Avodah Mailing List

Volume 25: Number 303

Fri, 22 Aug 2008

• 1. Ve'einenu me'iros (Gershon Dubin)
• 2. Re: Format of Tehillim (Alan Rubin)
• 3. Issur in smoking marijuana? (Efpasik@aol.com)
• 4. Re: Geirut (Chana Luntz)
• 5. Re: Geirut (Arie Folger)
• 6. Re: Geirut (Arie Folger)
• 7. Re: Geirut (Chana Luntz)
• 8. Fwd: Re; Geirut (Meir Shinnar)
• 9. Re: Geirut (Chana Luntz)

You mentioned that you didn't understand what enhanced sight had to do with shevach of Hashem.  

Rav Feivel Cohen once explained it to mean that we would be capable of seeing more of His niflaos and therefore be  better equipped to praise Him.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com


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To my question

 > > Why do the vast majority of siddurim print most tehillim as if they
 > > were prose? Doesn't this obscure the poetry of the tehillim?

Micha Berger answered
 > To really answer your question, I think in many cases it reflects the
 > fact that most people aren't shopping for a siddur based on their
 > knowledge of what the tefillos mean. In other cases, e.g. interlinear
 > siddurim (whether to English or Modern Hebrew), it's more like what I
 > had when I tried doing my mini-siddur -- the technical work is heavy,
 > especially given the interwoven translation.

 > Not a Torah answer at all, more Areivim than Avodah, but there it is.

Pity that the only answer is so prosaic!

It seems to me that the advantages of having tehillim formated 
'properly' would make the effort worthwhile. It may be relevant that the 
only siddur I have seen, with most tehillim formatted like verse, the de 
Sola Pool siddur, does not include weekday davening so there may have 
been more room to play with.

Our siddurim tend to be Swiss army knives and include everything that 
might ever be required. So we find Yom Tov Amidah in the siddur even if 
nearly everyone uses a machzor (though it is useful for the occasional 
idiot, usually me, who has left his machzor at home). A common, sight 
is an otherwise pristine siddur with the pages for shabbos musaf amidah 
falling out. Is there a case for a better produced and formatted siddur 
which doesn't have everything (including that tool for removing stones 
from of horse hooves).

Alan Rubin

I'd be curious to know when Rav Moshe Feinstein, ztl, wrote about marijuana.

From about the 50s through the 70s, marijuana was more of a protest symbol, 
than a recreational drug  The protest was Vietnam, civil rights, feminism, the 
generation gap, materialism. Young people got high for a reason, especially 
those in college.  I speculate that in declaring marijuana assur, and stating 
the reasons, dina d'malchus dina was not weighing on the mind of Rav Feinstein, 
because Jews were mostly law abiding then - I would say mentchlich.

Today, there is simply no validity for anyone to smoke marijuana, other than 
for medical reasons. Its a crime.  Also, if your're caught, you'll have a 
permanent criminal record, and in these days of easy background checks, you're 
limiting yourself in getting a job.  If Rav Moshe were writing today, I speculate 
that dina d'malchus dina would be addressed.

Elliot Pasik



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> I wrote:
> > In what cases do you believe an apotropos makes decisions requiring 
> > da'at en lieu of the minor orphans?

And you replied:

> For example, deciding how to split up an inheritance. Making 
> deals requires da'at, the apotropos can do it. 

But that was precisely why I thought that the mechanism of hefker beis
din hefker was required.  Wasn't it the day before yesterday's daf yomi
(Gitten 40a-b)- a man owned an eved in partnership and the partner freed
the eved, making the eved a half eved, half ben chorin.  Knowing that
the beis din would force him to free the eved completely, as per the
mishna, the father transferred the ownership to his minor son.  In order
to solve the problem, the Beis Din appointed an apitropos to the minor
which enabled the freeing of the eved.  And Tosphos there discusses how
this could be done, and both according to Rabbanu Shmuel and according
to Rabbanu Tam, the mechanism is hefker beis din hefker, that either the
half eved was transferred to the apitropos  who then could free him, or
it was based on the principles found on daf 52b which allows the
apitropos to take trumos and ma'asros for the yesomim katanim so they
can eat their produce, and allows him to free an eved by the method of
selling him to somebody else who can free him - both of which are
allowed, according to Tosphos, under hefker beis din hefker.  Does
anybody disagree with Tosphos on this? 

