Avodah Mailing List

Volume 26: Number 61

Mon, 06 Apr 2009

• 1. Re: Choshen (Micha Berger)
• 2. Re: Women at a funeral (T6...@aol.com)
• 3. running a seder (Eli Turkel)
• 4. birchat hachama (Eli Turkel)
• 5. flat earth (Eli Turkel)
• 6. Re: reasons for torah loopholes in dinei mamonos (Chana Luntz)
• 7. hoist by his editor's petard (David Riceman)
• 8. Re: reasons for torah loopholes in dinei mamonos (David Riceman)
• 9. Re: reasons for torah loopholes in dinei mamonos (Chana Luntz)
• 10. And Gave Us Shabbos (Yitzchok Levine)
• 11. Re: hoist by his editor's petard (Rich, Joel)
• 12. Re: hoist by his editor's petard (David Riceman)
• 13. Re: hoist by his editor's petard (Micha Berger)
• 14. Re: hoist by his editor's petard (Rich, Joel)
• 15. Re: reasons for torah loopholes in dinei mamonos (David Riceman)
• 16. Re: Ani velo hashaliach (I. Balbin)
• 17. Bris milah or Bircas Hachama which comes first? (Marty Bluke)
• 18. birchat hachamma (Eli Turkel)

On Thu, Mar 12, 2009 at 12:35:35PM -0400, Silverman, Philip B wrote:
: SBA asked about the background of the world "Choshen," and some folks
: have responded with interesting answers.
: I'm curious if any grammarians out there have focused on the two-letter
: root "ches-shin" with a nun suffix.

Well, here's what I found on possible 3 letter roots based on a possible
/ch-sh/ underlying root

CSH - chashah: silent or unresponsive (just hit me -- Chushim ben Dan,
who was deaf, could be named from the same shoresh as "yecheshu")

CSM (Chashum) - personal name in Ezra and Nechemiah

CSN - nidon didan

CSS (doubling the middle letter) - straw / chaff or dust

CVS/CYS (chush, chish) - hurry

CVS (chush) - to feel

YCS (yachas) - geneology (as spelled in Nechamiah 7:6)

NCS - bronze / bold / snake / hiss / tell the future (lenacheish)

That last one is promising. But that would make choshen as a permissable
form of lenacheish, a potentially huge topic.

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             It isn't what you have, or who you are, or where
mi...@aishdas.org        you are,  or what you are doing,  that makes you
http://www.aishdas.org   happy or unhappy. It's what you think about.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Dale Carnegie

From: "Prof. Aryeh A. Frimer" <fri...@mail.biu.ac.il>
>>R.  Zev Sero's distinction between women at a funeral and women at the 
cemetery is  well taken and is undoubtedly correct in theory.  However, since most 
 funerals in Israel and around the world take place at the Beit haKevarot --  
wouldn't that make this distinction nigh irrelevant or  moot?<<




>>>>>>
 
But the distinction would still be valid for those cases where the levaya  
takes place somewhere other than the bais hakevoros.  For instance, the  
hespedim for my father were said at the Ohr Someach yeshiva -- with my siblings  and 
myself present -- and afterwards a procession went to Har  Hamenuchos, where 
we children did not go.
 

--Toby Katz
==========




--------------------  




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Heard an interesting shiur today. Rabbi (from Shilo) claimed

1. There is no mitzva of simcha to eat the night of the seder only
the next morning. So he eats only matzah maror etc. and a main
dish of soup
giving more time for maggid

2. The only reason to eat less than a kezayit karpas is
not to make a beracha achrona and so include maror in the beracha
rishona. However, in any case over 72 minutes elapses between the
two and so that doesnt help. Instead they use potatos (filling) for karpas
and everyone especially the kids eat a few pieces so they are no longer
hungry followed by a beracha achrona. He says that people rush through
the seder since it begins (in Israel) about 8:30 and people are hungry.

