greatness overnight,
micha@aishdas.org and he wants to sleep well that night too."
http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yosef Yozel Horwitz, Alter of Novarodok
Fax: (270) 514-1507

Was:
[Avodah] Does God Change His Mind?

The first half of this post is quotation from the previous thread
(which I have tried to trim; previously, 2/3 of this post was
quotation. Following that is my reply.

> R' Micha wrote:
>RYGB wrote:
>: I would find it difficult to reply to someone who states "*I*
>: disagree" with the Rambam, RSRH et al.
>RMS shared what I believe is roughly the same sentiment when he wrote:
>: I find it difficult to reply to one who 'disagrees' with the Ari ZT'L.

> R' Micha wrote

> Detour into the matter of emunas chakhamim....

> There is something I'll call the Sinai Culture. Because nisqatnu
> hadoros, in general members of later eras, products of more
> dislocations since Moshe Rabbeinu a"h, have less of it. It's not a
> matter of book knowledge as much as having the perspective, priorities
> and etire gestalt. It's very much a culture, not a library.

> The nearest any of us get to recreating that culture is the talmud
> chakham. This is the concept chareidim call "da'as Torah", but the
> basic idea is that Torah study changes how one perceives the world.
> And the notion stands whether or not one buys into the consequences
> chareidim feel da'as Torah implies.

> See also
> <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2007/02/midgets-on-the-shoulde
> rs-of-giants.shtml>

> Thus, it takes a certain amount of caution when inserting oneself into
> the question of the authenticity of Zoharic Qabbalah. Knowing data is
> insufficient if one really doesn't have the same instinctive sense of
> what Torah "feels like".

(R' Micha is referencing my thread [Avodah] Kabbalah's Legitimacy)

> Michael Makovi wrote:
> : You'll also be hard-pressed to find a scholar who accepts that Daniel
> : was not written in the Hashmonean era. I mean only that this defense
> : cuts both ways. If you try to appeal to disputed authorship of an
> : apocryphal(-like) mystical work, you've exposed yourself.

> : In any case, I haven't yet found a scholar who can seriously
> : distinguish between Daniel on the other hand, and the other
> : apocryphal/apocalyptic works on the other, without simply resorting to
> : mesorah....

> R' Micha wrote:
> Who cares what scholars think? It's like taking proof from Apocrypha.
> In both cases one may have access to information, but people who know
> the Sinai weltenschaung deemed it irrelevent.

> This is a major blunder C inherited/adopted from the Historical
> School. This confusion of academia, where the goal is to know
> something well through staying apart from it, objective, as opposed to
> talmud Torah where the goal is to internalize the study and bedavka
> learn how to understand it from within.

> Mikha'el Makovi wrote
> : We've got mesorah that Daniel is kosher and the other works
> : are not, and otherwise, the two are difficult to distinguish...

> R' Micha wrote:
> Which simply /proves/ that we lack the basic feel to make a
> determination Chazal did make. Rather than play down the distinction,
> instead one must take caution at this proof of my lack of proper
> perspective.

> (WADR to people you tend to cite, R' Hertz, REB, and now Prof Urbach
> do not engender that kind of emunas chakhamim in me. I am not playing
> down their knowledge. I am speaking only of my ability to perceive the
> kind of internalization that Abayei and R' Papa discuss that one can
> perceive in RYBS, RMF, the SR, the LR, my rebbe... People who made
> their life's mission not academic study of the Torah but its
> internalization. R' Hertz did both, but his stature is in the academic
> sphere. But besach hakol, your choice of sources often makes me feel
> like you're talking cross-purposes with the rest of the chevrah.)

I think the problem we have is you have made the academic and Torah
approaches mutually exclusive. You seem to hold that either one
approaches everything objectively and theoretically, OR he approaches
it from a Torah perspective of lishma and yirat hashem and emunat
chachamim.

However, I do not find the two mutually exclusive.

Rabbi David Bigman of Maale Gilboa in an article
(http://www.myjewishlearning.com/texts/talmud/Gemara/ModernS
tudy/BigmanCritical.htm)
proposes a certain amount of academic Talmud study in the beit
midrash. He criticizes the academic community, however, because they
make it totally theoretical, and never ask how it ought to affect my
mitzvah observance. I'm not sure, but I think the point he is making
may be the one I am about to make:

The fact is that there is a great amount of academic knowledge
available today that simply was not available in the past, period.
Today, then, we cannot simply ignore it, but rather, we must confront
it and deal with it one way or the other. This, I think, is what Rav
Hertz et al. did; being an observant Jew does not mean ignoring the
academic information, and being an academic doesn't mean that he
doesn't believe in Sinai and keep halacha. The two can be mutually
exclusive, but don't have to be.