This is in contrast to the case of a minor to whom a yevama falls, where
we have to wait until the minor is a gadol and can perform chalitza or
yibum (although that is not just a matter of not having daas as there is
a need for gadlus).

That is why I was looking for cases in between.  Ones that do not deal
with property, but also do not have a specific requirement for gadlus.
My assumption was that if there was, then we would not need to come on
to hefker beis din hefker, but I could be wrong.

By the way, even according to the man deamar 
> that higdilu yekholim lim'hot, the power of the apotropos in 
> this matter is no less than a beit din converting a minor.

Not sure what you are saying here.

> The suggestion that an apotropos should swear en lieu of the 
> orphans if indeed  he can effectuate da'at for them is not convincing,
for the 
> ability to swear depends first and foremost on being informed about
facts. The 
> apotropos comes late into the game and cannot be expected to have
anything to 
> say on the  matter.

Not necessarily.  I agree in many cases that would indeed be the
situation, and of course then he could not swear.  In the same way that
we have to deal with the fact that those who inherit their father's
property, even as gedolim, also often do not know what happened to the
property and are not in a position to swear.  But if an apitropos has
been appointed to a minor since he was a small baby, and has acted on
his behalf and dealt with the property for - say 10 years, he may well
be fully in command of all of the facts.  As I understand it, there is a
blanket prohibition on swearing by the minor or an apitropos on his
behalf, regardless of whether he is or is not fully informed of the
facts.  However, once the minor hits majority, the rules change, despite
the fact that such minor is no more informed of the facts the day after
his barmitzvah than he was the day before.


> Arie Folger
> http://www.ariefolger.googlepages.com

Regards

Chana

On Friday, 22. August 2008 12.10:17 Chana Luntz wrote:
> By the way, even according to the man deamar
>
> > that higdilu yekholim lim'hot, the power of the apotropos in
> > this matter is no less than a beit din converting a minor.
>
> Not sure what you are saying here.

I was responding to your original question and anticipating your follow up 
question, where you stated that the power of apotropos comes from hefqer beit 
din hefqer (HBDH) only. In fact, what I wrote was based on the same sugya. 
However, as I am in the process of moving, I have not had the chance to 
review that daf. IIRC, Rav Na'hman's position is not based on HBDH.

In addition I wrote that, if you would claim that the apotropos' power is 
limited, as according to one view in the Talmud, higdilu yekholim lim'hot on 
the apotropos carving up of the estate, anyway, the same is true of a qatan 
who converted 'al da'at beit din. Hence, the apotropos exercising the 
orphans' vacrious da'at is similar to beit din doing so in a conversion of a 
minor.

However, you did write that you are looking for non monetary applications of 
vicarious da'at. I am afraid that it will be hard to find, if there are any 
at all, but do care to point out that we relate to giyur 'al da'at beit din 
somewhat like to monetary cases, as we can see from the statement that it is 
based partly on zakhin leadam shelo befanav.

KT,
-- 
Arie Folger
http://www.ariefolger.googlepages.com

On Friday, 22. August 2008 12.10:17 Chana Luntz wrote:
> Not necessarily. ?I agree in many cases that would indeed be the
> situation, and of course then he could not swear. ?In the same way that
> we have to deal with the fact that those who inherit their father's
> property, even as gedolim, also often do not know what happened to the
> property and are not in a position to swear. ?But if an apitropos has
> been appointed to a minor since he was a small baby, and has acted on
> his behalf and dealt with the property for - say 10 years, he may well
> be fully in command of all of the facts. ?As I understand it, there is a
> blanket prohibition on swearing by the minor or an apitropos on his
> behalf, regardless of whether he is or is not fully informed of the
> facts. ?However, once the minor hits majority, the rules change, despite
> the fact that such minor is no more informed of the facts the day after
> his barmitzvah than he was the day before.

