Avodah Mailing List

Volume 25: Number 363

Thu, 23 Oct 2008

• 1. Re: Sukkah in the BHMK (Gershon Dubin)
• 2. Re: Sukkah in the BHMK (Micha Berger)
• 3. Re: rain on Succot (Marty Bluke)
• 4. Re: Sukkah in the BHMK (Zev Sero)
• 5. Some thoughts on Shemonah Perakim (Michael Makovi)
• 6. Re: Sukkah in the BHMK (Micha Berger)
• 7. Re: Sukkah in the BHMK (Zev Sero)
• 8. Re: FW: Sukkah different to Esrog (David Eisen)
• 9. Aleph to Sof (Cantor Wolberg)
• 10. Fwd: Re: Korbanos on Succos (Micha Berger)
• 11. Re: Sukkah in the BHMK (Joshua Meisner)

They had to be brought to the northern part of the mizbeach;  where is there a limitation on eating only in the northern half of the azara?

Gershon
gershon.du...@juno.com

-- Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:
The qorban minchah had to be eaten in the northern half of the azarah.

What was done on Sukkos? Are the qorbanos outide of "ke'ein taduru"? Did
they build a sukkah in the azarah?

The person who asked me this in shul was more amazed by his inability to
find a discussion of the topic than the question itself.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             It's nice to be smart,
mi...@aishdas.org        but it's smarter to be nice.
http://www.aishdas.org                   - R' Lazer Brody
Fax: (270) 514-1507
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On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 03:50:22PM +0000, Gershon Dubin wrote:
: They had to be brought to the northern part of the mizbeach; where
: is there a limitation on eating only in the northern half of the azara?

You are right. They were limited to eating it within the entire azarah,
not just the north (Zevarchim 33a).

My friend's question still stands:
> What was done on Sukkos? Are the qorbanos outide of "ke'ein taduru"? Did
> they build a sukkah in the azarah?
> The person who asked me this in shul was more amazed by his inability to
> find a discussion of the topic than the question itself.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Mussar is like oil put in water,
mi...@aishdas.org        eventually it will rise to the top.
http://www.aishdas.org                    - Rabbi Israel Salanter
Fax: (270) 514-1507

R' Saul Mashbaum wrote:
<...I have not seen the peirush hamishnayot of the Rambam mentioned by
some posters, but cannot understand how the mishnyot in Taanit and
Succa can be understood to refer only to rain on the first night.
<Both clearly refer to rain on all of Succot.

Take a look at the Meiri and Ritva on Taanis 2b (where the Gemara
comments that rain on succos is a siman klala). They both say that it
refers to all of succos. Then they bring down the pshat of R'
Ephrayim(I believe) who says that it only refers to the first day.

The Rama brings down the mashal of the master throwing water in the
servant's face when he talks about leaving the succa for rain on ANY
day of succos, and therefore it would seem that the Rama understands
this to apply on all 7 days.

There are actually 3 opinions:
1. Rain is a siman klala all of succos since there is a mitzva of
teishvu k'eyn taduru (a person cannot go 7 days without sleep) and
rain interferes with performance of the mitzva(Ritva, Meiri, simple
understanding of the Rama)
2. Rain is a siman klala on all of the dayas after the first night,
however, since on the first night you need to eat in the succa anyway
it is not a siman klala
3. It is only a siman klala on the first night (simple understanding
of the Rambam in the Peirush Hamishnayos in succa)

Micha Berger wrote:
> The qorban minchah had to be eaten in the northern half of the azarah.
> 
> What was done on Sukkos? Are the qorbanos outide of "ke'ein taduru"?

I think so; the Cohanim eating in the azarah were very much not "at home";
they had to be constantly conscious of the kedusha of the place, and that
it was not at all their home.  They had to eat standing, because only
malchei Beit David could sit in the azarah.  This seems very different
from "keva`" as in "beito arai vesukato keva`".


> Did they build a sukkah in the azarah?

Surely not. "Lo tita` lecha...kol eitz".


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
z...@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

I just finished studying Shemonah Perakim, so let me give some random thoughts.

