Avodah Mailing List

Volume 25: Number 289

Tue, 12 Aug 2008

• 1. Re: The halakhos of ecology (Micha Berger)
• 2. kenignaot (Simon Krysl)
• 3. ID of chilazon and chagavim (Dov Kay)
• 4. Re: ID of chilazon and chagavim (Rich, Joel)
• 5. Re: The halakhos of ecology (Zev Sero)
• 6. Tisha B'Av on Sunday (Stuart Feldhamer)
• 7. Re: Can you build a community around Halakhic Man? (Micha Berger)

On Tue, Aug 12, 2008 at 12:19:17AM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
: >But lehalakhah, it includes wasting food rather than saving it for later
: >or sharing with others. Your description doesn't match the din.

: Does it include that?  Makor?

See Shabbot 129a, 140b, Qiddushin 32a -- it's the pointless destruction
of anything in general. See also Hilkhos Melakhim 6:8, Tosafos Qiddishin
32 "Rav Yehudah" is meiqil about breaking things for a chiunch point,
the Chinuch (529) and Semaq (175) are machmir. The Chinukh goes so
far as to say the mitzvah includes not even wasting one seed of mustard
without cause.

I also recall bal tashchis invoked in the discussion of overdoing
tachrichim and aronos, but I can't find it right now.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Nothing so soothes our vanity as a display of
micha@aishdas.org        greater vanity in others; it makes us vain,
http://www.aishdas.org   in fact, of our modesty.
Fax: (270) 514-1507              -Louis Kronenberger, writer (1904-1980)

Dear all,
I am writing in the hope for a possible insight on perhaps a technical - but
to me no less perplexing - question. The Kitzur Shulkhan Arukh (126.4),
based on Magen Avraham 224.3, prohibits attending "animal shows" presented
by goyim, as well as dances and other joyful occasions, as moshavei leicim.
R. Avrohom Davis translates "kenignaot" as "animal shows" which, I assume,
would concern circuses and similar, yet an explanatory note ( in the text of
the Kitzur itself?) in the Hebrew explicates kenignaot as "ceid hayot", that
is, hunts. (I do not find any etymology or explanation of the word
"kenignaot" elsewhere.) That seems to be a difference: can anyone help
understanding it? Is it because we understand, hunting as halachically
problematic (while not prohibited) for different reasons?
Many, many thanks for any thoughts.
Sincerely
Simon Krysl
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20080812/ce1c6cbb/attachment-0001.htm>

RMB wrote: <<The simanim for chilazon don't define what source may be
used for a dye (IOW, the claim is not that anything that gufo domeh layam
etc... can be used), they are the gemara's description of the source. They
are descriptive, and thus one can argue that they only serve to confirm a
mesorah.>>
 
If I understand him correctly, R. Weingort argues that where we have a
secretion emanating from a fish which dyes wool fast with a colour
identical to indigo (ie kalah ilan, which the Aruch identifies with
indigo), we have techeles, because these simanim are ?gor?mei hadin?,
unlike the ?gufo domeh layam? and such other similar simanim, which are not
prescriptive but descriptive.  
 
He therefore argues that, given that the murex trunculus techeles has the
same colour and molecular structure as run-of-the-mill indigo, the murex
trunculus techeles must be techeles.  So the argument goes.  As it happens,
I am not entirely clear on what basis R. Weingort determines which simanim
are d?oraisa and which are d?rabbanan (or, to follow RMB?s terminology,
prescriptive and descriptive).	 Of course, when it comes to techeles, one
has nothing to lose by wearing it. (Whether you are m'chuyav to do so is
another question.)  Obviously, there are other areas where we need to know
for certain, eg is the food kosher or not? 
 
I generally side with RRWolpoe by coming down on the side of minhag over
halachic innovation.  However, when it comes to techeles, there is clearly
no minhag either way, because no-one claimed to have discovered the
techeles until recently.  RHS makes this point in his introduction to
B?ikvei Tzon - sometimes it is more traditional to do something different
because the world has changed, eg we know something we simply didn?t know
before, or circumstances have changed.
 