Believe you me, if I wanted pure intellectual stimulation, I'd be in
university in America studying computer science, chemistry,
bioinformatics, and biology in English. So why am I instead studying
today keshira and tefira with Rambam, Ritva, Rif, Rosh, etc. in Hebrew
in Israel, followed by a heady dose of Rav Hirsch on chumash? I'll
tell you what, it's not because it's the most intellectually enjoyable
activity for me. Why on earth am I studying Torah? Why on earth am I
in Israel of all places? Because that's how I serve G-d, because
that's where I'm supposed to be and that's what I'm supposed to be
doing.

So when I bring Rav Hertz, REB, and Prof. Urbach, it's not because I'm
a secular academic specializing in Talmudic-era homiletics. It's
because I fear G-d, and I want to learn His Torah, and like it or not,
the fact is that (IMHO) there are certain aspects of this Torah
elucidated by academic knowledge and/or those with an academic
perspective/method. In fact, for example, after a few years in
yeshiva, I want to learn the academic aspects of Torah in a place like
Bar Ilan, not to get a degree, but purely lishma. My degree will
probably be in bioinformatics; the Torah part will be lishma l'zulato.

And so what I say is at cross-purposes with the chevrah insofar as
this above hashkafah is at cross-purposes.

Mikha'el Makovi

>Kant felt
> that because of man's limitations of reason,
> no one could really know if there is a God and an afterlife, and
> conversely that no one could really know that there was not a God and
> an afterlife.
> Therefore, he contended for the sake of society and morality, people
> are reasonably justified in believing in them (God and olam haba),
> even though there
> was no way to know for sure. In some sense he was reflecting free will
> and suggested hedging one's bets.
> ri

Of course, this does very little to inspire conscientious observance.
Kant shows that it is logical and reasonable to behave properly, but
who says I want to be logical and reasonable? See Dayan Grunfeld to
Horeb, Rabbi Berkovits G-d Man and History, and probably a million
other places, on this fact.

Mikha'el Makovi

On Thu, Feb 14, 2008 at 7:53 PM, Rich, Joel <JRich@sibson.com> wrote:

> (We have Rishonim saying that other Rishonim are wrong. No chidush. We
> have Achronim saying that a Rishon is wrong if it's to come to defend and
> explain the intent of a different Rishon. No chidush there either. But
> saying a Rishon is wrong is a big deal.
> ===========================================

> FWIW AIUI this is something "we" have taken upon ourselves, not something
> inherent in the system.

> KT
> Joel Rich

It seems that as the generations grow 'smaller" niskatnu hadoros" there is a
tendency to make our "gedolim" more and more infallible.

Onoe thing HAS changed over the doros. USUALLy ahcaronim have been called
upon to justify their decisions, whereas Rishonim were more terse and often
did not bother justifying a deicsion.

It is interesting that Rashi rarely explains WHY he gives a certain peshat.
He jsut does. Rambam, too.

While Tosafos bends over backwards [most of the time] to try and PROVE his
point. Many find Tosafos pilpulistic as a result. I find it refreshing to
see someone wrestling with the issue and not just coming down with a
decision.

While the Tur is terse, he gives most sides to the issue. In that sense he
is more Mishnaic than the Rambam who gives his side and his side only.

The Beis Yosef works hard at arriving at a conclusion. The Shulchan Aruch
does not. It is a problem today in tht we learn Shulchan Aruch w/o Tur/BY
first. SA [and evn Rema] come across as "pontificating" but they are not
because they have justified themselves [for the most part] in earlier works.

========================================================================

As for the other thread involving challenging Rishonim etc. there are
rules/guidelines as to how to do this. Choshen Mishpat 25 is a starter.

BEH I will be posting on the Aruch hashulchna and Minhag, soon based upon 3
statements in Hilchos Megillah

There is a LOT of confusion about Halachic methodology out there. And there
are different schools of thought as to how it works. And there is further
confusion because people conflate those schools at times.