An analysis of the Shemonah Perakim by Professor Lawrence Kaplan.
h
ttp://www.edah.org/backend/coldfusion/search/document.cfm?title=An%20Introd
uction%20To%20Maimonides%C2%92%20%C2%93Eight%20Chapters%C2%94&;hyper
link=Kaplan1%2Ehtml&type=JournalArticle&category=Major%20Religious%
20Thinkers%20Past%20and%20Present&authortitle=Dr&firstname=Lawrence
&lastname=Kaplan&pubsource=The%20Edah%20Journal%202%3A2&authori
d=256&pdfattachment=kaplan2%5F2%2Epdf

His central thesis is that Rambam's goal was to create a virtue ethic
in which obedience to the Law has its value, but that obedience is
nevertheless subordinate to virtue. Within virtue, moral virtue is
subordinate to rational virtue.

In other words, keeping the mitzvot helps on maintain the Mean.
Maintaining the mean helps one attain moral virtue, which in turn
leads to rational virtue. In the end, the only true value of life is
to perfect the rational intellect and thereby gain immortality.

Very fascinating essay which clarified Rambam's overall philosophy in
general and his intent in Shemonah Perakim in particular.

--------------


chapter about the man who obeys because of moral virtue, and the man
who obeys because of God's command.

Rambam says that in "rational" commands (mitzvot; murder, theft,
etc.), one should obey them due to his own moral virtue. On the other
hand, in non-rational commands (hukim; shatnez, kashrut, giluy arayot,
although I personally cannot understand why giluy arayot is not a
rational command, but be that as it may...), one should obey them
because of G-d's command.

Professor Isadore Twersky and others interpret this as a dialectic
between autonomy and heteronomy; in rational commands, one should
follow his own autonomous instinct and virtue, while in non-rational,
one should follow G-d's inscrutable and heteronomous command. But
Kaplan disagrees; chapter four already taught us that the non-rational
commands of the Torah serve as practical instruments to bring us to
the Mean. Therefore, following G-d's heteronomous command in this case
is not because we are to develop obedience to His inscrutable will as
a value in and of itself, but rather, because these commands only
indirectly affect the moral virtue, whereas the rational commands
directly relate to moral virtue. Obeying G-d's command for the sake of
obedience has little if any value for Rambam. Rational commands are to
be followed autonomously for the sake of their moral virtue;
non-rational commands are to be followed heteronomously, for there is
nothing intrinsically morally questionable in them, and had God not
commanded them, there'd be no objection to eating treif, etc.

Thus, Rambam shows that virtue is to be exalted over obedience; the
ultimate value is rational virtue, followed by moral virtue, and
obedience has value only insofar as it leads to these.

Now, my own thoughts:

I am inclined to follow the philosophy of Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits, as
expounded by David Hazony in "Why Judaism Has Laws", in Azure
magazine: Judaism, says Rabbi Berkovits, extols the practical
sociological effect of the deed over the intent of the performer.
Whether or not one is charitable in his heart is less important than
whether he actually helps the poor. This is almost the exact opposite
of Rambam, who extolled virtue over obedience. However, Rambam's
philosophy is still useful for us: in moral commands, I'd nevertheless
say that ultimately, G-d does want the moral virtue to be ingrained in
our moral fiber. As Dennis Prager says, "Judaism would love that you
give charity out of the goodness of your heart. But the Torah knows
that if it waited for this, it would wait an awfully long time. So it
says give 10%, and if your heart catches up, great. If not and/or in
the meantime, good has still been done". So while Rambam says virtue
is greater than obedience, I'd say the opposite, BUT, I'd say that
virtue is still a value, and hopefully, in the end, the moral virtue
will catch up to one's deed. However, in non-rational commands, such
as kashrut, this is not necessary. Following the philosophy of Rav
Hirsch, in which these commands have educational and symbolic and
training value, there is no moral virtue related to these commands.
Thus, there is no need for one to have a moral revulsion to treif,
etc. On the contrary, this subverts its educational value. Rabbis
Berkovits and Isidore Epstein say similarly, saying that kashrut
trains one in self-control. Dayan Grunfeld in Horeb in a footnote to
the introduction, criticizes Rabbi Berkovits for this idea, but
nevertheless, all these thinkers agree that one way or another, the
hukim are only indirectly related to G-d's ultimate goals of hesed and
tzedaka and mishpat. They may disagree on what kashrut does teach, but
they all agree it is educational, and neither intrinsically moral ( =
desirable to G-d) nor sacramental or mystical (I am following Rabbi
Danziger's view of Kabbalah according to Rav Hirsch, and not Dayan
Grunfeld's).