1: the apotropos can still not swear regarding issues that came about before 
he became apotropos. Being 10 years in service does not enable you to know 
first hand what happened before the onset of service. Hence, he can only 
swear about hearsay, which isn't what swearing is about.
2: as is evident from the sugya you quoted, there is a great dislike of 
swearing, and indeed, taqanot were enacted, such as the one by Rabban Gamliel 
hazaqen freeing a widow from swearing, allowing her to make a vow, instead. 
As the Talmud Bavli explains ad loc., even a very small component of 
inexactitude can count as the violation of an oath, and 'Hazal wanted to 
protect the minor orphans from such puraniyot.

KT, GS,
-- 
Arie Folger
http://www.ariefolger.googlepages.com

RAF writes:

> The majority of posqim - e.g., those who require KOM even 
> bedi'avad, would say that, based on how the Talmud explains 'Ameikh
'Ami 
> vE-lohayikh E-lohai, that you cannot meaningfully separate between the
two. To be a Jew 
> is to be a bar 'hiayuva, and you cannot at once meaningfully state
that 
> you want to become(or for a qatan "have become") Jewish and yet refuse

> teh 'ol mitzvot.

The question here seems to be though not quite as you have stated, and I
think this is the heart of the dispute - ie whether refusing the ol
mitzvos mean that the whole statement of wanting to become Jewish is
meaningless, or is it that the statement of refusing ol mitzvos is
meaningless - because it is not possible.  There is also the question of
the terminology at stake. If you take the statement "I want to become
Jewish but not be obligated in the mitzvos" - that last part is an
impossibility, given the first part, so do we ignore the last part, and
keep the first part, or do we knock out the whole statement as not
meaningful because it is contradictory.  And what if the statement is "I
want to become Jewish and not keep the mitzvos" (but nothing about
obligation)?  Is that too an impossibility and meaningless, despite the
fact that the reality of that is lived by secular Jews every day?  What
if the person said explicitly "I want to become Jewish and I want to
have the same olam haba as my non frum Jewish friends" - ie accepting
that there is an obligation, and there may well be din v'cheshbon on
this, but willing to take the same chances as the non Jewish friends. 

The case of the katan though is different, because at no stage does the
katan necessarily even state he wants to become Jewish.  At most he
seems to have the option to reject the whole package - Jewish plus ol
mitzvot.  So if he does nothing, what happens? Even if you hold that you
cannot halachically separate between the two, that does not necessarily
mean that you rule him not Jewish.  The other alternative is that you
rule him Jewish but still a bar hiyuva, whatever he says - in exactly
the same way you do for a born Jew - who can wander around refusing the
ol mitzvot as much as he likes, it don't help any.  In the words of the
gemora (Nedarim 8a) v'halo mushba v'omed m'Har Sinai hu - we are deemed
to be sworn to keep the mitzvos from the time of Har Sinai, and because
of this we *can't* in reality go swearing to keep mitzvos now, even if
we want to, because ain shavuah chal al shavuah.  Similarly, we can't go
resiling from the obligation to keep mitzvos now.  Neither, according to
this view, can the now grown up katan - the only thing he can do is
reject everything, and even that he cannot do once he has done something
that indicates that he is behaving like a Jew - ol mitzvos comes whether
he wants it or not, just like for us.

> But I am not convinced that coming to your bar mitzva service 
> in a car and  having announced a "qidush" in a seafood venue where the

> child will toast to  lobster doesn't sound like a convincing form of
being 
> passive. The actions scream "I don't want 'ol mitzvot."