On the question of mesora, RHS argues that Ashkenazim who now wear techeles
should follow the opinion of Rashi and the baalei Tosefos that 4/8 strings
are blue, as opposed to the Raavad (2/8) and Rambam (1/8).  I find this
fealty to the chachmei Ashkenaz in this case a bit puzzling.  I understand
that where there is a longstanding Ashkenazic custom in accordance with the
chachmei Ashkenaz in a particular halacha, that should be followed by
Ashkenazim.  However, why should the chachmei Ashkenaz carry more weight
when their p?sak has never been practically implemented?  After all, we
Ashkenazim follow the opinion of the Rambam over Tosefos when lighting
chanukas neros mehadrin min hamehadrin.  It would never occur to me to
revisit this halacha.  True, in that case, there is a minhag Ashkenaz
against the chachmei Ashkenaz, whereas with techeles, there is simply no
minhag at all.	However, I don?t find RHS?s argument persuasive.  RHS says
that, even though the Vilna Gaon held tha
 t Tosefos?s shita is definitely incorrect, only those who always follow
 the Gaon?s opinion should do so in this case.	Again, why should this be
 the case where there is no prevailing minhag?	(By way of disclosure, I
 currently await delivery of my Rambam-shita techeles from Israel to attach
 to my arba kanfos, so this is on my mind.)
 
Kol tuv
Dov Kay
_________________________________________________________________
Win New York holidays with Kellogg?s & Live Search 
http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/107571440/direct/01/
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20080812/2225ff43/attachment-0001.htm>

 

         

         

        On the question of mesora, RHS argues that Ashkenazim who now
wear techeles should follow the opinion of Rashi and the baalei Tosefos
that 4/8 strings are blue, as opposed to the Raavad (2/8) and Rambam
(1/8).  I find this fealty to the chachmei Ashkenaz in this case a bit
puzzling.  I understand that where there is a longstanding Ashkenazic
custom in accordance with the chachmei Ashkenaz in a particular halacha,
that should be followed by Ashkenazim.  However, why should the chachmei
Ashkenaz carry more weight when their p'sak has never been practically
implemented?  After all, we Ashkenazim follow the opinion of the Rambam
over Tosefos when lighting chanukas neros mehadrin min hamehadrin.  It
would never occur to me to revisit this halacha.  True, in that case,
there is a minhag Ashkenaz against the chachmei Ashkenaz, whereas with
techeles, there is simply no minhag at all.  However, I don't find RHS's
argument persuasive.  RHS says that, even though the Vilna Gaon held
that Tosefos's shita is definitely incorrect, only those who always
follow the Gaon's opinion should do so in this case.  Again, why should
this be the case where there is no prevailing minhag?  (By way of
disclosure, I currently await delivery of my Rambam-shita techeles from
Israel to attach to my arba kanfos, so this is on my mind.)

         

        Kol tuv

        Dov Kay


________________________________

         I suppose it depends on how you define prevailing minhag. For
example, when the gemara says we always follow the opinion of R' X over
R'Y, in the absence of other circumstances would you say it's OK to
follow R'Y because the case was not a practical issue till years later?
You seem to be arguing that when there is no prevailing minhag that it's
kol hayashar beinav yaaseh but why wouldn't we follow our usual dynamics
of psak
        
        The nerot example has always interested me - I'm sure R'RW has
some comment on how the practice developed to follow the Rambam - I'd
love to know historically what the actual transition was (I assume at
some time they followed tosfot opinion in Europe?)
        KT
        Joel Rich 

THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE 
ADDRESSEE.  IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE.  Dissemination, 
distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is 
strictly prohibited.  If you received this message in error, please notify us 
immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message.  
Thank you.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20080812/7dd68ced/attachment-0001.htm>

Micha Berger wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 12, 2008 at 12:19:17AM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
> : >But lehalakhah, it includes wasting food rather than saving it for later
> : >or sharing with others. Your description doesn't match the din.
> 
> : Does it include that?  Makor?
> 
> See Shabbot 129a, 140b, Qiddushin 32a -- it's the pointless destruction
> of anything in general.

With the emphasis on "pointless".  Remember that your criticism of
my position was that I'm "defining bal tashchis in a way such that
by definition no one would want to do it".  Once you agree that it's
only about pointless destruction then I think you've conceded my
position.  "Pointless" is simply another way of saying "something
that by definition no one would want to do"; if one has a reason to
want to do it, then by definition it isn't pointless.