(An aside: Rav Hirsch criticizes Rambam for his taamei mitzvot, but
Rav Hirsch has more in common with Rambam than he admits. Rambam and
Rav Hirsch agree that the mitzvot are either intrinsically moral, or
that they somehow are educational or pedagogical or symbolic, and thus
indirectly conducive towards some moral goal. Thus, Rabbi Danziger in
his reply to Rabbi Elias, can say that Rav Hirsch is being "pure
Rambam" and not mystically Kabbalistic. For Rav Hirsch, the mitzvot
are not sacraments as they are to Kuzari and others.)

Another comment: we are brought to the vexed question of why G-d
commanded the rational commands, if they are indeed rational. Hovot
haLevavot is deeply troubled by this, and suggests that the generation
of the Exodus was so morally and rationally deficient, that these
needed these rational commands, but we do not today anymore. Rabbi Leo
Adler (a Hirschian), however, in his The Biblical View of Man (Urim
Publications), says that this shows the pernicious influence of Greek
philosophy; only such a philosophy, by extolling the power of
intellect (the yetzer hatov) and ignoring the power of emotion and
vice (in other words: the yetzer hara), could even ask the question of
why G-d should command these commands. For in fact, without the Divine
command, the rational mitzvot, though being rational, have no binding
force. So too Rabbi Berkovits: he says that Kant proved it is logical
to be moral, but who says it is obligatory for one to be logical?
Without a Divine command, it may be logical to be moral, but there is
no binding imperative to be so logically moral, unless G-d commands.
As an aside, Rav Saadia Gaon suggests that the rational commands are
needed to flesh out the precise laws of the rational commands, for we
can rationally conceive of their general laws but not in all their
details. Thanks to Rabbis Adler and Berkovits, we no longer need Rav
Saadia Gaon's solution. I will say, however, that we can borrow Rav
Saadia Gaon's idea for our own purposes: I will say that the
conscience and the intellect can indeed serve to assist in keeping
mitzvot: Rav Hirsch speaks of the voice of G-d speaking within you,
and I believe that the conscience and the intellect can act as general
guides to the directions as to what is right and wrong, and the
mitzvot serve to confirm and direct him in more precision. Indeed,
one's conscience and intellect are necessary to raise questions when
something seems wrong but the subject does not know of a particular
law; the conscience thus raises a flag that calls for further
investigation. Moreover, the posek in his halachic decisions must be
guided not only by empirical logical, but also by his sense of what
the overarching ethos of the law requires, as shown by Rabbi
Berkovits, Rabbi Eliezer Samson Rosenthal, Rebbetzin Blu Greenberg,
Rabbi Yehuda Amital, Dor Revi'i, and others (I am not sure about Rav
Soloveitchik; Rabbi Lau regarding Rabbi Rosenthal says Rabbi
Soloveitchik disagrees, but Professor Marc B. Shapiro brings Rabbi
Soloveitchik as being in agreement with Rabbi Yehuda Amital and Dor
Revi'i on this matter). With all this said, we can understand what Rav
Kook in Orot haTeshuva means when he says that sins cloud the
conscience; when one sins, his moral barometer is disrupted, and his
conscience no longer so clearly can flag potentially questionable
situations and morals.

(A random note: in speaking to R' David Glasner and to Rabbi
Berkovits's sons, I have established that Rabbi Berkovits, before
learning under Rabbi Yehiel Yaakov Weinberg, first learned under Rabbi
Akiva Glasner, Rabbi Moshe Shmuel Glasner's son.)

Mikha'el Makovi

On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 01:41:56PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
: >Did they build a sukkah in the azarah?

: Surely not. "Lo tita` lecha...kol eitz".

How is a sukkah more comparable to an asheirah than to a wooden balcony
over the ezras nashim?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

Micha Berger wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 01:41:56PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
> : >Did they build a sukkah in the azarah?
> 
> : Surely not. "Lo tita` lecha...kol eitz".

> How is a sukkah more comparable to an asheirah than to a wooden balcony
> over the ezras nashim?

As you say, that was in the ezrat nashim, not in the azarah.


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
z...@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

RMB wrote:

>Thinking out loud:

>Taking an inferior esrog with which to thank HQBH for this year's crops is kind of like repeating Kayin's error.