3. The main part of the seder is questions and answers for the children and
not the recitation of the hagadah. In fact arami oved avi is the centerpiece.
Hence, much of the seder consists of quizzes for the kids. Usually in the
extended family seder some older children put on several skits and then
the others need to guess what midrashim were used in the skits

4. During the meal the discussion is for adults with deeper questions.
His father-in-law always asks some question for them to think about all
night long. In general his father-in-law works 2 weeks preparing the seder
with questions for everyone on their level.

chag kasher vesameach
-- 
Eli Turkel

<<Contrary to my error earlier, the event is not at dawn (or noon). It's
actually the night before. The moment that the sun is in its place is
during the rule of Shabbatai, which is at the start of Wed, the evening
before. The berakhah is made when the sun next appears. (Perhaps one
can compare making the berakhah after noon to making the berakhah on
the year's fruit blossoms after Nissan.)>>

Actually one can make the berachat ha-ilanot after nissan just that normally
there are no blossoms later in the year. In the southern henisphere one would
say it in Tishre.
Though one says it once a year I heard a psak that someone in Australia would
say in in Tishre and if he were in Israel 6 months later he would say it again
since it is another year (starting in Nissan).

I agree that many rishonim did not distinguish between science and mythology
(though Rambam certainly did distinguish between astronomy and astrology).
Nevertheless I read them as saying that birchat hachamma is once in 28 years
because literally the sun returns to its original location after 28 years
(1/4 day time 4 for a whole day and times seven to return to the same day of the
week).
Does anyone have any source before modern times that does not take this
literally (physically)?


-- 
Eli Turkel

<<It's not all revisionism, though.  It is pretty clear that at least some
of Hazal did know that the earth was a globe:

http://fkmaniac.blogspot.com/2009/03/chazal-earth-is-made-like-ball.ht
ml>>

Yes some but not all chazal. I have a book that claims that in general
the scientific knowledge of Rav Yochanan was greater than Shmuel in
spite of Shmuel's statement. Hence, it would not be surprising that it
is the Yerushalmi that got it right.

In the blog it also bring prrof from the Rambam. OTOH Rambam says
there are only 4 elements and the stars are living.
My LOR was once told by chababnik in the name of LR that one is
forbidden to believe there are 100+ elementary elements as it against
a psak (!) of the Rambam.
BTW at the Torah and Madda conference I asked a physicist about
Copernicus and he was incredulous that any modern rabbi could brrand
this as lacking in emuna as there are good estimates of the spped of
the earth around the sun (and even of the sum moving in the universe)

kol tuv

-- 
Eli Turkel

RDR writes:
> You are eliding a fundamental distinction in halacha which may not
> translate well to common law.  That is the distinction between mamon and
> knas.

Actually it translates very easily into common law - because damages goes to
the individual damaged, and knas goes to the court/government.  There is a
concept of punitive or augmented damages, which is arguably a form of fine
which does indeed go to the individual, but is fundamentally based on the
damage received.

The halacha in fact is the one that elides the distinction - because it has
both fines and damages going to the individual damaged - and where it cannot
find a person who has been damaged, or does not regard money as suitable
remedy, it does not use monetary penalty but other penalties.

  We have a general rule "ein govin knas b'bavel", and, indeed,
> that principle applies as well to some unusual sorts of mamon.  It's
> true that the gemara views boshes as unusual in this regard, but it's
> equally true that boshes doesn't fit well into the category of "mamon"
> since the fine is not evaluated based on quantity of damage, but on
> other considerations (like intent). 


The rule is that a tam ox that gores pays chetzi nezek, which is regarded as
a fine (and as you say not is not judged in bavel) whereas the same ox, if
it then gores three times, pays nezek shalem, which is regarded as monetary.
That means of course that in fact even your classic, basic form of damage  -
that of a muad ox, is not purely evaluated on quantity of damage, but on
other considerations (such as the nature of the ox doing the goring and
whether its owner had previously been warned).  And yet if the aforesaid ox
gored my ox first, and your ox third, I am significantly out of pocket
compared to you.  And there are loads of other cases where the evaluation is
not purely based on quantity of damage - the example of objects that
happened to be hidden in a haystack is yet another - and the list goes on
and on - there is always a balance drawn between what the damager might be
expecting to happen (no goring by a tam ox, no items in haystacks, no
embarrassment without intent), and what actually happened. It is part of the
same continuum.

 Several of the cases you cited
> don't fit the category of "mamon" well because they are fines, and,
> since we don't assess fines, the court is acting in some capacity other
> than evaluating damage.
> 

Well you do sometimes assess fines in halacha (well not in bavel, but in
theory).  Everybody agrees that chetzi nezek for a tam ox is a fine, and
yet, you can't work out what "chetzi" is if you don't work out what the
nezek is, and for that you need assessment.