They may do, as do the actions of those of all of his born Jewish
friends who are doing exactly the same thing.  Those Jews don't want ol
mitzvot either.  They got it whether they like it or not.  Is the fact
that this boy is entitled to protest and walk away from the whole Jewish
thing mean that if he doesn't, that decision is imposed upon him, when
what he really wants is to be like all of his Jewish friends (ie a
sinning Jew)?  The sources really don't seem to read like that.

> Kind regards,
> -- 
> Arie Folger

And then RMB writes:

> The usual case of apitropos is management of a yerushah on 
> behalf of qetanim. (At least I imagine it's the most common.) 
> This includes being a maqneh, even though the qatan's lack of 
> da'as bars him from giving up ba'alus if he were doing it himself.

Yes, and that is why the explanation given by Tosphos to allow this is
hefker beis din hefker.  But the apitropos isn't your (RMB's) argument -
because you were arguing that KOM takes place once the katan reaches
gadlus.  The likening to an apitropos has the apitropos doing the KOM in
place of the katan, thus fulfilling the perceived technical requirement
to have KOM as a condition for gerus, despite it not actually being done
by the katan.  I don't think there is a case of an apitropos being able
to substitute for daas of the katan in this way.  I like you believe
that the usual case of the apitropos is in relation to property, and
hence hefker beis din hefker covers the field, but I am interested to
know if somebody can think of another case more similar to this one,
where hefker beis din hefker does not work, and yet we substitute for
the katan's daas.  The only one I can think of is the marrying off of
the minor girl, and that is not allowed by an apitropos.

>
> KOM is a mandatory part of geirus. 

This is precisely the issue under discussion.  Is it?  There is
definitely one way to read the sources which makes it that (at least for
adults, I think reading it that way for katanim is much more difficult -
you really have to read in something that is not there and insist on a
positive where there is just a negative) - which is what you bring.
That is not the question.  The question is, is there an alternative way
of reading the sources which suggests that KOM is not a mandatory part
of geirus.  If there is, then we have an eilu v'eilu situation.  Now I
am never going to sit on a Beis Din, much less one that accepts
converts, so "where I am going" as RYG puts it, is not exactly relevant.
The question is, is it just as legitimate a reading of the sources to
say that KOM is not a mandatory part of geirus.  Obviously, as RYG
brings, the Rashba is able to read the sources in this way, so it cannot
be so completely out of left field to do so vis a vis the gemora.  But
one rishon does not halacha make - so the real question is do the codes
etc allow for this reading?  If they do, then it is not surprising that
there are those who will hold that this is the correct reading, rather
than  yours.

> The pragmatic issues:
> 
> 1- We can't measure qabbalas ol mitzvos. After all, it's 
> devarim shebaleiv

Well this gets us into what I think is an even more complicated issue.
If KOM exists as a halachic requirement - what *is* it.  Is it, as you
say devarim shebaleiv?  But halachically, as you know, devarim shebaleiv
aino devarim - they just don't really count for anything.  And suddenly
you are saying that devarim shebalev, which are discounted all the way
through halacha as having real halachic impact, suddenly do so in this
case?  That seems a really difficult understanding to have.

Thinking about it last night seems to me that an understanding more
consonant with halacha as we know it, would be to understand KOM as a
form of shavuah.  After all, we have an explicit gemora that tells us
that we are bound by a shavuah made at Har Sinai, and that is why *we*
cannot make a real shavuah to perform the mitzvos, because ain shavuah
chal al shavuah, we can at most make a pseudo shavuah to further
motivate ourselves.  So, given that our original KOM on Har Sinai was a
form of shavuah, mustn't that be what this is? And surely along with a
shavuah, which is treated as a form of action rather than d'varim
shebalev, must surely come kavana (if I sleeptalk, surely I am not
making a valid shavuah, not matter what I say, am I?)