The Rambam et. al. seem to be pretty sure that NO poseik after the Gemara is
absolute [aside perhaps for local g'zeiros that is in the purview of a mora
d'asra]. According to that school ANY post Talmudic source is disputable
and debatable. That is how the Rambam often ignored many Ga'onic decisions
and precedents, although the Yad is replete with exapmles of perpetuating
Ga'onic decisions, too.

Ashkenazic P'sak IS different. But remember, the midget on the shouldder of
giants model. And that is the point. If I question RMF or Mishna Brura, it
is NOT to say I KNOW better, it is to say that I have seen other approaches
that make more sens to me - and often they will make more sense to any
objective person who is not blinded by the name of the author. {The WHAT
would turmp the WHO for an open-minded person - The WHO trumps the What for
a person who judges books by their covers.] Caveat, you cannot completely
ignroe the WHO and I certainly do not either.

Illustration: I usually follow Rema, When it coems to ta'ruvos, the Rema
states Basar sehma azlinan. But if is clear that t'am k'ikkar is usueless in
that defintion. And so the Shach is massig on the Rema with raya bruros.
Chochmas Adam et. al follow Shach w/o a question. This Rema has a definite
Tiyuvta - and so we don't follow it [except where bittul is by 100:1, 200:1
etc. as with the noted exceptions by Shach himself. So Rema is NOT 100%
wrong...]

That is how the game is played. The Shach "shlugs up " Rema [on that
matter]. Anyone who does what the Shach does can do it. You need NOT be a
gadol, but you MUST do your homework. and if you do it well, you can answer
the possible counter questions to your thesis. This Shach has survived
"peer review."

There are more sublte cases. Shach nad Taz argue why salt from slating meat
is considered 100% unkosehr as oppsed to the amount absorbed

Taz- Chaticha na'asev neveilha
Shach- we do not know how much is absorbed.

The Taz is LOGICALLY wrong! Why? Becasue the mechabeir does NOT hold from
Chaticha na'aseh neveilha besh'ar issurim. It rpovieds a contradiction. The
Shach is consistent with other examples of measuring by the max [e.g.
kachel] You do no have to be a gdoal to se teh sheverkeit in this Taz. It
is apparent and manyacharnim have noted it. This does not mena the Taz is
not a Gadol or tht he is ALWAYS wrong. But kabedihu vechashdeihu anyway.
You cannot accept the Taz w/o analysis. That is why they print the Shach on
the YD on the other side.

Same for Rashi and Tsoafos

And that is EVEN true fro Bavli. There is a yerushalmi tht sometimes come up
with other teirutzim.

and even the Mishna has a Tosefta, and we sometimes pasken like the Tosefta
over the Mishna [e.g. by havdlah the machlokes Beish HShammai and Beis
Hillel we pasken like R. Yehudah in the Tosefta over R. Meir in the
mishneh as per R. Yochanna in Arvei Pesachim - based upon nahagu ha'am!]

KT

--
Kol Tuv / Best Regards,
RabbiRichWolpoe@Gmail.com
see: http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/
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kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:
> When a drop of milk falls into a pot of chicken soup, the milk is
> batel. I've always wondered if part of the mechanics is that we
> declare the mixture to be mutar because the alternative would be a bal
> tashchis problem. But if a drop of milk falls into a pot of water,
> perhaps we simply consider the whole thing to be dairy, because there
> is no threat of bal tashchis. Or maybe we do use the principles of
> bitul to consider it pareve.

It's clear that bittul does apply generally. Your example is a peculiar
one because of the water.

In my initial question I thought the problem centered on the
heterogeneity of the cookies. It seems safe to assume that the whey is
included because it does affect the flavor or texture of the cookie.
But the cookie is heterogenous. If all of the whey is in the chocolate
coating, is that battel to the cookie interior? Does it depend on the
manner in which you eat the cookie?

David Riceman

Daniel Israel wrote:
> First of all, AFAIK (as someone else mentioned), bitul only occurs when
> there is a davar issur involved.
About half of Massaches Trumos is devoted to the question of when trumah
is battel. If you are correct that entire bunch of halachos is
incorrect: trumah is never battel, instead the mixture must always be
given to a cohen.
> Second, we don't do bitul
> intentionally.
But the bittul;, if it happened, was done, not by me, but by the
factory. I would just be taking advantage of it.

Incidentally, if I understand your second comment correctly, you claim
that it's assur to put a drop of milk into a large container of water,
therefore making it batel. Could you possibly mean that it's assur to
deliberately m'vatel issur? In that case your point is irrelevant, since
the whey is not assur.