On the other hand, some things that are clearly defined as fines in halacha
appear, contrary to the way we would generally understand fines, ie purely
as penalties to deter the offender, to also be rough and ready assessments
for damage, to avoid the need for an assessment.  The payment for violation
of a woman raped or seduced, for example, is of course a fine, but also
allows for payment to the father for the stain on the family name, which
could be greater or less great.  In the common law, fines are paid into
court, and victims then in theory have access to a fund set up for them to
compensate them, which is independent of any actual payment by the damager,
but this is not the case in halacha.

> The original poster, AIUI, was asking specifically about mamon rather
> than knas.  This is intuitively appealing, since we might not expect
> fines to follow logical rules; they might very well depend on transient
> social norms.

Well if you are talking about the torah, it is much more difficult to say
that it is talking about "transient" social norms.  Part of the point I was
making was that damages, even when phrased as compensatory, are also or at
root function in the form of knas.  And when they found themselves in bavel
without the power to inflict knas, they found the level of damages they were
then able to award to be severely restricted - eg they can't ever provide
compensatory damages for the goring of an ox, even a muad ox, because to
become a muad ox one has to go through the procedure for a tam, and since
they could not do that, even that form of compensatory damages was blocked.
In my view part of the whole point of that gemora discussion is to show
exactly how intertwined mammon and knas are in the case of damages within
halacha, in distinction to systems like the common law, where there is a
much greater attempt to separate.

The theory behind separation a la the common law, is that why should the
victim specifically profit because of the wrongdoing of the damager, rather
than general society.  This does not appear to be a similar concern of the
halacha.

So part of the other point I was making in my original post, is that mammon
and knas are by their nature intertwined.  Accidents happen all the time,
that cannot be attributed to others.  Or even where they can be attributed
to others, the perpetrator is not always able to be caught and if caught,
can often not be made to pay.  A victim is thus arguably in a lucky position
if a person who can be held liable exists, can be brought before the justice
system, and money can be extracted from him.   The reality of any court
system is thus that for every victim who obtains recompense, there are many
many others who do not because of inability to find, judge or extract money
from the damager.  All damages thus really works hand in hand with knas,
with assessment giving the added benefit that the damager is faced with the
real consequence of their damage.

> There's a difference between recompensing the damaged party and
> discouraging the offender from repeating his offence.  Corporal
> punishment accomplishes the latter but not the former.  

Less so in the case of slander.  In the case of slander, what the person in
question really needs is for it to be made clear to everybody who has heard
the slander that it is not true.  That is the only way to put the victim
back in the position that he was in before.  Hence money is a relatively
poor way of recompensing a person for slander.  In a relatively small closed
society, a public flogging is likely to be a far better method of spreading
the word than a monetary payment.  Monetary payment in our society, somewhat
bizarrely, is in many ways an attempt to do the same - absent the ability to
spread the word in other ways.  Were it not for this need to "get the word
out" then it would seem that the common law system would likely not have
allowed for monetary recompense in the case of slander either, as it has
traditionally not allowed for damages for any other form of "mental
distress" absent any physical damage as well - despite the recognition that
mental distress can easily be caused by a damager.  Where however there is
physical damage, there has been recognition of mental distress (eg the
mental distress and nightmares that go along with being hit by a car has
traditionally been actionable, including but not limited to psychiatrists
bills, the mental distress of nearly being hit by a car has not - despite
the fact that the levels of mental distress can be such that a person then
becomes incapable of work).


This, I think,
> reinforces my point that your case is not a case of being recompensed
> for monetary damages caused by slander.



 
> No.  If you told them "this is a kosher chicken and you could sell it
> for more if you labelled is as such", you could get more for it.

No they wouldn't because they need nemanus, and they don't have it, but
nemanus is a characteristic of the person selling, not the chicken.  The
nemanus can be maintained by a person having it transferring it to bits of
plastic wrapper and metal attached to wings and things, but without that the
chicken will get no further if sold in the non Jewish market.

>My own grocery store sells both kosher and non-kosher
> poultry; if you like I'll check the price difference, but I imagine it's
> at least equally large as the difference you see.