You might want to compare this to my position on Tzaar Baalei Chayim,
which is that it prohibits only those actions whose point is the
animal's suffering.  In other words, actions that would be pointless
if we rule out the illegitimate point of satisfying sadistic feelings.
TzBCh is forbidden, not because of the animal's suffering, but because
it's bad for a person to have the midah of sadism.

Perhaps the point of Bal Tashchis is captured in that "or sharing with
others" that you noted above.  If I have no use for something, but
perhaps someone else might, should I put it outside so those others
have a chance to take it, or should I destroy it?  If I have no care
for others, the two options are absolutely equal, and I'll do
whichever is the least trouble.  If I harbour a bit of hostility to
others I'll prefer destroying it.  Both of these feelings are what
Chazal called "midat Sedom".  If I can cause someone enjoyment at no
cost to myself, why would I not want to do that?  The only reason I
would destroy something rather than let someone else have it is because
I have a "midat sedom", either a severe case where I actually harbour
ill will to others, or a mild case where I just don't care at all
about others; both are bad midot that the Torah wants to discourage.

A practical example: empty drink bottles, which carry a 5 cent deposit.
It's not worth my while to take them back to the shop for a refund.
I can either throw them in the garbage, or put them out in a bag of
their own, so that those for whom it is worth while can take them.
Bal Tashchis would guide me to do the latter.



> See also Hilkhos Melakhim 6:8, Tosafos Qiddishin
> 32 "Rav Yehudah" is meiqil about breaking things for a chiunch point,
> the Chinuch (529) and Semaq (175) are machmir. The Chinukh goes so
> far as to say the mitzvah includes not even wasting one seed of mustard
> without cause.

The gemara in Shabbos says smashing something to soothe ones nerves
is "mesaken", not "mekalkel".  It follows that this is not bal tashchis,
if the benefit is greater than the cost.

Ditto for Mar bar Ravina and Rav Ashi breaking expensive objects at
their sons' weddings, and our minhag of breaking a glass under the
chupah.  Not bal tashchis, because it has a point.

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

I have a question about when 9 Av falls out on Sunday, as it did this year.

The halacha is that the fast starts at shkiah. Why is it that we're allowed
to fast on Shabbos for 9 Av, especially when Shabbos is docheh 9 Av? Since
Bein Hashmashot is a safeik, why don't we see safeik d'oraita l'chumrah in
the case of oneg Shabbos, and safeik d'rabbanan l'hakeil in the case of
Tisha B'av?

 

Thanks,

 

Stuart

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20080812/24e22d0b/attachment-0001.htm>

On Sun, Aug 03, 2008 at 11:26:45AM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
: >how HM is expected to navigate the ramatayim tzofim. The 2 peaks are
: >to provide conflict, which then forces choice and creativity. One of
: >those peaks is the calling to be the HM.

: I'm handicapped here, since I haven't found a copy of RT...

I don't think it's been turned into print. Ask R' Milton Nordlicht, for
a copy. (Tell him I sent you; I grew up two doors down from his home /
the world RYBS tape library.) RARR translates a sizable chunk of it in
vol II of his "The Rav".

:>(It is probably of a piece with telling his students who are LORs to
:>make up their own minds, as they see the community and its issues,
:>rather than necessarily always following his own pesaq.)

: This isn't behirah.  See MDM, in the section I cited, #1 (pp. 230-231).  
: Clarity leads to inevitability, not to choice.  How would you react if 
: Gauss had told you, "It's true that I proved that a degree n polynomial 
: has n roots, but had I chosen differently I could equally well have 
: proven that it has 3n roots", or if Newton had told you "It's true that 
: I proved that a cannonball travels in a parabola, but had I chosen I 
: could equally well have proven that it travels in an ellipse."  The 
: creativity of HM is precisely in understanding a sugya so clearly that 
: he has no choice about how to explain it or pasken from it.

Then RCBrisker was not a halachic man. There was an agunah in Brisk,
and neither he nor the dayan knew how to pasqen. He asked the dayan to
write RYESpektor for a pesaq, and that he should telegram back a one word
answer. RCB was afraid that if he knew the sevara, he could argue both
sides and reopen the question! For that matter, that was RCB's explanation
for why he insisted R' Reguer be hired as dayan before he would take the
shtella. Lomdus in general, and all the more so one based on chaqiros,
doesn't provide clarity in pesaq.

I don't think I agree with your assumption; I think the role of religion
is more in terms of helping you constructively frame the questions than
in providing answers. But that's just me.