David Riceman

On Wed, February 27, 2008 1:53 am, R Daniel Israel wrote:
: First of all, AFAIK (as someone else mentioned), bitul only occurs
: when there is a davar issur involved. Second, we don't do bitul
: intentionally. For both of these reasons the cookie is dairy, and
: can't be eaten after meat.

The gemara has many examples of bitul WRT basar vechalav, so I guess
you mean then the result is a davar assur. But I believe that's not
true either.

Second, intent only applies if the person doing the mixing is subject
to the issur. A nachri mixing basar bechalav, or operating a machine
that does so, wouldn't count as trying to perform bitul lechat-chilah,
and AFAIK, would work. (I'm talking chalos, not whether doing it is
assur.)

To second RnTK's comment... I do not know why people assume that <2%
necessarily implies <1.66% (1/60 displayed to 3 digits lechumrah). US
companies have a vested interest in getting something unpleasant under
the legal limit for reporting, 2%. I therefore think it's possible
many products have ingredients at the 1.9% mark or so.

And BTW, the OU found that people didn't know what to do with (U)-DE
and now just call it milchig.

SheTir'u baTov!
-micha

--
Micha Berger "Man wants to achieve greatness overnight,
micha@aishdas.org and he wants to sleep well that night too."
http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yosef Yozel Horwitz, Alter of Novarodok
Fax: (270) 514-1507

I wrote:
> In my initial question I thought the problem centered on the
> heterogeneity of the cookies. It seems safe to assume that the whey
> is included because it does affect the flavor or texture of the
> cookie. But the cookie is heterogenous. If all of the whey is in the
> chocolate coating, is that battel to the cookie interior? Does it
> depend on the manner in which you eat the cookie?
On eating heterogenous food see Tos. Zevahim 78a s.v. "Hapigul
V'Hanosar ...." On reflection, though, it seems that it should matter
whether the function of the whey is flavor or texture, since basar
v'halav (and especially a derivative custom like waiting between eating
meat and milk) is dependent on flavor (H. Maachalos Assuros 9:16, Rashi
Hullin 116b s.v. "Im yesh bah" - - Tos. Hullin 116a s.v. "Hama'amid ..."
is relevant to the general question of how much information we need) and
not on the presence of issur (something I should have mentioned to the
posters who denied the possibility of bitul).

David Riceman

Daniel Israel wrote:

> It is worth noting, however, that the OU (as well as several other
> kashrus agencies) does not employ a "dairy equipment" designation. So
> when no dairy ingredients are listed on a product which is OU-D, it is
> often worth checking with the OU whether the product is actually dairy,
> or merely produced on dairy equipment.

Indeed, it is the OU's policy to give this information to anyone who
asks for it.

> In the latter case the product could be eaten after meat.

It's also relevant to those who don't rely directly on RMF's heter for
chalav hacompanies, but do consider it enough to give the keilim of
chalav hacompanies the status of "the keilim of the Rhinish Jews",
and eat food cooked in them.

--
Zev Sero Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

I was asked the following question by a bride.

She intends to go to the kever of her grandfather to give him an invitation
to her wedding. When should she do it?

As a Litvak, I've never heard of this myself, but I recall rumours of
something like it in other places.

Does anyone know anything abou this?

Thank you.

Shoshana L. Boublil

Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII

<1) Does the sister have ne'emanus? If not, is it not a case of shavya
anafshei?>

     ---What issur did she impose on herself?

Whether or not she has neemanus, if the brother believes her, then the
eirusin is suspect and he is assur on his "wife".

Arnold Lustiger
ExxonMobil Research & Engineering
Route 22 East
Annandale, NJ 08801

Tel: 908-730-2239
Fax: 262-313-5676

Micha Berger wrote:
> To second RnTK's comment... I do not know why people assume that <2%
> necessarily implies <1.66% (1/60 displayed to 3 digits lechumrah). US
> companies have a vested interest in getting something unpleasant under
> the legal limit for reporting, 2%. I therefore think it's possible
> many products have ingredients at the 1.9% mark or so.

I thought the legal limit was 1%. In any case, whey is listed on this
product (and is not particularly unpleasant), so that argument is
irrelevant.

As to "the 1.9% mark", there is an interesting problem which I only
hinted at. Hazal assume that we can't taste anything less than 1/60.
It should follow that anything under that margin is there for some
reason other than flavor. Whey is, at best, at the borderline (no more
than 1/50), and it has a fairly weak flavor anyway, so why would a cost
cutting company put it in at all?