Agreed, and the one lot sell to Jews and the other to non Jews.  And if the
grocery store (I assume it is a non Jewish grocer store) gets overstocked in
kosher chickens (eg erev yom tov), they probably discount the kosher
chickens (after all the Jews have gone off to shul I imagine) to the same
price as the non kosher chickens and the non Jewish consumers pick them up
(they may or may not take off the kosher packaging, but I don't think
anybody would fault them if they did).  

> But you've forgotten the initial question.  It was why should "hezek
> she'eino nikar" be patur min haTorah.  The Rambam says that it's because
> no damage occurred.  You argued, IIRC, that it's because damage occurred
> in one market but not in another.  The Rambam is very clear that it's
> because no physical damage occurred.  The value of a thing is not the
> thing itself.

I don't think this is so clear at all.  As I said, it is quite possible to
read the Rambam as just setting the scene.

OK, lets find a nafka mina.  The cases of hezek sheino nikar as given in the
gemora and as listed in the codifiers are all cases where the problem with
the item is that it has become much less fit for Jews, but the value does
not change for non Jews. This to me is significant.  For you it is not
significant.  So what is the case where in fact the item is not damaged, but
the value would change both in the market of the Jews and non Jews. I have
struggled to think of a case, but the best I can come up with is the
distinction between "new" and "used".  People (both Jewish and non Jewish)
will pay a fair bit more for something labelled "new" than something
labelled "used", even if the use in fact did absolutely no damage to the
item - in the words of the Rambam, the form did not change - and nobody who
did not know could tell the difference.  Do you then hold that if I were to
use your item, so that you then could not, without lying, label it as new, I
would be patur from paying any damages based on the hezek sheino nikar
principle?  Or in fact would you say that either a) I need to pay damages,
but perhaps since the damages for depreciation are less than a shava pruta I
am exempt,  - ie you might still ultimately not have to pay, but this is not
based on the hezek sheino nikar principle - which deems it automatically
patur from the Torah, or b) I need to pay damages based on the difference
between the new and second hand but in perfect condition market?  What if I
saw a lovely piece of new clothing at my friend's which she had decided to
return to the shop as it did not fit her, - I took it, wore it for a
wedding, and brought it back.  Exempt from damages as the damage is ano
nikar - even though her contract with the shop was that she could only take
it back if it was not worn (although she could clearly take it back if she
was prepared to lie) or not exempt?

Can you think of any other cases where the value would drop across the board
but the form would not change to fit in with the formulation of the Rambam?
How would you hold?

Shabbat Shalom

Chana

I've started leafing through the Rogatchover haggadah.  There's 
something there relevant to a subject we discussed several years ago.

What value is a psak lacking explanation? Rabbi Rosen (p. 22 column 2) 
rules that it lacks precedential value: "horaah kol zman shelo nisbarer 
lanu ta'amo ein tzarich lachush l'dvarav klal.  Ki haoser v'hamtamei 
tzarich l'havi ra'ayah".

Ironically the editor doesn't cite Rabbi Rosen's explanation.  The 
source is "Likutei basar Likutei, ed. R. Y. Mandelkern, letter 8, pp. 
49-50".  Does anyone have access to this book? If so, can you post the 
reasoning?

Thanks,

David Riceman

I'm trying to crystallize what we're arguing about, before going into 
the details:

The original question was how to justify the Torah's ptur for hezek 
she'eino nikar.  You postulate two markets (which I would rather call a 
"shadow market" since I think you're misusing terminology from 
economics).  I postulate that it's not really damage at all.

We then moved to an argument about whether payment for damage has the 
primary goal of compensating the injured party or of restraining 
behavior which may lead to damage.  Some of the cases clearly belong in 
one or the other camp, but many are ambiguous.

If I may be permitted an extravagant generalization I'd say that the 
goal is compensation if we wish to encourage risky behavior (taking your 
placid ox from place to place), and the goal is restraint if we wish to 
discourage risky behavior (taking your moody ox from place to place).

Now it's clear that the Rabbis motive was restraint when they imposed a 
fine on hezek she'eino nikar - "kdei shelo yelech kol ehad v'ehad 
v'ytamei tohorosav shel haveiro".  But why didn't God impose a penalty? 
My answer is that since the good has not been damaged there can't be a 
penalty.  You're answer is that since the good can be classified as a 
commodity in a few ways, and in one of those ways the price hasn't 
changed, there hasn't been <I don't know how to finish this sentence -- 
picture your noun here>.  I objected to this idea of using a shadow 
market, but now that I've expressed it this way I don't understand why 
it's not more widely applicable.  Even if I break your baseball bat or 
your fiddle, it's price in the firewood market hasn't changed.  What's 
special about hezek she'eino nikar?