If you do not hold KOM is a requirement, but rather all that is needed
is a desire to join the Jewish people, then presumably what you hold is
that once the person joins the Jewish people, they are bound by that
original shavuah on Har Sinai (whether they want to or not) and hence
are obligated in mitzvos.  That is why you need at the very least to
warn them that is what they are getting themselves into (at the extreme
if they were not at least made aware, then maybe they can argue taus or
some such, - you presumably can't say matir shavuah for the on way back
at Har Sinai).  But while affirming that obligation may be a good thing
to do, for precisely Rav Gidel's reasoning on Nedarim 8a "l'zarize
nafshe", and since of course Beis Din are keen for people to tend toward
zarizus, they ought to make them do this - actually it does not
accomplish anything except chinuch, since ain shavuah chal al shavuah,
ie - so long as they genuinely join the Jewish people, they are bound by
the mitzvos whether they want to be or not - as this comes along with
that.

On the other hand, if you do hold KOM is a requirement, does that mean
that you hold that the ger is *not* bound by the shavuah made on Har
Sinai (which makes a certain degree of sense, because as a goy he was
clearly not), and hence he had to enter into his own shavuah?  But
assuming he made the shavuah before he became a ger, does that mean that
the one made on Har Sinai is not chal?  Or if he makes the shavuah after
he becomes a ger, why does KOM carry any meaning at all, he is bound by
the same obligation all of the rest of us are?  If we cannot make a
shavuah to keep mitzvos, why can he? Because he does it at the same time
that the one from Har Sinai is chal with respect to him? Would there be
halacha l'ma'ase implications for this. If a ger, having made a valid
KOM then violates the mitzvos, is he chayav for a korban for violation
of shavuah as well as whatever the penalty is for whatever violation he
has committed?  If not, why not?

But then even if you require KOM as a requirement, and would reject
anybody who came along and said they were accepting the mitzvos except
for one (based on Bechoros 30b), because that is not a valid form of the
necessary shavuah for KOM (for which you need some form of na'aseh
v'nishma, presumably) - they you still might hold a conversion valid if
they were subsequently found to be lying - in the same way that a
shavuah is chal and the person is liable for a korban if they are
actually lying (that is one of the classic cases of shavuah, is it not -
they said I did not eat, and they did).

Dunno, but this is why I find the whole concept of KOM, that you seem to
swim through so easily, so messy and complicated.  Can somebody give me
another paradigm for KOM that is not a shavuah and not devarim shebelev?

> Tir'u baTov!
> -Micha

Regards

Chana

WRT RMB's bringing in the name of RYBS about understanding the rambam on geirut.

It is difficult for me to be holek on RYBS, but, BMKVT, I found the
pshat cited  quite difficult in the rambam, because it seems explicit
against the problem the rambam is raising.  Furthermore, most poskim
and shut have traditionally understood the rambam differently , and
have brought him as a ra'aya.  Therefore, it is difficult fo rme to
accept it as pshat in the rambam

The problem is as follows:  The rambam's problem is with the wives of
shelomo and shimshon, where the following points are made:
(references are to the machon mamre edition - hilchot issure biah,
chapter 13 (halachot numbers are different in the printed  - hal 10-14
correspond to 14-17 in the printed edition)

1) Shelomo and Shimshon could not possibly have married foreign women.
(halacha 10)

2) The women they married are of foreign origin, and i) Converted for
a utilitarian reason ii) were not converted according to  bet din iii)
It was shown that they were insincere  as they did avoda zara after
the giyur (hal 13)

3) Because it was clear that their conversion was insincere, the katuv
considers them as goyot, and that they are still forbidden.
This may suggest that the rambam considered them as goyot - with an
invalid conversion.

However, this is not the end of the story - because the concluision of
3 would cause problems for the 1- if the meaning is that the katuv
considers them as goyot and as forbidden means that their legal status
was that of goyot and forbidden - rather than a statement trying to
describe the attitude of the katuv to these wives.