I think, as I said in my previous post, that it's a (more substantial)
ingredient in the chocolate coating and not in the cookie, which is why
I find this an interesting question. I suspect, in that case, that
whether it's greater or less than 1/60 is in fact irrelevant, and the
proper question is what percentage of the chocolate is it.

David Riceman

R' David Riceman wrote:
> Transferring property requires intention (AhS HM 189:2).
> If I understand the original story correctly no one noticed
> the switch until after kiddushin, hence there was no
> intention to transfer property.

and Rav Elazar M. Teitz wrote:
> ... kinyanim don't happen automatically. They require da'as
> of the parties, or at least of the makneh. In this case,
> where there was no awareness of the need for a kinyan, there
> was no da'as for one.

Is it possible to compare this case to that of Orach Chayim 658:5?

The Mechaber there says that if Reuven handed his lulav to Shimon (on the
first day of Sukkos, when ownership is required) without specifying whether
it is a gift or a loan, that is good enough, and it is as if Reuven had
said that it is a "gift on condition to return it", because that's what's
needed for Shimon to be yotzay, so we are "omed" that that's what they had
in mind.

I recall once hearing that the above works even if both Reuven and Shimon
are unaware of the halacha requiring one to own the lulav: even in such a
case, they both have kavana to do whatever it is that the halacha wants
them to do.

If so, perhaps this can be extended to the current case: When she
unwittingly gave her own ring to the chasan, it was with presumptive intent
for whatever is necessary for that ring to effect a valid kiddushin, which
would include transfer of ownership. (From what I see of this se'if in
Hilchos Lulav, the kinyan has to be "on condition to return" because Reuven
needs the lulav tomorrow, even if tomorrow is Chol Hamoed when ownership is
not required. But since no one is getting married tomorrow, perhaps there's
no such requirement for the ring, and it can just be a permanent gift.)

I am well aware that all the above is quite a stretch of the imagination.
But the story as posted said that they did another kiddushin after Shabbos
*m'safek*, and I'm just offering a suggestion why it was only a safek.

Akiva Miller

First of all, AFAIK (as someone else mentioned), bitul only occurs
when there is a davar issur involved. Second, we don't do bitul
intentionally. For both of these reasons the cookie is dairy, and
can't be eaten after meat.

Is it obvious that bitul only applies when an issur is involved please
give sources. As to the second point the question is what is meant by
doing bitul intentionally. The cookies are already made. RMF paskens
that ice cream is okay in spite of various nonkosher jelling agents.
His entire teshuva concerns the question of whether bitul applies. He
ignores the question of whether one can give a hechsher or buy such a
product lechatchila. Hence, he obvioisly does not consider these
commercial products as a case of doing bitul intentionally

--
Eli Turkel

Daniel Israel <dmi1@hushmail.com> wrote:

David Riceman wrote:
> My wife recently brought home a few boxes of Girl Scout cookies.
> They're labeled OU Dairy, but when you read the list of ingredients the
> only dairy ingredient (whey) is third on the list headed by "contains
> less than 2% of:". Is one permitted to eat these cookies after eating
> meat? If not, why not?

First of all, AFAIK (as someone else mentioned), bitul only occurs when
there is a davar issur involved.
<<<

Bitul occurs even hetter in hetter. Y.D. Ramo 96:6

 Second, we don't do bitul
intentionally. For both of these reasons the cookie is dairy, and can't
be eaten after meat.

<<<

This isn't intentional. It was already botul when she received it.

(I _think_ if this cookie fell into chicken soup it would count as less
than 2% dairy, rather than all dairy, so it would be batel in about 1.2
cookie volumes of soup, assuming that it instantly disintegrated and
became an non-distinct part of the mixture.)
<<<

Correct. Y.D. 94:6

Akiva

> This whole attitude is so a-historical as to be disturbing

And Tosfos about Pinchas, Eliyahu, and Beis Hakvaros?

We have discussed before that chazal have a tendency to identify
together people who seem to have nothing in common. In many cases it
makes people hundreds of years old or on the contrary had children
very early when there is no reason in pshat for this. In fact by
Eliyahu and many other such cases there are other sources that dispute
these connects. Hence, some explain that these people had
characteristics in common or were a gilgul of one another etc.

As MYG points out one difficulty is when the gemara or rishonim try
and learn halachot from these identifications.

--
Eli Turkel

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