I'll try to compress the details:
> Me
>   
>> You are eliding a fundamental distinction in halacha which may not
>> translate well to common law.  That is the distinction between mamon and
>> knas.
>>     
> RCL:
> Actually it translates very easily into common law - because damages goes to
> the individual damaged, and knas goes to the court/government.
Is that true in the US also? All the cases I we've been discussing, as 
far as I know (and I'd be happy if someone who actually knows something 
piped in here) the fine would go to the damaged party.
> RCL:
> Well if you are talking about the torah, it is much more difficult to say
> that it is talking about "transient" social norms.
That's another possible digression, but I can think of plenty of 
examples.  One calendrically appropriate one is the Rabbis raising the 
value of machatzis hashekel.

RCL:
> OK, lets find a nafka mina. The cases of hezek sheino nikar as given 
> in the
> gemora and as listed in the codifiers are all cases where the problem with
> the item is that it has become much less fit for Jews, but the value does
> not change for non Jews. This to me is significant.  For you it is not
> significant.  So what is the case where in fact the item is not damaged, but
> the value would change both in the market of the Jews and non Jews. I have
> struggled to think of a case, <snip>
>
> Can you think of any other cases where the value would drop across the board
> but the form would not change to fit in with the formulation of the Rambam?
> How would you hold?
>   
Suppose I fail to mow my lawn, board up a few of my windows, and make my 
house look abandoned.  That would cause the value of my neighbors' 
houses to drop, without physically damaging them.  My impression (I can 
try to find sources -- there are analogies in agricultural cases) is 
that al pi din my neighbors can hire someone to mow my lawn and repair 
my windows and then sue me in Beis Din for the cost of the repairs.  But 
I have no idea if this is Biblical or Rabbinic.

IIUC in New Jersey my neighbors can go to court to force me to do the 
work, but I don't know what mechanism the court would use to enforce the 
judgment.

Has that case provided any help? I can't see how.

David Riceman

RDR writes:

> Now it's clear that the Rabbis motive was restraint when they imposed a
> fine on hezek she'eino nikar - "kdei shelo yelech kol ehad v'ehad
> v'ytamei tohorosav shel haveiro".  But why didn't God impose a penalty?
> My answer is that since the good has not been damaged there can't be a
> penalty.  You're answer is that since the good can be classified as a
> commodity in a few ways, and in one of those ways the price hasn't
> changed, there hasn't been <I don't know how to finish this sentence --
> picture your noun here>.  I objected to this idea of using a shadow
> market, but now that I've expressed it this way I don't understand why
> it's not more widely applicable.  Even if I break your baseball bat or
> your fiddle, it's price in the firewood market hasn't changed.  What's
> special about hezek she'eino nikar?

What to my mind is intriguing about hezek she'eino nikar as it is brought in
the Codes and as the rabbis legislated for it, is that the decrease in
value, the difference between the main market and the shadow market, if that
is the way you want to express it, is solely due to Torah values.  If we did
not have commandments regarding tumah and tahara, or yayin nesech or even
shechita and nevilos, we would not have these two markets.  This is not true
in the fiddle versus firewood market - which would have existed pre matan
Torah.  ie all the cases of hezek she'eino nikar that seem to be discussed
were impossible to achieve prior to matan Torah.