The rambam then specifically rejects the notion that these women were
halachically goyot - in hal 14.

he says about people who converted for secondary reasons  hare ze ger.
 veafilu noda shebishvil davar hu mitgayer - ho'il umal vetaval, yatza
miklal hagoyim  - an explicit statement that the previous statement
about the katuv considering neshe shlolmo as goyot is not a a halachic
determination - they are not goyot .
He then says, vehosheshim lo -, ad sheyitbaer tzidkuto.
RYBS, kedarko bakodesh, in a brisker derech wants to create an
intermediate state - that gerut ends up being a two step process - he
yatza miklal hagoyim, uliyede yisrael lo higia - but again, BMKVT,
this is hardly pshat (and such an intermediate state is hardly found
anywhere in poskim), and I don't see how it can be reconciled with the
end of the halacha.  Furthermore, for a two step process in halacha -
one would expect clear definition of each step - but here, there is no
clear boundaries, actions or criteria for the second step - it would
seem that the process of actually becoming a Jew (after ceasing to be
a non Jew) should have some clearly defined parameters...

 (BTW, The simple pshat (and apparently the one that was accepted by
most poskim until recently ) seems to be that even though the gerut is
chal, in such a gerut, he does not have the hezkat kashrut of a
regular Jew - and hosheshin lo - and presumably, one wouldn't want to
get married to such a person unitl one is sure ..- just as one would
not want to marry a yisrael meshumad - but he still has the halachic
status of a Jew - and this notion of hezkat kashrut fits far better
with the relatively nebulous notion of hitba'er zidkuto))

The problem with positing this intermediate status  - because
immediately he says about these gerim - not just a general din about a
regular ger, but about these gerim - afilu chazar ve'avad avoda zara -
hare hu keyisrael meshumad, ......meachar shetaval na'asa yisrael.
Furthermore, we know specifically that he is talking about these gerim
who converted for a reason or without knowledge of mitzvot - not about
stam gerim who then strayed back - and not even about gerim with an
initially inappropriate conversion shehitbaer zidkuto - because he
then applies this din to the wives of shimshon and shelomo - who he
just said were inappropriately converted, and we know that they never
intended to convert properly - the rambam says af al pi shenigla sodan
- that is, we found out their proper motivations - they were still
gerim and the kidduhsin of shelomo and shimshon were valid (even if it
was an inappropriate marriage, it wasn't against halacha) - that is,
the hishvan hakatuv of 13 is not a statement that they actually were
goyot.....

It is a thematic unit, from hal 10 -14, starts off with  a statement
that shimshon and shlomo could not have gone against halacha - then
emphasizes the difficulty and enormity of the problem -  and ends up
with an explanation - which concludes that they were gerim - even if
they shouldn't have been accepted, even if they were never sincere -
and therefore shimshon and shelomo could marry them - and could stay
married to them even when their original insincerity became known.
Any other conclusion leaves a tension - between the resha and sefa....

Again, I am always leery of disagreeing with RYBS - and especially
when it seems so pashut (as I know he knew how to learn far, far (add
a few more..)  better than me) - but BMKVT I  don't see how one can
reconcile the end of halacha 14 with a view that the conversion was
incomplete - that these women were no longer goyot but were not yet
gerim - and therefore how this pshat works.  One can perhaps parse
different parts of the halacha as applying to different cases - but
the pshat in the   I can understand RYBS paskening this way, but don't
see how this is pshat in the rambam.  One can of course pasken like
other rishonim - but that is a different issue...

Meir Shinnar

Meir Shinnar

RAF writes:

> I was responding to your original question and anticipating 
> your follow up  question, where you stated that the power of apotropos
comes 
> from hefqer beit  din hefqer (HBDH) only. In fact, what I wrote was
based on 
> the same sugya.  However, as I am in the process of moving, I have not
had the 
> chance to  review that daf. IIRC, Rav Na'hman's position is not based
on HBDH.