>However, comfort in the Sukkah isn't what we are bringing to the
>encounter with the Almighty, it's what He brings to us. In the mishnah,
>rain is compared to the rav tossing the wine back in the eved's face;
>the emphasis on it being from Him.

>>>
I believe one of the aharonim similarly notes why the Torah first commands
the mitzva of 4 minim followed by the mitzva of dwelling in a sukka, while
the Mishna reverses the order by first teaching the laws of sukka followed
by 4 minim. The answer given is that the 4 minim is the Jewish people's
hakarat hatov for the ingathering of the year's crops, while the sukka
reflects Hashem's appreciation to His nation that agreed to go in the
desert and weather the inclement conditions and the protection Hashem
provided via the sukkot; therefore, the Torah Shebikhtav emphasizes the
initiative that comes from the people and His love in kind, whereas the
Torah Sheba'al Peh written down by Hazal underscores the initiative that
came from Hashem and our love in kind.

B'virkat HaTorah,
David


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R' Micha asked:
According to Seifer haYetzirah, beri'ah involved 32 elements -- the 22
letters and the 10 sefiros. Isn't there a problem saying it's only about
22 of the 32 elements?

Not really. What about Eilu v'eilu, etc.?
Also, the word "es" is an aleph and sof.  That would justify the
alphabet explanation.  What else there would indicate an additional
ten?

Kol tuv.
ri
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Another post from a lurker. In his first post to me, he wrote: 
> See Nechemiah 8:16, referenced in Halichos Shlomo 7:27. 

Below is his follow-up message. 

-micha

Ah, I found it - in the first volume [of Moadim uZemanim]. Succah
Simman 88 in a footnote, he says he was Mefalpel that year on how
the Kohanim ate Menachos in the Azarah, as one may not add a structure
to the Azarah based on Hakol Bichsav.

He writes: a) A Binyan Arai is allowed, just as in the Hava Amina in
Sotah 41 they built a Bimah of wood in the Azarah and there was no
objection of adding such temporary structures to the Azarah. (And
the Passuk in Nechemiah refers to the Azarah as well).

b) Shu"t Beis Yitzchak by R' Yitzchak Shmelkes says that Achilas
Kodshim Avodah and does not need a Succah (Rav Sternbuch asks on this
from the Chullin eaten along with it).

c) The same Shu't adds that they built a Succah in a room that was
built B'Chol and Pesuchah Lakodesh. (Rav Sternbuch asks on this too
from Tosefta Maaser Sheni that such a structure is a violation of Hakol
Bichsav)

d) R' Sternbuch says that on the Har Habayis where one could eat and
live, one would be obligated to build a Succah, but in the Azarah there
is no obligation to build a Succah since it cannot possibly serve as a
Beis Dirah all year round, since one is limited to Achilas Kodshim there.
So since these Kodshim could not be and were not eaten in a place which
could function as a  Beis Dirah all year round, they could be eaten
normally on Succos as well - and they need not be eaten in the temporary
Beis Dirah of the Succah.

On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 11:27 AM, Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:

> The qorban minchah had to be eaten in the northern half of the azarah.
>
> What was done on Sukkos? Are the qorbanos outide of "ke'ein taduru"? Did
> they build a sukkah in the azarah?


The Rema writes (OCh 640:4) that a sukkah that is built in a place where it
is impossible for him to do all of his needs (eating, drinking, and
sleeping) because of fear of bandits is not a valid sukkah because it's not
k'ein dirah.  It seems to me that a sukkah built in the azarah, where one
would not be able to sleep (or sit, for that matter), would similarly be
pasul because it would not be k'ein dirah.

The gemara in Arachin 3b expresses a hava amina that kohanim should be
entirely peturim from sukkah because their inability to live with their
wives during the chag (due to their need to be tehorim to enter the mikdash)
precludes any sort of k'ein taduru, before concluding based on a beraissa
that this p'tur only exists when they are doing the avodah, not when they
are not doing avodah (akin to the p'tur of a traveller).  This distinction
implies the need for an explicit p'tur to allow the kohanim to leave a
sukkah in order to do avodah, which could either serve to significantly
broaden the scope of your interlocutor's question or to present an explicit
p'tur for kohanim eating kodshei kodoshim to do so outside of a sukkah.

- Josh
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