Now thinking about this further, and going back to look at various of the
gemoros, I wonder if there is a case that disproves my thesis, that of a
thief who stole a coin, and in the meantime the government withdrew it from
acceptable tender, making its value worthless (because this has nothing to
do with Torah, and the same loss would apply to a non Jew as well as a Jew).
This case is followed by two cases that fit my thesis much better, the first
where the thief stole and then the produce he stole became tamei, and the
second where the thief stole chametz, and then pesach passed, making this
chametz, post pesach, worthless.  And in all three cases the thief can say
to the owner, here is your property, and he does not have to make any
further restitution.  And this Mishna is the one that is used to prove that
Chezkiya is wrong and hezek sheino nikar lo shmei hezek.  On the other hand,
this particular case (ie the one of the coin) seems a bit odd to be used to
disprove Chezkiya for a number of other reasons - because there is
absolutely nothing the thief could have done to prevent the coin becoming
worthless, it was done by fiat of government, and presumably suddenly (not
like pesach where people know it is coming and can sell or use up their
chametz) and not even like the case of fruit rotting, where it is in the
normal course to expect fruit to rot, so he might have known that when he
took it.  And the same thing would have happened under the owner, he would
not have had any other remedies (not even the - I could have taken my ox to
the swamp argument from Baba Kama is applicable here - before the government
withdrew the coin, he would not have had any reason to change it, and after
they did, he would have found nobody to sell it to).  So it is a bit hard to
understand any other position than that the thief can say, herey shelcha
lefanecha, give back the coin and the owner is left with a worthless coin
(or at least only the value of the metals to be found in the coin),
regardless of whether the damage could be considered nikar or not (I mean
even if the government was able by remote control to cause all these coins
to change colour and shape to make it clear they were worthless, ie it was
clearly a shinui and nikar, are we really going to make the thief liable for
the value of the coin at the date of theft without any act on his part or
even any negligence vis a vis guarding the coin?).  I know Tosphos grapples
with some of these issues on Gitten 53b, d"h "gozel" but I confess I am not
sure that what they say fully explains the matter to me.  I confess
therefore that I tend to think that the proof to Chezkiya is from the other
cases, but you could perhaps argue differently.

> That's another possible digression, but I can think of plenty of
> examples.  One calendrically appropriate one is the Rabbis raising the
> value of machatzis hashekel.

Is that a fine?

 
> Suppose I fail to mow my lawn, board up a few of my windows, and make my
> house look abandoned.  That would cause the value of my neighbors'
> houses to drop, without physically damaging them.  My impression (I can
> try to find sources -- there are analogies in agricultural cases) is
> that al pi din my neighbors can hire someone to mow my lawn and repair
> my windows and then sue me in Beis Din for the cost of the repairs.  But
> I have no idea if this is Biblical or Rabbinic.

> IIUC in New Jersey my neighbors can go to court to force me to do the
> work, but I don't know what mechanism the court would use to enforce the
> judgment.
> 
> Has that case provided any help? I can't see how.

Based on a different principle I think, so I don't think it helps.  To fully
be analogous I think we need a case where there is a ma'ase b'yadaim - as
there is most clearly in the deliberate making of food tamei or making wine
nesach - the person does something that acts on the item and decreases its
value, just it is not visible.  
 
> David Riceman

Shabbat Shalom

Chana

I have posted RSRH's commentary from the Hirsch Haggadah on "And gave 
us Shabbos" at

http://www.stevens.edu/golem/llevine/rsrh/shabbos_haggadah.pdf

It gives deep insight into the importance of Shabbos.

Yitzchok Levine 

What value is a psak lacking explanation? Rabbi Rosen (p. 22 column 2)
rules that it lacks precedential value: "horaah kol zman shelo nisbarer
lanu ta'amo ein tzarich lachush l'dvarav klal.  Ki haoser v'hamtamei
tzarich l'havi ra'ayah".

Ironically the editor doesn't cite Rabbi Rosen's explanation.  The
source is "Likutei basar Likutei, ed. R. Y. Mandelkern, letter 8, pp. 
49-50".  Does anyone have access to this book? If so, can you post the
reasoning?

Thanks,

David Riceman
_______________________________________________
 How is psak defined after the cessation of true smicha?
KT
Joel Rich
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Rich, Joel wrote:
>  How is psak defined after the cessation of true smicha?
>   
What has semicha to do with psak? Naively psak is pronouncing an applied 
halachic decision.  Semicha is authority to perform certain judicial 
functions.

David Riceman

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Shabbos he miliz'oq, od me'at, urefu'ah qerovah lavo, be"H!



RDR wrote:
> What has semicha to do with psak? Naively psak is pronouncing an
> applied halachic decision. Semicha is authority to perform certain
> judicial functions.

Actually, according to the usual text you tend to find on the "klaf",
it's reshus to give pesaq even when lifnei rabbo.


If semichah is about judicial functions, then you've opened the door
(or I guess I now am) to discuss giving "Toreh Toreh" to a woman.