More to the point, I think RYBS's comment about creativity is about
using it to resolve the choice, rather than remain in doubt and being
arbitrary. As I tried to say, but failed to: dialectic leads to choice
which drives creativity which leads to resolution. Not that I know how
he addresses the times when pesaq runs out of sevara and is forced to
rely on rules of birur: rov, safeiq derabbanan, etc... Being chosheish
leshitas R' whomever, the textbook Brisker chumrah, isn't the product of
"understanding a sugya so clearly that he has no choice about how to
explain it or pasken from it."

What you say about clarity and choice is the Or Samei'ach's explanation
of why mal'akhim don't have bechirah. Given enough Torah, would man
enter the same state?

...
: In spite of being a graduate of Maimonides, I had practically no contact 
: with Rabbi Soloveitchik, so I have no idea what his plan was.  The 
: institutions he influenced, however, were not designed to produce HMs.  
: They were aimed at producing more rounded people.

I see HM as an archetype. A real person would be a composite, part
philosopher, part HM, part homo religiosus chassid, etc... and it's a
question of how much of what belongs in the blend. (Reread my observation
above as shorthand for: "Then RCB didn't well embody the HM archetype".)
HM is lauded as something RYBS believed should figure prominantly. And yet
he still lauded learning how to daven from the Chabadnikim in Chaslovitch.

BTW, I believe Bereishis was written to be more of a typology than a
history. Which is what it means when it's called Seifer haEisanim.

: >But this critique of HM as it plays together with his other works --
: >particularly in how he handles the confrontation with olam hazeh -- is
: >not the "Mussar objection"...

: I wan't clear.  The mussar critique is directed against the assertion 
: that "in Volozhin we're healthy".  Following the Rambam, ikkar halacha 
: induces the golden mean in an already harmonious person living in  
: already harmonious society.  Every person has to adjust it to his own 
: personality via humroth and kuloth, and every society has to adjust 
: based on the tendencies that society instills in its inhabitants.  HM 
: rejects that.

I understood what you meant, by the time I wrote that reply at least. But
that's a totally unrelated point. Saying that I personally disagree with
the ideal because of a difference in postulate sets doesn't mean as much.

Here I'm not discussing right or wrong, but functionality. If someone
believes that RYBS's is the only true derekh (which would be paradoxical,
since he didn't) then he would have to pursue it despite any dangers I
might feel one would have a hard time avoiding.

: Your critique in these posts is that HM can function only with a very 
: high level of expertise, and I think that's false...

More that someone trying to be living dialectically based creativity in
which one of the archetypes is HM -- and thus that creativity includes
halakhah -- needs a certain level of expertise. Not that high, but beyond
what most balebatim will bother gaining and if gained, will often apply.

It is far to easy to say "navigating a dialectic" and mean "compromising".
(Something not to discuss on list, but you can decide for yourself if
my presumed frequency of that error is born out by observation.) It
means that trying to follow the path, imbibing the bit about navigatin

: slavishly follows the MB or SSK is capable of doing with them what HM 
: does with Hazal and rishonim.  That's enough to enable a person or a 
: community to implement HM as a master plan for how to live.  They may 
: not all be poskim, but they can all try to devote their lives to 
: understanding the world via the a priori categories of Torah.

Yes, that HM in terms of rebuilding oneself to conform with halakhah's
a priori categories. But that's not becoming a creative partner with
G-d in how one deals with life's conflicts, including making halakhah
into a partnership excercise.

: Another critique of HM, irrelevant to this thread, is that the 
: categories of Torah are not really a priori, v'od hazon lamoded.

But I invite you to start another thread about it. I didn't think that
the a priori nature halakhah's categories was open to question (within
a Torah-dik worldview). Perhaps I'm just being naive, perhaps I'm
missing what you're getting at.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Man is equipped with such far-reaching vision,
micha@aishdas.org        yet the smallest coin can obstruct his view.
http://www.aishdas.org                         - Rav Yisrael Salanter
Fax: (270) 514-1507


------------------------------


Avodah mailing list
Avodah@lists.aishdas.org
http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org


End of Avodah Digest, Vol 25, Issue 289
***************************************

Send Avodah mailing list submissions to
	avodah@lists.aishdas.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
	http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
	avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
	avodah-owner@lists.aishdas.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Avodah digest..."