I am afraid you are going to be less cryptic here for me to understand.
How is Rav Na'hman's opinion relevant here and in what way is it not
based on HBDH?

> In addition I wrote that, if you would claim that the 
> apotropos' power is  limited, as according to one view in the Talmud,
higdilu 
> yekholim lim'hot on  the apotropos carving up of the estate, anyway,
the same is 
> true of a qatan  who converted 'al da'at beit din. Hence, the
apotropos exercising the 
> orphans' vacrious da'at is similar to beit din doing so in a
conversion of a 
> minor.

Agreed, which is why I would never claim that.  I can see a lot of
similarities, including this right to protest (at least according to one
opinion) on gadlus.  And nevertheless, Tosphos et all claim that the
basis for the apitropos' rights to do anything is Hefker beis din
hefker.  Note by the way, that under the principle of zaken adam shelo
befanav, the person on finding out (having daas) can also protest, and
then the gift or whatever it is is not ultimately chal.  That is
therefore what you would expect from zakin adam shelo befanav and
therefore the right of the katan to reject the gift given to him of
Jewishness on majority is not really so surprising.  

> However, you did write that you are looking for non monetary 
> applications of vicarious da'at. I am afraid that it will be hard to
find, if 
> there are any  at all, but do care to point out that we relate to
giyur 'al 
> da'at beit din somewhat like to monetary cases, as we can see from the

> statement that it is  based partly on zakhin leadam shelo befanav.

Again agreed.  But this all helps me, not you.  The dispute, remember,
is not over whether beis din has the power to perform gerus on a katan.
Nor that it is based partly on zakhin leadam shelo befanav (which is
where somebody does something for somebody else which is a benefit for
the first person without his knowledge).  The dispute was whether KOM is
needed for that geirus as a katan. KOM, whatever it is, is something
that is clearly impossible to perform without daas.  One option you
proposed was no KOM is needed because it is not possible for a minor to
have daas (and therefore we don't learn the adult case from the minor
case as we don't learn efshar from ein efshar).  But the other option
you proposed, which is what we are discussing here, was that there is
indeed KOM but that this KOM occurs by the mechanism of beis din or the
apitropos appointed by beis din (the adoptive parents) substituting
their daas for that of the katan.

I said that, as far as I am aware, the only case in which a beis din or
an apitropos can substitute its daas for that of a katan is in a
monetary case, and the mechanism by which this is achieved is generally
understood to be hefker beis din hefker.  KOM, whatever it is, the one
thing it is clearly not is a form of property that can be transferred to
the beis din or apitropos, so that they can then have the correct daas
in connection with it, so there is no way of applying hefker beis din
hefker to the situation.  So in order to show me that there is a case
that is remotely like the one being proposed, you need to find me a case
where beis din or an apitropos is permitted to substitute their daas for
the absent daas of the katan and either hefker beis din hefker does not
work (meaning we are not talking about property) or at the very least
the rishonim reject hefker beis din hefker as the mechanism applying in
such a case, and provide an alternative mechanism explaining how such a
daas is substituted, and such reasoning can then be applied to the case
of a katan being converted.  If we can't find such a case, that points
towards such a novel explanation of what is going on (ie there really is
KOM, just by the substituted daas of the apitropos or beis din) not
being a true explanation.  That is further supported by the fact that
Tosphos et al needed to revert to hefker beis din hefker to explain the
general apitropos case, when, according to you, they could have found a
more generalisable principle to cite which would have allowed us easily
to slot in the katan being converted case.  Without all that, the idea
that there is really KOM at the time of the conversion seems pretty
untenable, and the only remaining options are RMB's - actually the KOM
occurs at the time of gadlus (which I discuss elsewhere why this does
not seem to fit the sources) or that KOM, at least for a katan, is not a
necessary requirement for conversion.
 
> KT,
> -- 
> Arie Folger
> http://www.ariefolger.googlepages.com

Shabbat Shalom

Chana
 



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