(Awe, don't complain. If I didn't do it, you know someone would have. The
discussion of any actual merits vs prohibitions doesn't belong on
Areivim.)

:-)BBii!
-Micha

>  How is psak defined after the cessation of true smicha?
>   
What has semicha to do with psak? Naively psak is pronouncing an applied
halachic decision.  Semicha is authority to perform certain judicial
functions.

David Riceman
=============================================
If reuvain asks leah what bracha to make on a quinoa, is it a psak if
she answers? what if he says , give me psak on what bracha to make-does
that make it a psak? What if she says CLOR but I think it is X or I do
X, are either of these psak? what if she writes an article about
brachot, is that psak?
KT
Joel Rich
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I want to muse about this over Shabbos, but I have two knee-jerk responses:

> RCL:
> What to my mind is intriguing about hezek she'eino nikar as it is 
> brought in
> the Codes and as the rabbis legislated for it, is that the decrease in
> value, the difference between the main market and the shadow market, if that
> is the way you want to express it, is solely due to Torah values.  If we did
> not have commandments regarding tumah and tahara, or yayin nesech or even
> shechita and nevilos, we would not have these two markets.
See Ramban VaYetze 31:35.
> RCL:
> Based on a different principle I think, so I don't think it helps.  To fully
> be analogous I think we need a case where there is a ma'ase b'yadaim - as
> there is most clearly in the deliberate making of food tamei or making wine
> nesach - the person does something that acts on the item and decreases its
> value, just it is not visible.
>   
A  regular event in PG Wodehouse novels is that some bishop condemns a 
novel from the pulpit, causing the price to skyrocket, the printers to 
order extra runs, the booksellers to stockpile the book, and the author 
to go dancing in the streets (this seems to be happening more in the 
Jewish book world nowadays).  Suppose this happens, and then the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, the Grand Imam of Manchester, and the Chief 
Rabbi of Scotland announced that they'd all read the book, found it 
delightful, and intend to use it for bed time reading for their 
grandchildren (this is a tangent, but why don't we have Archrabbis?).

As a result the price of the book plummets, the booksellers and printers 
are stuck with unwanted stock, and the author (this is a PG Wodehouse 
story, after all) has to break his engagement.  The Archbishop, the 
Imam, and the Rabbi have acted on the book (somewhat indirectly) and 
decreased its value.  Can the printers and booksellers sue the clergymen?

Is this the case you're looking for? Again I don't think it helps, 
though in this case I don't think there'd be liability under halacha or 
in the US (British libel laws are so strict I couldn't even guess what 
the rule would be there).

David Riceman

>
>
> Towards the end of Maggid, just before the Ten Plagues, the Hagada  
> quotes the pasuk "V'avarti b'eretz mitzraim", and offers these  
> comments:
>
> "... Ani v'lo mal'ach.
> "... Ani v'lo saraf.
> "... Ani v'lo hashaliach."
>
> What is the significance of the heh hayediah in the last of these?  
> Is Hashem referring to a *specific* shaliach, but only a generic  
> mal'ach or a generic saraf?

I wish I could remember where I saw it, but I read that there is a  
concept of the possibility that Hashem himself and not Moshiach will  
redeem us. It is obviously linked to the Gemora in Sanhedrin 92b of  
"Ein Moshiach LeYisrael" and is one of the Pshatim. Pesach was special  
in that Hashem didn't use HaShaliach (which is the Moshiach) to redeem  
us. Rav Hillel's Memre, is explained as attempt to say that as a  
result of the actions in the days of Chizkiyahu, Hashem will cause  
Geula to also come directly and not "v'lo hashaliach" because we  
aren't zoche. Who knows, perhaps Rav Hillel held that Achisheno was  
through Moshiach and B'Ito is v'lo hashaliach.
Either way, we don't accept Rav Hillel's view.

R' Elyashiv was asked this question by one of his grandchildren who
had a baby last Wednesday. R' Elyashiv's psak was that first you do
Bircas Hachama and then the mila. Unfortunately the reasoning for the
psak was not given. I can certainly see sevaras both ways. Anyone have
any thoughts on the klallim involved?

R. Saadiag Gaon says to recite birchat hachamma at tekufat Tamuz not Nissan
and so obviously does not connect it with creation

-- 
Eli Turkel


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